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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

JULY-AUGUST, 1935

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE REIGN OF H.M. KING GEORGE V[1]

By MR. J. A. SPENDER

A GENERATION ago most Europeans spoke of British policy as King Edward's policy. In vain did Englishmen explain that the policy of their country was the policy of its Government which "advised" the King; to the foreigner the British Constitution was always a web of sophistry, certainly misleading, probably intended to mislead. It was so obvious and so much more dramatic to treat the Anglo-German contention as part of the quarrel between King and Kaiser, about which an unceasing stream of rumour and gossip ran round the whispering gallery of Europe. This was King Edward's misfortune rather than his fault, for whenever his conduct is examined, it is found to be strictly within constitutional limits; and it was certainly not a service to him or to British diplomacy that Anglo-German differences, which were serious enough in any case, should be interpreted in terms of a personal or dynastic quarrel between uncle and nephew.

No one spoke of Queen Victoria's policy; no one in these days speaks of King George's policy. And yet it would be a profound mistake to conclude that King George has played no part, or only a small part, in the tremendous events of his reign. It has been my lot in recent years to write the biographies of certain British statesmen, and to engage in other researches which have of necessity lifted the curtain on the action of the Crown, and on this occasion I ask leave to add my testimony, merely as a student of affairs, to a thousand others, that his contribution has been of the highest value. Plunge into the record on any critical occasion, domestic or foreign, and the King will be found wise, cool and self-effacing, with a remarkable

[1] Address given at Chatham House on May 14th, 1935, with the Rt. Hon. the Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, K.C., in the Chair.

faculty for rejecting bad advice, and a keen eye for the points of unity and conciliation. Now and again in the German and Austrian documents we come across the confidential reports by Ambassadors of their talks with him, in which if anywhere he might be caught off his guard. The King has nothing to fear from these disclosures. They show him to be shrewd and observant, and more aware than some of his Ministers of the general drift of events. If the present practice of making full disclosures is continued in future years, the younger members of this audience will have full material for forming their own judgment, but I predict with great confidence that they will learn nothing to King George's discredit and a great deal that is at present unknown to his credit. Certain things they will not find. They will not find him pouring out rash, dangerous and wounding observations in the margins of dispatches. They will not find that he made boastful and blustering speeches on the parade ground at Windsor or the Horse Guards. They will find him frank in speech with those whom he trusts, but on all public occasions measuring his words, weighing his responsibilities, and thinking of the permanent interests of his country.

Ministers come and go; the King remains—the King with a continuous experience unequalled by that of any other sovereign or head of a State, and the great qualities of character that have enabled him in these momentous times to practise without challenge or criticism the very difficult art of Constitutional Sovereignty.

If we measured time by quality as well as by quantity there are very few centuries in history which would weigh in the balance against the twenty-five years of King George's reign. The first eight years witnessed the crash of four historic empires and changes in the political and economic structure which we are as yet only beginning to understand and may take generations to assimilate. The young ask in a bewildered way into what sort of world they have been born, and we, their seniors, can only say that it is almost as new to us as it is to them. There are abundant theorists who see deep underlying causes at work—Marxian Calvinism working its predestined doom on capitalism, the Spenglerian cycle turning upon an exhausted phase of civilisation, and so forth. Just as an airman sees ancient earthworks or the outlines of Roman villas which are invisible from the ground, so at some future time may historians trace long-lasting causes and tendencies that are hidden from the contemporary observer. There are temptations here to speculations

which easily become grandiose and pretentious in incompetent hands. For my present purpose I will try as far as possible to anchor myself to facts as they seemed to a contemporary, but in passing let me just say this. It is, of course, true that the pursuit of wealth has entered into the politics of these times as into the politics of all times, and no student of them would dream of denying that competition for the remaining places in the sun grew keener as they became fewer, but to ascribe to economic causes and to something called " capitalism " all the occasions for strife which arise from pride, passion, sense of wrong or failure of statesmanship is surely to strain language to the point at which words cease to have definite meaning.

British policy in King George's reign inevitably divides itself into two parts—pre-War and post-War. I see the first part broadly as the period of doubt whether Great Britain was, like her neighbours, a Continental Power, ending in August 1914 in the decision that she was. Certain landmarks on this road were laid down before King George came to the throne, and in order to understand the sequel, it is necessary to dwell on them for one moment. By the year 1894 the Bismarckian policy of isolating France in the name of German security had definitely broken down, and Europe was divided into the two camps of Dual and Triple Alliance. For ten years longer Great Britain nursed her independence, and her great Foreign Minister, Lord Salisbury, for whom respect grows the more the period is studied, placed a check upon those of his colleagues, and especially Mr. Chamberlain, who favoured an alliance with Germany. The memorandum, printed in the British documents, in which Lord Salisbury examined the final effort to frame an Anglo-German treaty of alliance in the year 1901 sounds to modern ears like the swan-song of splendid isolation.

It will be noted, however, that the major premiss of this memorandum is that the British fleet will be equal to any possible or probable combination against it; only on that assumption does the argument hold. But the German Navy Law of 1900 had already thrown a shadow on certainty in that respect, and before he ceased to be Prime Minister Lord Salisbury had consented to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, which sprang from a serious doubt whether without an ally the British fleet would be able to cope with the possible combinations against it in the Far East.

In the next two years we may see this doubt extending to our situation in Europe and Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Balfour

gradually coming to the conclusion that we could not afford to remain in the unfriendly, not to say hostile, relations to both European groups that we had been in since the South African War. Simultaneously the French saw themselves being reduced once more to a position of isolation by the commitment of their ally Russia to her Far Eastern adventure. The natural, one may even say the fated, result was the British Convention or Entente of 1904.

The consequences of this were very imperfectly understood at the time. The European judgment was that Great Britain had given her casting vote—the great unawarded prize of Europe—to the Dual as against the Triple Alliance; the British judgment was that nothing had taken place except the friendly settlement with a now friendly neighbour of sundry vexatious colonial and oversea questions. Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Balfour laid special stress on the fact that nothing more had been promised than diplomatic support. There was a rude awakening in the following year when Germany, taking advantage of the defeat of Russia, struck back at France and, choosing the Morocco issue, on which this support had been pledged, compelled her to sacrifice her Foreign Minister and very plainly threatened her with war.

Coming into office in December 1905, Sir Edward Grey found himself at once faced by the French Ambassador with the question whether diplomatic support would in the last resort be backed by military assistance. Grey parried the question, as he was obliged to do, but after consulting the Prime Minister, and the one or two senior Ministers who were then in London, he consented to " military conversations " between the two General Staffs—which was the minimum of precaution, if war had even to be contemplated as possible. That was enough. The word went out that Britain was at the back of France; the Germans withdrew and the Algeciras Conference ended in what the world judged to be a signal success for British diplomacy.

Thus began the welding of the Entente, and in the next two years successive crises, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Casablanca, coupled with the German naval programmes, carried the process still farther and awakened the slumbering instinct which told the British people that the dominance of any one Power in Europe, and above all a Power which threatened their naval supremacy, was a menace to their Empire and even to their existence. The addition in 1907 of the Russian to the French Entente confirmed the Germans in their suspicions, but the Russian agreement, like the French before it, was accepted by Englishmen generally as a

welcome relief from trouble and friction in distant regions and only criticised by a few radicals who said that the Tsar was an evil tyrant with whom a free country ought not to have intimate relations. British Ministers continued to say that they were free from European commitments, but behind all their assurances lay the question whether we could purchase security by European partnerships and yet be absolved from the obligation of giving our partners assistance in arms if, as seemed increasingly probable, they were exposed to reprisals for having made friends with us.

The year 1910, when King George came to the throne, was a year of comparative *détente* in the European strain. The naval quarrel with Germany which had been fought out on the floor of the House of Commons in the previous year—the year of the eight Dreadnoughts—had died down; the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis ended in March 1910 in the collapse of Russia, which was incidentally a serious reverse for British diplomacy; the Tsar visited Potsdam and appeared to have buried the hatchet with the Kaiser; the French made an agreement of their own with the Germans about Morocco which, it was hoped, would make an end of that dangerous question. But early in 1911 all the old troubles flared up. The French marched to Fez; the Germans protested that that was outside their recent agreement with France and a violation of the Treaty of Algeciras, and demanded a large slice of the French Congo as compensation. In the middle of the negotiations which followed, the Germans sent the gunboat *Panther* to Agadir.

Great Britain and France and indeed all Europe interpreted this stroke as another thrust at the Entente, and it was thought specially to be aimed at Great Britain, since the *Panther* appeared to be pegging out a claim to a port on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, where the British Admiralty least wished Germany to be. The Cabinet was united in taking a serious view of the affair, and Mr. Lloyd George, then thought to be the leader of the pacifists in the Government, surprised his colleagues with the full-throated zeal with which he spoke on their behalf and that of the British lion in his Mansion House speech on July 21st, 1911. Whatever the intention of the Germans may have been, Agadir was now beyond doubt the test of the Entente which Ministers had taken it to be, and the weeks that followed were a nightmare of uncertainty and anxiety. The tense struggle between the two Houses of Parliament was at its climax while the Admiralty was warning the fleet to be ready for a German

attack. The day before the final scene in the House of Lords I happened to meet Metternich, the German Ambassador, at dinner, and he asked me to walk back with him across the Green Park to the German Embassy. As we walked he told me he thought it possible, even probable, that our two countries would be at war before the week was over, and he took me into his confidence about a message he was sending to his Government that evening in a last effort to save the peace. Though the worst result was avoided the crisis dragged right on to the middle of October, and was settled only just in time to enable the King to sail to India for the coronation Durbar.

The dispatch of the *Panther* to Agadir was beyond doubt an outrageously bad stroke, as all German historians and commentators admit, yet it is the one occasion on which a reading of the German document suggests a doubt whether the British interpretation of it was correct. When it was over the German Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs explained to the British Ambassador that it " was really meant to make it easier for the French Government to defend any compensation they might be ready to give and which they had expressed their readiness to give, before the French Parliament." The Ambassador not unnaturally treated this explanation as a pleasantry. Yet again and again in the records we see the ineradicable belief of the power-politicians of Berlin that a timely display of the mailed fist was part of the technique of diplomacy at which no sensible Government would take offence, and that they did so believe on this occasion is more than suggested by their private communications with one another. " What the devil are we to do now? " cries the Kaiser, when the expected favourable impression on France and Britain does not follow. " What a fix we are in," says Kiderlen-Waechter to Bethmann Hollweg; " remember," says the Kaiser's personal Secretary, " that it will be very difficult to obtain his consent to any steps which he thinks might lead to war." None of these eminent people apparently had given a thought to the next step if the dispatch of the *Panther* failed to have the persuasive effect that they seem to have expected from it.

That, however, is incidental. Whatever the right interpretation, it is strange that the experience of Agadir conveyed no moral to the Germans. Here was an occasion of no great intrinsic importance, and yet at the appearance of the concrete fact—the dispatch of one gunboat to a port in Morocco—the whole British Government had lined up to resist. Might it not have suggested

the extreme unlikelihood that this Government could or would remain spectators while Germany invaded Belgium? Reluctance to act before the fact and sudden resolution in face of fact were once more shown to be characteristics of British policy.

We touch here a question of method and manners which greatly complicated the relations of Germany and Great Britain in these years. The Kaiser was persuaded that to shake his mailed fist, to pile up his navy was, as he said, "the right way to treat an Englishman." Only make him fear you and he would drop his infatuation for France and eat out of the German hand. Nothing up to the very end could persuade him this was not the right way to treat the English. It was a singularly unfortunate way to treat the Englishman who was now Foreign Secretary. Grey, with his public-school spirit, his sense of chivalry and other simple qualities which the *rusés* statesmen of Europe thought so naïve as to be quite incredible, shuddered at the thought of deserting a friend under this pressure. This sentiment, in which Grey faithfully reflected the feelings of his countrymen, came into play whenever the Germans applied their pressure, and was seen powerfully at work at the eleventh hour when Grey and Asquith indignantly repelled the final German overture for British neutrality. We have nevertheless Bethmann Hollweg's word even on that occasion that no offence was intended, and he was an honest man.

After Agadir we note what on looking back seems a strange inconsequence in British policy. Mr. Lloyd George tells us that in 1912, barely a year later, the majority of the members of the Cabinet were "aghast" on learning that military conversations had taken place between British and French. "Hostility," he says, "barely represents the strength of the sentiment which the revelation aroused; it was more akin to consternation." These Ministers had lived through the Agadir crisis, they had been parties to Mr. Lloyd George's Mansion House speech, they had had at least three times to contemplate the possibility of war in alliance with France, and yet they were "aghast" to learn that the two War Offices had discussed together the concerted action which would have been necessary if war had actually taken place. One would rather have expected them to be aghast if they had learnt that this precaution had not been taken. I think Mr. Lloyd George has let his memory add a little colour to this occasion, but it is undoubtedly a fact that British Ministers suffered a sharp reaction when the Agadir crisis was over. The islanders, having astonished themselves with their sally, fell back behind

their moat, and the old fear of European entanglements set in. Grey has described how, in order to reassure his colleagues, he sat down with them in Cabinet and drafted the letter to Cambon on November 22nd, 1912, laying down in precise terms that the military and naval conversations did "not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force"—the British part of the famous Grey-Cambon correspondence. The fate of this correspondence is one of the classic instances of the dangers of definition. Wishing to get free, British Ministers had entangled themselves more than ever, for while its contents remained secret, the news that the correspondence had taken place went all over Europe, and it was believed or assumed that the Entente had been confirmed and extended. In spite of the fact that Grey's account has been on record for ten years, that version is still deeply embedded in foreign histories and records. Herr Brandenburg and Herr Pribram accept it without question. Poincaré, in his Memoirs, seems actually to claim it as a feather in his cap.

Through all these doubts and hesitations Asquith and Grey held firmly to the point that Great Britain could not afford to look on at the defeat of France by Germany, and in the search for formulas to appease Germany, carried the whole Cabinet with them in declining any which would have bound us to neutrality in the event of a German attack upon France. It was perhaps natural that when Ministers talked of their freedom, the public should think of them as standing aloof, but whenever it is tested it will be found that the freedom for which they stipulated was freedom to intervene as well as freedom to stand out. It was precisely on this point that the Haldane Mission broke down, for the "political equivalent," as Tirpitz called it, which the Germans demanded for a naval agreement, turned out, when examined, to be British neutrality in the event of a war between Germany and France. Isolationists and pacifists always stopped short of this.

Being baffled in their efforts to compose the naval quarrel and being obliged to accept the failure of the Haldane Mission as definite on that point, the British Government endeavoured to strike out on new lines. Might not the venue be changed and a settlement be reached with Germany, as formerly with France, on colonial and oversea questions? And if she could do nothing else in Europe, might not Great Britain play the part of mediator between the two Alliances and play it the more effectively since she was uncommitted, and had no direct interest in many of the

questions that troubled the peace of the other nations? Thus in the last eighteen months before the War we see British policy, concentrated on two objects: (1) to keep the peace by mediation in the troubles of the Balkans, and (2) to negotiate a settlement with Germany which would remove that chronic rock of offence, the Bagdad railway question, and make an end of other vexatious questions about colonies in Africa and elsewhere. These negotiations were conducted in an atmosphere of great good-will and resulted in an agreement which was only not published to the world because differences arose at the last moment about the method of publication.

Mediation was a different matter, and it seems to me important to consider rather carefully the attitude of other nations to Great Britain in her capacity as mediator. Grey had burnt his fingers rather badly in 1908 when he stood out for a European Conference to regularise the situation and bridge the gulf between Russia and Austria after the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. He had predicted, quite truly, as the event proved, that a wide door would be opened to mischief if no steps were taken to vindicate public law after this breach of the Treaty of Berlin, but in 1908 no one wanted public law vindicated. What all the Governments, the French included, wanted, was that the British Government should end a vexatious question by permitting Russia to take compensation at the expense of Turkey through the opening of the Straits to her warships. Grey, who felt great sympathy with the Young Turks, who had just carried through what seemed to be a promising revolution, set his face against this and insisted that the whole affair should be submitted to a European Conference. Scarcely anyone thought him sincere. Thirty years earlier Bismarck said, speaking of Gladstone, that whenever he heard a statesman talking of his duty to Europe or appealing to international law, he knew he was up to mischief; and so said all of them now. The editors of the Austrian documents published in 1930 repeat as undisputed fact that in 1908 England endeavoured to promote a war in which, standing aloof herself, she would gain by the weakening of her neighbours and rivals. Though more charitable in their judgment, the French were greatly annoyed, and Clemenceau improved the occasion by long lectures on the limitations of British policy. Britain, he said, had no right to take a high line in European politics unless she equipped herself with a conscript army and was prepared to appear in the same force as other nations on the continental battle-field. Otherwise she might make a nice hole in the sea

by sinking the German fleet and leave Paris at the mercy of the German army. On these terms she was too dangerous a partner for France. He still more abounded in this sense in the following year when it turned out that British remonstrances were not backed by force and, failing the support of her friends, Russia succumbed to a German ultimatum.

But the European mood had changed by the winter of 1912. Everything that Grey predicted in 1908 was now happening. In the name of compensation the rivals of Austria, great and small, were following her example. Italy began by seizing Tripoli; the Balkan States followed by falling on Turkey when exhausted and bankrupt after her struggle with Italy, and their unexpected success astonished, embarrassed and alarmed all the Powers in different degrees. Austria could with difficulty be restrained from attacking Serbia. Being unready for war, Russia, Germany and France now cried out for a Conference, and this time all insisted that it should take place in London and that Grey should preside. The Governments themselves stood at a distance and nominated their Ambassadors to represent them, with happy results. All knew each other intimately and could speak with the utmost frankness about their difficulties and the idiosyncrasies of their Governments. It was the least formal and most successful of all pre-War Conferences; it sat at intervals from December 1912 to August 1913, dealing with fluid material which changed from month to month, almost at times from day to day—the second Balkan war, the third Balkan war, the breach between the Balkan Allies—and the unceasing emergencies which arose from these events. Grey won golden opinions by his impartiality and resourcefulness, and no one who has read the Austrian documents or the Memoirs of Conrad von Hötzendorff can doubt that for this year at all events the Conference saved the peace.

The success of this Conference was none the less extremely misleading—especially to British statesmen. It led them to believe that the worst was past, whereas it was only beginning. The peace was kept not because Britain mediated, but because for the time being both Germany and Russia wished to keep it. Grey's criticism of his own policy, and I still think that which has most weight, was that he missed the road at this point. Having seen Germany restrain Austria during all these months, he assumed that she would continue to do so, and trusted to Austria to follow where Germany led. In fact from August 1913 onwards this situation was more and more reversed, and before the winter was out, Austria, being in despair about her Empire,

was whipping Germany to action with alarms about the Russian peril. On October 26th, 1913, the Kaiser had an interview with Berchtold in Vienna, and told him that from henceforth anything that issued from the Austrian Foreign Office would be to him a command. During the next nine months German and Austrian military chiefs were consulting each other about the coming war and the Kaiser himself was declaring it to be inevitable.

In his *Twenty-Five Years* Grey asks himself whether he ought not to have kept the London Conference in being, whether, if he had done so, he might not have restrained Austria. His answer is worth careful consideration :—

> " It did not occur to any of us to suggest that we should be kept in existence as a Conference, as a body ready to be called together at any moment, to which future Balkan or indeed any troubles between the great Powers might be referred. We could not have suggested this officially ourselves : it was not for us as a body to magnify our own importance. Still less could the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs have proposed that there should be a permanent body in London, with himself as President, to settle continental troubles. Such a proposal would have been resented as giving Britain undue predominance and advantage."

Between the lines of this we may read the haunting and continuing doubt whether Britain was in the same sense as her neighbours a European Power. Within a year it was to appear that Great Britain alone stood between Germany and the conquest of Europe, and that her choice was as decisive for Europe as for herself, yet Grey speaks as if it would have been an intrusion—a claim of undue predominance in Continental Europe—for her to insist on prolonging this Conference.

The result of this attitude was that the British voice was almost unheard in Europe during the last months before the War. Being unwilling to commit herself deeper, and being aware that, unless she did, her advice or remonstrances would be unacceptable, Great Britain became what is now called an " observer " during these months. Once more she retired behind her moat. The clatter of the armed competition now reaching its climax in all the European States, the heated appeals to fear and jealousy which had become necessary to keep taxpayers up to the mark, the quarrel raging in the newspapers of Berlin and St. Petersburg between Russia and Germany, the gradual raising of the military voices until they drowned the civilian—all this came to British ears as murmurs from without, affecting little

if at all their own improved relations with Germany as seen in the colonial negotiations. Not to involve themselves unnecessarily in the quarrels of Eastern Europe seemed good sense, and followed logically from the non-committal attitude which British Ministers were striving to maintain. The question raised by the experience of these months is whether falling back on the attitude of observer may not prevent British influence from being used to keep the peace and yet fail to save the country from being involved in war.

It should be added that British nescience was matched in these months by Austrian ignorance of the British point of view and the nature and value of British naval and military power. Conrad's Memoirs scarcely ever mention Great Britain and neither he nor the German Chief of the Staff, Moltke, seem to have given any serious consideration to the effect of British intervention on their joint plan. Had that intervention been deliberately contrived as an element of military surprise, it could scarcely have been more effective in that respect than it proved to be.

We reach the last stage with the tragedy of Serajevo and, after a deceptive pause, the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. Great was the consternation of British Ministers when Germany, in Grey's phrase, refused to "press the button for peace," but her action followed strictly from what we now know to have been her pledges to Austria and was strongly backed by the military staffs of both countries, who held war to be inevitable and painted lurid pictures of the avalanche threatening from Russia if she were given time to develop her military power. I will not go over this familiar ground, but the twelve days of pre-War diplomacy showed all the characteristics of British policy during the previous years—the doubt whether this Continental affair concerned us, the attempt to mediate as an uncommitted and relatively disinterested Power, the hope that our sea-power might save us from the necessity of fighting on land, even if we were compelled to fight at sea, and then the sudden line-up on the overwhelming fact of the invasion of Belgium. The French agonised while Great Britain went through her characteristic phases, exhausting all the possibilities before she declared herself—but in no other way could she have been brought to her conclusion. That conclusion covered all issues. Honest and generous as was the sentiment which stirred the British people on her behalf, the question of Belgium was never the purely sentimental issue it is sometimes represented as being.

It was to an immense number the climax of the whole argument, the final proof of the enemy's intention and its incompatibility with British interests as well as with British honour. The Germans forgot that the Belgian Treaty embodied one of the few settled traditions of British policy, viz. that a hostile Power in possession of Antwerp would hold a pistol at the heart of England. On August 4th, 1914, England decided that she was a European Power.

The idea that British policy in these years was an entanglement, an accidental commitment, the result of secret diplomacy, fades out of the picture as we look back on it. If anything looks destined on the lines on which the Powers were moving, it was that Germany would find Great Britain in her path. From the year 1900 the Anglo-German contention on sea-power had been one of the major issues of Europe and its effect may be traced over the whole field of policy. Look at the story in the Austrian documents of the Crown Council at Vienna on the eve of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Aehrenthal, the Austrian Foreign Minister, is asked by the other Ministers, "What will Germany say?" His answer is, "We need not trouble about that, for since the Kaiser has just refused to come to terms with England about the fleet, she is absolutely dependent on us." The Kaiser, it seems, had been foolish enough to boast about the snub he had administered to Sir Charles Hardinge when the latter raised the question of the fleet at the notorious Kronberg interview. This was on August 8th, 1908, and ten days later (August 19th), so sure was Aehrenthal that Germany would be bound to follow where Austria led that he did not even tell the Kaiser, let alone ask his consent, before he announced the annexation. All through the following years we find the same argument on the lips of Austrian statesmen. Since Germany will not make friends with England, Germany must follow where we lead, and so on to the final phase in which Austria led to disaster.

I have spoken of British policy, using the word as it is commonly used, but when we ask exactly what it means we are in a difficulty. Sir Thomas Sanderson once said to Lord Salisbury that there was no such thing as a British policy, and Lord Salisbury said he was perfectly right. Policy in the sense that Bismarck understood the word—the long and deep game directed to a given end, the driving of wedges, the playing off of Power against Power, in the interests of the player—will be looked for in vain in the British record. Eagle eyes have scanned the

documents so admirably presented by Drs. Gooch and Temperley, and found none of the revelations, the exposures of chicane and trickery, so common in the records of certain other Governments. British Ministers and officials do not confess to one another that they are deceiving other Governments or take pride in clever sharp practice. The British augurs do not wink; they do not assume that the morals of diplomacy are on a different platform from those of the private life. British dispatches are candid, truthful, straightforward, and when we read them we find that things are very much what we thought them to be. I think an Englishman may take some pride in that. No record has leapt to light which shames him.

But, as we read, the definition of British policy more and more eludes us. What we see are not the converging lines of a strategic plan, but certain modes of action to which the British people and their Ministers, to whatever party they belong, are extraordinarily true. They will take action most formidably on the fact, but they will not anticipate the fact. They hope against hope that they will not be involved in the quarrels of their neighbours. They will not have compulsory military service in time of peace; they will accept it in war, but insist that it be revoked the moment that war is over. They require proof for each step, proof especially that all alternatives have been exhausted before warlike action is taken. But they have certain abiding intuitions on the points on which they consider their safety or their vital interests to be touched. They will not have their sea-power challenged, they feel in their bones that the mastery of Europe by a Power hostile to themselves would be fatal to their independence. They see, or in those years they saw, foreign policy in very simple terms, and expected their leaders to see them in the same way.

I would claim for Grey and his Chief, Asquith—the two men who were most responsible for carrying Great Britain through these perilous years—that they thoroughly understood these British modes of action, and by that understanding won the confidence of the British people at the supreme moment. There were many cleverer men than Grey on the European scene in these years. Bülow was cleverer, Aehrenthal was cleverer, Isvolsky was cleverer, Mr. Lloyd George is so much cleverer that to this day he is lost in amazement that a man so different from himself could have held the commanding position that Grey undoubtedly held in the eyes of his countrymen. Those who knew him and saw him work during these years find it less diffi-

cult to understand. He was worthy to be trusted. He was simple, loyal, straightforward; he was patient, wise and forbearing. He spoke without rhetoric but with rare conviction and persuasiveness; always true to the fixed points on his own compass, he so conducted affairs as to persuade his countrymen that there was no other course open to them than that which he counselled.

I have been over the ground with him many times in subsequent years and have sometimes asked him whether, if he had had a free hand to commit his country to a military alliance with France and Russia, he thought he could have done better. His answer, as I recall it, was that in the existing conditions in Europe it was always doubtful whether such action on our part would have encouraged the militarists of one group or discouraged the militarists of the other. He also regarded British freedom as a useful guarantee that our friends in Europe would not adopt a policy which was unlikely to obtain the support of the British Parliament or people. But the question seemed to him one which was scarcely worth asking. He, the British Foreign Minister, had in his time and generation to work within limits which made the supposed military alliance impossible. No Cabinet or Parliament with which he had to deal would have accepted it. It was, in his view, the chief part of his business to carry Cabinet, Parliament and country with him, for otherwise he risked the greatest of all calamities—national disunity in or on the verge of war.

Not long after the War I came across a review in a German periodical by one German on a book by another German—a very absurd book seeking to brand Grey as the Machiavelli of Europe, the *Machiavelli* who deceived by *telling the truth*. The reviewer wound up with these words: "You seem to forget, my friend, that, judged by results, Grey was rather a good Foreign Secretary compared with ours." I do not think Englishmen will say less.

I have left myself very little time to speak of British policy after the War, but deliberately so, since I am dealing with ideas and tendencies for which all the pointers come from the past. Great allowances are necessary in forming judgments on the subsequent years. The wreckage of the Great War was stupendous and the work of reconstruction was beyond the capacity of the human brain. The immediate task was to bring some provisional order out of the chaos which would enable life to go on, and it was carried out in an atmosphere of passion and bitterness. Even at the time immense numbers in Great Britain only accepted

the Treaty of Versailles in the belief that by instituting the League of Nations it created a new order and provided the correctives of its own mistakes.

There is much to regret, and especially that rash pledges to an angry electorate disarmed us from playing the traditional British part—the part most congenial to the normal British character—of moderator in the hour of victory. But there is a moral to be drawn here which ought not to be quite forgotten. Combatants cannot drench each other with poison gases, throw bombs from aeroplanes on defenceless cities, sink without trace, and then, when a truce is called, sit down calmly and consider what is best to do. If wars are to be waged by these methods, we must make up our minds that any peace, when it comes, will be a ruthless peace, an unwise peace. Beyond all doubt the War proved, if proof were needed, that there was no profit in victory, but no less certainly the peace proved that defeat was an immeasurable calamity. "We want armaments," said Bethmann Hollweg in one of his last speeches to the Reichstag, "not because we want war, but because we want to win if war comes." There is no more evil legacy from the year 1919 than the branding of this thought into the consciousness of Europe.

Great mistakes have been made in the subsequent years, above all the mistake of deferring disarmament, about which, or the separate responsibilities for which, the historical judgment has yet to come. After seventeen years we have between us brought Europe to the point at which she is perilously near repeating pre-War history, and again going the way of armed alliances and balance of power. Nevertheless, I think on the whole we may claim that British Governments have been feeling their way towards the light. They set their faces against the disastrous expedition into the Ruhr; they led the way downhill into disarmament; if they deemed the times unripe for the Protocol of Geneva, which still remains the model of "collective security," they gave us Locarno and brought Germany into the League of Nations, and would, I think, have kept her there if their views had prevailed.

If their views had prevailed. At the end one asks, Can nothing more be done to make the British view, which I believe to be essentially that of moderation and forbearance, prevail? Will the old attitude of semi-isolation serve in the new world—the world seeking peace, as we hope it will, through the League of Nations?

This is no easy question for practical statesmen to answer.

After, as before, the War a British Government still finds it necessary to hedge its policy with restrictions. It is still uncertain whether it could mobilise its people for action unless when the time came it could convince them on the particular case. It believes it could not convince them if the occasion was a dispute in the Balkans, a flare-up about Memel or the Polish Corridor. Accordingly, it will not commit itself to Eastern Pacts, the Geneva Protocol, engagements covering the whole ground. Great Britain, according to its theory, is European, but only Western European. Its boundary is the Rhine.

Again, and equally important, a British Government has to carry the Dominions with it, and at the present time many of them are suffering from the same anti-European reaction as is passing over the United States of America. Not long ago I heard a distinguished representative of one of them say that he was "terrified" at hearing British statesmen speak of themselves as "good Europeans." He—and he said he spoke for all the Dominions—wished Great Britain to have no commitments or entanglements in Europe, and she must be warned that she could not rely on their support in any war which arose out of these entanglements. But almost in the same breath he went on to say that the true policy for Great Britain was to throw the whole of her weight behind the League of Nations and the Kellogg Pact.

The Dominions have their own representatives at Geneva, and these, I imagine, will have told their Governments that it is impossible for Great Britain to throw any sort of weight behind either the League of Nations or the Kellogg Pact unless she has a European policy—a policy, let us hope, which may fitly be described as that of "good Europeans." But the necessity of convincing all these followers and supporters invests British policy in foreign eyes with a mist of doubt and uncertainty. Foreign Governments take all the risks with their alliances East and West. Why, they ask, should not Great Britain do the same? Often, when I have been reading French newspapers in recent months, I have seemed to hear over again the debate which raged over Grey's action in the affair of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908. If Great Britain will not pledge herself to action, if she will not take the same risks as we do, she must not, say the others, mount the high horse, dictate to us, claim to mediate between us.

These are inevitable difficulties, and I do not pretend to have any cut-and-dried solution of them. Great Britain in her

conduct of foreign affairs resembles a powerful tug with a long string of barges in her wake. She moves slowly; her captain looks anxiously behind him to see if his barges are keeping line. Others in the fair-way want to know what he is doing and where he is going. Diplomatic courtesies need to be observed, or the language would at times be explosive. And yet, I suppose, most of us have the thought in our minds that if the British Empire could put the whole of its weight behind the League of Nations and keep in touch with the United States for an agreed interpretation of the Kellogg Pact, a long step would be taken towards securing the peace of the world.

We may hope that the consultations now going forward with the Dominion representatives in London will help to clear up this situation. What should we say, if any of them repeated the speech from which I quoted just now—the speech expressing apprehension and alarm at our European commitments? Something, I submit, of this kind: we should say, " If we were only an island in the North Sea having no one to think of but ourselves, we might be tempted to turn our back on Europe and seek such security as is enjoyed by countries like Sweden, Denmark or Holland, through a policy of non-intervention. But since we have to consider our Empire and the interests of Dominions and Colonies which all over the world have points of contact and of possible friction and collision with our European neighbours, it is to their interest as well as to ours that we should have a good European policy, a policy which makes for peace in Europe. For there is almost no possible war between our greater neighbours in which we could guarantee that our Dominions and Colonies would not be involved, and it is even as likely as not that we should be involved through them as they through us.

If that is so, it is of supreme importance that we should have a common policy on lines which will be intelligible to our neighbours and on which they can rely. The one thing to avoid is a perpetual zigzag with an appearance of doubt whether our Empire or our public will follow where our statesmen lead, the appearance of being drawn reluctantly in one direction by the pressure of French, Italians or Russians, and pulling back on the counter-pressure of isolationists at home or in the Empire. That is to waste the strength of the British Empire and revive the old doubt whether it has any policy, or can be trusted to act in the hour of need. Now as before we have to beware lest too much hedging with insularity should prevent us from speaking decisively for peace and yet fail to save us from being involved in war.

In fairness we must realise that, however much we may explain and justify it to ourselves, the element of uncertainty in British policy was and is a disturbing factor in any attempt to organise Europe for peace or for war. It was, and to a certain extent still is, in European eyes the *x* of the equation. Let us try to reduce this unknown quantity to a minimum, for reasonable certainty about the action of Great Britain and the British Empire is a condition of anything that can be called collective security. It is beyond my scope to enter into details about our present situation, but a clear understanding that we shall be found in the path of peace-breakers and war-mongers, and that we shall use all our influence for disarmament, seems to me to follow from any honest adherence to the League of Nations and the Kellogg Pact. It is the existence of these instruments which differentiates our situation now from our situation before the War.

It is easy to criticise after the event. Those of us who have survived to see sequels and consequences have a comparatively easy task in passing judgment. Few battles would have been lost and few great mistakes have been made if generals and statesmen had possessed the same knowledge as their critics. Let us remember that the men of the hour were groping their way, as we do now, through fog and darkness to uncertain conclusions, and that for them, as for us, the visibility was always bad. We do well to search the past for light on the future, but the faults we find in the past must never blind us to its achievements. I believe that when the time comes for impartial historians to deliver judgment, they will say that, in spite of all the faults we may find in it, one of the bravest chapters in British history—perhaps *the* bravest chapter—was written in the first twenty-five years of the reign of King George.

Summary of Discussion.

COMMANDER CARLYON BELLAIRS said that he remained an unrepentant isolationist in the sense that he was in favour of selfish isolation on behalf of the British Empire, though not a true isolationist, for those who felt like himself were in favour of the utmost possible cooperation with the United States of America. Mr. Spender had also mentioned the possibility of agreement with the United States on the lines of the Kellogg Pact, but he (Commander Bellairs) could not see how it was possible to have commitments to Europe in the League of Nations and have a full agreement with America. If Great Britain kept herself clear of European complications it would be quite possible to have an agreement with the United States, whereby it

would be held that any nation that went to war had broken the Kellogg Pact and whereby Great Britain and the United States would jointly guarantee their trade against interference, if necessary placing it under joint convoy. It was doubtful if any nation would contemplate the possibility of war with the British Empire and the United States of America at the same time.

Certain mistakes had been made before the War. If Great Britain had made it clear to Germany that she would defend the neutrality of Belgium she might have kept out of the War. In 1870 she had left no doubt in the minds of Germany and France that she would go to war with any nation that crossed the frontier, with the result that France and Germany bound themselves by separate treaties with Great Britain not to cross the frontier. Another occasion on which Great Britain might have declared her policy was when the Dutch announced in 1911 that they proposed to fortify Flushing, probably at the instigation of Germany. Great Britain might have said that she regarded that as a move that would seriously interfere with her sending warships to Antwerp in defence of Belgian neutrality, but she ignored the situation altogether.

There had always been a lag in British policy. At one time Great Britain had been opposed to Russia. After many years the Prime Minister of the day, Lord Salisbury, had said that she had backed the wrong horse. There was still the same lag in British policy. Because there had been a war with Germany many people seemed to think that Germany was still an enemy. He thought that any treaty imposed by war was bound to be repudiated. That had happened in connection with Russia in regard to the Black Sea and was happening again in connection with Germany. It served to prove that nothing was gained by war.

PROFESSOR G. M. TREVELYAN referred to Commander Bellairs' suggestion that Great Britain and America should inform any belligerent nation that they would not tolerate any interference with neutral trade, and that they would act in concert in protection of their trade, and would only allow themselves to be forced into war if their trade were interfered with. Although America had in the past been drawn into wars through interference with her trade, and that might be the only reason which would induce her to go to war in the future, it was possible, in the case of England, to conceive circumstances which would draw her into war without any interference with her trade, as, for instance, if Germany attacked France. He had believed before the War, and still believed, that it was vital to British interests that France should not be conquered by Germany. If that happened it would leave practically the whole of the Continent of Europe as an absolutely German military empire, and under modern conditions that would mean the destruction of Great Britain.

In the Napoleonic wars Great Britain had been able to avoid a European military empire for twenty years because she had complete

command of the sea and was in no danger from the air. But now she could no longer trust to complete command of the sea and was in danger from the air and long-distance guns which could reach the south of England from the western coasts of Europe. It was a brute fact that Great Britain could not allow France or Belgium to fall under the Germans, and that justified the line which Sir Edward Grey had taken before the War. He (Professor Trevelyan) had not been so sure on this point at the time, because he was not certain that Germany was strong enough to conquer France; he had thought, like many other people, that it might have been better to let them alone to fight it out. But the War had shown that the Germans could easily have conquered France if Great Britain had not intervened, thus completely justifying the policy of Sir Edward Grey.

He agreed that Great Britain was in a very nebulous state with regard to her present commitments, but one thing which was clear, was that she had certain commitments under and through the League of Nations. At least she was clearly committed to the defence of France against an aggressive attack by Germany under the Locarno Pact, and that was quite right, because if the subjection of Western Europe by Germany were permitted, Great Britain would soon be reduced to complete submission.

Thus, looking at the matter purely from the point of view of self-interest, Great Britain could not afford to have Western Europe subdued by Germany because of the changes in the character and organisation of war which had taken place since the days of Palmerston and Gladstone. That fact had been appreciated only just in time before the Great War. But he did not want to think of the present and future only in such terms. They must think of it in the terms of the League of Nations and in the terms of the Kellogg Pact, to the principles of which he hoped the League of Nations would give effect. He did not think that the ideals of the League of Nations and of the Kellogg Pact were in the least incompatible with Great Britain's necessarily fundamental policy of preventing the conquest of France by a great Power in Central Europe.

Dr. Gooch said that he was in general agreement with Mr. Spender's reading of British policy before the War. He could speak with special authority, as for some years he had been engaged in investigating, selecting and editing the British documents on the origins of the War. He entirely agreed with Mr. Spender's statement as to the extremely high character, at any rate as compared with the policy and record of other countries, of the conduct of British policy during the five years of Lord Lansdowne's office and the period when Sir Edward Grey was Foreign Minister. He had not found a single document which he would have desired to suppress in the interests of those two Foreign Ministers or in the interests of the good name of British diplomacy.

Although, as Mr. Spender had pointed out, Lord Salisbury, after

turning down the Anglo-German flirtation which made a certain appeal to Mr. Chamberlain, had accepted the Anglo-Japanese alliance, he had not been at all pleased with it. There was an interesting revelation in the official life of Sir Michael Hicks Beach of the latter's belief that if Lord Salisbury had been Foreign Minister as well as Prime Minister that alliance would never have been made. His point of view might be summarised in the statement of Lord Palmerston, that Great Britain had no eternal friendships and no eternal enemies, only eternal interests. He (Dr. Gooch) never used the phrase " splendid isolation." He greatly preferred the " free hand."

Mr. Spender had made one slip in dealing with the Agadir crisis. He had said that the Ministers were parties to Mr. Lloyd George's Mansion House speech. The only two Ministers who knew of the speech before it was delivered were the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister.

Mr. Spender was right when he said that the whole object and purpose of Sir Edward Grey in the Grey–Cambon correspondence was to limit any obligations which France might have imagined, and in fact did imagine, Great Britain had incurred. It was equally true that the French were determined to, and did, interpret the letters in a completely different way from the British. They were intensely anxious to prevent England giving any written document to Germany, during the period between the coming into power of Bethmann Hollweg in 1909 until the final collapse of the neutral negotiations in the spring of 1912. The Germans were equally anxious to have a formula of neutrality, however vague. Lord Bertie was working with Poincaré behind the back of the Foreign Office. One reason why the French were so anxious for a written formula of consultation was because the Franco-Russian alliance had begun in 1891 in that way. It was the tragedy of British policy and of Europe that Great Britain was neither completely committed nor uncommitted. But it was an inevitable tragedy. Sir Edward Grey did what Lord Lansdowne would have done. He steered a very difficult course which was intended to be cautious and which in the long run failed to avoid our being involved in war. That did not condemn him, for the European situation made the course he took seem the less dangerous of the various available alternatives.

DR. SETON-WATSON said he entirely concurred in Mr. Spender's tribute to Sir Edward Grey in the period before the War.

He was mildly astonished that Mr. Spender in the course of his very comprehensive survey had not used the word " Einkreisung," or encirclement, although he had given them the background and indeed the foreground of that word. A thing which had struck him very forcibly in his study of the British Documents on the Origins of the War (and especially the Balkan volumes) in combination with the German and Austrian documents, was the abundant evidence, at first hand and second hand and third hand, of the fact that Great

Britain was utterly opposed to any such idea as "Einkreisung." This deserved emphasis, in view of the constant assumption by prominent speakers that "Einkreisung" was a reality. It was a complete myth, and without elaborating the facts it was sufficient to point out that Sir Arthur Nicolson's first impulse on receiving from Bax-Ironside in Sofia the first secret news of the conclusion of the Balkan League and Russia's foreknowledge of it, was to describe this to Sir Edward Grey as very unfortunate and to urge that Britain must do nothing to encourage it. In the same way, time after time during the first Turkish Revolution Sir Edward Grey impressed upon Sir Gerard Lowther and other diplomats that everything must be avoided which might increase the likelihood of Europe falling into two camps; and it would be easy to produce many documents to show that British policy under Grey was opposed to that happening.

It might be worth while drawing a contrast between the two methods adopted by Britain in the crises of 1908 and 1914. He of course endorsed what Mr. Spender had said about the inevitability of Great Britain not committing herself beforehand in the latter year. In 1914 the Russian Ambassador was waiting in terror and doubt till the last moment to know what Great Britain would do. But in 1908 Sir Edward Grey had quite early in the Bosnian crisis made a clear and straightforward communication to the French and Russians, to the effect that Great Britain would give every support within her power to their point of view in the Austro-Russian conflict over Serbia, but that that support would not go beyond diplomatic measures. Because they knew that, the Russians had no choice but to climb down before Germany. That was one way of avoiding a war. The other policy, inevitable though it may have been, left everything in uncertainty till the last moment, when it was too late to reverse the engines of war.

THE CHAIRMAN (LORD CECIL) said that there was a very curious contradiction underlying the history of the period which had been dealt with by Mr. Spender. There had never sat on the throne of England a king more convinced of the necessity of peace or more desirous of preserving it in the world than George V, as His Majesty had repeatedly shown, and yet the whole of his twenty-five years' reign had been dominated, as far as foreign affairs went, by the Great War. Even the period before the War had been dominated by the impending war. From 1910, and indeed much before that, to 1914 Europe was considering that a war must come, and the different Powers were manœuvring to get into the best position when the war should come, and negotiating to try to bring Great Britain to one side or to the other of the combatants if the war took place. He believed that Great Britain did rightly in declining to commit herself beforehand to either combatant. Her position then was beginning to be what it had become, and he hoped would continue to be, that her interest was the maintenance of peace. To paraphrase Lord Palmerston's

observation, Great Britain did not desire to favour this country or that country, but did desire to favour peace and, in that sense, the interests of her own country.

Then came the War from 1914 to 1918, during which normal foreign policy was suspended, and then followed the Treaty of Peace. It had four main points. He did not believe that the territorial settlement, although it had been seriously criticised, was very different from what almost any territorial settlement must have been at the end of the War. The financial part was absurd and never had had a chance of success and had been entirely destroyed. Disarmament, which was a very essential part of the Treaty and of the negotiations which led up to the Treaty, was carried out as far as the beaten Powers were concerned with tolerable completeness. It was not carried out by the victorious Powers in spite of their undertakings. That was a great blot on the policy of the victorious Powers since the War.

But it was the creation of machinery for the preservation of peace which was the really novel element in the Peace Treaty of 1919 as compared with previous treaties. The great change, apart from the machinery of the League of Nations, which it attempted to make, was the substitution for the old doctrine of national interests of trade, territory and so on, of the other great object which had always underlain a great deal of British policy, namely, the maintenance of peace.

Someone had quoted observations of Lord Salisbury on the undesirability of alliances and, as Dr. Gooch put it, his preference for a free hand. That policy might have been the best in existing circumstances, but Lord Salisbury did not regard it as the ultimate solution of the international situation. On the contrary, it would be found that on several occasions he did not think it was sufficient to make peace sure, and that he did look forward to some new system by which the Powers could unite to enforce peace in the world, and prevent any single Power from breaking it. There was no doubt that that was Lord Salisbury's ultimate conception of what might be done, but he had never had an opportunity of carrying it through himself.

How tremendously the point of view had changed could be seen from the observations of Mr. Spender, that when the British Government before the War talked of the desirability of maintaining peace they were regarded as hypocrites, and Lord Grey was held up in subsequent continental writings as a man destitute of honour because he pretended that he was advocating the maintenance of peace instead of some obscure British interest. Nothing, of course, could be less true. Lord Grey's immense contribution to his country and the world was the conviction held everywhere of his absolute candour and straightforwardness.

Lord Cecil ventured to think that Commander Bellairs was wrong in his isolationist policy subject to the support of certain special interests. That policy was as wrong and as unworkable amongst nations as amongst individuals. He did not think the country believed in it or that it had any prospect of success. That was the great issue

which the twenty-five years of King George V's reign had left unsettled. There were still many people who thought in terms of isolation and exclusive national sovereignty, even more in foreign countries than in Great Britain, and on the settlement of that issue depended the future of the world.

MR. SPENDER in reply said that he agreed with what Lord Cecil had said about the change of attitude and of atmosphere which had taken place. In spite of all the discouraging circumstances he believed there remained an element to justify optimism. If one were to go back over the pre-War dispatches one would find that all of those which were written at any critical moment would have to be rewritten in the terms of the thought of these times. The exchanges between Governments were on a basis now which was very different from what it used to be. Everybody had to profess to believe that war was a crime. It might be hypocrisy, but hypocrisy was very useful in this world. Sometimes people lived up to their hypocrisies.

AUSTRALIA'S PLACE IN THE EMPIRE[1]

By The Hon. R. G. Menzies, K.C., M.P.

I am going to adopt a method of attacking my subject which is perhaps the converse of that to which we are accustomed. When we discuss the place of Australia, or of any other Dominion, in the British Empire, we usually begin by endeavouring to find out what that particular Dominion thinks of the Empire, what that particular Dominion thinks of Great Britain, and what that particular Dominion thinks of the Imperial connection. In other words, we are usually very concerned to know what the outlying portions of the Empire are thinking about the centre, but I want to reverse the process and invite you to consider what the centre of the Empire is thinking about the outlying portions. Before I do that, let me say that I am quite familiar with the questions addressed to myself and others of what Australia thinks of the Balfour Resolutions of 1926, what Australia thinks of the Statute of Westminster, and what Australia regards as the ties that to-day bind the Empire together; whether she thinks of these ties as being resolvable into the single link of a common kingship, or whether she attaches importance to those other ties which undoubtedly exist. To some extent these are matters of technique. To some extent they require a certain amount of knowledge of what the Balfour Resolutions were and of what the Statute of Westminster was. They require some intellectual consideration of matters of peace and war, and the relations that Great Britain and the Dominions may have towards each other in connection with these matters. But I think, if I may say so, that we are frequently tempted to assume that all the people are interested in matters which are the especial concern of intellectual people. Those who are highbrow—and it is unnecessary to point out that I am not one of them—are a little prone to imagine that the lowbrows of the community, who outnumber them very considerably, are interested in the same kind of things as they are interested in, and I am not at all sure that if you said to me as an Australian, with some knowledge of Australia and Australians and of Australian sentiment, "What

[1] Address given at Chatham House on April 9th, 1935, with Sir John Power, Bart., M.P., in the Chair.

is your answer to all of these questions?" I should not say, "If I am to speak on behalf of two or three per cent. of the population, I will endeavour to give answers to them, as the recent Conference on Commonwealth Relations in Canada endeavoured to give answers to them. But if I am to speak on behalf of the ninety-seven per cent. of the people who are ordinary John Citizens, the truth might require me to say that we have not heard of the Statute of Westminster and we do not know what the Balfour Resolutions are, and we are rather at a loss to understand how it was, or why it was, that the British Empire ceased to be the British Empire and came to be the British Commonwealth of Nations."

The truth is that the ordinary citizen in Australia does not know very much of what may be called the technical aspects of these problems, but we have some general views which it is perhaps unwise to forget. The same John Citizen in Australia who told you that he had never heard of the Statute of Westminster, or alternatively has a vague recollection of a very early Statute of Westminster about which he may have read in *1066 and All That*, might say, "I want you to understand that I am entirely British in my sentiments and in my traditions, and I rather object to academic people fussing themselves about determining whether, in some subtle fashion, I am ceasing to be British and becoming something else." The thing which sticks firmly in the mind of the average Australian is that he is entirely British, and he does not understand what the discussion is about when one tries to demonstrate that he is not. Of course he has certain notions which some of his critics might regard as deplorable. He believes, for example, in his own ideas, and he has a strong disposition to think that he ought to govern his own affairs without interference by other people. But those are two habits which are entirely hereditary.

He has another prejudice (I am simply trying to indicate in very brief outline what his answer to these questions would be), and that is a prejudice in favour of Freedom. I do not say this in any rhetorical sense, but in this sense, that the Australian, speaking broadly, is not very interested in "-isms" of one kind or another. He rejects Communism with a good deal of rough humour and he rejects Fascism with a good deal of round humour, because he has rather a suspicion that all these things are inconsistent with the opinion which his grandfather brought with him from the British Isles, namely, that Freedom is the inherent right of a citizen, and not some right to be denied or conceded

by a State. And because he believes that, because that is the basis of his political philosophy, he is increasingly proud to realise that he is British, because he finds the institutions of Great Britain, almost alone among the institutions of the world, as firmly set on Freedom as they ever were. At least he thinks so, and I can very confidently assert that in Australia they *are* as firmly set on Freedom as they ever were.

In the same way my John Citizen in Australia believes in Peace, and believes in the League of Nations. He is not tremendously vocal about the League of Nations, because he has gained a sneaking idea in what superior persons may regard as his obfuscated mind, that the British Empire is not only the chief support of the League of Nations, but, in the last resort, its most powerful agent. That is how he regards the countries organised in the direction of collective security.

Having made these few general observations about how the ordinary Australian would answer some of the questions of the day, I would like to direct your attention to the other side of those answers, to tell you something about the questions which the Australian citizen is putting to himself, questions which I believe the people of Great Britain and the Governments of Great Britain will have to answer. Not one of these questions is in itself a very remarkable one, but, like most questions of great simplicity, our usual technique is to avoid answering them, and I venture to believe that if we go on and if you go on indefinitely avoiding some clear answer to the questions which arise in the Dominion mind to-day, the difficulties of future association will be very much greater than they need be.

I am going to put the questions to you. I do not propose to answer them. I cannot answer them because every question is directed to the mind of the United Kingdom, and the answers are not answers which are vouchsafed to me. Let me put them with some sort of elaboration in some sort of order.

The first question is this: Does Great Britain—and I am putting this question in relation to my own country—does Great Britain regard Australia as an asset or a liability? That is not a very easy question to answer. A number of my friends whom I have met already in the last three weeks in England would be hard put to it to give a perfectly frank answer to that question. Does Great Britain regard Australia as something which is worth developing, or as a liability to be treated with that measure of distaste with which one contemplates one's liabilities? Does Great Britain still feel, as one of the great English statesmen felt,

that it has called into existence a new world to redress the balance of the old, or does it feel that it made a mistake? Does it feel that its sons and brothers, one might almost say its sons and lovers, in Australia, are its own flesh and blood, or does it regard them as " remittance men "?

That may be regarded as a fairly abrupt question. But it is the kind of question that must be answered before we can proceed to determine exactly what our mutual relations, not merely for the next five years, but for the next five hundred years, are going to be. It is a question which is a direct challenge to the whole spirit of a Little England, and it is a question which is increasingly coming into the minds of informed Australian citizens.

Let me put my next question. This question is a little softer and at the same time a little harder. It is a paradoxical question. Does Great Britain regard Australia merely as a potential customer, in whose business Great Britain has invested money, and in respect of whom the investment has to be looked after? In other words, is the point of view upon a Dominion like Australia to be a purely mercantile point of view? I must confess that, as an Australian who is by ancestry half Scotch and half Cornish, even I am at a loss to understand the purely mercantile point of view. And yet I have read speeches by eminent English statesmen which revealed this state of mind, that if one is to determine the relative allocation of business that ought to be made, or preferences that ought to be given, to a country like Australia and to some foreign country, one ought to do it by instructing an accountant to work out sums and to find out how much money one has invested in each country, and what is the size of the investment that ought to be protected.

Of course, from the point of view of the disinterested onlooker all considerations of a sentimental character are to be dismissed. They are rejected as unworthy of a rational people. But surely nobody who understands the integral relationship between the British Isles and Australia can imagine that our common destiny is to be assessed in terms of the pounds, shillings and pence that one may have invested in the other. But there is the question—and I venture to think that nobody in Great Britain to-day who is conscious of the gravity of the problem of the future of the British Empire can avoid answering it quite frankly to himself—the question whether he does regard us merely as a potential customer, and whether his point of view is merely that of the bank manager who grants an overdraft so that a customer

may carry on business and make some reasonable measure of profit.

The third question is this—and it is one by which my mind has been considerably stirred during the last three weeks—Does Great Britain really desire a renewal of migration? Does she really see any permanent solution of her unemployment problem without migration? I know that this is, of all contemporary subjects, the most debated, because I know that in my own State of Victoria we were regarded—for a time at any rate—in certain sections of the English Press as villains of the deepest dye because we had misled your immigrants to our own country. Let me say at once that nobody with any knowledge of the last twenty or thirty years in Australia will be concerned to deny that we have made some most shocking blunders in land settlement. But one point to remember is that we have made them with great impartiality in respect of our own people and in respect of people who have come to us from oversea. It is worth remembering that, if it were not for the most valiant efforts in the State of Victoria to overtake these errors and to make proper financial provision for them, Victoria to-day would show a surplus on her Budget. That must, I feel, indicate that we are not merely saying, as a matter of speech, that we have made blunders, but that we are trying, as a matter of hard financial sacrifice, to rectify them.

But when all that is put on one side we are driven back to remember that Australia exists to-day because of British immigration. Emigrants from Great Britain established Australia, established a continent and a nation, and laid the foundations of the whole Commonwealth of Australia, and if you believe—and this throws you back to my first question—as I believe, that Australia is an asset to the British Empire, then you must realise that that asset is due to a policy of immigration. When I, as an onlooker with some experience in Australia of having to consider problems of unemployment, look round these islands and realise the volume of their unemployment, I cannot believe—I may be wrong—that you will ever have any permanent solution of many of your social and industrial problems until the stream of migration once more flows into the Dominions.

But of course the consideration at once arises that if the Dominions are to receive immigrants they must be in a position to receive them. They must be encouraged to develop their resources in order that they may receive them, and it is in that sense that Great Britain's attitude towards Australia is directly

associated with Australia's attitude towards the problem of receiving immigrants from Great Britain. It is not a matter of saying " We won't play in your backyard unless you play in ours." In a way it is a sheer matter of capacity, of our capacity to receive this stream which we know is the condition of our future life and our future growth. We ought to be in a position not merely to stand still but to develop our resources and to grow, and we have reached a position to-day when one of the conditions of our growth depends upon what Great Britain is going to do about it.

My fourth question is this : Is it fully realised in Great Britain that, while we have our faults, those hereditary faults I have already freely admitted, of thinking that our own views are the best and that we have rights of our own, the fact is that Australia contemplates no future at all outside the British Empire? I am fully conscious of the difference in this problem in some other Dominions, but for reasons which I need not elaborate it must be clearly understood that there is not now, and there never was in the past, any separatist movement in the Commonwealth of Australia. Australia sees no future outside the British Empire or outside the British Commonwealth of Nations, and it is because of that and because of what we feel to be our responsibility in relation to the development of the Empire that we become just a little irritated—and of course we are just as capable of becoming irritated as people in Great Britain are capable of becoming irritated—when we find that our requests, for example, for a growing market in Great Britain, are put down by some people, though not by responsible people with whom we have had to discuss these matters, to mere parochial selfishness. It is a very queer thing how the telephone subdues personality, but the failing of the telephone in that respect is nothing to the failing of the cable and beam wireless. When one is twelve thousand miles away from people and has to commit oneself to the mercy of words which are subject to infinite variation in the course of transmission, the result is very frequently and naturally that one group of people in Australia says, " Of course, these English people are very smug, they are very satisfied that they are right, they are very stiff, unbending, un-understanding people," and the people at the English end of the wire are saying, " There is no doubt about it, it is a great pity that these Colonials are not a little better bred."

In these circumstances it is the simplest thing in the world for our requests on any matters which are matters of negotiation

between ourselves and Great Britain to be put down to the playing of some selfish game. I want to say this in all sincerity on behalf of Australia, that we are not conscious of selfishness in any of these requests. We feel we are endeavouring to provide not for the six million of people in Australia, but for the sixty million people who ought to be in Australia to-morrow if we are to play the part that we ought to play in the future of the English race.

The fifth question that I want to put is one which will perhaps not need very much explanation to some people. It is this: Does Great Britain realise that the potential wealth of Australia—and I apologise for using a much-overworked phrase—possesses a somewhat intractable character? By that I mean that if we are to develop mining and agricultural and pastoral production in Australia we must be prepared to lay out vast sums of money in the enterprise. There are some people who think of countries like Australia as Eldorado in which one has only to lean over gently and pick up nuggets of gold, or of some tropical and luxuriant country where one has only to lie on one's back and wait for the fruit to drop into one's mouth. But no one who has had any experience of the investment of money in a country like Australia will require to be told that Australia presents tremendous problems to a person who is going to develop it. Mining is not easy. It calls for enormous capital and is indebted to the investors of London for a great deal of the capital employed. Agriculture too is difficult and is subjected to all kinds of problems. People who talk about the Japanese problem very frequently talk as if we had hundreds of thousands or millions of acres in the north of Australia just ready to be cultivated by really industrious farmers. All I can say is that I should be sorry for the really industrious farmer. He would be much thinner at the end of six months.

All this means that there is required for the development of our undoubted resources a great deal of capital and great enterprise, and that one cannot have both enterprise and capital and the courage that will take big chances, unless one is prepared to give to those people some prospect of a long-range security in their markets. A large sum of capital cannot be raised and cannot validly be expended for the mere chance of production of a year or two. It is because people believe in the country that they have invested hundreds of millions of pounds in Australia and in the development of its resources until a stage is reached at which they may bear fruit. Can you wonder that

the average citizen in Australia is rather inclined to-day to raise his eyebrows and to say, "This is very curious. All this money has come in. The work is done and the tree is about to bear fruit—and we are told that we must let the fruit fall to the ground"?

I am saying this because I want people to understand, when they read their papers, or rather when they read their *Times*, because that is the only paper in which any Australian news appears, how it is that they find that some ill-conditioned fellow in Australia has been speaking distinctly out of his turn about the problem of marketing Australian goods in Great Britain.

My sixth question is this: Does Great Britain realise what a peculiarly exposed part of the Empire Australia is, in some respects the most exposed part of the British Empire? As such we have a mission that we regard as an urgent and proper mission to become self-supporting as soon as possible. We know that in problems of defence to a large extent we are liabilities, but in many respects we claim that we are a great asset, and we are not ambitious to remain a liability indefinitely. The reason for that ambition is not some separatist reason, but because we, in common I suppose with all the generations of Englishmen who ever lived, have an ambition that "we may grow and take our place as men and women of our race."

The last question I want to put is this: Do people in Great Britain, in considering all these problems of the relationship of Great Britain and Australia, imagine that we in Australia are, even if in a friendly sort of fashion, strangers to the blood? Do they desire, as some of my very good friends occasionally do, to emphasise the "friendliness" with which they discuss problems with us? Because if they do I want to take the opportunity to emphasise that we do not meet them on mere terms of friendship when we consider our mutual problems, we meet as members of the same family. It is quite true that sometimes members of the family go into far corners of the earth and come back using accents that were never conceived within the walls of Oxford and Cambridge, but they are still members of the family and it would be a great blunder to imagine that they are not. We in Australia are, of course, perfectly conscious—and I hope that nothing I have said will obscure this truth—of the enormous generosity and wisdom displayed by Great Britain in her treatment of the Dominions in the past. It would be a mere work of supererogation for me to discuss that. But I do want to emphasise that, whatever straw-splitting lawyers or

straw-splitting political philosophers may say, the outstanding element in the relation between Australia and the British Empire is this definite element of the sense of family. Indeed I may perhaps conclude my somewhat discursive remarks by giving you one little instance of what that sort of thing means.

The other afternoon, in the absence of the Members of Parliament because it was a Saturday afternoon, I visited St. Stephen's Hall at the Houses of Parliament, and I stood in what Macaulay described as " the Great Hall of William Rufus." For the convenience of ignorant strangers some wise people have put brass plates in the floor of this Hall to tell the story of how on that floor there stood Charles I, Strafford and, in turn, Warren Hastings, at their trial. I, having always been a great admirer of Warren Hastings, found myself standing on the adjacent flagstone and the words of Macaulay went through my mind, " The culprit was indeed not unworthy of that great presence," and I unconsciously found myself endeavouring to look like Warren Hastings, until I remembered the words of Macaulay that his person was " small and emaciated," and I must say that my unconscious posturing ended at that point. But I would ask people in Great Britain to try to realise the feelings that pass through the mind of an Australian of British birth who stands in a hall like that and who recaptures this sense of the past. It is no use saying to him as if he were a stranger, " We will be perfectly friendly with you." His retort will be, " Friendship is not enough. I have stood in this Hall and I know that I have thought of *my* Hastings, not merely yours; of *my* Empire, not merely yours; of *my* England, not merely yours."

Summary of Discussion.

THE CHAIRMAN (SIR JOHN POWER) said that there were few Dominions which excited more interest and sympathy among English people than the Commonwealth of Australia. Everyone admired the way in which she had extricated herself from the difficulties which fell upon her, in common with all the world, in 1931. At that time the State and Federal Governments of Australia had had a budget deficit of some £27 million and had anticipated a deficit of £40 million in the succeeding year. When one remembered that the total population of Australia was something under seven millions, one could see that her position had been proportionately as bad as that of Great Britain. Australia had risen to the occasion; she had submitted to sacrifices and had made a wonderful recovery. The Commonwealth Government had balanced its budget and the States had steadily reduced their deficit until equilibrium had come in sight.

Australia was 98 per cent. British and had as much right to British traditions as the people of Great Britain. But the fact that the two countries were separated by a distance of ten to twelve thousand miles made the problems which confronted them somewhat different, and it was perhaps inevitable that there should be different points of view. He was convinced, however, that any difficulties which arose between them were capable of solution if there was sympathy and an endeavour on each side to understand the other's point of view. No greater service could be rendered than that which Mr. Menzies was rendering in explaining the point of view of his countrymen.

MR. E. EVERETT REID said that efforts were being made with regard to migration. A little time ago a scheme had been put forward and carefully considered by Sir Henry Page Croft and others, and a letter had appeared in the *Times* from Mr. Drummond Wolff, M.P., on the 1st March last saying that he had completed a scheme, including the drafting of a Bill in conjunction with Sir Edward Grigg, which was before the Government. Moreover, the Empire Settlement Act of 1922 provided that the United Kingdom Government might bear up to half the cost of Dominion migration schemes up to a total not exceeding £3 million a year during the succeeding thirteen years. But what did Mr. Menzies think of the message which Mr. Malcolm MacDonald had brought back from Australia, that the time was not propitious for immigration into that country, while Mr. Bruce had said that renewed prosperity could not be expected until the question of migration had been dealt with in a proper manner?

A short time ago a certain number of emigrants were sent out to Australia and, in the end, they cost Great Britain and the Australian Government about £4000 per head.

He agreed with what Mr. Menzies had said about Freedom, and did not wish to interfere in any way with the Government of Australia. But looking at the question from the commercial side he found that during 1934 nearly 3 billion gallons of milk in the form of butter and cheese had come from Australia, and some from New Zealand, and that the increases in 1934 over 1932 had been some 200 million gallons, while, at the same time, Great Britain had produced only 1,200 million gallons of milk.

MR. J. H. HUMPHREYS said that, as an Englishman who had visited every state in Australia, he would say that the men and women of Great Britain looked with profound affection upon those fellow-members of the British Empire who were living in Australia, and that most Englishmen would agree with Mr. Menzies that questions of trade should be considered in the light of the close association involved in blood relationship. Personally he would prefer complete free trade between Australia and Great Britain if that were possible, but he felt that there would be more hesitancy on the part of Australia than on the part of Great Britain. It might be possible to make some arrangement such as had been made by certain countries in Europe whereby,

year after year, there should be a percentage reduction in the tariffs between Australia and Great Britain.

He was glad to learn that Mr. Menzies contemplated an Australia of 60 million inhabitants. He thought Great Britain would like to see migration continued, but he would draw attention to the table which appeared in the December 1934 number of the *Round Table* indicating the future population of Great Britain. The figures there given showed clearly that Great Britain was faced with a decline in population and a very serious decline in the numbers of children and of potential mothers. Fewer migrants would be available. It seemed that the most capable section of the population in Great Britain was not willing to leave behind it a still better race of English men and women, and he wondered whether the same elements in Australia were adopting a similar attitude towards new life. The slow rate of the growth of population in Australia would seem to indicate that large numbers were unwilling to have more than one or two children. There was now proceeding serious discussion between Australia and Great Britain as to the disposal of the meat surplus of Australia. If there had been another million well-developed young persons in Australia, as there might have been, there would have been no surplus of meat. Australia with its abundance of meat, of fish, of corn, of fruit would have been in a much stronger and healthier condition. If ever there was to be the great Australia envisaged by Mr. Menzies, it seemed necessary that statesmen should take counsel together as to the probable outcome of present trends in population in Australia and in Great Britain.

SIR EDWARD GRIGG said that, having known Australia for many years, he was conscious of the absolute truth of Mr. Menzies' description of Australian feeling towards Great Britain and the Empire.

He was not going to attempt to answer Mr. Menzies' questions, though he agreed that they were questions which should be answered. It was perfectly true that the frozen state of the country's trade and exchanges was making relations between Australia and Great Britain difficult, but he believed he could, on behalf of the great majority of the people in Great Britain, say that they wanted to keep in the closest possible cooperation and in the closest possible family relation with the Dominions, not only because of the past and their common traditions and common language, but because they believed that they were engaged together on a great common enterprise. Freedom needed protection in the world, and he was convinced that the nations of the Empire must stand together for Freedom if it were not to perish from the earth.

One of the previous speakers had suggested that Great Britain would welcome free trade with Australia. That might have been true a little while ago, but he could not see the farmers of Great Britain consenting with enthusiasm to that doctrine. The difficulties about free trade within the Empire were just as great in Great Britain as in any of the Dominions. Personally he very much regretted that they had been

obliged, perhaps unnecessarily obliged, to adopt a policy of restriction of production. That in the long run was a fatal policy from which they should escape as soon as possible. It would mean the end of the Empire and, in the last resort, the end of Great Britain.

The chief difficulty which the common enterprise of the Empire had to face was the force of nationalism, from which the world was suffering more than from any other cause. A narrow and extreme nationalism was tearing the world to pieces. If the Empire, as members of one family, could not overcome the dangers of nationalism how could they be overcome in any part of the world? The question arose in its most insistent form in regard to economic relations, but if people in Great Britain would take a broad view, he thought a broad view would also be taken in Australia and the other Dominions.

It was also necessary to take a broad view in regard to policy in international relations. He believed Mr. Menzies was right in saying that throughout the British Empire there was a desire to see the success of the League of Nations. But they had not really given it very much effective support since they joined together to establish it. They had all been inclined to take the view that the League of Nations was not something which was going to rely on them for its success, but that it was something on which they could themselves rely. A stage in the world's history had now been reached where that doctrine must be abandoned. If people believed in the League of Nations they must be prepared to do something for it. The idea which had been spread abroad that there was something inconsistent between loyalty and devotion to the League of Nations and loyalty and devotion to the Empire was extremely dangerous. The most effective part of the League of Nations was that smaller League which was constituted by the self-growing parts of the British Empire. If the Empire stood together to support the League he believed its success was assured, and in the process the Empire would make certain of its own future. What did the League stand for? It stood for the very principles on which the British Empire had been built up. It stood in the first place for justice for everybody, including minorities. That was very difficult to secure in many places in the world, but they had endeavoured to secure it in the British Empire and racial minorities had everywhere been granted full rights, religious toleration and freedom of thought and speech. In the second place it stood for treaty faith. That principle also was being challenged in the world, but he hoped the whole Empire would stand together in asserting the necessity of treaty faith to humanity. The third principle was that the differences between people must be solved if possible by discussion, by agreement, by negotiation, or by arbitration—at any rate not by force. That was the way in which they were attempting throughout the Empire to settle their own questions.

Sir Hal Colebatch, speaking of the relationship of migration to unemployment, pointed out that between the year 1929 and the year

1933 there had been a drop of £100 million in the imports into Australia. That was not due to any action on the part of the Australian people but to the fact that their products—though increased in quantity—had fallen in value by nearly £70 million, whilst borrowing from Great Britain, which had been at the rate of about £30 million per annum, had been stopped. It was well to remember that the money borrowed by Australian States in London went from England to Australia in the form of goods for developmental purposes. Consequently the stoppage of borrowing increased unemployment both in England and in Australia. He would be the last to deny that Australia in the past had borrowed injudiciously and that some of her borrowings had been spent extravagantly, but it was significant that although Australia, as a primary producing country, had been more hardly hit by the depression than any other country, she was one of the very few countries in the world that had met all her interest and sinking-fund obligations. This suggested that the resources of Australia and the character of her people were such that there was no great reason for arbitrarily preventing people, who wished to lend money to Australia for development work, from doing so. So far as governmental schemes of migration were concerned, he had little faith in them. The migrant under a government scheme was never the same man as he who went out on his own initiative and knew throughout that he must rely on his own industry and his own resources. He was far from suggesting that the fault lay with the rank and file. It lay rather with those who, having the command of large sums of money, preferred to lend it to governments rather than venturing it themselves as men of light and leading had done in the past. The accumulation of money in London instead of its use in the development of real wealth in the Dominions was an unhappy reversal of the policy that had built up the British Empire: a policy which he believed was essential to its maintenance.

MR. D. O. MALCOLM said that he was glad to hear what Sir Hal Colebatch and Mr. Menzies had to say about the remarkable recovery of Australia. When he had been there, in the latter part of 1928 and the early part of 1929, the danger signals had been apparent, and the danger had become manifest in a couple of years. If a cessation of external borrowing had not taken place Australia's difficulties would have been postponed, but would have been all the more acute when they finally arose, and her economic and financial survival might not have been possible.

He sympathised with Sir Hal Colebatch's views on migration. Experience had shown that when times were good in Great Britain they were good in the Dominions, and when times were good, redistribution of population took place freely and easily, and no one heard anything about it. That was the only healthy process. When times were bad and unemployment rife, people were apt to seek a solution of the unemployment problem by shifting their surplus population on to another member of the family, and migration then

took place through expensive, dangerous and often disastrous government-aided mass schemes. Migration was a very dangerous thing to tackle artificially. It was not a blessing to a country to lose large numbers of the best and most industrious and enterprising of its population, and yet nothing else would be accepted by the Dominions under any such scheme.

MR. LIONEL GELBER said that he would like to know Mr. Menzies' opinion on certain problems of the conduct of foreign policy, one of which had been raised by Sir Edward Grigg in his address at Chatham House on January 29th, 1935.[1] During the Conference of Dominion Prime Ministers, at the Jubilee, the British Government might have to make some important decisions with regard to its commitments in Europe and the furtherance of the collective system. It was sometimes said that statesmen in Great Britain could not do what they wished because the Dominions objected. But how could anyone say with authority what Canadians, for example, really thought on such questions? Foreign affairs played no part in the party politics of the Dominions, and the overwhelming majority of her Ministries and Parliamentarians were uninstructed in these intricate matters so vital to her future well-being. Were conditions similar in Australia?

What was Australia's position likely to be in respect of British obligations on the continent of Europe? Had the Dominions any right to say that Great Britain could not undertake certain responsibilities? Difficulties, ethical and diplomatic, of the gravest character thus arose.

When the prolonged crisis developed in the Far East in 1931 there was an opportunity for the new Commonwealth principle of reciprocal consultation to be put into operation. Was any pressure brought to bear by Australia in London between September 1931 and the time when the Lytton Commission went out? Statesmen often gave lip-service to the idea of the League of Nations, but, when the great testing-time came, some Dominion spokesmen at home and abroad, if not wholly indifferent, seemed to be taking another course.

MR. CAMPBELL suggested that migration had taken too prominent a place in the discussion. It was necessary to ask what were the motives of people who had migrated in the past. Was it not that they were hard pressed in their own country, compared with the opportunities believed to offer overseas, and was not the position now that unemployment relief had given relative economic security? It was doubtful, even if countries overseas were anxious to take them, whether people in Great Britain would show much enthusiasm to go. Could migration be regarded as a cure for unemployment in Great Britain, or was not the problem, as Sir William Beveridge had argued, one of lack of organisation rather than of scale of industry? Even if popula-

[1] On "The Merits and Defects of the Locarno Treaty as a Guarantee of World Peace," *International Affairs*, March-April, 1935, p. 176.

tion were reduced by a quarter, the relative scale of unemployment might still remain. Apart from the unemployment question, it was a dubious economic and social proposition for any country to raise, educate and train some millions of people and then, when they attained their productive period of life, ship them overseas.

SIR EDWARD GRIGG said that he agreed with what Mr. Gelber had said in reference to his own address on Locarno and he would like to make the point a little clearer. Great Britain had entered into the Treaty of Locarno to obtain a closer definition of her obligations under the Covenant, because she believed that that was the way to establish the security of Western Europe, and because she felt that her security was very much involved in the security of the other nations who were signatories to the Treaty. The Dominions did not take part in the discussions. They only gave a general approval of the Treaty and, though an Imperial Conference followed soon after, they had never endorsed it. There was no question whatever that that abstention had greatly weakened the value of the Treaty. He had no doubt as to what the Dominions would do if Great Britain were in danger, but there was a general feeling in Europe that where the action of the Dominions was uncertain the action of Great Britain was uncertain too. He would like to ask Mr. Menzies whether there was in Australia any active readiness to participate in engagements of a kind like the Treaty of Locarno, it being made perfectly clear that what the Dominions were being asked to do was not to participate in a war, but to undertake to be non-neutral. Whether they came in and actually took part in hostilities was a further question for them to decide for themselves.

MR. MENZIES agreed with most of what had been said about migration. But he did not share the gloom of Mr. Campbell at the prospect of the resumption of migration to the Dominions, nor the pessimism of Mr. Humphreys at the declining birth-rate. Birth-rates were affected by depression, and the figures of the last five or six years did not necessarily indicate a permanent trend. Although the population of Australia might appear to have gone up very slowly it had in fact gone up remarkably rapidly. Australia in the first 150 years of her colonisation had achieved a far greater population than had been achieved in her first 150 years of existence by America.

The point made by Sir Hal Colebatch about migration and government schemes was worth emphasising. Like most government schemes of land settlement they tended to be indeterminate in their working and to put a premium on inefficiency in the last resort. But he did not doubt that there would be a resumption of migration. Without it Australia would be faced with a prospect of very lean times and precarious security. It was a mistake to assume that hardship alone had given rise to emigration in the past. The greatest stimulus to migration was the attractive power of the new country and not the expulsive power of the bad conditions in the old one.

One other group of questions had emerged. He had been asked to say how far in Australia there was an active and informed opinion on foreign affairs. The plain truth was that there was none. It was a deplorable fact which a small group of people was trying to counter. The reason for it was that all such things seemed so remote. Some interest was taken in the Japanese problem, but it was entirely sporadic. There were, however, signs of a changed point of view. Some years ago the Australian Government of the day had established some liaison with the British Foreign Office and with the British Administration generally, and that had been continued. Until recently the Department of External Affairs had been regarded as incidental to some other more important portfolio. His predecessor, Mr. Latham, had been Attorney-General and also Minister of External Affairs, and in the public mind there had been a very misguided but definite feeling that those two departments were placed in order of merit. But in the present government the Ministry of External Affairs had become a single portfolio.

He agreed with Sir Edward Grigg that it was a shocking thing to discover that in relation to the most significant international acts the Dominions had been completely uninterested and in some cases unconsulted.

He would not presume to speak on that point with any authority, but he would say that they were standing in the presence of an international position which was about as difficult as any position that had ever confronted them, and every indication that had come to him as a member of the Australian Government was that no agreement was likely to be consummated between the United Kingdom and any other country without consultation with the Dominions. That exhibited a spirit of cooperation on the part of the United Kingdom.

THE PRESENT SITUATION IN CHINA:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

By Dr. T. F. Tsiang

The problems of a country are usually so intertwined that they seem to form a closely-woven fabric, no thread of which can be touched without disturbing directly or indirectly all the other threads. If the analysis of any one of China's problems is at all adequate, it must examine in its course a series of other problems. While this is true, I have chosen as the thread of my discussion the completion of China's unification. I select this problem because I am deeply convinced that the solution of this central problem is the key to the solution of all other problems. Foreign friends of my country who have been disappointed by her slow progress in some reform in which they happen to be interested, in education, public health, railway-building, broadcasting, destruction of landlordism and war-lordism, emancipation of women, alphabetisation of the language, and what not—and I know there are enthusiasts, often noble enthusiasts, for all these good things—frequently fail to appreciate the blighting effects of the civil wars, born of the lack of unity, on all these lines of human endeavour. I think I am justified in calling the problem of unity the central problem of China, but before I am through, I shall, I assure you, touch upon a number of other problems, so that you will get something like a total picture of the present situation in China.

In a sense, China's problem of unification is superficial. The Chinese are one nationality. The people all read the same books, respect the same standards of conduct, celebrate the same festivals, and worship the same gods. Although Canton is fast getting the reputation of a Chinese Ireland, the real trouble is that the people of that southern province are inclined to regard themselves as the cream of the nation.

When we speak of the completion of China's unification, we mean, of course, China's political organisation as a State. Even in this sense the problem is not so deep-rooted as is commonly thought. For we have behind us a strong tradition of unity, derived from historical fact and political philosophy. The first

Emperor of the Ts'in Dynasty created the united Chinese Empire two hundred years before Christ was born. During the two thousand and one hundred years which have passed since then, although there have been recurrent periods of disunity, we have had fifteen centuries of political unity to six centuries of division and civil war; and of these six centuries, only one falls in the time span of the last thousand years. The first Emperor swept away the warring states and the territorial feudal nobility; he created on their ruins a bureaucracy whose only claim to power was imperial favour. On top of this, the emperors of the next dynasty added the spiritual cement of political unity, namely, Confucianism. Originally the Confucian solution of the problem of unity was the perpetuation of a kind of Holy Roman Empire in China, with all the states, big and small, continuing to exist but all acknowledging allegiance to a common emperor. After the actual process of unification was completed, along lines far more radical and real than the Confucianists had conceived, the latter dropped their feudal outlook on politics and ever after taught loyalty to one emperor as the chief political virtue of the people. After such a change of heart, the astute Han emperors made Confucianism the State religion. Scholars have not begun to appreciate the political contribution of Confucianism to Chinese unity. To put it in one sentence, Confucianism made one emperor for the whole Chinese world the moral norm of all who claim to be Chinese. Later dynasties added to this structure by gradually evolving a civil service examination system, which, on the one hand, created the career open to talent and on the other made all educated people look upon imperial service as the highest of all human achievements.

With this historical background in mind you will understand why we Chinese regard periods of unity in our history as periods of moral order, and periods of division as periods of moral disorder. It is this very firm belief in the norm of one political organism for the whole of China that makes our civil wars so distressing. If we could accept a scheme of division into states, we might have peace by compromise and by the balance of power such as the European States manage to achieve for short periods. But such division would be unthinkable to us. Aside from economic and international considerations, we would regard any such splitting of China into independent states as a moral sin. Looked at in this way, the situation of China to-day is radically different from that of Germany before 1867. In Germany before unification, the thirty then existing states,

though all of German nationality, were all historical entities, accepted as such by the German people and Europe at large. Therefore the thirty odd states could exist side by side without being in constant strife. In China, history has decided differently.

While asking you to consider the contemporary Chinese situation in the light of Chinese history, I should at the same time point out how in the past reunification was achieved after a period of division. How far the experience of the past is applicable to the present is a question on which I would not like to dogmatise. It depends on the extent to which Chinese life has remained traditional. It is manifest that in some ways China is still the traditional China and that in some other ways China has radically departed from her tradition. As to this there can be only one opinion. People differ only when they try to apportion the traditional and the modern in Chinese life. If this be true, the experience of the past cannot be entirely without value for the present.

Since the united Chinese Empire was first created, there have been, not counting the recent events, nine periods of varying lengths when unity was disrupted, followed by nine reunifications. Although each instance had its peculiarities, there runs through Chinese history a common pattern of statesmanship by which reunification was achieved. Every reunifier of China did certain fundamental things. First, he constructed a nucleus of unity in some limited region to play the rôle that Brandenburg-Prussia played in Germany. In this nuclear region, the rough outlines of the new régime were given concrete expression in its civil and military administration, so that the whole country could have a foretaste of what to expect. Secondly, the reunifier won control of his rivals partly by force and partly by diplomacy. It never occurred in Chinese history that one battle decided the issue; the geographical extent of China made this impossible. Many a leader united a region equivalent to three or four Germanies and yet failed of final success. What usually happened was for the unifier, by war and diplomacy, to win direct control of the majority of the provinces, to get his title as ruler of whole China acknowledged by all, and at the same time to leave a number of the outlying provinces in the semi-independent condition under the control of his former rivals. The completion of unification followed after a decade or two of peace. This element of compromise, of diplomacy, is an essential feature of every historical instance of the reunification of China.

Thirdly, the reunifier of China had always to do something

for the masses. Usually, he was himself a man of humble origin and knew the needs of the people. He reduced taxes, abolished unpopular laws and regulations, enforced stricter discipline in the army, and kept his officials under better control. Our old chronicles liked to picture every founder of a new dynasty as a saint and the inauguration of his rule as the beginning of a golden age. They make especially a great deal of the reduction of taxation, which is, of course, the most popular measure, as if the founder of a new dynasty had a magical bag of gold so that he could scatter favours to his subjects. In fact, since he had to win his position through the sword and for some time maintain it with the sword, any reduction of taxation could not have been very substantial.

Finally, the reunifier must satisfy the demands and expectations of the *literati*, that is, the intelligentsia. He restored Confucian temples, patronised learning, and enforced honesty in the State examinations. He consulted, or pretended to consult, the best scholars of the land.

If we wish to reduce all these measures to a simple formula, we can say that Chinese unity has ever been restored by a man who exercised the best combination of force and policy. And if we examine history carefully, is it not true that the unification of all nations, Eastern as well as Western, was in point of fact effected in just this way?

So much for the historical past. Let us now turn to the conditions of the recent decades.

The leaders of the civil wars in the recent decades have all been military men. The basis of their power has been the possession of a personal army, that is, an army which knew loyalty only to its commander and not to government or State. The personal armies were a legacy of the Empire, not a creation of the Republic; they came into existence more than eighty years ago. In 1850 there began in Kwangsi the so-called Taipeng rebellion. The regular army, both Chinese and Manchu, suffered defeat after defeat at the hands of the rebels. The march of the Taipeng army in 1851 and 1852 from Kwangsi to the middle Yangtse and then to Nanking resembled very much that of the Revolutionary Army in 1926 and 1927. The Emperor had to resort to temporary expedients, the most important of which was the organisation of volunteer armies, something like Garibaldi's Volunteers in Italy. The most successful of such armies was that of Hunan, led by that remarkable man Tseng Kuo-fan. It was mainly

the victories of this army which maintained the dynasty. What was the principle of organisation at the basis of this volunteer army of Hunan? It was no other than that of personal loyalty. Tseng Kuo-fan first recruited a band of officers who were well known to himself and to each other, and they in turn recruited men from their own villages and townships, men whose families were all neighbours and relatives. The personal and local ties cemented Tseng's army into a most efficient fighting machine, far superior to the old regular army. Tseng proudly called his army an army of brethren. He led it more as the eldest brother of all than as the commander appointed by the government. Around 1860 it was that army which held the balance of power in China.

In 1862, Tseng commissioned Li Hung-chang to organise a similar army from Li's province of Anhuei, to defend Shanghai. (It was with Li that General Gordon cooperated.) While Tseng later disbanded most of the Hunan army, Li continued to add to his Anhuei army, including eventually a navy. In 1894–95 it was really Li's army and navy which fought Japan. That war, however, finished Li's military career, and his mantle fell on the shoulders of Yuan Shih-kai, who built up the so-called Peiyang army. Yuan patterned after Li as Li had patterned after Tseng. In armament the Peiyang army was more modern than the Anhuei army just as the latter had been more modern than the Hunan army, but, on the personal side, the underlying principle remained unchanged. In the first decade of the twentieth century, the Peiyang army overshadowed China. It was because Yuan had the support of that army that the Manchus appealed to him to save the dynasty from the revolutionary republicans in 1911. It was also because of the Peiyang army that the republicans led by Dr. Sun made Yuan President of the Republic in 1912. Both Imperialists and Republicans rendered unto Cæsar that which was Cæsar's. The leaders in the civil wars, up to 1926, under the various names of Feng Kuo-chang, Tang Chi-jui, Tsao Kun, Wu Pei-fu, and Feng Yu-hsiang, all came from the brood of the Peiyang army.

I must, however, call your attention to one peculiar circumstance in connection with the old personal armies. Although during the last sixty years of the Manchu dynasty Tseng, Li, and Yuan successively held the balance of power in their hands, none of these men, with the possible exception of Yuan, was disloyal to the dynasty. Tseng and Li were both Confucianist to the core. They fought for the Manchus against the Taipengs,

because they wished to fight for emperor against rebel, for Confucianism against the alien religion which the Taipengs had adopted. Although men were not wanting who suggested to Tseng and later to Li that they should ascend the dragon throne themselves, they did not consider it for a moment. To them, the throne of an established dynasty was a symbol, a tradition, a magical instrument which might be used for beneficent purposes. They knew the history of their own country and thought the inevitable civil war, subsequent to the fall of a dynasty, was too high a price for the country to pay. The fact that the occupier of the throne was a Manchu and not a Chinese was minimised by them, because by the middle of the nineteenth century the Manchus had totally adopted Chinese culture. Yuan's record was not so clear, but this much we can say for him: when he was suddenly dismissed from office by the Regent in 1908 he obeyed although his army remained loyal to him. With the potent spell of Confucianism still alive, the Manchus might have remained on the Chinese throne if during the last two decades of their rule they had shown the least sign of statesmanship. They had so decayed that their fall was a natural collapse and not a violent overthrow.

That the Chinese soil should produce personal armies is natural enough. Eighty-five per cent. of the population are peasants. They are the backbone of the nation as well as the raw materials of the personal armies of the generals. The Chinese peasant is industrious, law-abiding, and though illiterate has an ample stock of worldly wisdom of his own. In peace he is a good producer; in war he can be made a good fighter if properly led. He is as good material for the building of a State as found anywhere in the world. But Chinese masses have not been made actively conscious of the duties of citizenship in a national State. The peasant is poor, illiterate, attached to family and village. His natural needs are satisfied by means found in his immediate neighbourhood. In any case, lack of good roads prevents him from reaching beyond. For him, family, village, and district are the world. Hitherto, the predominant political philosophy of China has been one of extreme *laissez-faire*. The State has done almost nothing to nationalise the masses. The peasant is conscious of the existence of the State only through taxation and occasional criminal jurisdiction. When pressed by poverty and the monotony of village life, he joins the army of some general and remains loyal to the man who pays him and treats him with decency. Before 1926, the

peasant-mercenary soldier fought in any war, for anybody, against anybody, without demanding to know why he should shoot and be shot. Since 1926 the change has not been deep enough to alter the situation fundamentally. While the modern arts of propaganda can go far in arousing the passions of the peasantry, there is not much discrimination. Kuomintang and communist slogans can get hold of the peasant, just as the Christianity of General Feng Yu-hsiang, the Buddhism of General Tang Sen-chi, the mediæval magic of the Boxers, and the pseudo-Christianity of the Taipengs each in its day got hold of the masses. And beneath the veneer of hot-house indoctrination you find that the peasant is still uncomfortable unless his loyalty is attached to some person. This fact cannot be changed until there has been a fundamental social-economic revolution.

So far I have dwelt on the traditional aspects of the present situation in China. If this were all, the problem, though difficult, would be simple. Personal armies and illiterate peasantry have been with us for a good many centuries, and yet we managed to live most of the time in peace and unity. On top of the traditional aspects there have been added modern complications. First of all, the revolution of 1911 broke with tradition. Instead of setting up another dynasty, it established a republic. With all that can be said for republicanism in the abstract and for the difficulties connected with the setting up of a new dynasty—and I assure you king-making in the broad daylight of the twentieth century in China is almost impossible—it is manifest that the political contribution of Confucianism has no validity in a modern republican State, at least without a great deal of modernistic reinterpretation. Confucianism torn apart from monarchy is like a flying buttress without the cathedral walls to make it functionally useful. If the new intelligentsia, in setting up the republic, could agree upon a new spiritual basis for the new State, the situation would not have been so disastrous. But agreement among the intellectuals has been as difficult as agreement among the generals. To the possible differences of political faith born of our own intellectual evolution, we have managed to impart all the political differences of all political parties of all Western nations. It was unfortunate that when we began to take the West seriously after the Russo-Japanese War, the West itself lost its faith in its traditional liberalism and began a series of political experiments, intensified by the World War and its aftermath. Some of the Westernisers in China got stranded at Gladstonianism; others jumped to the doctrines of

Marx, as practised by Lenin; still others are reaching for the newer heavens of Fascism and National Socialism; more recently, a small group are turning back to Chinese culture itself.

I am a member of this last class and have participated with zest in its intra-class controversies. I naturally believe that my class is the salt of China and moulds her present and still more her future. Yet for some years I have felt that not all is well. Reflecting on the scene in China from the distance of London, I see more clearly where we have gone astray. We have sinned not only in disagreeing with each other and thus cancelling each other's influence, but in living apart from our people. We reside in the cities where modern conveniences are available. We read foreign books and are engrossed in things in which the people have no interest. Whereas the peasant wants more land and less taxation, we imagine he wants freedom of speech, press and association, or class struggle and world revolution, or mathematical economics, or political pluralism, or elections and parliament, or stream-line coaches, or modernistic architecture. We can be eloquent in the class-room, in the Press of Shanghai and Peiping, even come to Chatham House and make you think we are intelligent, and yet we cannot make ourselves understood to a village crowd in China, far less make ourselves accepted as leaders by the peasants. History has made the intellectual class the leaders of the Chinese people and we have no intention of abdication, but just now the leaders and the led live in different worlds and different centuries. It is as if an army had its officers on one field and all its privates on another field with systems of trenches between the two. In the meantime, the militarists stole into the field of the privates and claimed them all for their own, leaving the intellectual class without a following. In a sense, the real struggle in China is between the two camps, in one of which—the traditional—are found the militarists and the people, and in the other—the modern—are found the intellectuals. The picture is much blurred because there is considerable firing within each of the camps, directed not against the opposing camp.

A second group of modern complications is so well known to you that I need not dwell on them. We are engaged not merely in reunification, for a reunited China remaining traditional in all her ways would not be able to stand the rude and hard struggle of the nations. While trying to create unity, we are at the same time attempting to give the country the needed modern material equipment, such as industries, railways, air lines, a modern army, etc., as well as a modern social and political organisation. In

other words, we are trying to crowd into a few years the changes which the West has made from the middle of the eighteenth century to the present time. We are making the adjustments necessary for the change from isolation to world life.

While making this mighty attempt we are constantly interfered with. Extraterritoriality takes away from our government part of its essential powers. Rebel leaders and defeated militarists find in the concessions convenient places for incubation or recuperation. Foreigners beyond the reach of Chinese law, for profit or for sympathy, under the guise of merchants, travellers, admirers of Chinese art, etc., circulate in China and bring moral and material comfort to discontented elements. Our neighbour Japan thinks it to her interest not to allow the unification and modernisation of China to proceed without exacting in time a good price for her acquiescence. As things stand, no party or leader can go ahead with the twofold task of unification and modernisation if that party or leader is known to be anti-Japanese.

I have briefly analysed the historical background, the social and intellectual conditions, and the foreign difficulties which together have constituted our problem. It remains for me to speak about the latest efforts and tendencies at a solution.

The work of Nanking, for the sake of analysis, can be divided into two categories, liquidating the past and building the future. The former category has been entirely the task of General Chiang K'ai-shek. He has empirically and almost unconsciously followed in the main the traditional pattern of statesmanship. He started with the lower Yangtse as his nuclear region and, as in the past, has by force and diplomacy added province after province to the domain of direct rule of the central government until to-day no province is in open rebellion and only three or four provinces have potentialities of danger. As far as unity is concerned, the picture of China is brighter to-day than in any year since the Republic was proclaimed, with the possible exception of the brief period when Yuan was at his height.

The work of General Chiang, measured by the standards of any modern political ideology, will be found short. He has used a great deal of manœuvre, as much of force; he has tended to concentrate power in his own hands. I personally think that this has been inevitable. If he has not submitted to democratic control, the provincial war-lords have been even more arbitrary and irresponsible. Furthermore, democratic control in the centre with autocratic control in the provinces would end in the oblitera-

tion of all central power. With the provinces each going its way, competing in armament always, indulging in civil war now and then, tending to erect economic barriers between provinces, China would sink more and more into mediævalism. The historical mission of General Chiang, as I conceive it, is to sweep away with a big broom the provincial feudalisms and create a central power that can at least keep the peace. With peace, the efforts towards modernisation, both governmental and popular, can fructify. I am convinced that once China gets on the horse she will learn to ride and even enter the international cup race. The price we are paying for unity is admittedly big, but the price we have paid during the past twenty years for disunity was several times bigger.

General Chiang's task has not been finished. There remain three or four provinces potentially dangerous from the viewpoint of unity, chief of which are Kuangtung and Kuangsi. Foreign papers have exaggerated the danger. To put it in the worst terms, their power of doing evil is very limited. Then there are the communists to be finished. The problem of communism needs more explanation.

Properly speaking, there is very little communism in China. In the so-called Soviet regions where the Chinese communist army has exercised control, no communist doctrine has been put into practice. Land has been divided among the peasants, but not collectivised. Trade has been regulated, but not monopolised by the Soviet authority. Conditions in China were so unfavourable to communism as practised in Russia that the most prominent Chinese communist advocating integral communism was exiled to Moscow by his comrades for further education. What we have in China is peasant discontent, to be satisfied not by communism but by adjustment of taxation and redistribution of land ownership. General Chiang in a way recognised this when he proclaimed three years ago that the liquidation of communism in China was to be achieved seventy per cent. by economic policy and thirty per cent. by force. Although he has not observed in practice these percentages, his policy during the past three years has been twofold. On the one hand, he waged war on the communist regions where Soviet government had been set up under the protection of a communist army; on the other, as soon as a district was retaken, better local administration was introduced and economic relief, in form of seeds and cattle, of loans, promotion of cooperation, was given to the returning peasants. The landlords' title to

property has been recognised and upheld by the State, but rents have been limited and the landlords have been forced to prove their title, which in many cases was impossible because the deeds had been destroyed during the communist reign. By such methods he has succeeded in clearing the province of Kiangsi, the main stronghold of communism.

The anti-communist campaign has been both long and costly. At the beginning many were opposed to it; even now some doubt the eventual outcome. However, General Chiang, while fighting the communist armies, has had to keep an eye on the situation of the other provinces. It was not enough that he should suppress the communist armed revolt; he must see to it that the position of the central government in relation to the refractory provinces should at the same time improve. A year and a half ago, the militarists in Fukien actually went on the war-path, thinking that all General Chiang's energies were absorbed in the anti-communist campaign. The swift victory of the central armies showed that he had considerable reserves. During the past several months, the scattered communist armed bands have fled to Kueichow, Yunnan, and Szechuan, appearing now here and now there. In the latest development, two things should be observed. First, the communists have gone to provinces which had not been directly controlled by the central government. Secondly, the armies of General Chiang have followed the bands and have begun a systematic campaign which promises to eliminate both the communist and the former local militarists. At least, that has been the result in the province of Kueichow. As a military problem it seems to me that Chinese communism has seen the beginning of the end. As a social-economic problem peasant discontent is still to be removed, for that exists even in provinces where there has been no organised communism and the measures hitherto taken have been grossly inadequate.

The other category of Nanking's work, building for the future, has not large concrete results to show, partly because the resources of government have been mainly devoted to liquidation of the past. The railway mileage has been increased; whole systems of provincial motor roads have been constructed; good beginnings have been made in wireless communication and in aviation; university and higher technical education have been steadily supported; the foundation of Academia Sinica, including most branches of human knowledge, has been a powerful stimulus to research; the taxes of the central government have been greatly

consolidated and rationalised in administration; government control of finance has been made stronger; government administration of public relief in cases of flood or drought has been on a much larger and more scientific basis; vigorous attempts are being made to develop the hitherto neglected provinces in the north-west. These and other things make up a record which, while falling short of the needs of the country, is all in the right direction. When we ponder on the difficulties we have had to face, both domestic and foreign, the wonder is that we have managed to do so much.

Every step in modernisation is a help towards unity. Take the modern banker in China: his interests require peace and stability in as large an area as possible; he has an enormous distaste for provincialism and a perfect horror for civil war. Likewise the modern industrialist and the modern intellectual. The latter class, though differing in views as to what kind of country China should be, is united in demanding a united China; in its outlook there is no provincialism.

The policy of the two partners, General Chiang and Mr. Wang Ching-wei, who are guiding the destinies of China to-day, seems to be to push the completion of unification through modernisation, not through further wars. Barring unforeseen factors, they may succeed. But this modern world is full of surprises. Who could have foretold that the United States would force deflation on China? And who can tell when this political volcano of the East, Japan, will again burst?

This much I am sure. Nanking's ways may be hard to explain or understand in terms of Western experience, may be even distasteful to idealists in the West of various descriptions. But they are Chinese ways. If they should fail, there remains no Chinese alternative. Foreign ways, enforced by the bayonet on China, may be, in foreign eyes, better than Chinese ways. But that alternative, I can say with certainty, will be rejected by the Chinese people.

Summary of Discussion.

LT.-COL. H. ST. CLAIR SMALLWOOD said that Dr. Tsiang in his address had used the expression "If you understand Chinese politics," and he felt that that "if" was an extremely large one.

He was very interested in Dr. Tsiang's theory of nuclear growth from a small number of provinces, which indicated that there must have been a change since he was in China, since he could remember only a very few provinces adhering to the central government. In the north, Manchuria was divorced from China and Mongolia was

absolutely under Russian control. Canton was independent, so was Sinkiang, and central government had little or no control over Szechuan and Yunnan. It did not seem as if the nucleus was growing at the rate which the lecturer had suggested, and the real unification of China might be centuries ahead. He would therefore be glad if Dr. Tsiang could throw a little light upon—

(1) Whether the unification of China could be made to include Mongolia or an attempt to regain Manchuria.

(2) The financial position. The buying up of silver by the United States had meant the export of silver from China, who did not know where to look for money. She had lately been in the markets of the world for money but without success, and there could be no hope of her unification until she had acquired financial help, which was only likely to come from a group of countries, as no one country could put up the money.

DR. TSIANG said that when he spoke about unification he meant the end of the civil wars. Manchuria and Mongolia were not problems of the civil wars, but were international problems. If China could once get the eighteen provinces united, then she might find some solution for the question of Turkestan and Manchuria and Mongolia. There were already nine provinces under the control of General Chiang K'ai-shek. In addition there were the provinces which were not under the direct control of General Chiang K'ai-shek but which supported him, of which Dr. Tsiang's own province of Hunan was one. Thus unification would come by degrees.

As to the second question he knew very little about finance.

MR. G. E. HUBBARD said that Dr. Tsiang had not made it very clear what form the unification of China would take. Some few years ago there had been a conflict of opinion in China as to whether the unification ideal should be a central or a federal one. At one time it had been said that the policy of the Nanking Government was in the direction of federalism and that the central authority was relinquishing the attempt to impose its direct control on the provinces.

Dr. Tsiang had said that the historical unification of China took the form of centralisation, and that the idea of separate states on the basis of the Holy Roman Empire was foreign to China. The speaker had very little knowledge of ancient Chinese history, but his impression was that there had been several periods when such a federal system existed. Had it not been so at the time of Confucius himself?

If unification came about, would it be in the form of a highly centralised system under a central government such as existed at Nanking or was a federal system likely to develop? And would the events of the last five years, especially the present relations between China and Japan, be likely to favour the federal solution or the opposite? It seemed obvious that a China divided into provinces with a high degree of independence would be more vulnerable to outside

pressure than a centralised China. On the other hand, it was possible from what was known or guessed of Japan's policy towards China (and Dr. Tsiang had admitted that China had to pay great regard to that) that Japan might favour the decentralised system.

Dr. Tsiang said that he felt the terms federalism and unitary government were not very applicable to China.

In China's history there had never been a single instance of federalism. At the time of Confucius China was like Germany before the nineteenth century. It was a feudal State but not a federal State. Unification in China was not possible with federalism, because as things were in China the people could not control the provinces. It would be a question of trying to federate a number of militarists, which was impossible. If the people in every province could have political power as in the United States a federal government would be possible, otherwise it would only mean a perpetuation of the civil war. The generals in control of the provinces fought each not because the people wished to fight each other, but for their own objects. At present the people were not organised, but fifty years later when the political consciousness of the people had developed it might be possible to try a federal government and yet have unity. In present circumstances it would mean disunity.

But that did not necessarily mean that they should have a highly centralised form of government. The central government could delegate functions and powers to the provinces.

With regard to the foreign situation he did not think that Japan would prefer federalism for China. What she did want was to control certain vital keys to China. She would like to get the Chinese market and opportunity for investment in China, and to make China a kind of appendage of Japan. But it did not matter whether China was federal or unitary.

From the point of view of China's national strength he was much in favour of the unitary form of government. But if the process that was going on succeeded he thought the result would be very like the foundation of another dynasty, though no one would use the words dynasty or throne or emperor.

Mr. E. R. Hughes asked four questions:

(1) There was great truth in what Dr. Tsiang had said as to there being unification in China in the third century B.C., when the Ch'in dynasty came into existence, but a distinction should be made between that unification and the kind of unification which was achieved by the Han dynasty. That seemed a vital turning-point in the history of the Chinese people.

With regard to unification and the bureaucracy, his impression was that the officials who were recruited from the mass of the people were sent out not so much as governors in the European sense of the word, but more as cultural agents. They did valuable work in the

way of forming a cultural centre, but themselves carried out no policing, education, or administration of justice. Quarrels were generally settled by middle-men, and only when this failed by referring them to any State official.

(2) He appreciated what Dr. Tsiang said as to the military result of the Taiping rebellion in the nineteenth century. But was there not a duplication on the civil side? The Chinese leaders like Tseng Kuo-fan were not *persona grata* in the Court and the result was that they were kept away from Pekin and were given a certain power, both military and civil, which enabled them to develop a sort of provincial loyalty which was a new feature in Chinese history. That development of local feeling was another turning-point in China's history.

(3) He sympathised with Dr. Tsiang when he said it was not possible to talk about China in terms of central or federal government. It was not until he himself had been to Canada that he realised the difference between the government of a small country like England and the government of a continent. Although the people of Canada were prepared to accept Ottawa as a unifying cultural centre, they turned against it the moment it tried to do anything of a heavily bureaucratic nature which did not suit their special economic interests, and the position in China seemed to be much the same.

(4) Was it not true that the new study of Chinese history, with the resulting re-alignment of the forces to be seen in the history of the past, would bring a new inspiration not only to the intelligentsia but also in time to the less educated members of the community?

DR. TSIANG agreed with Mr. Hughes' first point; the bureaucracy, in fact, did not do much. But there was no question of federalism, the whole government was a *laissez-faire* government. It was not a question of the difference between a provincial centre and a national government. The whole conception of government was a negative one, and even now he would not advocate too much interference by the central government with the provinces. It should make an alliance with democracy in the districts, for the centre and the various localities were by nature allies. The militarists corresponded with the old nobility of Europe, and, as was so often done in Europe, the government might very well make allies of the third estate.

With regard to provincialism, it was not so much that provincialism was born as a result of the Taiping rebellion. There always had been a certain degree of provincialism, but there was no doubt that the personal army with its natural advantages had a great effect on it. It had been calculated that in 1885 Hunan contributed three viceroys and five governors; by 1895 there was only one viceroy and one governor. The rise of the personal army did stimulate the provincial revolutionary. He agreed with Mr. Hughes' fourth point.

A MEMBER asked what happened to the power of taxation when the central government got control of the nine provinces? Did the

central government control taxation or did it take a percentage of the taxes? Real power was where the power of taxation was, whether China was unified or not.

DR. TSIANG said that some of the taxes were collected by the central government and some by the provinces. Customs and excise, for example, were collected by the central government. The land tax was collected by the provincial governments and went to the support of the provincial governments. The *likin* where it existed was collected by the army stationed in the district.

A MEMBER said he understood Dr. Tsiang to use the words "No leader can unify China who stands on the anti-Japanese platform."

Whatever might be the answer to that, would he give his views of the discussions going on between General Chiang K'ai-shek and the Japanese Minister? What did he think would become of Sino-Japanese cooperation in view of the serious financial position of the Chinese Government? Would the Chinese Government accept monetary assistance from Japan?

DR. TSIANG said that when he came to England he read a number of things about the negotiations between China and Japan: that an alliance might be made between China and Japan; that Japan was trying to persuade China to leave the League of Nations; that China should borrow from Japan so as to exclude the influence of other Powers. He could not say that all that was entirely without foundation, but it was contrary to everything that he knew about the situation. The view of Japan, as he understood the situation, was that if advantage was taken of her occupation of Manchuria to talk about Sino-British friendship or Sino-American friendship she would come back to China to restore the balance. Therefore she said to China, "It is said you want to import experts from the League of Nations. We can guarantee that our experts are quite as good and cheaper. You want to borrow money through the League—that is, you want to borrow English, American or French money, for the League has no money of its own. We shall be glad to lend you money and without conditions in the shape of political guarantees." In those circumstances it was very difficult for China to say "No" to Japan. What the government did say was that it could not negotiate in such general terms and that the Japanese must be more specific, and in regard to specific things the Japanese had not gone as far as the newspapers reported. Japan did not worry about China being in the League of Nations. Japan did not worry about China recognising Manchuria because recognition did not alter the facts. With regard to the lending of money, Japan had not much to lend and she was more anxious to collect her old debts. She gave new loans because that was the only way in which she could collect her old debts.

A MEMBER asked if Dr. Tsiang would elaborate what he had said about Confucianism in modern China and say what part religion played in Chinese life? Also would he say something about the languages that were understood in China and what part he thought broadcasting would play in the unification of China?

DR. TSIANG said that there were certain districts which had dialects which were not understood by men from other provinces. But with the exception of those places the Chinese understood each other. In Tsing-Hua University at Peiping there were students from every province to whom he lectured in Chinese. Some of the students had difficulty with certain phrases, but after a few weeks everyone could understand them all, even the Canton boys. Broadcasting would help the unification of language and unification would help broadcasting.

In the old days Confucianism was a fundamental part of China; its political teaching was that China should have only one Emperor. This doctrine was later extended to say that there should be one Emperor of the whole universe. But Confucianism had been a political factor of the greatest importance, though in modern times its hold on the intellectual classes was small. Its hold in the country places was much larger. It was doubtful if it could be revived in the future.

MR. R. O. MENNELL referred to Dr. Tsiang's observation that it was useless to apply modern Western ideology to Chinese problems, arising as they did from ancient traditions peculiar to the East. Did he not think that the pinning of faith to military power in order to bring about unification and peace was an example of this very thing? The violence exhibiting itself in China, as elsewhere, was surely largely due to the agony of poverty and could not be arrested by military suppression. Dr. Tsiang had admitted that the Nanking Government had attempted little in the way of relieving economic distress or of tackling economic problems.

An application of Western ideology of a different kind had been the sending, in response to an invitation from the Chinese Government, of the League of Nations delegation under Dr. Rajchman, a body widely representative of Western culture at its best. Was this disinterested effort at friendly cooperation a thing to be rejected?

When Dr. Tsiang laid emphasis on Western ideology was it his intention to suggest that the Japanese had an ideology more appropriate to China and that the economic approaches being made from the Japanese side would be more welcome?

DR. TSIANG said that the process of unification in China was partly by force and partly by policy, and he thought it would have to continue in that way.

He had always criticised Nanking for not doing more for the masses, but he did not want his criticism to result in the disruption

of the Nanking régime. The condition of the masses would have to be improved, but nothing was to be gained by a revolution. Take, for example, the Fukien rebellion. It was desired to carry out what he thought were good social and economic ideas with regard to the division of land and the confiscation of landlords' property. But before those ideas could be put into operation it was necessary to have an army, and an army meant increased taxation. And so the people who should have been the first to benefit from the experiment suffered the most from it.

He thought the civil war in China was very like the Wars of the Roses in England, and they would not be able to do much for the masses in China until they had a Henry VII or a Henry VIII.

People in China had had and still had a great deal of respect for Dr. Rajchman and the League group. He had not entirely failed but he had not done as much as was expected. The failures were not due to Chinese antagonism or to the fact that China preferred the Japanese form of cooperation.

The Chairman (Professor C. K. Webster) said that they had had an interpretation of modern politics from an historian who, because of his profound knowledge of the history of modern China and its relation to other countries, had been able to throw a new light on problems that had often been discussed at Chatham House. The way in which Dr. Tsiang had interpreted his country was the way in which they wished such interpretations could always be given in the Institute. Such an interpretation involved not only experience and knowledge and profound learning, but a combination of all those qualities with a deep insight into modern problems. They had listened to one of the makers of the new China. He had as great an influence with his countrymen in conjunction with his great colleagues. The great man whom he had not praised, to whom he had not applied any adjectives, had been the centre of the process of unification, and, in the face of disappointments and difficulties that would have made many men quail, had gone on amid foreign aggression and domestic revolution, famine and flood—General Chiang K'ai-shek, who, it might perhaps be hoped, would be the Henry Tudor of the new China.

THE FUTURE OF CENTRAL EUROPE[1]

By Dr. Milan Hodza

Before speaking of the new Central Europe I should like to say something of its recent past. The public opinion of Western Europe and of the United States of America still seems to resent the so-called " Balkanisation " of the new Central Europe. It is true that before the War Central Europe was not very complicated. There was the large German Empire and an equally large Austria-Hungary; further south, the small Balkan States which were not considered as part of Central Europe, and still further south, up to 1913, the great Turkish Empire. Even very serious-minded politicians and economists still express their regrets that the former Central Europe, comparatively united, was broken into pieces. The big three, namely Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau, had to endure many criticisms because at the Peace Conference in 1919–1920 they permitted the division of the political and economic units in Central Europe into small parts. Even the slogan of a " powder magazine " was created.

Was the Balkanisation of Central Europe with its " powder magazine " really an historical necessity, could it have been avoided, and finally, is this prophecy of a " powder magazine " unavoidable for the new Central Europe?

First of all I must emphasise that the national differentiation of the parts as well as their dissolution into the present eleven States in Central Europe was not really caused by the World War. The War only completed and crystallised an inevitable development.

It would be highly erroneous to believe that old and relatively united Central Europe was by any means a quiet idyll. As far back as the end of the eighteenth century, and with vital force at the beginning of the nineteenth century, this region witnessed the growing struggle of all the oppressed nationalities, first for equal rights and later on for independence. The revolutions in 1848 and 1849 kindled these fires even in areas hitherto quiet. A few statesmen were even willing to give this development a constitutional expression. I think the Russian Tsar Alexander I

[1] Address given at Chatham House on March 26th, 1935, with Professor R. W. Seton-Watson, D.Litt., in the Chair.

and his Foreign Minister the Polish Count Czartoryjski were among the first to evince this—two young men bound by ties of a romantic personal friendship and by a common desire to find a solution to the great political and moral problem of making Poland part of the great Russian Empire as a free, semi-sovereign State. I consider the way in which Tsar Alexander parted with his friend and their common idealism as one of the most interesting problems of political psychology. But because no solution was then found for relations between Russia and Poland, a first "powder magazine" was created in Central Europe, which continued to explode during a whole century in the form of revolutions and international crises.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Austro-Hungarian Habsburg Monarchy missed a unique opportunity of lending a helping hand towards the first solution of the Serbian Problem. Austria refused assistance to the most important Serbian ruler of the time, Karageorgevitch, who consequently went seeking help in Russia, where he found it. Austrian historians agreed, with regret, that this failure greatly sharpened the great eastern conflict for a whole century. Again, therefore, because another national problem was not solved, another "powder magazine" was created more than a hundred years ago, which became a permanent and final threat to peace in the area of present-day Central Europe. However, this inability of the Habsburg Empire to understand the racial problem was not confined to their foreign policy. It was more serious that the Habsburgs were equally incapable of grasping their obligations in the realm of internal politics. And yet these obligations were quite clear. In the revolutionary period of 1848–1849 both Metternich and Schwarzenberg must have seen that an overwhelming majority of the population of the Habsburg Monarchy was neither German nor Magyar, but Slav and Roumanian and, in Northern Italy, Italian. A great opportunity was offered for the creation, by a decisive policy, of a federal Empire instead of an absolutist and Germanised one. The Austrian Slav nations as well as the Roumanians would gladly have cooperated with the Habsburgs for the execution of such a policy. At the Imperial Parliament in Kroměříž (Kremsier) in March 1849 the Czechs proposed to create a federal empire consisting of eight semi-sovereign States. In Hungary, Slovaks, Serbs, Roumanians, as well as the whole of Croatia, took up arms in support of this idea. They gathered round the Habsburgs and offered them the basis of a policy, the only one possible, upon which Vienna would have

been able to establish a strong nucleus of a stable and peaceful Central Europe. The Czech leader Palacký, who was invited to the Pan-Germanic Assembly in Frankfurt in 1848, openly declared that Austria (of course a federal Austria) was a necessity, which, if it did not exist, would have to be created. What was the answer from Austria, from the Magyars? The Imperial Parliament, to which the Czech Deputies submitted their proposals for a federation, was dissolved. The Slovak authors of a federalist programme for Hungary were persecuted. When a Serbian delegation proposed to Louis Kossuth autonomy for the Hungarian Serbs, his reply was: "The sword only will decide between us." The Roumanian subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, like the Croats, Serbs and Slovaks, were driven into a revolutionary war against the Magyars. The political grouping was clear: on the one side there was the Habsburg Dynasty backed by the Austrian Germans and, ten years later, allied with the Magyars for a programme of Germanisation and Magyarisation. On the other side were the Czechs with the Slovaks, the Serbs and the Croats, and that part of Roumania which, up to the World War, was included in Austria-Hungary.

I have referred to this historical background to show that the present-day Little Entente is, fundamentally, not a post-War creation or even improvisation, nor is it the work of formal diplomacy only. The foundations of it were laid eighty-eight years ago, in defence of national existence against Germanic and Magyar attacks. Eighty-eight years ago this alliance was based upon national liberty, upon democracy, and, therefore, upon peaceful evolution. The battle was, at that time, lost and the system of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire prevailed, which meant, in reality, creating and maintaining "powder magazines" in the heart of Central Europe.

In 1867, after the war between Prussia and Austria, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, headed by the Habsburgs, was given another opportunity to correct its historical blunders of 1848–1849. The Habsburgs then arrived at an important agreement with Hungary, and, at the height of their power, both the Austrian-Germans and the Magyars could have afforded to be generous, not only for the sake of political ethics but for their own interest. The Czechs were claiming a kingdom of their own within the framework of the Empire; in Hungary, the Slovaks, Serbs and Roumanians asked for local government in national matters. But both Vienna and Budapest refused the federal idea and replaced it by the double hegemony of a German and

Hungarian minority ruling over the majority of all other nations of the Empire. The first pre-War Little Entente raised its head and Austria became the scene of bitter national strife, while the Hungarian Government practically destroyed the suffrage of the Slovaks, Roumanians and Serbs, with the result that their representatives got into Parliament only by accident, and finally declared that they had no alternative but to remain passive, taking no part in parliamentary activity. In Croatia some sort of local political autonomy was formally permitted, but in practice everything was systematically crushed by brute force.

Yet once more Providence gave Austria-Hungary a fresh chance of regeneration. In 1895 a Congress of Slovaks, Serbs and Roumanians took place in Budapest. Again the pre-War Little Entente offered Hungary a solid basis for the settlement of national problems. Of course it declared at the same time that, in the event of its proposals being again rejected, it would inevitably remain in passive opposition to the Hungarian parliamentary system because it was impossible to participate in it. In Austria, Czechs as well as other Slavs repeated their attempts to obtain a positive attitude towards the Empire, while in Hungary pioneers of national liberty were put in prison and the Magyar Government relied on guns. In this way the dangers of a Central European "powder magazine" increased. Even as late as ten years before the World War, Slovaks, Serbs and Roumanians submitted to the Magyars a new proposal, namely, a universal suffrage, which would give them appropriate representation in the Hungarian Parliament and, consequently, a first step towards a settlement of their national problems. The solution of the problems could not differ from that proposed by the Czechs back in 1849, namely, a federation of the Habsburg Empire. The Magyars refused the proposal and in effect the Emperor Franz Josef also refused it. But another Habsburg did not refuse it, namely, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand d'Este, the successor to the throne, whose personality is to-day a matter of history and has, indeed, been obscured by extreme sympathies and antipathies. I refer to the man who became the victim, in June 1914, of the Sarajevo *attentat*, and whose death became the pretext for launching a war that swept the whole world.

I have a right to talk about Franz Ferdinand, as I and several of my political friends were for seven years in close political and personal relations with him. From 1905 I was a member of the Hungarian Parliament, where we founded a Parliamentary party of Slovaks, Serbs and Roumanians of Hungary. In 1906 this

party was completed by men such as my colleagues Maniu, Vajda Voivod and the Serb leader Polit-Desančić. We could not present our programme and proposals to Franz Josef since he flatly refused such ideas. We submitted them, therefore, to the heir to the throne. His opinions about federalising the Habsburg Empire were such that our programme met with his understanding. Franz Ferdinand omitted to formulate his attitude towards the Czechs, but he wanted a Habsburg Federation, which he saw as the only salvation possible for both the Empire and the Dynasty. On the other hand, he considered the Magyar régime dangerous both for himself as the future ruler as well as for the Habsburg Monarchy. In questions of foreign policy he endeavoured to free himself from the overwhelming influence of the Hohenzollerns. It was by no means easy to collaborate with him, as he was a personification of the historical pride of the Habsburg family, to which was added the realisation of his responsibility for the Empire's future, but his intellect and political outlook were far wider than those of many Habsburg rulers. Although I knew what he wished and how he wished it, I cannot say, and nobody else can, how far he would have persevered in putting his programme into practice.

Franz Josef was succeeded by Karl, who of course had not the slightest qualification to be a ruler of an Empire in which so much depended upon the Emperor's decision. The Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Stephen Tisza, in November and December 1916, lost no time in convincing Karl that he should at once be crowned as King of the Magyars. This coronation in Hungary is of special importance, since it binds the King by a traditional oath to observe the constitution and to preserve the integrity of the kingdom. This formula, otherwise obvious, had in the case of Karl fatal consequences. The obligation not to change the constitution implied continuing the political serfdom of the Slovaks, Serbs and Roumanians and preserving the dualist form of the Habsburg Monarchy. Thus by his first deed as a ruler Karl made it *a priori* impossible to attempt any reform of the constitution. He never corrected this blunder and could not eradicate it even by offering a separate peace in March 1917. He was unable to do this because at that time he was no longer master of the situation in Austria-Hungary, the power having passed into the hands of German Generals, of William II and his Headquarters Staff.

The Austro-Hungarian "powder magazine," built and enlarged since 1848, finally exploded in 1914, and caused a world-wide

conflagration, burying once and for all the régime which had created it. So you see that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was not at all an organisation for order, tranquillity and peace. It would be far more accurate to speak of it as dangerously playing with the fire which finally destroyed it. Austria-Hungary did not succeed in solving either her national or her social problems and was an altogether wrong instrument for the maintenance of peace and progress in Central Europe.

I know that many economists regret the united economic territory which was represented by Austria-Hungary. They are mistaken, however. Even from the economic point of view, the old Austria-Hungary was no idyll. Economists in Western Europe complain sometimes about the present-day tariffs in Central Europe. I agree that that system is far from ideal, but it must be remembered what tariffs Austria-Hungary put up against the Balkan States, and especially against Serbia. For long years a tariff war went on on the Magyar frontiers against Serbia and Roumania. Magyar estate-holders introduced against agricultural imports from the Balkans a system which often amounted to prohibition. Pessimistic historians as well as politicians maintained that these periodical customs wars concealed the germ of an armed conflict. Perhaps that was not the case, but at any rate the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was separated from the Balkans by an insurmountable barrier of 100,000 pigs and 50,000 oxen.

If the old system was unable to consolidate Central Europe, the question remains whether we shall be capable of doing so in the new international order which arose out of the World War; whether we shall succeed in getting rid of all the "powder magazines" and in destroying all traces of them; whether we shall be able to dispose of all the economic as well as the political obstacles that are still in the way of the new Central Europe.

What are the main issues involved in the organisation of this new Central Europe? Does it concern anybody outside Central Europe, and possibly also France and Italy? The new Central Europe consists of eleven States lying between Germany and Russia. The greater the unrest which arises from German armaments and from the Soviet economic system, the greater is the need that Central Europe should become an element of economic and political consolidation. An older idea of a consolidated Central Europe was in the first place conceived by Germany. Her policy had tended in this direction since 1848 and it was her definite objective in the World War—the famous

" Drang nach Osten." That would have resulted in the present area of new Central Europe with its 108 millions of inhabitants being under German rule.

Incidentally, I would not attribute the " Drang nach Osten," in the form in which it arose in the Middle Ages, and again in the eighteenth century, solely to German aggression. The nations of the new Central Europe were then virtually minors, from the economic, political and cultural points of view. German civilisation was the stronger, and a stronger civilisation always penetrates areas that are less civilised. That might well be the sociological meaning of the historic German " Drang nach Osten." The World War, however, created a new situation. It made the nations of Central Europe free and they took upon themselves the obligation of becoming factors of civilisation on an equal footing with other nations. Up to the World War Germany had common frontiers with Russia. To-day Germany and Russia are separated by Poland. There can be no doubt that Poles, Czechoslovaks, Austrians, Magyars and even the States formerly embraced in the term " Balkan," are capable of cultural activity. They have for centuries been good workers for European civilisation and indeed defended it first five hundred and then three hundred years ago against Turkish invasions. Now since the World War we are witnessing the revival of their historic forces, political and moral. Therefore the civilising mission of Germany in the new Central Europe has become superfluous.

It is sometimes said that Germany forms the geographical centre of Europe. But even from the geographical point of view Germany is not Central Europe. Geographically, the centre of Europe is formed by the Polish River Vistula, by the Slovak River Váh, by the part of the Danube flowing at the southern frontier of Czechoslovakia and further through Hungary, and finally by the Serbian rivers Morava and Vardar down to Salonika. This is the Central European Corridor, similar to the Western European Corridor formed by the Rhine and Rhône. This shows that Germany has no right to claim the domination of Central Europe either from the cultural or from the geographical point of view. Central Europe belongs to the Central Europeans. While the relation of Germany to Central Europe can never be represented by any kind of domination, we sincerely wish that it may become that of cooperation on an equal footing.

Have any attempts been made to organise this new Central Europe economically as well as politically? The nucleus of the

new Central Europe is formed by the Little Entente, which consists of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Roumania, totalling 48,063,000 inhabitants. Another important feature of the new Central Europe is formed by the Balkan Pact. Two of its members, namely Yugoslavia and Roumania, are already closely connected with Czechoslovakia through the Little Entente. Further members of the Balkan Pact are Greece, Turkey with its 24,831,000 inhabitants, and it is to be hoped Bulgaria. Greece and Turkey may not have a direct interest in the new Central Europe, but they desire to entertain with her the best relations possible. Thirdly, a union has been formed by the three Baltic States, Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania, with 6,074,000 inhabitants. Finally, the fourth part of this new Central Europe consists, under the Rome Pact of March 17th, 1934, of Hungary and Austria with 14,596,000 inhabitants.

The problem now is how to get these four parts closer together. As to the Little Entente and the Balkan Pact they are already complementary and mutually interrelated. The three Baltic States are neutral. So the problem melts down to the relations between the Little Entente and the Rome Pact, *i.e.* Austria and Hungary. Personally I always maintained that the Little Entente and the Rome Pact were not mutually exclusive; they could and should try to reach an agreement. This opinion of mine was confirmed three months ago in an article in *The Manchester Guardian* by the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Dr. Beneš. So the fate of this new Central Europe depends upon an understanding between the Little Entente and the signatories of the Rome Pact. Such an understanding is from the economic point of view in the interest of all Western Europe, while from the point of view of peace it is of concern to the whole world.

When speaking about all this I must refer to some facts which, at least as far as my country is concerned, may improve the goodwill which is indispensable if the handicaps to economic coöperation in Central Europe are to be eliminated. As to the Little Entente, we are strengthening and enlarging its economic basis. During the last few months some new schemes were put forward for this purpose, and, of course, all the participants of the Little Entente will do their best to make them successful. As far as economic relations with Austria and Hungary are concerned, I hope a new era in commercial relations with these countries is to be initiated. Actually negotiations between Czechoslovakia and Austria are now taking place. Czechoslovakia agrees with a very important demand of Austria to afford preferences for

Austrian manufactured goods. This will be a new step beyond the theoretical discussions of Stresa. Preferences for Austrian manufactured goods mean undeniable sacrifice for Czechoslovak manufacturing production. Still, if we desire a consolidated Central Europe we cannot refuse to make some sacrifices.

Recently discussions have been initiated for settling our commercial relations with Hungary. Until now Czechoslovakia has only compensational conventions with Hungary. These conventions have to be replaced by a formal regular commercial treaty. A Czechoslovak-Hungarian commercial treaty signifies sacrifices for Czechoslovak agriculture. We are prepared to deal also with this problem on the footing of equity. Our enforced and broadened economic *rapprochement* with these two Danubian countries belonging to the framework of the Rome Pact may contribute to a better outlook for closer cooperation between the Little Entente and the Pact of Rome.

Obviously, considered from the economic point of view, this new Central Europe cannot be self-supporting. It is an area in which, on the average, sixty per cent. of the population belongs to agriculture. Czechoslovakia and Austria have the smallest percentage of farmers, viz. 34·6 and 30 per cent. respectively, while other Central European countries have as high a percentage of farmers as 56 and 78 per cent. The agrarian exports of Central Europe cannot be bought up either by Italy or by Germany. Who then should take them? One day even the markets of Western Europe, even the London market, may reconsider this position—of course within the interests of the commercial policy of the British Empire—since Central Europe may be desirous to go on buying from England as before the crisis. Last but not least England is, besides others, one of the most important creditors of Central European States. For example, Poland owes to England £4,640,620, Hungary £43,129,000, Bulgaria £8,770,000, etc. The States of Central Europe are at present suffering from a financial crisis and their payments are rather difficult. Their population amounts to one-half of the entire population of Western Europe, while they dispose of one-tenth of the amount of currency —195 millions of gold—and their gold covering is seventeen times smaller than that of Western Europe—7 millions of gold sterling. This shows us the reason why Central European States are paying with difficulty. They could do so much more easily by exporting their agricultural products. I think every creditor should be interested in facilitating the payments of his debtors. But England one day, in my opinion, will find that she has yet another

interest in the matter of agricultural imports from Central Europe. In the years of boom, for instance in 1929, England exported to Central Europe goods to the value of 30·65 million pounds. In 1932 this figure melted down to 24·09 million pounds and has now decreased by more than 60 per cent.

I am fully aware of the serious difficulties involved in the effort to renew and strengthen commercial relations between Western and Central Europe. But is there nowadays any international problem which is easy to solve? I believe that economic consolidation is no less important than purely diplomatic agreements. Further suggestions must and doubtless will be made in the near future as to the economic consolidation of Europe, which is an indispensable condition for better international understanding. When several years ago Briand was dreaming his great dream about a European federation, his scheme had no doubt, among other weak points, also the drawback of refusing to recognise the inter-relation between political and economic problems. Even at present it is indispensable that side by side with the international problem of disarmament there should be considered a well-thought-out endeavour to solve all these problems in the field of commercial policy that are a handicap to any successful peace policy.

Politically the importance of an organised Central Europe is obvious. The new Central Europe is first of all a suitable instrument for a definite arrangement of racial problems. The classical countries in Western Europe succeeded, many centuries ago, in consolidating their national problems and thus in settling the spirit of nationalism. I think England did it after the Spanish wars, France through Louis XIV and the great Revolution, Italy only in 1860 and Germany as late as 1870, and recently, let us hope in a definitive manner, by the return of the Saar. As far as Central Europe is concerned, national-political organisation was produced only by the World War and the subsequent Peace Conferences in 1919–1920. Those are the great landmarks of history. We are no doubt aware, all of us, that, with this national-political organisation of Central Europe, it was utterly impossible to give the different States concerned such frontiers as would exactly correspond to ethnical differentiation. That would have been a task exceeding human possibilities, because new Central Europe happens to have, besides her great ethnical units, real racial mosaics. These mosaics have their origin in the colonisation of territories inhabited by other races. Most of these colonisations are due to Germans and Magyars, sometimes simply under the influence of civilising tendencies,

sometimes as a result of well-thought-out action. Such of the frontiers as were decided by the Peace Conference correspond as far as possible to ethnical and geopolitical interests. Even if objections are raised against the present frontiers, it would be fatal to believe that any revision could bring about a general satisfactory settlement. On the contrary, any change of frontiers would mean a futile attempt at consolidation for the following reasons: if that revision were to be a small one, it could hardly satisfy those who asked for it; if, on the contrary, it were an extensive one, it would only provoke more serious objections on the part of those against whom such revision was carried out. Any kind of revision means, therefore, not a solution, but new turmoil and unrest which would make impossible any permanent settlement of political problems for the future. The new frontiers are, for the States concerned, sacred and not to be touched, especially when they are considered as representing a historical judgment on the States they have succeeded, which had to be crushed because they ruled over their nationalities by brute force. The work of the Peace Conference in 1920 so far as the frontiers of Central Europe are concerned was no improvisation but the result of ripe considerations. Such historical documents that give to humanity and civilisation new, better foundations cannot be changed according to moods and temporary situations.

Objections on ethnical grounds to the existing frontiers in Central Europe cannot be met by any revision, but they can be settled by an honest minority policy. I can speak about this with a good conscience because it is generally known that Czechoslovakia is setting a good example in her minority policy. So, for example, if we consider the percentage of national schools with the percentage of pupils according to nationality, we can see that our German minority has only 20·4 per cent. of pupils but 22 per cent. of schools, while Magyars have, for their 5·6 per cent. of pupils, 5 per cent. of schools. As far as minorities in the whole of Central and Eastern Europe are concerned, they numbered under the old régime 80,983,000, *i.e.* 36·3 per cent., whereas now their number has melted down to some 22,692,000, *i.e.* 15 per cent., and, if we include Russia, to 8·8 per cent. only.

So far as Czechoslovakia is concerned, another national problem must be mentioned—Sub-Carpathian Russia, which is to obtain a formal autonomous local government. Until now it has been semi-autonomous only. With her Ruthenians Czechoslovakia inherited 80 per cent. of illiterates and a nearly hopeless social and economic situation. These conditions having been consider-

ably ameliorated, the Czechoslovakian Government is proceeding now to fulfil its obligations in this matter, although a large part of the population and its representatives continue not to emphasise the need for the wider autonomy provided by the Peace Treaty. During the last month a new Governor, a Ruthenian leader, has been appointed in Carpathian Russia to deal with this problem.

I should like to draw attention also to the settlement of the so-called Slavic problem. For many decades up to the World War, a great part of European public opinion considered so-called Panslavism as a very dangerous "powder magazine" in the whole of Central and Eastern Europe. New Central Europe has among her eleven States four Slavonic ones. The national aspirations of these Slavs are nearly satisfied. If these Slavs consider their affinities of language and civilisation as a suitable basis for mutual cooperation, such cooperation can take place only within the framework of an international regional group of Central Europe, where Slav and non-Slav States counterbalance each other. That shows that what had been considered to be an old "powder magazine" of Europe, and what was called Panslavism, has disappeared. As to Russia, nobody would believe that she could become a political centre capable or desirous of reviving Panslavism.

One would no doubt consider it a great drawback of European diplomacy if this reorganised Central Europe did not offer far-reaching possibilities of peace also with regard to Germany and Russia. No thought is more distant from me than that of attributing now and in this place plans of expansion to either Germany or Russia. But the hard fact remains that Germany is a great nation with a tradition tending towards political expansion. Similarly, nobody can question the fact that Russia is a great nation worthy of our attention by reason of her power. Who could prophesy in what direction the tendencies of these two big nations will develop? Again, I am not speaking about tendencies that are shaped into a political programme but of those sociologically and psychologically comprehensible tendencies that can develop within big nations. Except for Poland, with her thirty-three million of population, the remaining ten States of Central Europe are medium in size or small. What a free field for particularist interferences, that would, in their ultimate consequences, never serve the idea of peace! How different would the situation be if at least these middle- and small-sized

States of new Central Europe were to form a regional economic as well as diplomatic unit! Even without counting Poland it would mean a group of seventy-five million people! It is not wholesome to leave in new Central Europe such a vast political vacuum. We cannot speak about the consolidation of Europe as long as Central Europe is not consolidated. It would be futile to repeat Briand's attempt. All our experiences point out that the road from universal to partial solutions is impassable. The road from partial to general solutions is much safer. I do not want to avoid even the question whether it is true, as it was and still is so often written and said, that even this new Central Europe has three "powder magazines," namely, the Polish Corridor; the frontiers between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Roumania; and the Austrian question. As to the Polish Corridor there is doubtless at present no danger of it becoming a "powder magazine." To insist on a revision of Czechoslovak-Hungarian frontiers would create a new "powder magazine," if it implied a serious attack against the Czechoslovak or Yugoslav or Roumanian border. From my experiences as a member of the Magyar Parliament I can say that I know Magyar psychology, and it is generally obvious that Magyar demands will be dangerous only as long as they are supported by serious factors outside Hungary. The events of the last six months are not without a certain interest. One outstanding leader of the Magyar Revisionists, who in November 1933 spoke in this place in favour of revision, declared in September 1934 that, considering the new international situation, all possibility of a revision must be postponed into the far future. Whatever may be the development of this idea in the future, this statement involves an essential disavowal of any kind of revisionist policy to-day by a man who for twelve years was its chief author and leader.

Czechoslovakia showed once more her readiness to reach an agreement with Hungary about all their normal relations. We all are sincerely pleased to see Yugoslavia marching firmly towards a safe consolidation in seeking her strongest social and political foundations in a conservative peasant democracy. If an organised Central Europe is to come into existence in which Austria would like to participate too, European policy can easily avoid an enforced union of Austria with Germany. Without an organised Central Europe what will happen I do not know. This does not mean any formation of a united front against Germany. On the contrary, an organised *bloc* of an overwhelming majority of new Central European States can become the best instrument for

arranging normal and correct relations between this region of Europe and Germany. An organised and consolidated new Europe will hold the keys by which the doors leading to several conflicts can be closed.

Summary of Discussion.

MR. J. H. HARLEY asked if it was not the case that while Monsieur Briand was elaborating his plan for federalising Europe, contemporary economic conferences were being held which comprised not only the Little Entente, but also Poland, with the object of obtaining an exchange of goods between the industrial nations of Western Europe and the agricultural States of Central Europe?

Was the clause of the Versailles Treaty which afforded Czechoslovakia access to the sea by giving her certain rights in Hamburg still working satisfactorily? Had the new régime in Germany caused any alteration in the arrangements which had already been made?

DR. MILAN HODZA said that the Hamburg scheme was not working very well.

DR. MITRANY said that one of the proposals put forward by Count Bethlen was that a plebiscite should be taken in Slovakia. What did Dr. Hodza think of that proposal and what did he think in general of the revisionist position taken up by Count Bethlen?

MR. BELL asked if Dr. Hodza would indicate on the map the countries where he suggested the Little Entente should be formed and if he would make clear whether their political entity was to remain as at present. Would the main result of that Entente be an economic agreement between the countries forming it to have more or less free trade between the various countries? Dr. Hodza had seemed to indicate that Austria might be left out of that agreement because some day she might voluntarily join Germany.

DR. HODZA said that he did not think it would be advisable to form a new Central Europe without Austria. He had only referred to the question of the *Anschluss*, or forced union of Austria with Germany. Three or four years ago he was convinced that a new Central Europe with Austria was likely, but he could not say what the position was at present. If it were possible to form a *bloc* of Central European States, the *bloc* would, in his view, consist of Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece, and in a future not too far also Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Esthonia.

A MEMBER asked what Dr. Hodza thought of the idea of the restoration of the Habsburgs as an alternative to the *Anschluss*.

DR. HODZA said he did not wish to refer to the decision of the Committee taken in 1920, according to which the question of the restoration

of the Habsburgs was an international one. Personally he could not understand how the restoration of the Habsburgs could be useful either to the cause of peace or to Austria.

With regard to the plebiscite for Slovakia, it would be erroneous to think that Slovakia had been united with Bohemia without a formal decision to do so. A decision had, in fact, been made at the town of Turčanský Sv. Martin on October 30th, 1918, by a National Council which really had been summoned by an Imperial Decree. Towards the end of the War, in October 1918, the Emperor Karl issued a decree inviting the nations concerned to make their decision according to the principle of self-determination, and the decision made by the National Council was even more effective than a plebiscite. In the Slovak Council the old parties and the old political groups were represented, with the exception of the Magyar minority which represented only about 5 per cent. of the whole population of the new Republic. This decision of the Slovak Council was adopted by more than a hundred local national councils representing local interests and local public opinion. Therefore there was no point in suggesting that a plebiscite in Slovakia should now be taken.

QUESTION: Had not the original Declaration of Turčanský Sv. Martin been altered before it was taken to Prague?

DR. HODZA said that the declaration was completed. When the original text was adopted by the National Council at Turčanský Sv. Martin, events were taking place at Budapest that were unknown to the Council. He referred to the answer by Count Andrássy to President Wilson in which he recognised the right of self-determination, especially as regarded Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Dr. Hodza had himself conveyed that information to the National Council, which thereupon decided to insert in the Declaration a paragraph which ran as follows:—
"We recognise the new international order and the national States created by the answer of Count Andrássy given to the Diplomatic Note of Wilson."

A campaign against the so-called alteration had followed and he was grateful for the opportunity of explaining what had actually happened.

DR. MITRANY said that Dr. Hodza had suggested that the arrangement in Central Europe would not mean much unless there was an economic foundation. The Little Entente had gone pretty far in arranging the political aspect, and had made at Geneva a beginning towards a common representation. But he, Dr. Mitrany, was rather sceptical about the second aspect—the organisation of economic relations on a common basis—and he wondered what Dr. Hodza had in mind about that, and more especially, since he was an agrarian leader, about the agrarian competition between Czechoslovakia and Roumania?

Dr. Hodza said that the question was a difficult one. Czechoslovakia had an agreement with the other countries of the Little Entente, namely, with Roumania and Yugoslavia, to prevent competition in relation to cereals, live-stock and pigs. Czechoslovakia was a country with very well-developed agriculture and it would be wrong to endanger that by competition. They had been able to deal with that competition because during the last two years they had succeeded in regulating the market in cereals, and were doing the same thing in the market for live-stock and pigs. In the case of cereals that meant a fixed price, and in the case of live-stock and pigs it meant at any rate good prices in relation to the cost of production. But the fixing of prices alone was not enough. They were also regulating production not only in cereals, but also in live-stock and milk and pigs, in order to avoid surpluses, as that was in the interest of adequate prices, and it proved to be a good way of preventing the competition of their neighbours from being dangerous.

The Chairman (Professor Seton-Watson) said that Dr. Hodza had spoken of revision as being impossible, by which presumably he meant that though rectification here and there might be possible in the physical sense, it would solve no problems. He believed that Dr. Hodza was right in putting the main emphasis on proper minority treatment, though he had no illusions about the existing situation. He was aware that a great many of the provisions made for minorities in more than half the countries of the world were a dead letter. But he was also aware that Czechoslovakia had sinned less than her neighbours in that direction, though her record was not perfect. But, as it was better than that of most countries, Dr. Hodza, as the representative of Czechoslovakia, and in particular of Slovakia, was entitled to outline how he hoped, in a calmer European atmosphere, the question of the relations of two countries, each of which had a minority on the wrong side of the frontier, might be improved. Would Dr. Hodza say how he thought the political and economic difficulties could best be overcome and what would be a sound basis for the relations between Slovaks and Magyars?

Dr. Hodza said that he was entitled to speak about minority treatment because he was responsible for the inclusion in the Czechoslovak Government in 1926 of members of the minority races. It had not been very easy to accomplish, but the Government had decided to follow a liberal minority policy. Since 1926 there had not been any Government in which the minorities were not represented. In the present Czechoslovak Government there were two representatives of the German minority, the leader of the Social Democrats and the leader of the German Agrarians. From 1926 to 1929 the German Catholic Party had also been represented in the Government.

Czechoslovakia was trying to do the same thing for its Magyar

minority as it had done for its German minority. But he could not speak about the Magyar minority in Czechoslovakia without mentioning the Slovak minority in Hungary, and he would like to be able to feel that the treatment of that minority was as liberal as the treatment of the Magyar minority in Czechoslovakia. Unfortunately, for the time being the Slovak minority in Hungary had practically no schools and their language was not respected in any branch of the administration. The first step towards better understanding between the Slovaks and the Magyars was a generous minority policy, and he wished that Hungary would treat her German and Slovak minorities as generously as Czechoslovakia had treated her Magyar minority.

IMPERIAL ECONOMIC POLICY[1]

By Mr. H. V. Hodson

Imperial economic policy was not, of course, invented by Lord Beaverbrook, nor by anyone in this generation. Its history is as long as that of the Empire itself. What is commonly known as the old colonial system, which governed the economic affairs of the Empire in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, is sometimes represented to us, by way of contrast with the free trade policy which succeeded it in the latter part of the nineteenth century, as having been designed, or at any rate as having worked, in the interests of the overseas parts of the Empire. On the contrary, the eighteenth-century system was designed primarily in the interests of Great Britain, not in those of the colonies, which were regarded as plantations, a sort of exotic back-garden of England. And whether or not the restrictions on trade and shipping which were imposed in consequence were to the advantage of those colonies, they were considerably resented by large sections of their people, and they contributed to the causes of the American Revolution.

Thus one of the strongest forces which compelled a breakdown of that old colonial system, and with it the protective tariff system of Great Britain, was the growth of political independence in the overseas parts of the Empire. Of course other forces contributed to that change in British economic policy. But before we attempt to judge its influence on the Empire, we should remember that conditions were very different then from those to which we are accustomed to-day. When Great Britain turned its back on protection as a national economic policy, the Canadian and American prairies were entirely undeveloped and largely unexplored. The United States was an importer of wheat, and Australia and New Zealand had only just begun to be colonised. After all, we were reading only the other day of the centenary celebrations in honour of the foundation of Melbourne, the second city of Australia.

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, Great Britain's world economic policy was free trade, and it is equally true to

[1] Address given at Chatham House on February 19th, 1935, with Mr. F. Clarke in the Chair.

say that free trade was our Imperial economic policy. Probably it was not a policy that was adopted with any particular eye to the interests of the Dominions. But it did admirably suit their interests at this stage of their development. It was not by coincidence that it was associated with the period of their most rapid economic expansion. It gave them an assured market (though not, of course, a constant or necessarily a profitable price) for their primary products of all kinds. They knew that if they grew more wheat they could find an open market for it, against whatever competition they had to meet from the rest of the world—and of course from the producers in Great Britain. That policy gave Great Britain the benefit of cheap food and raw materials, which enabled us to produce manufactured goods at a cost, in most cases, as low as or lower than the costs that ruled in the countries of our competitors. And that in turn was of advantage to the Dominions, who required machinery and manufactured goods of all kinds which they were not in a position to produce themselves.

However, the first great blow to this system of Imperial development by mutual free trade (or, in the case of the Dominions, low revenue tariffs) was dealt by the Dominions themselves, when, in the last years of the nineteenth century, they began to raise protective tariffs to foster their secondary industries against the competition of British as well as foreign goods. Mr. Joseph Chamberlain's campaign for tariff reform and Imperial preference was an answer, not only to apathy and ignorance in Great Britain about the overseas Empire, but also to the rising protectionism of the Dominions themselves. It was clear by the beginning of this century that we could no longer expect the same open market for our manufactures in the Dominions as they found for their primary products in Great Britain. The system of mutual free trade had already given way to that of unilateral free trade, combined with preference in favour of United Kingdom manufactures in the Dominions, and it seems unlikely, even if there had been no interruption by the War, that this somewhat one-sided system could have continued, without modification, as the guiding theme of our Imperial economic relations.

The War, however, finally killed the old economic system. The dislocation of industry, and the consequent unemployment, were powerful popular arguments for a policy of protection, and intensive economic nationalism abroad was an argument not only for answering protection in Great Britain, but also for Imperial preference as a means of securing, at least in the Dominions, some

stable markets for our manufactures in the future. Meanwhile the Dominions also found themselves opposed by growing barriers of economic nationalism in Europe, in the United States, and in other countries where they sold their products. It was typical of this stage of Imperial economic relations that all parties in Great Britain should have agreed in principle that, whenever it was thought necessary and desirable that we should have a tariff for any reason, our import duties would carry with them a preference in favour of other parts of the Empire. The establishment of the Empire Marketing Board was also a part of the same effort, in the absence of a general tariff, to assist in our own markets those countries to whom we were looking most hopefully for the maintenance and improvement of our exports of manufactures.

When a general system of protection became Great Britain's national economic policy it was adopted partly, of course, for such imperial reasons. Let me recall the seven reasons which Mr. Chamberlain gave, in a speech in the House of Commons, for the policy that was embodied in the Import Duties Act of 1932. They were :

(1) To correct the balance of payments.
(2) To raise revenue.
(3) To effect an insurance against the possibility of a rise in the cost of living following upon the depreciation of the £ (a rather puzzling intention this).
(4) To introduce a system of moderate protection, scientifically adjusted to the needs of industry and agriculture.
(5) Under cover of protection to enable more efficient methods of production and distribution to be adopted.
(6) To provide a lever for negotiations with foreign countries.
(7) To enable us to offer the Dominions advantages in return for those which they had already given us or might be disposed to give us in the future.

In spite of the last item it is impossible to discern in that recital any clear Imperial economic policy; for in essence items (6) and (7) are the same, with the difference only that we apparently felt that we should offer a degree of privilege to the Dominions in this market without exacting from them any equivalent return beyond the preferences that they had already given to us. Under the Import Duties Act, free trade for the products of the British Empire remained the general rule, and, of course, many of the most important products of the Dominions were left on the free list. But it is significant that the exemption of Dominion products from the general 10 per cent. tariff was planned to

terminate in the following November, by which time the Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa would have been held.

It is impossible to say, therefore, that up to the time of the Ottawa Conference there was a real Imperial economic policy to take the place of the old system of free trade for Empire products, whether combined or not with free trade for foreign products also. Our policy for Empire trade at that time might be summed up as trying to secure within the British Commonwealth the same relaxation of tariff barriers as we hoped would follow upon our bargaining with foreign countries, but of course with the advantage that in the Commonwealth we were bound by ties of blood and history and mutual interests and common institutions, and with this further advantage, that for the most part the products of the Dominions were not manufactured articles which it was the first aim of British protective policy to keep out, but primary products the free entry of which, both from the Dominions and from foreign countries, remained for the moment a principle of our policy.

At that time many forces were at work to determine the shape of our Imperial economic policy, if and when we should decide upon one. There was the ambition to secure world freer trade, an ambition that was held by a great many protectionists as well as by what we may call national free traders. There was a desire to bargain with any countries disposed to give us a liberal entry into their markets. There was imperial sentiment, indicating that we ought to give favours to British countries, just because they were British, and for the general reasons associated with the existence of the British Empire. There was a growing pressure towards protection for agriculture; and, last but not least, there was the doctrine that low prices for primary products are not a symptom but a cause of depression, and that we could help to raise ourselves out of the depression by restricting the supply of primary commodities and thus raising their price.

Then came the Ottawa Conference. The confused fumbling after an Imperial economic policy resolved itself into a conflict between those who, at any rate within the borders of the Empire, put as their first objective the liberation of trade, and those who put first the direct assistance of national economic interests, primarily by national protection, and secondly by Imperial preference. To people who were thinking in these terms, Imperial preference was a projection of protective policy beyond the national borders, a means of doing for export industries what the protective tariff was intended to do for home industries subject to foreign competition.

Perhaps Mr. Baldwin most ably expressed the former view in his opening statements at Ottawa. "What then," he asked, "should be the first aim of this Conference? It should be to clear out the channels of trade amongst ourselves." Later he said:

"There are two ways in which increased preference can be given, either by lowering barriers among ourselves, or by raising them against others. The choice between these two must be governed largely by local considerations; but subject to that, it seems to us that we should endeavour to follow the first rather than the second course." [1]

It is not easy to find any comparable concise statement of the opposite view—possibly because no one was prepared to set it out with full frankness at that particular moment. But I may, perhaps, quote Mr. Bruce, who said, after outlining the history of protection and preference in Australia,

"the effect of such duties has been to give to Britain practically the whole of the Australian trade, and there is not the least doubt that in adopting such a policy we have penalised Australian industry and our consumers."

"The unanimous view of the Australian people [he added a little later] is that, while for a quarter of a century they have given preferences to Great Britain freely and unconditionally, they regard the British preferences granted under the Import Duties Act as a somewhat tardy response for the benefits from Australia long enjoyed by British industry." [2]

He could scarcely have better expressed the view that a preference, biting into a protective system, was essentially a concession, involving a sacrifice by the country granting it, as well as an advantage to the country in whose favour it was granted. He did not state very precisely the logical conclusion, which fell, more aptly perhaps, from Mr. Havenga:

"The Union [of South Africa] has always adhered to the principle that her principal obligation was towards her own producers. Consequently the Union would see nothing unnatural or unreasonable in South African produce being subjected to duties in the market of the United Kingdom for the protection of the domestic produce of the latter." [3]

The Ottawa Conference, therefore, in retrospect, appears to have been a battle, with the sides not very distinctly marshalled and sometimes shifting, between the adherents of two contrasted ideals: (1) freer world trade by way of freer Empire trade, and

[1] British White Paper: Cmd. 4175, pp. 73, 75.
[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 103–4. [3] *Op. cit.*, p. 127.

(2) one's own country first, other British countries second and foreign countries a bad third.

To whom ought we to award the palm of victory in this battle of Ottawa? It is worth noting that the Conference, as a whole, paid most emphatic verbal tribute to the first or international aim, for it recorded its conviction—

"That by the lowering or removal of barriers among themselves provided for in these Agreements the flow of trade between the various countries of the Empire will be facilitated, and that by the consequent increase of purchasing power of their peoples the trade of the world will also be stimulated and increased."[1]

There was indeed a certain lowering of barriers within the British Commonwealth, but of course this could not have had the beneficent effects claimed for world trade if it had been accompanied by an equal increase of general tariffs or other restrictions of trade with foreign countries. It is, I think, at least a debatable point whether, in fact, the net result of the Ottawa Agreements, that is, of the specific pledges that were entered into there, was a lowering or raising of tariffs, taking into consideration the tariffs both on British and on foreign goods. Naturally Great Britain's concessions were almost exclusively in the direction of more restrictions on foreign imports; for, as we had previously had a free trade system, that was the only kind of concession we could offer to the Dominions. And, of course, there was to be added to our tariff system, as a result of Ottawa, quantitative restrictions on imports of meat. Many of the changes in Dominion tariffs took the form rather of raising the duty on foreign goods than of lowering it on United Kingdom goods. I do not think it is possible to sum up in any concise way the effect of these specific pledges. The best test of the spirit and of the practical content of the Ottawa Agreements is to be found in the general clauses of the treaties with Canada, Australia and New Zealand, which were henceforward to guide them in fixing their tariffs on United Kingdom goods; because it was only in the general clauses that we could look for any principle to guide the long-term development of Imperial economic policy.

Those Governments undertook that protection by tariffs should be afforded against United Kingdom products only to those industries which were reasonably assured of sound opportunities of success; further, that the tariff should be based upon the principle that protective duties should not exceed such a level as would give the United Kingdom producers full opportunity of

[1] Cmd. 4174, p. 10.

reasonable competition on the basis of the relative cost of economical and efficient production, provided that special consideration should be given to the case of industries not fully established. What are we to say of this undertaking, which provided a formal principle on which to base Imperial economic policy and to fix the tariffs of the three Dominions concerned? Economists, in their usual destructive way, at once pointed out that logically the principle was ridiculous; for it is only because countries possess differential advantages and consequent differential costs of production that international trade exists and that, existing, it has any economic merit. By authorising the erection of tariffs which would exactly compensate the difference in costs, you would destroy at once the cause of international trade and its advantages to both parties. Furthermore, they pointed out, the less efficient an industry was, judged by comparative costs of production, and therefore the less deserving it was of government assistance, the more it would receive, in the shape of tariff protection.

Fortunately, however, we are not exclusively ruled by logic in this world. As a practical rule of thumb the Ottawa clauses had considerable merit. First, they did ban prohibitive tariffs, and the protection of flagrantly inefficient and uneconomic industries. Secondly, the clauses did not specify that tariffs were to be no lower than was necessary to compensate for differences in production-costs, but that they were to be no higher, so we had a reasonable expectation that some at least of the Dominion tariffs might be lower than the level determined by the stated principle. In the third place, as an experienced customs administrator in one of the Dominions said to me, the clauses gave a means of comparing the tariffs of one Dominion with those of another. Thus it would be impossible for, say, Australia, to claim that a 40 per cent. tariff was necessary to protect an efficient industry, at the same time giving reasonable opportunities of competition to British producers, if New Zealand found that only 20 per cent. was necessary in the same industry against the same kind of competition.

Well then, how have these clauses worked out in practice? It has to be admitted that, as far as Canada is concerned, the results have been rather disappointing. A very able and impartial tariff board was set up to advise the Government on the implementation of the clauses, but it has not yet found itself in a position to recommend any sweeping changes. In May of last year it presented an interim report on the case of woollen textiles, which had occupied it over a good deal of time and was generally re-

garded as something of a test case. The Board found itself unable, on the evidence put before it by Canadian and United Kingdom manufacturers, to determine what were the relative costs of efficient production for the purpose of fixing the duty. The difficulty of assessing costs of production in any industry, where the cost may fluctuate from firm to firm and from time to time, according to the volume of production or the price of raw materials, was foreseen by the critics of this clause, and this particular report of the Canadian Tariff Board illustrated rather forcibly the unscientific character of the so-called scientific tariff-fixing principle.

However, again returning to rule of thumb tests, the Ottawa clauses have secured in Australia and New Zealand certain positive and visible results. It is worth noting, further, if only as a somewhat caustic comment upon so-called scientific international economic relations, that whereas the New Zealand Tariff Commission specifically denied that the rate of exchange ought to govern the degree of protection appropriate at any time, the Australian Tariff Board, in face of almost identical conditions, held the contrary view. Indeed, the general downward movement of the tariff which the latter proposed was less, I think I am right in saying, the result of the Ottawa endeavour to liberate Empire trade than the result of purely Australian causes—that is to say, the protection afforded by the fall in the Australian pound, and the great reduction in the costs of Australian industry that had taken place in the course of the slump, a fact to which the Tariff Board drew particular attention.

On the whole, therefore, I do not think we can say that the general clauses of the Ottawa Agreements have dredged very deeply the silted channels of inter-imperial trade. I do not deny that the trade of the Empire has expanded very considerably in the last two and a half years. Nor do I deny that the Ottawa Agreements have contributed towards that expansion. But I think that they have been of less effect than the general economic improvement that has taken place in every Dominion and in the United Kingdom, and especially the advantage we have been able to gain directly and indirectly from the fall in the pound sterling and from the consequent rise in the price of gold. Gold is produced in every one of the overseas Dominions, and also of course in India, where, however, it has been largely a matter of the withdrawal of hoards rather than the production of new gold. It is only by virtue of these hoards of gold that India has been able to maintain, let alone improve, her imports of British goods.

Because of the intervention of these powerful independent forces, it is quite impossible to conclude, as some people have attempted to conclude, that the Ottawa Agreements were a bad bargain from our point of view, simply because our imports from the Dominions have risen a good deal faster than our exports to them. The Ottawa Agreements cannot be separated from all the other causes that were at work producing that result.

The operation of the Agreements has been further obscured by the subsequent development of agricultural protectionism in Great Britain, following the line of restriction of imports and, therefore, in some measure, restriction of production in the Dominions, from whom we buy such large quantities of meat and dairy produce.

I do not think it is always fully realised in Great Britain how deep-seated and powerful is the opposition in Australia and New Zealand, and in some other parts of the Empire, to the restriction of output or exports of staple food-stuffs. I happened to be in the Commonwealth House of Representatives at Canberra two years ago, when questions were being asked about the proposal, which was then under telegraphic discussion between the Empire Governments concerned, for the restriction of the trade in butter and cheese. A Government spokesman with a considerable party majority behind him is seldom placed in so uncomfortable a position as Mr. Latham, the Deputy Prime Minister, found himself on that occasion. He got no applause from his own supporters. The Country party was openly hostile, though not very vocal. To make up for their silence the two groups of the Labour party seized on this opportunity of baiting the Government on their Imperial and economic policy. "So this is your vaunted Ottawa Agreement, is it?" they said in effect. "You sacrifice the Australian manufacturer, claiming that a more than balancing advantage has been gained for the primary producer, and then only a few months later you come along with this plan for restricting primary production also." Whether they are justified or not, I think it is well for us to realise that our efforts to secure the restriction of the supply of beef and dairy products are regarded by many sections of opinion in the Dominions most concerned as a breach of the spirit of our undertakings given at the Ottawa Conference.

Perhaps this opposition in the Dominions to restriction is factious and misguided. I think to a certain extent it is. But before we decide that we know better than the primary producers in the Dominions what is good for them, we should remember two

things. First of all, even though the result were a considerable rise in prices, the contraction of a primary industry, which is one of a country's major sources of wealth and employment, presents very grave difficulties. There is the administrative difficulty of controlling production. There is the difficulty of finding other employment for those thrown out of work. There is the problem of mortgages on the land that must go out of cultivation. There is the connected problem of capital equipment, which can only pay for itself on the basis of large and expanding output—and under the head of capital equipment must be included great public works like irrigation, roads, railways and so on. In the second place, we should make allowances for the natural exasperation felt by the Dominion producers at being asked to assist in the protection of what they consider inefficient British agricultural industry. Their argument is this. If restriction of production is the proper means of restoring prosperity to primary industry, then plainly it is the least efficient producers and the least efficient areas that should be subjected to contraction first. If, on the other hand, the real purpose of restricting output is not the restoration of agricultural prices throughout the world, but the protection of the home producers, it would be more honest to say so, and not to ask the Dominions to endorse a policy designed not in their interest but in the interest of the British farmers. That is the argument I have heard in the Dominions.

In view of these facts can we in Great Britain really claim that at this time we have an Imperial economic policy? I think not. If there is an Imperial economic policy at this time I would like to know what its principles are. Perhaps I may forestall some of the criticisms that will fall upon me by making it clear that I do not consider it an Imperial economic policy merely to say: United Kingdom producers first, Dominion producers second and foreign producers last. That is a watchword which is a mainspring of trouble in Imperial economic relations. It was the converse of this very attitude in the Dominions themselves that, according to Mr. Baldwin, we set out to attack at the Ottawa Conference. The formula tells us neither to what extent we should protect industry in Great Britain, nor to what extent we should give preference to Dominion products. It starts off from the assumption that we are protectionists. Some of us are. But, if we are not to throw the Empire into the arena of domestic politics, we must, if possible, devise an Imperial economic policy which as an Imperial policy secures the assent, if not the positive championship, of every party in the State.

What, then, is to be our Imperial economic policy? A number of different policies are possible. I suggest the following principles as a sound basis. First, there should be, throughout the Empire, free trade in primary products; and by free trade I mean not merely an absence of tariffs, but also an absence of quantitative restrictions on trade or production, except such as are freely negotiated between producers of the countries concerned, and applied equally to all. This principle should, of course, extend to the primary products which Great Britain exports as well as to those exported by the Dominions; that is to say, there should be free entry for United Kingdom coal into every one of the Dominions. I do not suggest that such a bargain is possible at the moment, but I do suggest that it is an ideal that we should aim at.

Second, it is a corollary of the first principle that there should be no dumping of such primary products. Dumping can be defined as selling abroad at a price substantially lower than the price at which the product is sold in the home market. If we were negotiating this policy, it should be made clear to Australia, for instance, that her policy, which has already been applied to butter, and which is about to be applied to wheat, of establishing a home consumption price so as to maintain exports at a lower world price, would automatically deprive her of her claim, under the first clause of this policy, to free entry into this market.

The third principle is that there should be a general reduction, if possible a progressive reduction, in tariffs on manufactured goods. It is easy to lay down a sweeping principle of that kind, not so easy to plan its operation in practice. I cannot give details now, but I think it could be advanced by adherence to the rule of specialisation in the different countries of the Commonwealth, combined with the rule of a maximum protective tariff—shall we say, 35 per cent. *ad valorem* on manufactured goods other than luxuries, that level to be, if possible, reduced with the passage of years.

The fourth principle, which is vital to any Imperial economic policy, is that all aspects of Imperial economic relations should be considered as a whole. The problem of tariffs has been too long regarded, especially in connection with the Empire, as if it were a thing apart. On the contrary, it is intimately and directly bound up with such matters as emigration, shipping, and even intellectual contact between the peoples of the Empire.

This leads to the fifth point in what I admit to be no more than an ideal Imperial economic policy, which is that Imperial

economic relations should be constantly under review in Great Britain by an inter-departmental body composed of the responsible Ministers and their advisers. The Dominions Office, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Board of Trade would obviously all be concerned and would each be represented, and I should regard it as essential that the Committee should have its own staff free of departmental preoccupations and prejudices.

But even this co-ordinating body, which would soon come to have a tradition and personality of its own, would be insufficient by itself to determine, and from time to time to adjust, the principles of Imperial economic policy. If Imperial economic policy means anything, it means a policy for our mutual economic relations which has been agreed upon, and implemented, by at least the majority of the self-governing nations of the Commonwealth. We could scarcely claim that we had an Imperial educational policy if we meant only that we gave special attention to the history and geography of the Dominions in our school curriculum and text-books. Nor can we claim that we have an Imperial economic policy unless and until its principles have been hammered out by a cooperative effort of the whole Commonwealth.

Summary of Discussion.

MR. WILLIAM GRAHAM said that he was surprised that Mr. Hodson had made no reference whatever to the problem of international indebtedness in so far as it related to the Dominions and Colonies. Until the problem of the international indebtedness of Canada, India, Australia was fairly faced up to, it did not seem possible to arrive at an economic policy which would satisfy a creditor nation intent on preserving its own industry and agriculture and maintaining what was called a favourable trade balance, and at the same time by restriction of imports, whether by quotas or tariffs, making it difficult for the debtor nations to provide their favourable trade balances without which they could not meet their international indebtedness.

He believed that India had to find roughly £40 million sterling annually to meet the service of her present international indebtedness. Canada had to find £30 million to £40 million sterling and Australia a similar amount. How could it be done if not by exporting, to the extent of the amount required, more goods than these countries imported? Whether they exported to Great Britain or not did not matter. They had to have a favourable trade balance to meet their international indebtedness.

Australia had dealt with the problem for a number of years by raising new loans to meet the service of the old, but that could not go on

indefinitely. It was a problem not only in Imperial economic relations, but in world economic relations, and he would be glad if the speaker would address himself to the question in connection with his second point, that there should be no dumping of primary productions. If the country of production was a debtor nation, which had to provide a favourable trade balance to meet her debt services, she had to subsidise her export trade or default.

He submitted also that Mr. Hodson's second point must be related to his fourth one, that all the economic aspects of Imperial relations should be considered as a whole, for when the whole of the colonial world was in debt to Great Britain, or to other parts of the world, to ignore the fundamental problem of debt was to ignore the fundamental problem at issue.

MR. FRANCIS DEVERELL said that the speech they had heard from the preceding speaker contained a widely accepted fallacy which was not sufficiently contested. Both Mr. Lyons and Dr. Earle Page had declared that Australia should insist on being permitted to ship to England anything that she wished to ship, because, they argued, unless she could have unrestricted shipments, Australia would be unable to pay interest on her loan indebtedness to the United Kingdom.

When referring recently to Australian export figures for the five years ending 1933, Mr. Deverell had found that the tonnage exports of butter and meat from that Dominion had increased by no less than 71 per cent., but that the selling value of the total meat and butter tonnage for the year 1933 was only approximately £100,000 more than the selling value of the 1928 tonnage, so that after deducting the cost of freight, insurance and other charges, it was clear that the Australian producer had received actually less sterling for 171 tons of produce in 1933 than he had received for 100 tons of produce in 1928. It was therefore clear that Australian capacity to pay interest on her loan indebtedness in this country depended upon the value of what she sold rather than upon its volume.

Although Australia had recently been asked to agree to a temporary restriction of beef exports to the United Kingdom, it should be remembered that her present rate of beef exports showed a very appreciable rise since the Ottawa Agreement. The mutton and lamb import policy of the British Government had succeeded, but the beef policy had failed largely because the Dominions had increased their imports into this country, thereby more than offsetting the beneficial effects on the market which were expected as a result of curtailing South American imports.

It was only fair to say that the Ottawa Agreements had not been properly tried out. The policy which had been laid down at Ottawa was undoubtedly the right one, but it had to be enforced, and it was necessary for the Dominions to use rather more haste than they had done in certain respects to implement their undertakings. The whole commercial world had been so disturbed during the last few

years that it was almost impossible to get the full advantage from a policy which, in normal times, would have been very successful.

A number of statesmen in the Dominions had overlooked the fact that every Treaty which the British Government had made with foreign countries which resulted in an increase of British exports was of direct advantage to the Dominions, because the market price of Dominion produce in the United Kingdom depended upon the purchasing power of the people in the United Kingdom, and if the purchasing power could be improved by more people being employed as a result of increased exports to foreign countries, then the Dominions shared in the benefits arising from the improved purchasing power. Furthermore, the United Kingdom could not expect the Dominions to take from her additional exports to the extent which would be necessary if her foreign markets were to be ignored. The growth of her trade within the Empire must necessarily be a gradual one and the rate of growth in no small measure depended upon the measure of reciprocity forthcoming from the Dominions.

SIR KARL KNUDSEN said that he would like to ask Mr. Hodson for his candid opinion whether Great Britain could afford his Imperial economic policy. Did he really think that the Ottawa Agreements had resulted in any appreciable increase of trade with the Dominions? He noticed that Mr. Hodson had hedged about it, making reservations about the effect of departure from gold and general world improvement, though on the whole rather claiming that some good results had followed from the Agreements. The last speaker had said that the success of any trade agreement depended upon good purchasing power in the United Kingdom. Could that kind of prosperity be built up by agreements of this kind?

It was claimed that there was a great increase in United Kingdom exports to the Dominions, but, on looking at the figures, taking 1929 as a basic year, in that year the Dominions exported to the United Kingdom practically the same amount in sterling as in 1934, so that the quantities must have very much increased. On the other hand, purchases from the United Kingdom by Australia and New Zealand in 1934 were about half what they had been in 1929. Of course there had been an improvement in 1934, because purchases by the Dominions fell to an extraordinarily low level in 1931.

If one took those three small countries, Norway, Sweden and Denmark, one would find that, in spite of the tremendous fall in prices, the purchases by them from the United Kingdom in 1934 were exactly the same in value as in 1929. There was a very fair trade balance between that group of countries and the United Kingdom. Whereas purchases from the Dominions amounted to about £140 million, while their purchases from the United Kingdom amounted to about £60 million, so that there was a pretty fair margin towards covering that international indebtedness which had been referred to.

Two years ago trade agreements were concluded which were carried

through with a great deal of opposition in other countries, and he wondered what was going to happen when they came up for revision. There was nothing which the United Kingdom disliked more than discrimination. At Geneva the Dominions were represented as nations, and yet for trade purposes the United Kingdom took shelter behind a perfectly proper legal claim that the Empire should be considered as one State. The effect on the trade of other countries was nevertheless the same as discrimination.

MR. W. H. AYLES said that the real difficulty with regard to the Ottawa Agreements was that while everybody knew what they wanted, nobody knew what everybody ought to have. He wanted to refer particularly to Mr. Hodson's fifth point in his ideal economic policy, as he felt that the biggest need in formulating an Imperial economic policy was the appointment of an Imperial Commission to go into the whole question of the resources of the Empire and the needs of the Empire in a comprehensive way.

He did not believe with the last speaker that it was possible to go back. When the Government decided to place the United Kingdom upon a tariff basis in 1931 they entirely altered the situation. If he had been asked in 1930 whether he thought Ottawa was an excellent proposal he would have said No; in the light of 1930 he would have said that it meant a step back, but in the light of 1934 he would say that it meant a step forward, at any rate to the extent of bringing the United Kingdom and the Dominions together to consider the one thing that in the near future was likely to bring peace of any kind into the economic relations of the Empire.

MR. MACKAY said that he came from Australia, and would like to discuss particularly points 1, 2 and 3 of Mr. Hodson's policy. He thought that that policy was too ideal to be considered and would like to suggest an alternative policy which was more in keeping with the facts.

Under point 2, Mr. Hodson had suggested that there should be no dumping. He did not think that was practicable in view of the nature and development of the Dominions. In Australia during the last ten years every party had supported the sugar bounty in Queensland, and the same thing applied to the butter and dried-fruit industry in New South Wales. To suggest no dumping as a feature of Empire policy as things were was out of keeping with what was practicable, at least as far as Australia was concerned.

The next thing he would suggest was a revision of tariff duties throughout the Dominions, but how could one, in the light of Ottawa, expect that the Dominions were going to be any more true to the ideal which was circulated then? The Australian Tariff Board had ingeniously said that the application of reduced duties only applied with regard to those imposed in future and did not relate to those already in existence. Then what about the cotton industry? No one

could describe the cotton industry in Australia as being necessary and substantial, and yet the Government had been unwilling to revise duties in connection with that industry which had no justification.

He suggested that it was clear from their experience of the fate of the binding agreements of Ottawa, that the Dominions were not prepared to revise their tariff duties unless they got something more concrete than they got at Ottawa. Two points must be faced : first, that there was a feeling of youth and nationalism amongst the Dominions which wanted to be self-supporting, and secondly, that a policy of free trade, as adumbrated in point 1, committed the Dominions to the position that their prosperity would always depend upon the price the United Kingdom was going to give them for their goods. Australia in 1928 got £140 million sterling for wheat and £70 million in 1930. They were not going to have an economic policy which resulted in a drop in their national income of 50 per cent. The alternative policy he wanted to suggest was a definite bargaining between the Dominions and Great Britain. In Australia the Government was controlled by the manufacturers. Both parties were tariff parties because only in that way could they get sufficient support. Unless something drastic were done to show the Dominions that they had got to reduce their tariffs in order to sell their goods abroad there would never be any solution of the dilemma they had been discussing or any satisfactory Imperial economic policy.

He could only speak of one Dominion, but so far as Australia was concerned, what they wanted, say with regard to wool, was a certain minimum price, because that meant security, which was what they desired. During the last three years imports of Australian meat and wheat had increased in volume though not in terms of money, and he suggested that Great Britain should enter into a binding agreement with Australia to take the whole of her primary products at a fair price, in return for which Australia should take the same amount in value of United Kingdom manufactured goods, and reduce her scale of duties accordingly. It was time we called the bluff of modern democracies with regard to tariffs. So long as there were democracies in Australia, Canada and South Africa, so long would government policy be determined by electoral facts, at any rate that was so in Australia with regard to tariffs.

MR. MACKINTOSH said that he came from Canada. There had been a danger in the last few years of attempting to legislate in terms of crisis, to lay down Imperial and other economic policies of long range in terms of short-term facts. To say that the trade of the world or even of the Empire could be restored in terms of barter was to go back centuries. Even in a democracy the demand of the people was that some greater degree of reason should enter into their economic policy. In Canada, for example, he thought that there was a distinct change of opinion in favour of lower tariffs which was likely to influence whichever political party held power during the next two or three years.

In one respect the Ottawa Agreements were unfortunate because the time at which they were negotiated was a time at which they had least chance of success. Certainly as far as Canada was concerned they had almost doubled their tariffs, and the Government was not unnaturally reluctant to reduce them in a short time. But Mr. Baldwin and the Dominion Prime Minister were not so far apart from every point of view. Both wanted the freedom of the other's market.

He did not think that an Imperial economic policy could be produced by any Imperial Commission. It must be a matter of negotiation between the self-governing unities of the Empire, and there could be no Imperial Economic Board as suggested, though there might be investigation in different quarters, and there might be a willingness on the part of the different members of the Empire, for political as well as for economic reasons, to adopt some measure of common policy with those countries to which they were related by ties of race and with whom they could discuss economic matters more freely.

The policy laid down by Mr. Baldwin was undoubtedly the proper Imperial economic policy in the long run and did not differ very greatly from the one which the speaker had outlined, but it could not be achieved within a few years of an economic crisis. Tariffs and quotas in the last few years had been matters of economic fear, and only as some measure of security came back would there be a relaxation of tension. In the upward trend which was now taking place in business there was an opportunity for a more reasonable view of economic policy within the Empire.

QUESTION: Did the speaker think that the restriction on agricultural output which he had proposed was practically possible, and was there any community in the Empire with the necessary economic discipline? Could he relate Imperial economic policy to the Scandinavian countries already mentioned and to the Argentine Republic?

SIR OSBORNE MANCE said that, as they had heard the opinion of several different parts of the Dominions on Imperial economic policy, it might be of interest if he mentioned that, shortly after the Ottawa Agreements, he was lunching with a prominent German banker in Berlin, who expressed the view that Ottawa was a turning-point of vital importance to the British Empire, the beginning of a series of conferences which would lead to a consolidated Empire economic system. It was interesting to know what a foreigner thought of Ottawa and of the general trend of British economic policy.

MR. J. I. PIGGOTT said that he knew a good many of the statesmen and others who were at Ottawa who said that they prayed every night that there would never be another Ottawa Conference. For that reason he directed attention to the speech of their Canadian friend, which seemed to be very much more realistic and sound than most they had heard that evening. One had only to hear remarks similar

to those of their Australian friend to realise what an almost impossible task it was to lay down a hard-and-fast Imperial policy. The Dominions expected to be able to ship to the United Kingdom almost their entire output, he gathered, irrespective of the size of the market, irrespective of the fact that in order to sell abroad the United Kingdom had to buy abroad and must therefore reserve certain sections of her market for her other very good customers; irrespective, for example, of the fact that Japan was one of Australia's most valuable customers and would expect to sell, herself, in Australia; irrespective of the fact that the Dominions were increasing secondary industries to a most alarming extent. In steel, for instance, the United Kingdom found itself being excluded from each Dominion in turn.

What was the solution, except a short-time policy to parcel out the United Kingdom market to those nations of the world who could give her the best return, obviously giving the first offer to her own kith and kin?

MR. CYRIL GILL referred to the question whether there was sufficient economic discipline to impose restrictions, and said that in June 1934 there had been held in London a conference of Empire fruit-growers. He had been secretary of the Conference and therefore could speak with knowledge. At that Conference the Australian, New Zealand and Canadian fruit producers had voluntarily agreed to undertake very substantial restrictions in their output for the forthcoming years and were loyally carrying out their obligations. There was a certain amount of heart-burning, it was true, but there was general agreement that restriction, however unpleasant it might be for the individual grower, was the best course to adopt, taking a far-sighted view. There was at any rate one industry, relatively a small one compared with certain others, which had the economic discipline to enforce and to carry out restriction.

QUESTION: Had the speaker deliberately excluded the Crown Colonies from the orbit of his remarks?

MR. HODSON, in reply, said that there was not much left for him to say after his critics had attacked each other. Mr. Mackay's system of offering, presumably several years beforehand, a price for Australia's produce, whether a limited quantity or everything she produced, was a great deal more unreal, in view of the changing circumstances of economic life, than his own ambitious and admittedly ideal guide for tariff policy and for policy in respect of quantitative restriction. (A Member interjected that this policy was adopted for wool during the War, to which Mr. Hodson replied that in the War all were socialists, and given a socialist economy a great many of these problems would become materially easier to solve, though of course a socialist economy would create problems of its own.) His sketch of an ideal Imperial economic policy was not intended as something which immediately

or in ten years' time would convince the Australian democracy or even the democracy of this country. He thought there ought to be a standard to which we could repair.

He agreed with Mr. Mackintosh that conditions were not so difficult in Canada as in Australia. In Canada the United Kingdom had had the misfortune at Ottawa to meet the most protectionist Administration that had been in office for many years. Even in Australia, although the swing of the political pendulum after Ottawa had gone towards the Labour party, the result had been to bring into a controlling position a party interested in the reduction of tariffs. There was also the question of constitutional relations in Australia, which was putting very serious pressure on all aspects of political and economic policy.

Since his Imperial economic policy was an ideal one it was not necessary to contrast it with any practical policy that might be pursued at the actual moment in relation to foreign countries, except in so far as that policy would be incompatible with his principles. He did not think there was anything in those principles to prevent the United Kingdom from pursuing either a liberal or a protectionist policy towards other countries.

In reply to Sir Karl Knudsen, he would say that although the Ottawa Agreements did produce an appreciable improvement in Empire trade, even after allowing for other general factors, their total result, in his personal opinion, was not beneficial to United Kingdom trade in comparison with what might have happened had a more liberal international policy unhindered by commitments to the Dominions been pursued.

The question of the United Kingdom's receipts from interest and dividends and other invisible receipts from the Dominions was very much tied up with the other question, whether the United Kingdom could afford his policy. Figures had been quoted of the United Kingdom's international trade since 1929, but he would draw attention to another fact, namely, that the United Kingdom's invisible exports had suffered as severe a decline, if not more severe, than her visible exports; certainly the balance of invisible transactions had been affected by the slump, and by restrictions on trade and finance arising out of the slump, far more seriously than the balance on visible trade. From this he drew the conclusion that, in spite of any pressure there might seem to be on her visible balance, the interest of the United Kingdom was in the liberation of world trade, which would enable her to gain more from shipping and financial services and other invisible receipts.

With regard to the Crown Colonies, there was a distinction in principle, not only because the United Kingdom had a more or less decisive voice in the determination of their tariff policy, but also because she was finally responsible for the political administration of those countries. However much she might like to adjust their economic policies in her own interests, or in the interests of the Empire as a whole, she had to consider first the political implications of her policy and, in the case of

native territories, the paramount interests of the native populations whom she governed. For that reason it was exceedingly difficult to draw into one picture a policy which could be pursued towards the Crown Colonies and a policy which could be pursued in cooperation with the British Dominions.

He would like to conclude by insisting on the cooperative character of any Imperial economic policy. This did not mean that it should be decided upon, or carried out, or even recommended from time to time by an Imperial Economic Board. That was not what he suggested. What he suggested was that there should be a national ministerial council linking up all the factors involved, and that this council itself should be guided by such discussions as were possible from time to time between the different self-governing members of the Commonwealth.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Any book reviewed in this Journal may be obtained through the Publications Department of the Institute. Members of the Institute wishing to cable an order may use, instead of the title of the book, the number which it bears, e.g., "Areopagus, London: Send Book Twenty May Journal: Smith."

Books marked with an asterisk (*) are in the Library of the Institute.

GENERAL

1. SHACKLED DIPLOMACY: THE PERMANENT FACTORS OF FOREIGN POLICIES OF NATIONS. By Michael Demiashkevich, Ph.D. 1934. (New York: Barnes and Noble. 8vo. 238 pp. $2.50.)

BOTH by its good features and its bad features this book brings in question the purpose and the method of historical study in England and the United States. At present almost all advanced study consists in initiation into historical research, that is to say, the discovery and presentation of facts. The "philosophy of history," the perception of its processes and their interpretation to increase man's understanding of man—these things still occur furtively, but are regarded as frivolous by "serious students"; no provision is made for them in academic curricula, which are, in fact, concerned with "historiography" rather than history. Professor Demiashkevich has written a "philosophy" of the last three-quarters of a century of diplomacy, but he has felt constrained to adopt the method which has been perfected for historiography.

He has, therefore, devoted 63 pages (pp. 131–193) out of 238 to a narrative of diplomacy. This has enabled him to use the *Grosse Politik*, the *Documents Diplomatiques Français* and the *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, in other words, to base a portion of the book upon primary sources and thus claim that it is a "serious historical work" in the sense usually understood by that phrase nowadays. Regarded in isolation the narrative is excellent; it follows for the most part Bourgeois and Hauser, but extensive quotations from documents are given and many of these are of great interest and have escaped the attention of Langer. Nevertheless, the narrative seriously hinders the clear development of the philosophy, which is the real purpose of the book. Hence it seems very probable that the narrative and its documentation are included as a defence against the accusation of superficiality, so glibly made against books containing ideas by those whose minds are unable to compass matter less palpable than facts.

As a whole the philosophy is not notably creative, although it is more profound than the historical distillations of the journalists who have recently been filling the gap left by historians. The theme is that nationalism is a derivative of primitive animism, and the immorality of diplomacy is therefore largely inevitable: the League of Nations, though useful, is merely a piece of diplomatic machinery, and the best hope for the future of the nations lies in gradual elimination

of international hatred by the method of *Kulturkunde*, the teaching to the young of the true nature of the genius of other nations. This is a variant of the liberal theory that education is the instrument with which to dispel barbarism; it is no mean thesis and, even in the space and structure of this book, much is achieved. The section on French political mysticism (pp. 77–89) is an admirable exposition, and the nature of the League of Nations (treated pp. 204–222) as a political phenomenon is very clear in the light of Professor Demiashkevich's philosophy.

On the other hand, German political mysticism is not intelligible without an account of the Prussianisation of Germany, of the Eastern-European character of the Prussian State and the influence upon it of its proximity to the Slavonic countries. Professor Demiashkevich does not give much prominence to Slavophilism and Panslavism in Russia; it is at least permissible to doubt his assertion that Russian diplomacy has been influenced less by political mysticism than by the alien character of the Russian dynasty and government. It is doubtful too whether Russia abandoned her hostility to Japan only because Japan became accommodating after 1906 (see pp. 33–36). Likewise to prove that statesmen took pains to justify their diplomacy before public opinion after 1815 does not prove that they omitted to do so before 1815. In the narrative there occur a few flights of fancy which ought to have been resisted; for example, that Bismarck secured the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina for Austria in 1878 "in order to keep the continental road to Asia Minor open for the future expansion of Germany via Austria" (p. 135) seems to proceed rather from the imagination of Professor Demiashkevich than from that of Bismarck.

Other criticisms may also be made. Chapter II, "Revanche," is an awkward hotchpot, containing much elementary matter, which, if it deserves mention at all, should not be associated with *revanche*. Proper names only appear in the index, whereas in a philosophical work surely there is need of some key-words to important theories? A bibliography would have been useful, especially in connection with political mysticism. There are a number of typographical errors; "Bismark" is the most original of these.

It remains to draw attention to the use of quotation as an important vehicle of the philosophy itself. This too arises, no doubt, from a desire to make the book follow current practice as closely as possible, although here the result is on the whole good. There is too much and too lengthy quotation, but that does not alter the fact that much of the quotation is excellent; perhaps the best is a quotation from Anatole France's *Message of the French Village to its Children* on pp. 88–89. The depth and breadth of cultural background revealed by the choice of material to quote again causes regret that the author subsequently ran for cover behind the three great series of diplomatic documents. If every school of history were divided in function between the philosophy of history and historiography, then the philosophy might become a "serious study" and Professor Demiashkevich and his kind would not be forced to ape the scholasticism of the uninspired.

RUSHTON COULBORN.

2. THE NATURE OF CAPITALIST CRISES. By John Strachey. 1935. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 384 pp. 10s. 6*d*.)

MR. JOHN STRACHEY has written a book that resembles the curate's egg. It goes without saying that it is a highly intelligent book. A

long time has gone by since Mr. Strachey followed a pamphlet of Sir Oswald Mosley's, entitled *Revolution by Reason*, by a book of the same title. Much has changed since Mr. Strachey pointed out the obligation of all reasonable men to join the New Party. He has since pointed out the obligation of all honest men to adopt a revolutionary communist policy. The implication of this present book is that the incisive discussion of the capitalist system here put forward leads to this same revolutionary conclusion. That inference is quite illegitimate.

This book is a presentation of the Marxist analysis in an easily digestible form, set out with an intellectual hauteur that is Mr. Strachey's own and coupled with a telling criticism of Mr. Cole's recent popular exposition of Marx in modern dress. Mr. Strachey occasionally contradicts himself flatly. On the whole, however, and taken apart from the creature it may hatch, the egg is a surprisingly good one.

Whether or not Mr. Strachey's work is marked by what the *Spectator* calls " radiant scientific effrontery " or merits the enthusiastic commendation of the Conservative Premier of Canada, I should like to place a copy on the breakfast-table of every economist and business man of my acquaintance. The questions of Marx, re-presented with vigour and general appeal by Messrs. Strachey and Gollancz, have got to be answered with more energy and acumen than has been displayed hitherto. In the alternative, two hundred and fifty years of nominal civic peace in Great Britain is at an end. GEORGE E. G. CATLIN.

3*. WAR—ITS CURSE AND CURE. By William Leighton Grane. 1935. (London : Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 164 pp. 4*s*. 6*d*.)

HALUGA transformed the granary of the East into a sandy desert and he built 70,000 skulls into a pyramid at Baghdad. Abdur Rahman, the Afghan, captured 2000 prisoners and blinded them with lime. The Thirty Years' War left Central Europe in a state of misery more hopeless by far than that which has prevailed there since the Armistice of 1918. In fact, war has always been a curse and in each age it has no doubt appeared specially hateful. It seems to Canon Grane a greater curse than ever because it threatens, with weapons scientifically perfected for the indiscriminate slaughter of our enlarged numbers, a form of civilisation and a standard of life finer than any of older days. This, however, is only a matter of form. The higher standards have always been menaced by the lower, the " haves " by the " have nots." While agreeing, therefore, with the author that war is a curse, we suggest that it stands, relatively to other curses, in its former place.

As to the cure, Canon Grane faces facts bravely. He realises the impotence of disarmament conferences, the futility of attempts to humanise war and the impossibility of an international air force. He pins his faith, as perhaps the majority of thinkers are doing to-day, on collective action. Not, however, on economic sanctions, nor on an empty hope of military action through the League, but on a pact between powerful nations to act forcibly together against an aggressor.

Just as, however, the curse has been shown to be no novelty, so it is with the cure. William Penn, the Quaker, suggested it and so did the Abbé de Saint-Pierre. Yet the three centuries intervening between them and Hitler have furnished no example of collective action applied successfully to the prevention of a major war. To see, therefore, in collective action a certain cure is to encourage unfounded optimism. The pact under consideration at the moment may well founder in a sea of discussion as to whether it shall be regional,

European or universal; or, if accepted, may be wrecked by conditions wholly unforeseen at the time of inauguration.

Canon Grane is quite right, however. War is a curse, and the best hope of its prevention lies in collective action. We must plan accordingly. In the meantime the League can pursue its proper line of improving international relations by cultivating good-will, arbitration and every form of social and cultural contact among its members.

H. ROWAN-ROBINSON.

4*. IS WAR OBSOLETE? By the Rev. Dr. Raven. 1935. (London: Allen and Unwin. Cr. 8vo. 183 pp. 4*s.* 6*d.*)

5*. THE CHRISTIAN'S ALTERNATIVE TO WAR. By the Rev. Leyton Richards. 1935. (London: Student Christian Movement Press. 8vo. 125 pp. 1*s.*)

6*. THE CHRISTIAN'S CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE. By the Rev. Leyton Richards. 1935. (London: Student Christian Movement Press. Cr. 8vo. 160 pp. 4*s.*)

CANON RAVEN's book is so thoroughly sincere that it seems harsh to criticise it as inconclusive. He is no doctrinaire pacifist: he served in the trenches, and recognises the good, as well as the evil, in war; but it is contrary to the Christian ideal, and he is struggling through the darkness to find an alternative, to attain perfection while patiently accepting the imperfections of human nature. War, he conceives, may once have been necessary, and even right. It may have been defensible in 1914; but evolution is moving rapidly, and the evolutionary case against war is that it subjects a highly organised cveature to disintegrating conditions; in other words, that it reverts to primitive methods for the conduct of modern life. Canon Raven would assent to the internationalising of force until such time as the world discovers the path of reconciliation by the bringing of all men into one Church of Christ. But in the duty of working for peace "a peculiar obligation rests upon the churches; their failure to respond . . . is probably the heaviest count in the indictment now being generally brought against institutional religion." Yet while to so many among us the Church, as the writer pungently puts it, "still seems synonymous with Pleasant Sunday Afternoons or mysterious creeds and sacraments," its reforming power will remain atrophied. It must be challenged to undertake some definite work for peace, something which will bring to its followers the savour of romance which Canon Raven believes is of the essence of the Christian ethic.

Mr. Leyton Richards takes up this challenge. He is a confirmed pacifist, with no use even for an international police. "Killing," he argues, "like all short cuts to moral ends, is a hasty evasion of Christian responsibility. It does not even attempt to solve the knotty problem of meeting and overcoming evil; it merely pushes the problem off on to the hands of God!" Holding this view, he sketched out some tasks for pacifists in his smaller book when it was originally published in 1929. On being urged by both critics and friends to develop his theme, he has now produced the larger book. Starting from his conviction that Nationalism (which he somewhat laboriously endeavours to define) is, rather than Capitalism, the enemy of peace in the world to-day, Mr. Richards insists that nationalism must be replaced by a patriotic internationalism imbued with the spirit which holds together the United States of America and the British Common-

wealth. Thereupon disarmament will follow; the distinction between great Powers and little Powers will vanish; law will supersede war; and territorial jealousies will be abated by "the transfer of all the non-self-governing portions of the great empires to the Mandates Commission of the League," while the strategic points and water-ways of the world will be handed over to the control of an international commission. This, says Mr. Richards, is the programme to which the Christian should work, by labouring to mould public opinion and to alter human conduct, even if he cannot alter human nature. The case is set out with a fullness and clarity which make the book an admirable manual for those who would be glad to do practical work for peace, and to organise support for the League. MESTON.

7*. CLASHING TIDES OF COLOUR. By Lothrop Stoddard. 1935. (London: Scribners. 8vo. 414 pp. 10s. 6d.)

IN this book Mr. Lothrop Stoddard surveys some of the problems that beset the world in these troubled times and endeavours to interpret the tendencies of present conditions and to explain the effect of the machine civilisation of the West upon the economic, social and political state of the whole world.

Recent developments, he states, have upset the balance between the East and the West. For the last four hundred years the basis of world politics has been the ascendancy of the white peoples of Europe and their off-shoots in America. Up to the Great War Western peoples kept their faith in the nineteenth-century gospel of automatic progress. That faith the War has effectively destroyed. War and revolution have assailed our entire political, economic, and social order, and no institution and no ideal has been immune from attack. While science has made theoretically possible a higher level of economic well-being than the world has ever known, and although it is generally recognised that the practical benefits of an economically united and efficiently run world would be enormous, yet, owing to the insurgence of a hypertrophied nationalism, never has that goal appeared to be more remote than it appears to-day.

The most serious consequence of the War, however, is the disappearance of the moral prestige of Western civilisation and the denial of its spiritual and intellectual standards of value. Men are seeking in vain for a better and more stable era.

East and West, Mr. Stoddard goes on to say, are to-day subject to the same process of disintegration though at different speeds and in different ways. The West has lost its former sense of solidarity and the East is being literally "Balkanised" by the impact of Western mechanistic civilisation and by new ideas such as nationalism and communism.

Chapter II deals with Russia's secession from Europe's comity of nations. Although there are no precedents upon which to base an opinion as to the ultimate success of the Bolshevik experiment, the author considers that Russia's secession is irrevocable.

Chapter IV contains a general survey of racial conditions in Central and South America. The author points out that Latin America never wholly belonged to the white world. Over large areas long-repressed indigenous elements are now threatening to submerge the white man and white civilisation.

Racially, Latin America may be divided into three zones in which the characteristics are widely different. Argentina, Chile and Uruguay

in the extreme south are the only States in which the population is thoroughly "white." In the north, stretching from Mexico to Peru, is a retrogressive Indianised zone; and adjacent to it are two unstable regions—Brazil and the Caribbean—peopled by a mixture of races. In the block from Mexico to Peru, white blood and white civilisation alike are on the decline. A new revolutionary phase is coming as the result of which the indigenous Indians may ultimately gain control. As the Indians show little aptitude for Western civilisation an Indianised block from Mexico to Peru would be a backward area with small resisting power. It would offer a tempting opportunity for Asiatic expansion on a large scale; and if the white man stands aside, that opportunity will almost inevitably be seized.

Asia is menaced with dissolution. Throughout Asia races hitherto resigned or sullenly submissive are planning to throw off white control. There is widespread disillusionment regarding Western political institutions, culture and ideals; but the old Orient has gone, never to return. The mechanistic Western civilisation has caused a fivefold revolution—political, economic, social, cultural and religious. The author touches on the problem of over-population (an important factor in the present crisis), which he points out is largely due to Western influence in diminishing the checks on the growth of population caused by war, pestilence, famine and gross misgovernment.

In Japan, almost the only example of political progress in Asia, there is increasing unbalance and disharmony. In Mr. Stoddard's opinion, the discontent and unrest are so acute and widespread that unless the situation is unexpectedly eased, breaking-point cannot be far off.

India's future, in the author's opinion, is also gloomy. If the British connection endures, order will be maintained; but British rule in India cannot cure India of its basic ills, because it is and must be alien and aloof. Should the British leave, India would revert to anarchy even worse than that which followed the collapse of the Mogul Empire two hundred years ago.

In Africa, in the coastal belt between the Mediterranean and the Sahara, the ten million Arabs and Berbers are being welded by a blend of religious fervour and hatred of alien rulers into a strong nationalism which may endanger France's position in Northern Africa. South of the Sahara and throughout tropical Africa the primitive tribal societies are crumbling under the impact of Western civilisation. There is, however, little possibility of a concerted native revolt on a large scale. South of the Mediterranean coastal belt, white civilisation in Africa will go forward destroying and creating.

The Islamic world is in a state of transition. A Mohammedan revival springing from Islam's own vitality is now in progress and is producing important effects, although it is hampered by much narrow-mindedness and fanaticism. Everywhere there is hatred of European civilisation and ways of life.

Communism has not yet swept the East, but the communist threat remains. Oriental unrest offers a fertile ground for communist propaganda. If Asia should adopt communism the immediate result would not be the establishment of communistic states, but chaos, barbarism and the wrecking of Oriental civilisation and culture.

Mr. Stoddard observes that the ultimate goal of most internationalist thinkers is a world-wide federation powerful enough to impose its decisions. But science and psychology alike point to the inexpediency

and impossibility of eliminating racial differences by the amalgamation of races. The balance of scientific evidence shows that the miscegenation of races far apart physically and temperamentally leads to a disastrous deterioration of the quality of their progeny. No solution of the problem of exaggerated nationalism is therefore to be found in this direction. Moreover, as Professor Tosey has pointed out, the destruction of rational and racial loyalties would merely serve to bring about the breaking apart of mankind into new groups based, perhaps, upon economic interests. Between those groups the struggle would continue in a form more bitter and more disastrous than the present struggle between nations and races.

In endeavouring to draw conclusions as to the future course of events the author expresses the opinion that mankind has entered upon a period of transition the outcome of which is uncertain. Time alone will show how, when and to what extent Western civilisation will be adopted by the East, and how Western man will accommodate himself to the mechanistic civilisation which he has created. But Mr. Stoddard feels that there are hopeful signs that Western man is preparing to redress the lack of balance and that a more spiritual age is dawning for the modern world. He does not state on what foundation these hopes are based. J. R. C.

8*. The World as I See It. By Albert Einstein. Translated by Alan Harris. 1935. (London: John Lane. Demy 8vo. 214 pp. 8s. 6*d.*)

Nearly one-half of this book is caviare to the general and must have been very difficult to translate: the mathematical theory, for example, of tea-leaves in a cup, or the description of how Kepler arrived at the shape of the earth's orbit. The larger half is a collection of papers, letters and jottings illustrative of the great scientist's outlook on some of the problems of life. They give an impression of almost whimsical simplicity (*e.g.*, regarding the economics of over-production) combined with a happy idealism and a passionate love of Nature. Einstein describes himself as a solitary creature, a mystic with democracy as his politics and militarism as his anathema. In a sense he claims to be a deeply religious man: he has no belief in an anthropomorphic God, punishing or rewarding man for predestined acts; but he lives "in rapturous amazement at the harmony of natural law, which reveals an intelligence of such superiority that, compared with it, all the systematic thinking and acting of human beings is an utterly insignificant reflection." There are flashes of humour too, as in his reflections on interviewers, and in his "Reply to the Women of America." The Nazi movement is not mentioned; but there is an interesting analysis of the Jewish mind and ideals. Meston.

9*. The Frustration of Science. By Sir Daniel Hall, J. G. Crowther, J. D. Bernal, V. H. Mottram, Enid Charles, P. W. Gorer and P. M. S. Blackett, with a Foreword by Prof. F. Soddy. 1935. (London: George Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 144 pp. 3s. 6*d.*)

The argument running through this collection of essays is that present scientific knowledge, which is capable of feeding, clothing and housing the population of the world in comfort without any increase in the amount of labour expended, is prevented from exerting its beneficent influence by a money economy and by political considera-

ons which ignore science. Sir Daniel Hall, in the most interesting ssay in the volume, points out that agricultural investigators have een hailed as benefactors when they have increased the fertility of ie soil and the yield of crops, but that at the present day nations re restricting output and in some instances deliberately destroying ie products of the soil, as in the burning of wheat and coffee, the loughing in of cotton and tobacco, and the wholesale slaughtering f pigs. At the same time, in the interests of national self-sufficiency, ther countries are encouraging the cultivation of crops which could e grown more cheaply and efficiently elsewhere, and artificial barriers etween producers and consumers are everywhere increasing. Other riters urge that science is largely turned from its proper purpose by ie conversion of every new discovery where possible into an instru-ent of warfare. The scientific investigator has no control over the ses to which his work is put, and one aim of this volume is to call ie attention of scientific workers to their responsibility for such ses. Several of the authors take the view that one nation has taken ie right road, and that in the U.S.S.R. science is employed for social irposes as nowhere else, but the argument is not very convincing, id Professor Soddy, in his preface to the collection, maintains that is not enough for science to look to a new master, but that the public ould acknowledge its real masters, those who are concerned with e production of real wealth and not with the manufacture of debt. ie book is deliberately provocative, but will repay careful study.

C. H. DESCH.

). JUDAISM AS A CIVILISATION : Towards a Reconstruction of American Jewish Life. By Mordecai M. Kaplan. 1934. (New York and London : Macmillan. 8vo. xiv + 200 pp. 21s.)

DR. KAPLAN has been the head of a Jewish Teachers' Institute in ew York, a teacher of Homiletics at the Jewish Theological Seminary, id the organiser of a society in America for the advancement of Judaism. e has felt for years that Judaism is a problem, that if it is to survive modern conditions it must undergo a radical reinterpretation and construction. He has set himself in this book to "formulate the eology" which he considers necessary for the salvation of the ancient ith.

Broadly his point of view is that the outlook of the Jewish leaders the last century, the period of civil emancipation, was wrong. They ught to denationalise Judaism and turn it into a religious creed. iose who held to the orthodox life and wished to maintain all the inute prescriptions of the Rabbinical law were equally at fault. If idaism is to be a living force in the young generation, it must be terpreted and accepted as a civilisation, as an outlook on the whole life, calling for a certain social conduct, a certain outlook on inter-tional relations as well as the maintenance of a certain way of life.

Palestine as the Jewish national spiritual centre must have its stinctive place in that civilisation. It is the symbol of the Jewish naissance and the centre of the Jewish civilisation. Nationalism, Dr. Kaplan sees it, is essentially cultural, and it is for the Jew to emplify and spread that higher conception of nationalism and the ternational outlook which is essential for the peace of the world. It part of his civilisation that he should throw in his lot with all move-ents to further social justice and universal peace.

The book is written with transparent earnestness and wide know-

edge. What is lacking in the new presentation of Judaism, perhaps, ; a simple, instinctive sense of religion. It is fundamental in Dr. Kaplan's conception that to survive Judaism must become complex, nd he sets out a programme of "a maximum of Jewishness." The niversal religions, however, have been essentially simple; and it is kely that to hold the enthusiasm of masses of men they must remain imple in their appeal.

The book then is stimulating rather than convincing. It is written rimarily for the American public and is couched in an American social argon which is often strange to the English reader. But its theme and s argument are of interest to all concerned with Judaism and the ewish people. N. BENTWICH.

1. THE MAKING OF THE MODERN JEW. By Milton Steinberg. 1934. (London: Routledge. 8vo. vii + 279 pp. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

THIS is an excellent book. It traces the history of the Jews from he Diaspora to the present day. The author points out with great orce that the ghettoes preserved the Jews in mediæval conditions, ocially, economically, and intellectually, right up to the French Revolution, when the walls of the ghettoes were everywhere destroyed t a blow and their inhabitants found themselves free and often forced o mix with a world of whose existence, of whose science, culture, rganisation and achievements—the growth of three hundred years—ney had been totally unaware and which they now had to assimilate n a generation. This violent and unique experience, together with the enturies-old conditions imposed by their Christian masters on the ccupations that Jews had and had not been allowed to follow, ufficiently explains all the characteristics generally attributed to Jews.

Mr. Steinberg shows how persecution has always tended to intensify ewish consciousness and unity, and assimilation to diminish them, lthough the emanicipation of the last hundred years has not brought ll that was hoped. He foresees a renaissance of Jewish consciousness, nd if the Zionist experiment succeeds, he believes that Palestine ay become a spiritual and cultural fountain-head for Jews all over the orld. The alternative is a Jew nominally assimilated, actually lost o his own origins and culture and people, and rejected if not persecuted y the lands of his adoption. RICHARD PYKE.

2. LA SITUATION ÉCONOMIQUE DES JUIFS DEPUIS LA GUERRE MONDIALE. By Jacob Lestchinsky. [*Comité des Délégations Juives*, Cahiers 11–14.] 1934. (Paris: Rousseau. 8vo. 151 pp.)

THIS treatise, which is admirably produced and very thorough in s analysis, tells the terrible story of the plight of the Jews of Eastern nd Central Europe to whom the last century, with its breakdown of udalism and partial adherence to free trade and liberalism, now ems a golden age. The extremes of post-War nationalism, Fascism varying degrees of intensity, State capitalism, and the stoppage of nigration have combined to bring disaster upon the Jews in this ea, who form about 50 per cent. of the Jews in the world. The orporate State, regulating and organising an increasing proportion the economic life of its citizens, leaves little room for the individualtic activities in which Jews have generally found their vocations, and ves ample opportunity for those who wish to prevent the entry of ews into the only enterprises which offer any security or prospects.

The author deals fully with the German situation, but he clearly shows that the position of Jews in many neighbouring countries is hardly any better—a fact which is generally obscured by the dramatic and sensational aspects of Nazi anti-semitism.

The book contains remarkably interesting statistics as to population and economic distribution. Two significant facts are that in the last hundred years the Jewish population increased five-fold, whilst the world's population doubled, and that in the same period the Jews, who came twelfth in numbers amongst European peoples, occupied fourth place in the emigration figures. The statistics would be more valuable if the author had given fuller indication of his sources.

A. A. MOCATTA.

13. MARXISM. By J. Middleton Murry, John Macmurray, N. A. Holdaway and G. D. H. Cole. 1935. (London: Chapman and Hall. 8vo. 245 pp. 5s.)

THIS interesting composite work is significant of the present-day eagerness of thinkers who would be thought "advanced" to flock into the Marxist sheepfold. With the doubtful exception of Mr. Holdaway, none of the contributors to this volume has any title to call himself a Marxist; and the opinions which they express have only a fleeting and superficial resemblance to that extremely categorical body of doctrine, Marxism. Mr. Murry is fluent, ingenious, and lucid in detail. But he inevitably succumbs to the confusion of thought resulting from the identification of Marxism with his own particular brand of "practical mysticism." Anyone who can persuade himself that "Marx never said, or implied, that Religion was nonsense" either has not read Marx or possesses a singular aptitude for the Nelson touch. Mr. Macmurray, who is made of sterner stuff, devotes himself exclusively to defending and expounding Marx's doctrine of "the unity of thought and action." But nobody would bother to write books about Marx to-day if he had confined himself to metaphysical theory. It is an odd way of interpreting Marxism to ignore the most vital parts of it. Mr. Holdaway comes to closer grips with the real thing and defends Marx's economics on the now familiar line that the famous theory of value has nothing to do with prices. Mr. Cole's rather jejune essay tells us little except that Marx is obsolete on many matters of detail. All these writers would, one feels, have had something far more worth while to say if they had not had to make some show of justifying that Marxist label.

JOHN HEATH.

14. COMMUNISM. By Ralph Fox. 1935. (London: John Lane. 8vo. xvi + 156 pp. 3s. 6d.)

MR. FOX is a pious and thorough-going Marxist. He deals with such problems as those arising from the theory of surplus-value by the simple method of ignoring their existence. He adduces as evidence of the truth of Marxism the fact that "the more Marx is 'refuted' the stronger grows the influence of his ideas," being presumably too young to remember the days when the same "proof" of the truth of Christianity was popular in schools and pulpits. Mr. Fox is on safer ground in attacking the abuses of capitalism. It is revolting that in certain European countries institutions should exist which can, without much exaggeration, be described as slave camps; it is distressing that there are families in London subsisting on five shillings a week per head; and it is disagreeable that unemployed persons in

receipt of the "dole" should be subject to "intolerable intrusions" and "humiliating questions." But Mr. Fox's indignation is completely stultified when he seeks his ideal in the Soviet Union, where "slave camps," hunger-line poverty and inquisitorial bureaucracy notoriously exist on an extended scale. This volume is one of a series on contemporary problems and movements. It seems a pity that the publishers did not entrust it to some one more likely to take a detached and scientific view. JOHN HEATH.

ECONOMICS AND FINANCE

15*. THE GREAT DEPRESSION. By Lionel Robbins. 1934. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. xiv + 238 pp. 8*s*. 6*d*.)

THIS is by far the best book yet written about the great depression. It is clever and wise, brilliant and sound, theoretically thorough, and, at the same time, soberly realistic. It can be read (and it has been widely read) by the practical man, who may learn from it the value of abstract reasoning, and it ought to be studied by the theorist, who can gather from it the importance of a fearless analysis of existing facts and policies. Within the limited space of two hundred comparatively sparsely printed pages, it encompasses a wide field.

After a short synopsis of after-War economics and a lucid exposition of various popular misconceptions of facts and theories purporting to explain the origin of the crisis, it deals in four short chapters with "The Genesis of the Depression," "The Causes of Deflation," "Great Britain and the Financial Crisis," "International Chaos." The last three chapters discuss "Restrictionism and Planning," "Conditions of Recovery," and "Prospects."

The author, whose attitude towards economic problems has sometimes been belittled by opponents as purely analytical and incapable of coping with reality, has shown a much firmer grip on it than many of his critics. He flatly refuses to explain a world-wide phenomenon like the present crisis by a single cause. He appreciates the impact of political forces on the economic system at home and abroad, quite as justly as did Mr. Keynes in *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*. He allocates their proper place to monetary causes and does not throw in his lot with those learned money wizards who seem to imagine that one can fight famine or flood by a contraction of credit, in order to reduce the price of goods buried by dust storms or washed away by rivers. He attributes the main responsibility for the crisis to the inflated money and credit policy which has been followed, with short interruptions, in most parts of the world ever since the War, and which either led to rising prices, or at least to a break in their natural decline. The almost universal piling up of a top-heavy debt structure facilitated, on the one hand, an exaggerated speeding up of production, which resulted in prices declining, and made it impossible for the debtors, on the other hand, to pay their debts, as soon as decline had become heavy enough. Such a situation can only be dealt with successfully by wiping out bad debts. The capitalist system could not continue if private enterprise bags the profits but is unwilling to bear the losses. There is no other way of coming back to a sound price level than the road leading through bankruptcy. This road has been trod in every country, but many of them have camouflaged their movements by

currency depreciation. Instead of weeding out overcharged enterprises, and letting healthy concerns defray their just obligations, a sort of collective bankruptcy has been decided upon, which has not saved the weak concerns, but which has given quite superfluous benefits to sound concerns to the loss of all creditors. In many cases the dislocation between the different groups of income resulting from the crisis has not yet been adjusted, and it has probably been aggravated by the various methods of covering it up.

Mr. Robbins underrates perhaps the importance of the fall in the prices of agricultural products which ushered in the crisis. No doubt purchasing power all over the world is merely shifted by the decline of agricultural purchasing power. But the increased purchasing power of the industrial classes, due to lower cost of food-stuffs, cannot be turned immediately towards those goods formerly demanded by agriculturists. The British worker and the British investor did not take over the goods Australian and Argentine grain-growers could not import any longer; in fact, the purchasing power of the British investor declined simultaneously as he no longer received interest on his investments. As the situation was not allowed to work itself out quickly, the farming influence being nearly always strong enough to postpone the clearance, the more so as their interests were identical with those of the banks who had lent them money, credit was pumped in to bolster up their purchasing power until the bubble burst. But this is a mere question of nuance.

Mr. Robbins is very hard on the policy of the British Government. He denies the popular assertion that the gold standard was not properly handled by the United States and France, by pointing out that the British authorities themselves have not played the game according to its rules, since they did not contract credit when gold flowed out. One reason for the hesitating British discount policy may have been the desire to keep interest rates low in order to convert the War loans.

As to the American situation, an orthodox gold policy was scarcely possible after Mr. Roosevelt was elected. Mr. Roosevelt was probably won over to some sort of monetary experiment by advocates of depreciation before he assumed the presidency. The possibility of his considering a depreciation of the dollar could not be ignored, and may well account for the gold hoarding and the gold exports which forced his hand later on. And it is quite possible that this extremely able politician may have preferred a settlement of the inter-allied debts, by which the United States do not get a cent, but for which neither he nor Congress need shoulder the responsibility (which can be laid completely to European wickedness) to a settlement which might have secured fifty per cent. of the just demands of the United States, but would have made President and Congress responsible for the reduction. Mr. Robbins' book should not be given in extracts, however stimulating many of his points are; it ought to be read. M. J. BONN.

16*. THE EXCHANGE EQUALISATION ACCOUNT. By N. F. Hall. 1935. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. x + 115 pp. 7s. 6d.)

MR. HALL has written a most lucid and interesting account of the operations of the Exchange Equalisation Fund, an understanding of which is indispensable for an intelligent opinion about the proper monetary policy of Great Britain. With a wholly admirable restraint he has avoided the pitfalls of excessive conjecture and guess-work based

on insufficient evidence. He has eschewed attempts at a precise estimate of the scale of operations. Instead he has given us a careful and conscientious piece of work, using all reliable sources of information. It may be claimed that he has successfully rebutted the accusations that the fund was manipulated in a selfish or predatory manner, though he holds the view that we might have done well to hold sterling at a somewhat higher figure in the early part of 1933.

Mr. Hall claims that he "makes no attempt to appraise British monetary policy since 1931." Running through his commentary, however, is the notion that there is a certain natural level for sterling exchange rates, determined by fundamental conditions. There is, however, another view, namely that there is at no time any unique natural level for sterling, but a number of different possible natural levels each appropriate to a different possible internal monetary policy and to the pitch of industrial activity associated therewith. To regard the rate, which market forces tend to establish in a short period, as natural, implies acceptance of or, anyhow, acquiescence in a given monetary policy as inevitable. Mr. Hall might defend the Exchange Equalisation operations as neutral in the sense that they did precisely take the actual monetary policy being pursued internally as given, and avoided using—probably rightly—the Account as an agent of policy.

In his later sections he propounds an ingenious scheme for amalgamating the Account with the Issue Department in such a way as to restore the automatic working of the gold standard, but with this additional device, that international short-term movements of funds could be offset, and could be seen by the public to be offset by reference to the published account. Thus an active balance due to fundamental conditions would lead to credit expansion in accordance with "the rules of the game," while one due to a movement of short-term funds would be offset. His proposals are neat and deserve examination. But a word of warning must be given. Those who hold that there ought to be a concerted international effort to secure stability in the value of gold could not wholly endorse his proposals. For there is a radical and unavoidable contradiction of principle between those who wish to revert to or to devise automatic gold-standard rules on the lines of Mr. Hall and those who wish to use monetary policy on an international scale to counteract the natural tendency of the monetary system to fluctuate. It is of the essence of the former principle that at any point of time some countries (those with an active balance) should expand credit while others (those with a passive balance—there must be some) should contract, while the latter principle demands that all countries should expand or contract simultaneously in accordance with the current phase of the trade cycle. Mr. Hall also presupposes that permanent exchange stability is desirable; at least he does not discuss the gadgets that have recently been proposed for introducing an element of elasticity at this point. But it would be going too far afield to join issue with him on this question. R. F. HARROD.

17. ECONOMIC PLANNING AND THE TARIFF. By J. G. Smith. 1934. (Princeton University Press; Oxford University Press. 8vo. x + 331 pp. $3.00; 13*s*. 6*d*.)

18. LE PROBLÈME DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL. By F. Oulès. 1934. (Paris: Sirey. 8vo. xxiii + 483 pp. 50 *frs*.)

19. THE TRADE BALANCE. By K. E. Edgeworth. 1935. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 135 pp. 3*s*. 6*d*.)

20*. BRITISH COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY: the post-War Transition, 1919–1934. Volume I. (London: The Russell-Square Press. 8vo. xv + 431 pp. 15s.)

THE first two of the above books both deal with the tariff question, but they are of very unequal value. Professor J. G. Smith is not afraid of plain speaking, and he has written a book which deserves a warm welcome. In the course of a couple of hundred pages he traces the growth of the tariff in the United States, reviews the arguments (popular and otherwise) advanced in support of protection, shows how the tariff has led to log-rolling and fostered monopoly, and ends with a positive programme of reform. Some of it has been said before, but little of it has been said more cogently. In the last hundred pages of the book appendices give details of the Hawley-Smoot tariff and other acts, a short history of the U.S. Tariff Commission, and some useful statistics relating to the foreign trade of the United States. Altogether a book which was well worth writing.

M. Oulès' book is a very different affair. He sets out with the notion that if a controversy is sharp enough, not only must there be something to be said on both sides, but the truth is certain to be in the middle. Accordingly, the first half of his ponderous volume is devoted to an elaborate critique of the (so-called English) classical theory of international trade. With the help of a distinction between national and individual interest, a specious appeal to increasing returns, and a judicious use of short-run arguments connected with the balance of trade, M. Oulès proves to his own satisfaction that the amount of truth in the classical theory is quite inadequate to support the free trade position. The second half of the book is devoted to an exposition and critique of the doctrines of M. Mihaïl Manoïlesco. M. Manoïlesco, it must be explained, is a Rumanian statesman who, believing that the protectionist policy of his country could be placed on a sound theoretical footing, published in 1929 a book called *La Théorie du Protectionisme* which obtained an instant success, not only in the Balkans. Suffice it to say that the protection of an industry is considered justified provided that its output per head (measured in money) is greater than that of the industries which it will displace. Protection in general is justified in so far as it increases the money value of the total output of the country. The reactions on real output and real income are altogether ignored. Above all, agricultural countries should be protected from exploitation by industrial ones. M. Oulès is no more satisfied with this as a general case for protection than with the classical theory as a general case for free trade. Cases can, he believes, frequently be made out for protection, and among the most important he seems to consider dumping. While he does not seem at all perturbed at the present trend of world commercial policies, his own opinions are not systematically presented. In the original M. Manoïlesco is quite unreadable. M. Oulès has performed a certain service in providing a convenient guide to a set of doctrines which, absurd as they may be, have gained great popularity and practical importance in Eastern Europe and elsewhere.

Lieut.-Colonel Edgeworth's essay is a plea for the adoption of a "variable gold standard." In order to obtain the advantages of national autonomy without sacrificing convertibility, he proposes that the currency price of gold should be raised or lowered in each country

by a small percentage every week. He suggests rates of change of 2 to 5 per cent. per annum. The two great difficulties about such a plan are surely, (1) that deliberate under-valuation may be attempted for mercantilist reasons; and (2) that a rate of variation in the currency price of gold which is small enough to obviate speculation will frequently be inadequate to achieve the amount of adjustment required. The author does not sufficiently appreciate either of these difficulties. His most interesting suggestion is that international debts should in future be contracted as to half in the currency of the lender, and half in the currency of the borrower.

British Commerce and Industry is the first volume of what is intended to be an annual review of our economic activity, designed to interest not only ourselves but also our foreign customers. Mr. T. E. Elias is general editor and also contributes to the text. Professor G. C. Allen makes a survey of industrial changes since 1924, Dr. Delisle Burns discusses planning, Mr. Norman Crump deals with the recent history of the foreign exchanges, Mr. H. V. Hodson is concerned with the changing direction of our foreign trade, Mr. A. W. Kiddy discusses the future of international investment, Mr. L. Urwick describes recent trends in business management, and Mr. Hartley Withers discusses the current recovery in trade. The remainder of the book consists of contributions by some twenty-five individual firms each prominent in its own particular field. The volume is excellently produced and lavishly illustrated. HAROLD BARGER.

LAW AND LEAGUE OF NATIONS

21*. DAS MINDERHEITENSCHUTZVERFAHREN VOR DEM VÖLKERBUND. By Dr. Otto Junghann. 1934. (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr. 8vo. 268 pp. *Rm.* 11.)

THIS useful survey begins with an account of the minorities procedure at present practised by the Council of the League of Nations, in virtue of the "Guarantee Article" of the Minorities Treaties and of the various Council Resolutions. Although brief, this account is clear and covers the main ground. A few of the interpretations seem surprising, particularly the statements on p. 22, that "the plaintiff minority may participate (*teilnehmen*) in the session of the Council [which discusses its complaint] and is shown the reply of the State concerned;" on the same page, that the Council can send a Commission to the spot; on p. 23, the categorical statement (qualified only by a footnote that Professor Rauchberg is of a different opinion) that the vote of the "defendant" State does not count for purpose of unanimity; a few lines below, the remark that the decisions of the Council cannot be enforced (compare the previous page).

There follows a somewhat fuller and critical account of various suggestions made for improvement of the procedure—an excellent piece of work, which might well have been longer still. The bibliography, again, is too summary; a most notable omission is that of Professor Stone's two works.

The Appendix, which comprises two-thirds of the book, gives the texts of the main official documents (art. 12 of the Polish Treaty; M. Clemenceau's letter of June 24th, 1919; the Tittoni Report and the main Council and Assembly Resolutions); and—a very interesting

and valuable collection—the resolutions on the question adopted by the Congress of European Nationalities, the International Law Association, the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the Federation of League of Nations Societies. C. A. MACARTNEY.

22*. LE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL ET L'ORGANISATION DE LA PAIX. By B. Mirkine-Guetzévitch. 1934. (Paris: Sirey. 8vo. 100 pp.)

THIS is a reprint of the lectures delivered by Professor Mirkine-Guetzévitch at The Hague Academy of International Law in 1933. It is essential for the proper appreciation of this admirable monograph to understand that, according to the author's interpretation, the term "constitutional law of peace" means that part of constitutional law devoted in the constitutional charters of the various States to the organisation and maintenance of international peace. Such express provisions may now be found in some of the modern constitutions, viz. in Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Danzig, and Siam, but more particularly in Spain, whose new constitution lays down the two fundamental principles that the country "renounces war as an instrument of national policy" (art. 6 of the 1931 charter) and that war may only be declared in accordance with the provisions contained in the Covenant of the League of Nations and after all means for the preservation of peace have been exhausted (art. 77). An essential prerequisite to the establishment of international peace is uniformity of legislation in the various constitutions "outlawing war." In this connection, reference may be made to the Budapest Articles of Interpretation of the Briand-Kellogg Pact adopted by the International Law Association in 1934, which provide that "it is the duty of all States without delay to enact such domestic legislation as may be required to carry into effect any treaty obligations entered into by them." A second prerequisite is the institution of democratic constitutional governments in the various countries. As the distinguished author remarks, the prevalence of justice and peace in international relations can only be based on the liberty and freedom of all the peoples of the world, and it would be impossible to achieve this object in States where a dictatorial régime has displaced liberty and democratic institutions. C. JOHN COLOMBOS.

23. LA VISITE DES CONVOIS NEUTRES. By E. Gordon. 1935. (Paris: Pedone. 8vo. 120 pp. 25 *frs.*)

THE Declaration of London (1909) provided that "neutral vessels under convoy of their national flag are exempt from search" (art. 61). That Convention—which in the eye of English law was not a valid international treaty (the *Hakan*, 1918, A. C., p. 151)—departs in the said article from the view as to the right of search of vessels under neutral convoy accepted for a long time by Great Britain and stated in the *Maria* case by Sir William Scott. An admirable and modern statement of the doctrine was made by Professor A. Pearce Higgins in 1926 (Académie de Droit International: *Recueil des Cours*, T. XI, pp. 67 *seq.*).

Having traced the history of the controversy as to the right of search, Mr. Gordon examines closely the arguments against such right and comes to the conclusion—unusual in the continental literature—that search of vessels under neutral convoy is advisable because their immunity cannot be said to be universally admitted and because without it the belligerent cannot effectively exercise its right to prevent

infringements of neutrality. The book is the result of serious study and is a useful contribution to the subject. V. R. I.

HISTORY: PRE-WAR AND POST-WAR

24. The Reign of King George V. By D. C. Somervell. 1935. (London: Faber and Faber. 8vo. viii + 533 pp. 12s. 6d.)

This book has been written for the occasion of the King's Jubilee, but it is much more than a *livre de circonstance*. There is, of course, some disadvantage in the selection of a span of years—the twenty-five years of George V's reign—which do not form a complete period. The reign began in the middle of a crisis concerning the House of Lords, and the Jubilee occurs in the middle of an economic crisis or depression. Mr. Somervell partly meets this difficulty at the beginning of the book by starting his chronicle a few years before the King's accession; but he cannot, or at any rate is cautious enough not to try to, continue it into the future. The story of these twenty-five years makes a very pleasant narrative, mainly political, although there is also a chapter on the Prayer Book. He has, as he explains in the Preface, excluded the history of manners and customs, fashions and thought. The omission is to be regretted. But within the limits which he has set himself, Mr. Somervell has written a pleasant, useful narrative with the relevant facts skilfully marshalled and with plenty of quiet, judicious comment. R. B. Mowat.

25*. A Modern History of Europe, 1046–1918. Comprising *The Middle Ages*, by Oliver G. Welch; *The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, 1494–1714, by P. C. Gordon Walker; *The Eighteenth Century and the Revolution*, 1714–1815, by H. E. Howard; *The Nineteenth Century and the World War*, by C. J. Pennethorne Hughes. Edited by J. Hampden Jackson. 1935. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 1236 pp. 10s. 6d. Separate vols., 3s. 6d. each.)

26*. The Post-War World: A Short Political History, 1918–1934. By J. Hampden Jackson. 1935. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 520 pp. 6s.)

These two books together comprise a series of European Histories designed as " text-books which are not sectarian," presumably in the main for the upper forms of schools, but also for any members of the public who desire efficient, compendious histories for reference or for information.

The first book consists of four separate text-books, each by a separate author, bound together in one volume. Three are by schoolmasters; one is by an Oxford history tutor. Each author has individuality, a style of his own, and a method of approach that is his own. The effect of all this is pleasing, as each successive period has a new writer and a fresh point of view. The book (or the four books bound in one and covering the years 1046–1918) is what it professes to be, a good text-book history of a rather more scholarly, more cultural kind than were many of the old-fashioned text-books. There are plenty of good sketch-maps, genealogical and chronological tables and other useful auxiliary material. Mr. Jackson, who writes the second volume, *The Post-War World*, is also the general editor of the whole series. He, too, is a schoolmaster, but his book is somewhat less of a text-book than are the other units of the series. Mr. Jackson is, quite

naturally, excited by post-War history, and approaches it with a certain degree of energy not commonly displayed in text-books. It is, indeed, a text-book in so far as it contains, within the limits of the book's space, all the facts of all the subjects which are "history" in the examination sense of the word. But it is also, as every contemporary history is bound to be, an essay in interpretation of a somewhat confusing present or recent past. Everybody who is interested in contemporary affairs, who wishes to have his memories of the last fifteen years revived and organised, and who wants suggestions for judgments on men and events, can read this book with profit. Mr. Jackson does not stint his criticism. He is outspoken in his judgments upon Japan, upon President Franklin Roosevelt and other notable men and things. He sees post-War history as the second great revolution of the modern world (the first being that of 1789); and as the revolution is not over, the book has no natural ending, but no reader can find fault with it on that account. It is an interesting piece of work.

R. B. MOWAT.

27. THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE. By Ramsay Muir. Fifth Edition. 1935. (London: Constable. 8vo. xii + 326 pp. 8s. 6d.)

THE fifth edition of this interesting book has been considerably altered in the process of resetting. Two chapters have been practically rewritten in order, as the author explains, to eliminate symptoms of war-fever and to expound "a saner and more balanced view than was possible when war was raging." The first chapter, a suggestive and stimulating, but brief, essay on "The Motives of Imperialism," could be usefully expanded by the author. After this introductory chapter the book proceeds historically, taking up each country by turn, including the United States. A very large proportion of space is, naturally, devoted to the British Empire, on which Mr. Muir writes with knowledge, sympathy and reasonableness. The chapter called "Towards the Cataclysm" is a valuable contribution to the subject of responsibility for the World War. The book as a whole is an admirable piece of political history by a writer who combines capacity for observation and reflection with prolonged and direct experience in practical politics.

R. B. MOWAT.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

28. THE BOOK OF THE KING'S JUBILEE: The Life and Times of Our King and Queen and their People, 1865–1935. Edited by Sir Philip Gibbs, K.B.E. 1935. (London: Hutchinson. Demy 8vo. 512 pp.; illus. 3s. 6d.)
29. THE KING'S REIGN. By John Drinkwater. 1935. (London: Methuen. 8vo. xi + 82 pp. 5s.)
30. THE KING'S FIRST AMBASSADOR: a Biographical Study of H.R.H. the Prince of Wales. By Basil Maine. 1935. (London: Hutchinson. 8vo. 290 pp. 7s. 6d.)
31. THE KING'S GRACE. By John Buchan. 1935. (London: Hodder and Stoughton. 8vo. 327 pp. 5s.)

THE four books dealing with the Jubilee of King George submitted to me for review have very different objects and merits. *The Book of the King's Jubilee*, edited by Sir Philip Gibbs, fairly fulfils its object of being a "concise pictorial record covering the lives of the King and Queen from their childhood to the time of the Jubilee." With its 500 photographs and 506 pages for 3s. 6d., it is undoubtedly very good

value for the money. As history it inclines to popular and simplified versions of events. The picture of an "unheeding" people and Government awaiting the European explosion may seem a little sketchy to those who remember the London Conference of Ambassadors, the strenuous efforts to find a way of peace with Germany, the naval programme of 1914 and other events of 1913 and 1914.

Mr. Drinkwater's *The King's Reign* bears the mark of its origin, which was the preparation of a film illustrating the King's reign. It is a succession of short vivid chapters; the King and his Administration, the King and the Great War, etc., etc., and winds up with brief reviews of art, science, industry and sport during the reign. It is done in a straightforward, workmanlike manner without offence to historical accuracy.

The same may be said of Mr. Basil Maine's biographical study of the Prince of Wales, whom he calls "the King's First Ambassador." All the facts of the Prince's useful and busy life are brought together with the right stress on his many-sided interests and quick sympathies. It is done in such a way as to leave the Prince a human and credible figure, which cannot always be said of royal biographies.

Both for its contents and for its authorship, *The King's Grace* of Mr. John Buchan is in a different class from most of the books produced by this occasion. Mr. Buchan groups his facts about the King, but in the natural and simple way which best does justice to the King's part. His book makes good reading without ever being flashy; it is always well and sometimes brilliantly written. I know of no better short account of the War than will be found in the chapters devoted to it in this book. Here Mr. Buchan has the advantage over more pedestrian writers of being a practised story-teller as well as a careful student of military operations. As an historian of domestic politics he has the further advantage of having played a part in them and being able to speak from personal knowledge of many of the events that he records. The historian and the politician are admirably blended in his pages.

The book being on this plane, I am tempted to suggest a few points on which Mr. Buchan might reconsider his opinion after further research. Austria did not have Germany "at her back" when she annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, though Germany afterwards decided, with great reluctance, that she was bound to support her ally. The story is fully told in the German and Austrian documents and in Prince Bülow's Memoirs. The Austrians proclaimed the annexation without consulting or even informing the Kaiser, who was greatly angered by a stroke which cut across his policy of friendship with Turkey, and was with difficulty persuaded not to demand the revocation of the Austrian proclamation. In the Austro-Hungarian Council of Ministers which decided on the annexation, Aehrenthal actually told the other Ministers that they need not trouble about Germany, since after her refusal to come to terms with Great Britain about the fleet, she was absolutely dependent upon Austria and would have to follow where Austria led. Being thus cornered the Kaiser put a bold face on it, and it was a German ultimatum (or its equivalent in diplomatic language) which finally brought Russia down and enabled him to make his "Shining Armour" speech in Vienna the following year; but to the end he considered himself to have been badly used and grumbled all the way.

Similarly, I think some qualification is needed of Mr. Buchan's

statement that "the spur behind Austria was Germany" in the last weeks before the War. It is undoubtedly true that the Kaiser encouraged Austria to go all lengths in the days after the Serajevo murders, but Austria needed no spur. She had for two years been urging on Germany the necessity and inevitability of a war, but up to August 1913 the Germans remained unconvinced and used all their influence to restrain her. In the following October they gave way and threw the reins to Vienna, but the Kaiser had many moments of vacillation in the subsequent months. Even in the last stage he wrote on the margin of the Serbian reply to the Austrian ultimatum, "there is now no cause for war," and he appears to have been honest in supporting Grey's final plea for direct negotiations between Austria and Russia. Taking the whole last phase I think it would be truer to say that the spur was applied by Austria to Germany rather than by Germany to Austria.

In domestic affairs Mr. Buchan has written a sober and straightforward narrative with admirable impartiality. He does well to bring out the wise and patient attitude of the King in the constitutional and afterwards in the Irish crisis. His view of Sir Edward Carson's attitude on the Ulster question accords with what Asquith supposed it to be, and with the general view taken of it at the time, but it can scarcely be reconciled with Mr. Ian Colvin's interpretation of it in his *Life of Lord Carson*. In the judgment between parties, none can be held blameless, and whatever excuse may be made for it, the weakness of the Government in face of openly threatened rebellion was a heavy blow to the prestige and authority of Parliament. But while it is quite true that the Government could not have survived if it had not gone forward with Home Rule, I do not think it is fair to suggest that this was the only or the main motive for proceeding with it. Home Rule had for twenty-five years been the avowed policy of the Liberal party, and there were abundant reasons—only too well justified by the sequel—for thinking a settlement with Ireland to be an urgent public necessity. But these are points on which opinions may differ, and they in no way detract from the value of Mr. Buchan's admirable short study of the reign.

J. A. SPENDER.

32*. THE EMPIRE IN THESE DAYS: AN INTERPRETATION. By R. C. Coupland. 1935. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. vii + 276 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

PROFESSOR COUPLAND, in his sub-title, describes this collection of lectures and essays as "an interpretation." What is the interpreter's point of view? Repeatedly he returns to the classic pronouncements on freedom and obligation—Fox on the "assimilation" of colonial and English institutions, Burke on "trusteeship." The last paper in the book is a lecture delivered in 1933 on "The Memory of Wilberforce." The interpreter now finds his standard, not in a phrase or a speech, but in a life. The standard set by Wilberforce is the standard at which the British administrator in Africa must aim to-day. The same standard is valid—though not without qualifications—for the purposes of historical inquiry and judgment. Wilberforce is "a striking example—perhaps the most striking one can think of in modern history—of the power of pure idealism in the modern world." Professor Coupland refers from time to time to the action of economic forces, in the past and the present, in shaping British imperial policy. But his own interest is in the ideal forces.

In the present reviewer's opinion, this weakens to some extent the

proportions of a survey which is otherwise admirably balanced. The summaries of proceedings and the appendices of Imperial Conferences for two generations suggest that economic matters are well in the front of the minds of imperial politicians. There is almost half a century of propaganda—chiefly from overseas—behind the Ottawa Conference of 1932. So far as the Dominions and Great Britain are concerned, Professor Coupland is content to repeat the well-worn theme, so infuriating to foreigners, that Ottawa "has given the world a lead." But, in a pointed essay on "The Future of Colonial Trusteeship," he does consider Ottawa, and other "economic aspects of sovereignty" —to borrow Mr. Hawtrey's phrase—from the point of view of the colonies. Ottawa, he points out, differentiates the economic status of those colonies to which it has been applied from that of the mandates. "We can no longer claim to be trustees for the commerce of the world." And we may easily slip into the position of subordinating our trusteeship for those we rule—which is our most essential trusteeship—to the interests of our own commerce. Professor Coupland illustrates from the anti-Japanese quotas, imposed without consulting African consumers and over the heads of the Ceylon legislators. He pleads that we should not drift into policies which are contrary to our best traditions and to our pledges, whether explicit or implied.

The core of the book is contained in a series of chapters entitled "The Meaning of the Empire." Professor Coupland deals in turn with the Dominions, India, and British Tropical Africa. Under each heading he asks the question, "What is the Empire for?" and each time he gives substantially the same answer—Freedom in Unity. The section on the Dominions is an admirable example of learning lightly carried and judgment happily expressed: on pages 88–90 he takes in his stride the questions of secession and neutrality and with admirable conciseness says the essential things about them. In the two sections on India he traces the process by which "trusteeship" has passed into "assimilation," and examines the heads under which the White Paper proposals correspond to and deviate from the Dominion process. In Africa, freedom advances by another road—through indirect rule—and must advance more slowly. But here too he looks forward to a far-off day when the African peoples also will be "masters of their destiny."

One feels that the essays printed in this book are essays in persuasion. Persuasion, not propaganda, for behind them all is learning and experience and a reasoned standard of judgment. From the preface, and from suggestions in certain of the lectures (*e.g.* Nos. III and IX), one feels that Mr. Coupland wishes most of all to persuade idealistic youth—to persuade it that the Empire is worth knowing and that it offers to idealism the opportunity of creative activity. He would wish (*e.g.* p. 2) to recruit a strenuous body of practical idealists who would push forward their work regardless of the "extremists" of right and left, of die-hards who believe in the supreme virtues of force and of revolutionaries—particularly revolutionary nationalists—who are the opposite numbers of the die-hards. The reviewer feels that this aim, admirable though it may be, occasionally gets in the road of understanding. For example, it shuts out from serious inquiry the mentality of the revolutionary nationalist himself. Thus, in Dublin, Professor Coupland sees and records the symptoms of an uncompromising republican loyality which is hostile to association with the British Commonwealth. He reminds British readers that there are historical

explanations of this intransigence. And yet he does not penetrate the immediate historical background of Irish history. By implication at least (he puts Ulster "loyalists" in inverted commas but speaks downright of Englishmen murdered during the troubles) he accepts the English fiction of "serious political crime" as a true interpretation of the struggle of 1919–21. Such a fiction is a barrier to any understanding of Arthur Griffith and Mr. Cosgrave, let alone Mr. De Valera or Mr. P. O'Donnell. One wonders, too, whether Professor Coupland's zeal to persuade has not ended in some undue self-persuasion. He says that we would not contemplate the use of force to keep Ireland in the Commonwealth. Does "we" mean liberals like Professor Coupland, or does "we" also include the British people and government? Mr. Thomas has refused the invitation to make the pronouncement which Professor Coupland advocates.

Possibly in his treatment of India there may also be some similar confusion between ideal and fact. The historical sketch savours a little too much of "Whig interpretation": Mr. Coupland traces British policy from its fountain-head in Burke; but surely Dr. Weitzmann's study of Hastings has shown that Burke's notion of trusteeship has an abstract and doctrinaire context, derived from Francis. The champion of indirect rule in Africa to-day should find a place for Hastings among the makers of British policy in India. Is not the exclusion of Hastings suggestive of over-simplification which may in other places distort judgment?

One must, however, remember the small scale of the book. To say so much in so short a space, and to say so much that is true and that needs saying, is an achievement. And Professor Coupland says it so well. There are pages—the description of early morning in Kenya, of Zanzibar and its clove plantations in the evening—which fix on the reader's mind a vivid picture of strange places. The length of this review is justified both by the matter of this little book and its manner.

W. K. HANCOCK.

33. NATIONALISM AND EDUCATION IN AUSTRALIA: With Special Reference to the State of New South Wales. By T. Findlay Mackenzie, Ph.D. 1935. (London: P. S. King. 8vo. xi + 148 pp. *8s. 6d.*)

THE British Dominions, as typical modern democratic communities, have now attained to such a degree of maturity and determinate social form that valid and valuable comparisons between them and the older communities of Europe now become possible. There is some danger in England both of under-estimating the extent and of misunderstanding the nature of their divergence from Old-World models. The consequences of this may be serious in view of a need for close cooperation to which the events of each day now bring additional emphasis.

Particularly is it necessary that the character and inspiration of Dominion Nationalism should be understood. Perhaps discussion in England has centred a little too exclusively upon the legal and political aspects of Dominion Status to the neglect of less palpable and less formulated attributes of these new nations. Studies designed to relate the historic influences which have produced Dominion Nationalism to the educational forms which have grown up *pari passu* with it, and now serve to sustain and consolidate it, might be of very great value. For in communities where equalitarianism has itself become

a tradition, and where one of the most powerful means of giving full effect to the tradition is a strongly knit system of State popular education, education itself becomes a main instrument of policy. Study of its methods and its sources of inspiration may throw much-needed light on aspects of Dominion policy and action which now seem obscure and perplexing to outside observers.

If Dr. Mackenzie's book is intended as a study of this kind it must be judged as achieving only a qualified success. The complaint is not that he takes New South Wales as a type, ignoring the other States. It is truer of New South Wales in Australia than of any province in Canada or South Africa in a corresponding relation, to say *ex uno disce omnes*. The trouble lies deeper than in the choice of a type, which, in the circumstances, is valid enough. It consists rather in failure to lay bare the real roots of Australian Nationalism and so to relate its spirit and demands to the spirit and structure of the educational system that has been fashioned to serve it. The long-continued experiment with a denominational system on English lines and its supercession by a highly centralized and secular system of State schools, important as it is, is only one part of the story. But Dr. Mackenzie discusses very little else. Like so many writers on the subject he confuses State and Nation, so that access of nationalism and increase of State provision are to him identical. Yet the term "national" has been used even in Australia, as well as in England and in South Africa, for schools which were explicitly non-State provided, while, conversely, one need not go beyond the British Empire to find State-provided schools deliberately repudiated by national feeling.

Dr. Mackenzie appears to argue—indeed it is his main argument—that the swing of New South Wales to a State-provided system of education was a great achievement of nationalism and, as such, was a step towards the goal of federation which, to him, is the supreme triumph of nationalism. The connection will be less obvious to many English readers who, if they sought in the field of education for influences making for federation, would seek them rather in the spirit and content of the education itself than in the administrative devices by which schools are provided and sustained. Even so one would have thought that the school system and the achievement of federation were related less as cause to effect than as the common fruits of a basic national *ethos*. Dr. Mackenzie mentions some of the influences which contributed to the making of this *ethos*, but precisely how they operated and precisely how the result exercised a determining influence on the spirit and structure of the educational system he does not show us at all clearly. Yet surely that is what a book with such a title should do.

The book is not all easy reading. There is much repetition, much returning on the track, and a good deal of confusing of sequence, and the language is occasionally formal and stilted. F. CLARKE.

34*. THE FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION OF SAORSTÁT ÉIREANN. By J. B. O'Connell. 1935. (Dublin: Browne and Nolan. 8vo. xiv + 228 pp. 7s. 6d.)

THIS work is a rather unexpected outcome of the recommendation of the Committee of experts on budgetary questions, constituted by the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference, that the States participating therein should provide material showing expendi-

ture on national defence. In working this matter out, the Defence Department of the Irish Free State found it necessary to study in detail the whole system of financial administration and government accountancy. The work undertaken must have been most searching, and the Civil Service of the Free State has now obtained a study of the financial administrative system which is marked by equal lucidity and completeness. There is nothing available in England covering the ground so completely, and the work should therefore prove of interest far beyond the limits of the Free State, for it deals with numerous issues, common to all Dominion financial systems, while the problems dealt with are on a scale less formidable than in the United Kingdom.

A. BERRIEDALE KEITH.

35*. ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. By W. P. M. Kennedy. 1934. (London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. xv + 183 pp. 8s. 6d.)

PROFESSOR W. P. M. KENNEDY'S *Essays in Constitutional Law* serve in part to supplement his well-known study of the Constitution of Canada, in part to bring out his reflections on the structure and meaning of the new Commonwealth. His point of view is eminently sane; he belongs to the school of thought which believes that complete autonomy within the Commonwealth is perfectly compatible with the maintenance of the Commonwealth and the development to the highest degree of its powers to do good in the world. His *credo* is worded with a point and vigour which would be out of place except in one who, like the author, has assimilated to the full the best traditions of Canadian nationalism: "It is better to be a dominion under the Crown in a great empire, than some republic, decked in sovereign peacock's feathers, and perhaps enjoying international 'status' through the condescension of some over-mighty neighbour" (p. 19). The same insight recognises that, however easy it may be to deride the theory that the Constitution of Canada rests on a treaty, there is a vital sense in which constitutional change in the Dominion is impossible without provincial good-will. His reaction to the Statute of Westminster is of special interest, and there must be great sympathy with his conclusion that there is strong reason to desire (p. 174) for the interpretation of the Statute the creation of a Commonwealth Court on the lines so far as possible of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Nothing can be more undesirable than to see the spectacle of the Judicial Committee being compelled to adjudicate on such an issue as that of the abolition of the appeal to that Court from the Supreme Court of the Irish Free State. For any person or body to be a judge in its own cause is contrary to the principles of English law, and it becomes especially unfortunate when the Lord Chancellor, who as member of a Cabinet must hold one definite view, is compelled to sit as member of a tribunal whose members as lawyers must be strictly without preconceived views on the topic. Unhappily both in the Dominions and the United Kingdom the idea of adjudication by a permanent tribunal of inter-imperial disputes has made very slight progress.

A. BERRIEDALE KEITH.

36*. QUEBEC AND SOUTH AFRICA: A STUDY IN CULTURAL ADJUSTMENT. By F. Clarke. [*University of London Institute of Education: Studies and Reports, No. V.*] 1934. (London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. 29 pp. 1s.)

THIS brilliant paper is an outcome of Professor Clarke's observations during his tenure of the Chairs of Education in Capetown and in

Montreal. He has worked, therefore, for the last quarter of a century in the British Commonwealth "in the very sensitive sphere of education," under governments none of whose heads bore British names or were brought up in British fashion. The two situations have had very similar histories, which still dominate them, and, Professor Clarke points out, give the lie to "those technocratic realists who profess to believe that history is largely bunk, or who think that national temperaments and characters are the product of geography rather than of history." Apart from this the two have developed on very different lines. In Quebec the deciding factor which settles the form and manner of a child's education is his home religion; in South Africa it is his home language. In South Africa the State is the instrument of education, in Quebec it is the Church. Hence the two systems differ widely. But the necessity of cultural adjustment by the British has been equally great in both, and leads Professor Clarke to the discovery that the British Commonwealth is an instrument not to make people love one another, but to make peaceful cohabitation possible among people who do not love one another, and may never learn to do so. H. A. WYNDHAM.

37*. B.U.F. OSWALD MOSLEY AND BRITISH FASCISM. By James Drennan. 1934. (London: John Murray. 8vo. 293 pp. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

MR. DRENNAN gives chapter and verse for what many observers often uneasily, are beginning to recognise; namely, that the Blackshirt movement is going to be a factor in our politics which will have, sooner or later, to be reckoned with. "Fascism," says the author, "has no long pedigree of theory; it is a real insurrection—an insurrection of feeling—a mutiny of *men* against the conditions of the modern world"; and he sets out with vigour to show where these conditions are wrong and how Sir Oswald Mosley would start to put them right. The book is too long, and there is a good deal of rhapsodical Spenglerism in it; but no one can read it without realising that here is a fire which will spread. MESTON.

EUROPE

38. FRANCE IN DANGER! By André Tardieu. Translated by Gerald Griffin. 1935. (London: Denis Archer. 8vo. 256 pp. 15*s.*)

THE preface of this book is dated January 30th, 1934, and its title in France was *L'Heure de la Décision.* For the English edition, published in April 1935, a more sensational title, *France in Danger!* has been adopted, while the jacket bears the words "A great statesman's warning!" More attention to misprints would have improved the translation.

Part of the book is topical to-day. It is, for example, of interest to note that over a year ago M. Tardieu foresaw that conscription of work in Germany, started in 1932, was paving the way to the re-establishment of military conscription. His main theme is that France should be prepared to face three dangers:—"(1) German aggression; (2) Socialistic enterprises; (3) The corrupt condition into which the principle and spirit of her institutions have fallen. This last danger is as serious as the other two."

The first part of the book deals mainly with the German menace,

and M. Tardieu prophesies that, if the attack should come at any moment as a result of the internal necessities entailed by the Hitler policy, and France lost, the doom which the Nazis would inflict on defeated adversaries can be imagined from the treatment—" Annihilation (*Vernichtung*) "—already meted out to fellow-citizens.

The second part of the book is a grave indictment of French internal affairs to-day. Based on his own experience as a member of three Cabinets, serving under M. Clemenceau, M. Poincaré and M. Briand, and as three times Prime Minister, M. Tardieu asserts that as soon as the head of the Government has chosen his Ministers he is " handed over helplessly to the whims and caprices of Parliamentary chicanery." He points out that 94 Ministries have held office in France in the course of 63 years, with an average of eight months for each Ministry. He summarises the results since 1914 as 40 changes of Government, 200,000 additional Civil servants, Budgets increased by 42 per cent., a growing incubus of State monopoly, a dislocated system of government and a precarious diplomatic machinery.

His remedies for these domestic evils seem strangely mild. He wishes to give the Government power to dissolve the Chamber without having to apply for the sanction of the Senate. He would suppress the right of Deputies to initiate expenditure. He is in favour of " Votes for Women " and of a constitutional referendum. Finally, he would like France to follow the English example and restrict the rights of Civil servants to engage in political activities and strikes.

British readers will be flattered by his admiration of the British constitution, and will find his analysis of French affairs of value in helping to give a better understanding of the French longing for security, and their present lack of self-confidence. B. S. TOWNROE.

39*. LES PRINCIPES DE LA CONSTITUTION ESPAGNOLE DE 1931 By Paul Marland. 1935. (Paris: Pedone. 8vo. 187 pp. 20 *frs.*)
40. CATALUNYA I L'EUROPA FUTURA. By Alexandre Deulofeu. 1934. (Barcelona : Libreria Catalonia. 8vo. 300 pp. 6 *pesetas.*)

THE first of these books is a competent study of the principles underlying the present Spanish constitution, which, M. Marland points out, is to a large extent a synthesis of the democratic constitutions drawn up in other European countries since the War, and shows in particular the influence of the Constitution of Weimar. In the present Spanish constitution, as in other post-War democratic constitutions, there is a strong tendency to extend the right of the State to interfere in all departments of public life. The Spanish constitution, however, is original in the importance it attaches to the attitude of the State to international affairs.

The first part of the book is a brief, and on the whole unbiassed (if highly controversial), account of events and conditions in Spain before the Revolution. M. Marland has definite sympathies with the liberal intellectuals who made possible the revolution, and considers that the personal failure of ex-King Alfonso to win the support of the people was an important factor in the downfall of the old régime.

In Part III M. Marland analyses the dogmatic aspect of the constitution. He devotes a good deal of space to discussing the implications of the phrase " Spain is a democratic Republic of workers of all categories "—a phrase that has caused much uneasiness among the reactionary element in Spain, which fears that its time-honoured right to do nothing is thereby threatened. M. Marland deals fully with the

articles referring to the Church, education and divorce, and to the clause (subsequently rendered inoperative) guaranteeing freedom of the Press. He also brings out clearly the influence of the socialists on the constitution, especially in the clauses relating to ownership of land and property —clauses which are considered by some people in Spain to be less innocuous than the rather vague phraseology would at first suggest.

The last part of the book is concerned with the attitude expressed in the constitution towards international affairs and world peace. This, M. Marland considers, is the most important and interesting side of the constitution and represents a departure from narrow nationalism. Spain has shown herself a staunch supporter of the League, and M. Marland attributes the pacifist tendency of the constitution to the influence of Señor de Madariaga, whose work for disarmament is widely appreciated outside Spain.

From the theoretical point of view the Spanish constitution is impeccable, but M. Marland expresses some doubt as to whether it will prove sufficiently elastic to survive changes of opinion in the country. The most successful constitutions, he says, have been those which were the least rigid and dogmatic and all-embracing. Recent events, and the agitation of the right for revision of the constitution, especially of the clauses relating to religion and education, would seem to justify M. Marland's doubts.

It is a pity that an otherwise competent book should be marred by so many misprints. Don Melquiades Alvarez thus appears on p. 54 and subsequently as Don Milquiades; Don Fernando de los Rios, who played an important part in the drafting of the constitution, appears on p. 83 as Fernandez de los Rios; another minister, Señor Zulueta, on the same page is called Zulita, and so forth, to say nothing of numerous minor misprints. The bibliography at the end is useful.

The second of these books is of a very different calibre. The author, who—we are told in the preface—is young and enthusiastic, deals with the problem of the future of Catalonia and of Europe. "Catalonia," he says—writing before the suspension of Catalan autonomy after the revolt of October last—"has just passed from a régime of oppression to one of liberty, and it is necessary to consider our position as Catalans and citizens of the world." He then sets out to awaken Catalonia to a consciousness of herself as a nation. Like many other Catalans he is not satisfied with autonomy and is a firm believer in federalism, not only for Catalonia but for the whole of Europe. "What will be the future organisation of the world?" he asks. "Obviously a voluntary federation of free peoples. . . . How can we attain this? Obviously by natural evolution." Having disposed of the problem of federating the different Spanish regions he proceeds to do the same for the British Isles, France and so on, ending up with a World Parliament, an international police force and an international language.

In the space of some 300 pages he covers a wide field, including the historical and cultural development of Catalonia and the history of Europe from 1000 B.C. to the present day. But, although we can sympathise with Señor Deulofeu's idealism and recognise that he is on the side of the angels, we cannot feel that he has worked out in a very practical way his solution for the immediate problems of Catalonia, or, for that matter, of the even more complex problems of the rest of Western Europe.

HELEN F. GRANT.

41*. La Petite Entente. Étude historico-juridique. By V. M. Radovanovitch. 1933. (Paris: Pedone. 8vo. 65 pp.)

This is a short account of the Little Entente from its inception to the completion of its new Statute in February 1933. All the relevant documents (the Statute itself, the earlier treaties of alliance, etc.) are briefly but adequately summarised and a few words are also devoted to each of the periodical meetings. The result thus constitutes a most useful little handbook. There is, however, little sign anywhere either of criticism or of independent information, so that these accounts are no more than summaries of the official Press communiqués issued at the time, and consist to no small extent of repeated assertions of perfect agreement among the three States concerned. Such details as are given of the political background are seen through the eyes of a warm supporter of the Little Entente.

In the short last chapter the author discusses various views on the proper legal description of the Little Entente and concludes that it is:

> "An organised alliance, with the highest degree of cohesion and the appearance of a 'regional understanding' in the sense of Article 21 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Although not constituting an organism of state in public law, it can claim a separate personality in international law, in a new form hitherto unknown, presenting the aspect of a category intermediary between a group of allied States and a fairly loose confederation—this personality not excluding the personalities of the three contracting States."

C. A. Macartney.

42.* Oesterreichs Selbständigkeit als Weg einer gesamtdeutschen Lösung des Donauraumproblemes. Ständeverfassung und Demokratie. By Dr. Emmanuel Vogel. 1935. (Berlin: Carl Heymann. 8vo. 46 pp. *Rm.* 2.)

The first of these two essays is an interesting contribution to the Central European question. The author quotes figures to show that since the increase of agricultural self-sufficiency in Germany and Italy, and of industrialisation in the agricultural States, the economic difficulties of the Danubian States could not be resolved by simply re-establishing economic unity between them, but only by action on a larger scale, including Germany and Poland. Italy's economic interest in the Danubian States is, on the other hand, small, and although the Rome agreements of 1934 have been useful, they will remain "piece-work" unless extended to the whole Central European complex, Germany included. Politically, the complete independence of Austria is indispensable.

The second essay consists of a careful examination of the recent ideas (particularly those of Othmar Spann) of the Corporative State. The author maintains that corporations, even if constructed on a better system than Spann's, are not fitted to deal with other than purely economic questions, and defends the idea of democracy against the accusations levelled at it. Similarly, democracy is fully capable of realising the "totalitarian" idea. This is a thoughtful and stimulating piece of political thought. C. A. M.

43*. Scritti e Discorsi di Benito Mussolini. Volumi III, IV, V, VI. 1934. (Milan: Hoepli. 8vo. 15 *Lire* each volume.)

These four volumes (October 28th, 1922–1928) cover the four most epoch-making years which Fascist rule in Italy has yet known. Volume III opens with Signor Mussolini's first speech as head of the government and contains also his first speech on the basis of a Corporate State.

However elaborate the structure of the Corporate State has now become, it is based on the conviction of the need of cooperation for the good of all, which Signor Mussolini preached in December 1923. Volume IV contains the speech with which Signor Mussolini summed up the debate on the Address to the Throne in the first Parliament elected after Fascism came into power, and all the speeches after the murder of Matteotti and the withdrawal of the opposition parties from the Chamber. Two years are compressed into Volume V, of which perhaps the "high lights" are the reply to Stresemann on the question of the Alto Adige, the announcement of the stabilisation of the lira, the lecture to the University for Foreigners at Perugia on "Classical Rome and the Sea," the two speeches on the abolition of Freemasonry, and the speeches and articles which show the gradual growth of the Corporate State. In Volume VI there are the famous Ascension Day speech in which he reviewed the actions and the theories of the Fascist government, his explanation of the reform of the constitution and the great review of international affairs in the Senate on June 5th, 1928.

The foreign reader could perhaps have spared the many short speeches made by Signor Mussolini in the towns and villages during his tours up and down the country; it is to be hoped that one day a single volume will be published containing all those speeches which are of national, international and historic importance. These volumes are the stuff of which history is written, and it can only be repeated, as in former reviews of the series, that they are essential to all students of modern Italy. MURIEL CURREY.

44. ORIENTAMENTI. Piccoli Saggi di Filosofia Politica. By Benedetto Croce. 1934. (Milan. 8vo. 112 pp. 6 *lire*.)

45. ORIGINI E DOTTRINA DEL FASCISMO. By Giovanni Gentile. 1934. (Rome: Istituto Nazionale Fascista di Cultura. 8vo. 107 pp. 5 *lire*.)

THESE philosophers, closely associated until the War, and recently condemned to the "Index" by a single Vatican order, are politically at loggerheads. Croce, having elected to go into opposition to the Fascist régime, has the disadvantages and advantages of being restricted to an allusive treatment of Italy's conditions, by way of comment upon events in Germany and Russia. These "little essays in political philosophy" are in the main exhortations to a courageous and responsible political attitude, addressed to a generation too ready to think of destiny as overwhelming and implacable. In one particularly notable essay on a Russian topic, Croce urges thinkers to get it clear in their minds that the two aims of liberty and equality, so often straining against one another, are not to be treated on a par with one another. Liberty is the necessary condition of a vital society, and a vital society is continually striving towards a greater measure of equality, otherwise expressed towards justice. But whereas liberty generates justice, justice does not generate liberty. Croce's, if anyone's, is the authentic voice of the great liberal-idealist tradition in the world to-day.

Gentile's philosophy diverges from Croce's by emphasising the unity of being where Croce stresses the distinction of the "forms of the spirit" (æsthetic, logical, efficient, ethical). Gentile's feeling about Fascismo is that the whole man expresses himself in such a system which is simultaneously theoretical and practical, political and religious.

Liberal philosophy, a protest in the nineteenth century against throne and altar transcendentalism, can for Gentile have no significance in these days unless it immolates itself in the ardour—some might say the frenzy—of action. Thus does Gentile hymn with enthusiasm what his former friend and colleague can envisage as at best an unpleasant national medicine. C. J. S. SPRIGGE.

46. THE STORY OF MY LIFE. Vol. III. By Marie, Queen of Roumania. 1935. (London: Cassell. 8vo. x + 463 pp. 18s.)

THE third volume of Queen Marie's reminiscences covers the years from her husband's accession to the close of the War. During this period Queen Marie was in a position to exercise more political influence than had previously been the case, and with Roumania hesitating between the two alliances, her position was a very important one. She tells us that she was regarded as the heart and soul of the pro-Allied Party, and there are one or two interesting notes of attempts made by the Austrians and Germans to win her over to their side. A few notes which passed between the Roumanian, British and Russian Courts are also reproduced. There is a mysterious but intriguing account of a Hungarian mission sent to the Roumanian Court in 1918 (most unluckily the Queen failed to note the Emissary's name) and an abstract of a message which might be important, in which the British Government is said to have promised in December 1912 to uphold Roumania's interests and "revindications," regardless of how much she will presently be forced to give way.

Otherwise, although there are some lively pictures of the sufferings of Roumania at war, this record is almost entirely personal. As a self-portrait it is undeniably both vivid and detailed; few can close this book without feeling that they know well what Queen Marie is like. This is satisfactory, for it is, we are told, what this royal authoress desires. C. A. MACARTNEY.

47*. LA CONDITION JURIDIQUE DU CONSEIL DU PORT ET DES VOIES D'EAU DE DANTZIG. By Nicolas de Weck. 1933. (Paris: Boccard. 8vo. xv + 279 pp.)

ARTICLE 104 of the Treaty of Versailles provided for the negotiation of a treaty between Poland and Danzig securing to Poland *inter alia* the free use of the waterways, docks, etc., of Danzig. Effect was given to this provision by Articles 19 to 28 of the Convention of Paris, 1920, and this book is an account of the Council of the Port of Danzig which these Articles created.

Like most of the constitutional arrangements of Danzig, the régime of the Port is anomalous and complicated. The Council by which it is administered consists of five Polish and five Danzig nominees, with a president chosen by agreement, or, failing that, a Swiss national designated by the Council of the League. Within the limits of its competence the Council of the Port is independent of both Governments; but the two national delegations on it have habitually allowed political to predominate over commercial interests, and the latter have been left to the neutral President to uphold. It is a striking testimony to the men who have held this post that while Poland and Danzig have never been able to agree on an appointment, they have twice agreed in extending a President's mandate for a further term.

The author of this book is a former Secretary-General of the Council, and he is intimately acquainted with its work. He has given

a clear and detailed account of the organisation and working of a minor, but a not unimportant, part of the Danzig-Poland settlement.

J. L. Brierly.

U.S.S.R.

48*. Armed Intervention in Russia, 1918–1922. By W. P. and Z. K. Coates. 1935. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 400 pp. 10s. 6d.)

This is not the history of Allied intervention in Russia for which we are all waiting. It is a book written with a purpose and it follows a method well adapted to that purpose. Unfortunately neither the purpose nor the method is that of the objective historian.

The purpose is to show that Soviet financial claims against Great Britain in respect of the intervention (which are summarised in an appendix) are as valid and as extensive as British financial claims against the Soviet Government for losses inflicted on British subjects, and that to cancel out these claims against each other is therefore the equitable, as well as the only practical, solution. The method is to base the narrative of the Allied intervention almost exclusively on the reports and comments of the British conservative Press and of other well-known anti-Soviet sources, much as people have written denunciations of the Soviet régime based exclusively on reports taken from the Moscow Press and on admissions of Soviet Commissars. Both the purpose and the method are, in brief, those not of history, but of propaganda.

This reserve having been made, however, it should be recorded that the propaganda has been well done. Few people now defend the folly of intervention; and if there is any disposition to cavil at the equity of the proposal to wipe out all debts, it is because there is felt to be a certain moral, if not legal, difference between State claims arising out of warlike action and claims arising from State confiscation of the property of individuals. But it is doubtful whether this difference can be effectively maintained; and Mr. and Mrs. Coates point out (though this has no connection with their subject) that we have acquiesced without a murmur in an 80 per cent. expropriation of holders of French bonds and an even higher percentage of expropriation in the case of landowners in many Eastern European countries.

Propaganda apart, the book contains a fairly good outline of the course of the intervention on the various fronts, though it is a pity that the narrative is so violently one-sided. One may share the general view taken by the writers of the intervention without necessarily believing that atrocities and other abuses were a monopoly of the Whites or honour of the Reds.

John Heath.

49*. Russia's Iron Age. By W. H. Chamberlin. 1935. (London: Duckworth. 8vo. ix + 400 pp. 15s.)

Mr. Chamberlin, at the end of his twelve years' service in Moscow as correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor*, has written a trenchant indictment of the Soviet régime. Little of the sympathy with the communist experiment which he expressed in his previous book, published about five years ago, has survived his experiences during the past few years. Russia's "Iron Age" began with the introduction of the First Five-Year Plan in 1928. The "Nep" policy, which had enabled the Soviet Union to achieve a certain

measure of prosperity, was then finally liquidated. Everything was sacrificed to the development of the heavy industries, of which the armaments industry is an important branch. Agriculture was left to shift for itself; the *kulak* was exterminated with a ruthlessness unparalleled in the earlier years of Soviet rule; and the widespread famine of 1932–33 was tolerated, if not actually fostered, by the government as a means of breaking the opposition of the peasant. Into this framework are fitted chapters on Soviet foreign policy (which, however, stop short before the entry of the Soviet Union into the League of Nations), on the leading Soviet statesmen, on the war against religion, on the Soviet theatre, and so on. Mr. Chamberlin has a wide knowledge of his subject, but his book would have gained in impressiveness if it had been written with rather less of the fervour of a new convert to the anti-Soviet front. JOHN HEATH.

50. OUTLINE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION. By N. Popov. 1935. (London: Martin Lawrence. 8vo. 2 vols. 6*s.* each.)

THIS useful, though dull and badly written, book traces the history of the Russian Communist Party back to its remote origins in the eighteen-sixties, when the modern revolutionary movement began in Russia. Formally speaking, the Russian Social-Democratic Party was not founded till 1898, when its first modest conference was held at Minsk. The Bolshevik section of the Social Democrats (from which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was formed in 1918) goes back to the second party congress held in London in 1903; and the history of the party between 1903 and 1914 is a long series of disputes between Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and other groups which sprang up within the party. The Bolsheviks triumphed not so much because of any inherent superiority in numbers or doctrine, but because, thanks to Lenin, they were the only disciplined and organised group. The importance attached by Lenin to questions of discipline and organisation was thoroughly justified.

Much of the history of the party, both before and after the revolution, is necessarily devoted to these internecine disputes. In M. Popov's pages the villainy of Trotsky assumes melodramatic proportions. He is the hidden hand behind almost every heresy which has troubled the party since 1903. The period of five years during which he was Lenin's principal henchman is carefully glossed over; and Stalin's own "deviation" in the Spring of 1917 is, needless to say, not even mentioned. The detached reader may, however, get the impression that Trotsky, though not a Bolshevik till 1917, was a good deal nearer to strict Marxist orthodoxy than Lenin. There is no doubt that Marx, like Trotsky, regarded the peasant as fundamentally "counter-revolutionary" and a natural enemy of the proletariat, and rejected the policy of "socialism in a single state," which Stalin has taken over from the last years of Lenin. It is therefore somewhat paradoxical that Trotsky should to-day be denounced, by orthodox party historians like M. Popov, as an "opportunist." In point of fact, he lacked that inspired opportunism which enabled Lenin to adapt doctrine to the exigencies of the time and made him a great statesman. JOHN HEATH.

51*. THE COMMUNIST ANSWER TO THE WORLD'S NEEDS. By Julius F. Hecker. 1935. (London: Chapman and Hall. 8vo. xvi + 323 pp. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

52*. L'U.R.S.S. DANS LE MONDE. By Jean Marquès-Rivière. 1935. (Paris: Payot. 8vo. 368 pp. 25 *frs.*)

53*. WHY THE U.S.S.R. JOINED THE LEAGUE. [*New Fabian Research Bureau Series*, No. 21.] 1935. (London: Gollancz, and The New Fabian Research Bureau. 8vo. 36 pp. 1*s.*)

"IN the smoking-room of a Moscow tourist hotel a group of British intellectuals are resting. Most of them are men of middle age, in appearance and bearing having the stamp of Oxford or Cambridge breeding." The opening sentences of *The Communist Answer to the World's Needs* already provoke a faint smile, which will spread as the book proceeds. Dr. Hecker, by way of contrasting the communist solution with other solutions (socialist, fascist, pacifist, Douglasite, etc.) of the world crisis, has reverted to the dialogue form, which he used with some success on a previous occasion. Unfortunately, he has chosen this time to particularise, and has ventured into a *milieu* which is evidently foreign to him. Instead of being content with lay figures, he introduces a Canon of the Church of England, a Labour M.P., a contributor to the *Economist*, etc., as spokesmen of the views he wishes to criticise. But since he has no notion how such people really talk, the result borders on the ridiculous. This is a pity, as Dr. Hecker has obviously taken pains to be as fair as possible, and some of the speeches are quite able summaries of the theories which they represent. Perhaps the book will be of some use to those who know as little about "British intellectuals" as Dr. Hecker.

L'U.R.S.S. dans le Monde is a brightly written study of Soviet activities at home and abroad, somewhat marred by the frequency of those fluent generalisations which spring so easily from a French pen. Does it, for instance, help much to tell us that the Russian is both an *émotif* and a *rationaliste*, or to attribute Soviet industrial progress to *le dynamisme russe*? And the author's concluding suggestion that communism would have strengthened itself by an alliance with the remnants of the Orthodox Church suggests a somewhat naïve view of his subject. Some of the most interesting pages are those on which the recent Franco-Soviet *rapprochement* is discussed. This causes M. Marquès-Rivière some uneasiness, partly because "la France risque, à ce jeu, quelques alliances: l'Angleterre et surtout la Yougoslavie." Events may prove this to be an acute observation.

Why the U.S.S.R. Joined the League, an anonymous pamphlet issued by the New Fabian Research Bureau and introduced by Dr. Dalton, quotes a large number of official Soviet utterances on the League and adds some rather trite reflections. But no attempt is made to analyse the underlying causes of the change-over in Soviet policy, and it is a mockery to dignify this harmless booklet by the name of "research." JOHN HEATH.

54. MEN OF SIBERIA. By Hugo Huppert. 1935. (London: Martin Lawrence. 8vo. 326 pp. 2*s.*)

A FICTIONISED account of life in the Kuzbass, the great Siberian coal-field. The characters are, of course, lay figures designed to illustrate the virtues and achievements of the Soviet régime. But the descriptions are remarkably well done, and are effectively set off by quotations from older writers on Siberia. J. H.

NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST

55. MOVED ON! FROM KASHGAR TO KASHMIR. By P. S. Nazaroff. 1935. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 317 pp. 12s. 6d.)

M. NAZAROFF, a Russian mining engineer, fled from his native Tashkent when the Bolsheviks took possession of it in 1919 and, after two years of wandering, settled in Kashgar, the capital of Chinese Turkestan. This phase of his travels was described in a previous book. The present volume takes up the story of his life in Kashgar, when he witnessed the supremacy and the downfall of the notorious General Ma. Then, in 1924, the *rapprochement* between the Chinese and Soviet Governments, and the impending arrival of a Soviet Consul-General in Kashgar, made M. Nazaroff feel that the distance separating him from his native country was dangerously small. He decided to move on into British India; and the second half of the book is occupied with his adventurous journey over the Karakoram Mountains into Kashmir. M. Nazaroff has a professional eye for the geology and mineral wealth of the regions through which he passed, and something more than an amateur's eye for the fauna and flora; and his book, though it has no great political importance, is full of keen observation and pleasant description. JOHN HEATH.

56. PATRIOTISM PERVERTED. By K. S. Papazian. 1934. (Boston: Baikar Press. 8vo. 79 pp. $1.00.)

MR. K. S. PAPAZIAN in *Patriotism Perverted* brings a terrible indictment against the society called Dachnakist, *i.e.* Armenian Revolutionary Federation. The arguments he brings forth are so overloaded and exaggerated that they defeat their own ends, and the book leaves the impression that it was not written with the idea of being helpful and constructive, or to give the outsider an insight into Armenian problems, but rather with the view of airing a grievance. Personally I do not think that this book will enhance the prestige of the Armenian people in the eyes of the world or even his own compatriots in the United States.

On p. 10 the author writes:

"This vagueness and equivocation was designed from the beginning, in order to appease the ultra-radicals and socialists in the ranks of the organisation. Political and economic freedom in Turkish Armenia was more acceptable to these groups than political independence or autonomy for Armenians in Turkish Armenia."

Surely it was the very diversity of the problem at that time which made it quite impossible for the Federation or any other group to lay down a cut-and-dried policy. Was it possible to have had political independence under the Czarist régime? Was it possible to have political independence or autonomy for Armenians in Turkey? Or to have had economic freedom and political independence for Armenians in Persia? All these aims or aspirations were only in embryo when the Federation was formed. Only a vague and hazy idea of political freedom could then be visualised. Time was the weary road which they would have to travel to enable them to crystallise their policy, which would lead them to their goal.

The Turks have ever been past masters in their political strategy. They accused the Armenians of plotting, thus fostering the seed of the plot. Their continual reiteration that there was no Armenia forced the Armenians to believe in its existence. This in turn brought

into being Armenian revolutionary committees or societies, the first of which was formed by an Armenian named Maro in 1885; gathering a few of his compatriots around him he founded in Geneva a revolutionary committee which he named Hinjakist and published a paper called *Hinjak* (little bell). Their aim was a national emancipation from Turkish yoke. In the year 1890 Christaphor Michaelian founded at Tiflis the Dashnakist; later, this federation was established in Geneva, its aim being to federate all the other organisations in working for the political freedom of Armenians. This organisation by its very composition was enabled to enlist a large number of intellectual Armenians in Southern Russia, the Caucasus, Persia and Turkey.

The Dashnakist was the only Armenian political group represented at the congress of the Committee of Union and Progress (Young Turk Party) at Paris in 1907. The late Djemal Pasha in his *Memories of a Turkish Statesman* describes this group as "the most reasonable and best conducted of the Armenian Committees."

Revolutionary organisations are not banded together as a pacifist group, nor do they always in their dealing with others wear kid gloves. Their life and motives make them rather a body of hard hitters. Many of them lived in the mountains, hiding in caves, hunted like brigands, gun-running, smuggling arms to carry on their guerilla warfare—all these tended to make them a wild and devil-may-care group. I am not considering the right- or wrongness of their activities, but just putting down things as they were.

I have had personal acquaintance with a very large number of these men and those of other committees, as well as most of them mentioned in this book, and in my thirty years' experience and intimate contact with the Armenian people and the countries which they inhabited, I have been deeply indebted to Armenians of all political shades and parties for spontaneous help and support when needed, and in the Great War they all proved to be loyal and staunch friends of the Allies. The accusation of Talaat Pasha goes to prove this when he stated, "They (Armenians) have assisted the Russians in the Caucasus, and our failure there is largely explained by their actions" (*Secrets of the Bosphorus*, p. 222).

On p. 40 he writes:

"Some Dashnak leaders did everything within their power to frustrate Antranik's efforts in Erzerum to organise a defence against Vehib Pasha's army. Antranik had opposed the corrupt methods and policies of the Dashnaktzoutune, therefore he had to be punished."

This is not in accordance with my knowledge of the facts of the situation. I had the honour of including the late General Antranik as one of my most cherished Armenian friends, one whom I worked with before and after this engagement at Erzerum, the failure of which I would put down as follows: Russian officers who were in command of the artillery had no heart in the fight—this was not to be wondered at when you consider their position and the fact that gun ammunition was negligible. Antranik's army was hastily mobilised, had no field training, little or no equipment, their officers Russian-speaking Armenians, rifles that they did not know the mechanism of, boots too small that on the march had to be thrown over their shoulders, poorly clad, half fed, and with no experience of fighting seasoned and well-equipped troops like the Turks under Vehib Pasha. That they made a stand at all is to their credit, and a wonder to those of us

who were intimate with the situation. Surely such a statement as that made by Mr. Papazian is a libel against a gallant people.

Mr. Papazian has not to my mind rendered the Armenian people a service that they can thank him for or take pride in, rather will many look with shamed faces at their dirty linen being washed in public. No one who loves justice and peace would condone the evils that have been perpetrated by the Armenian Dashnakists, or indeed any other revolutionary organisation who batten on such methods. But whether *Patriotism Perverted* will further the Armenian cause is for the Armenians to decide upon; personally I am doubtful.

GEORGE F. GRACEY.

57. UNENDING BATTLE. By H. C. Armstrong. 1934. (London: Longmans, Green. 8vo. xv + 302 pp. 9*s*.)

THE reader may be inclined to think that in reading the story of the *Unending Battle* he is thereby studying Georgian history. If this is so, disappointment awaits him. Surely history should be the essence of countless biographies, while Armstrong deals with one, the life story of the patriot General Leo Kerresselidze and one of Georgia's most fearless revolutionary leaders, who has a striking personality and a typical Georgian character.

The story is perhaps a little more exaggerated than is absolutely necessary. Revolutionists as a body are of themselves sufficiently lurid and require toning down rather than burnishing up. However, the writer treats the story of Georgia in a novelised historical form, which makes an intensely interesting, gripping and thrilling novel. Perhaps one of these days someone with more historical data will give to us a much-needed up-to-date history of Georgia and its people. Then will the readers be indebted to Armstrong for hastening this event.

GEORGE F. GRACEY.

58*. L'UNITÀ DELLA SIRIA E L'INDIVISIBILITÀ DEL SUO MANDATO. By Romolo Tritonj. 1934. (Rome: Nuova Europa. 8vo. 223 pp. 12 *Lire*.)

SIGNOR TRITONJ, already known as a pertinacious critic of the mandatory régimes, directs his attack on the French administration of Syria to two main points: the division of the country into separate "states," and the economic monopoly established in favour of France. In regard to the latter he protests against the disregard of the provisions of the Mandate which stipulate the economic equality of all States Members of the League. The projected Franco-Syrian treaty he regards, like the Anglo-'Iraqi treaty, as merely a means of setting up a veiled protectorate without the safeguard of League supervision; it is more dangerous, however, because it stultifies the legitimate aspirations of the Syrians, and is likely to drive them to an extreme xenophobia, thus creating a fresh menace to the peace of the Levant. To forestall this danger he pleads for the emergence of a "common European mentality" which is "to co-ordinate the efforts of Western States towards a free and legitimate economic competition."

On the political side his arguments for the essential unity of Syria introduce little that is fresh to English readers, and are weakened by a tendency, not peculiar to him, to overlook the deep personal antagonisms in Syria that do not necessarily or always coincide with the frontiers of the present "states" or religious confessions. His reply

would be that the mandatory authorities are so fascinated by these divisions as to under-estimate the real strength of the sentiment of unity, and are in any case doing nothing to advance it; and he insists that, in order to focus the forces that are making for unity and to direct the transitional stages, the most effective means in Syria, as the experience of 'Iraq has shown, would be the establishment of a monarchy. H. A. R. Gibb.

AFRICA

59*. Morocco at the Parting of the Ways. By E. F. Cruickshank. 1935. (University of Pennsylvania Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. xxv + 238 pp. $2·50.)

The title of this book is not very appropriate. One gets a little weary of "the parting of the ways" and the "cross-roads." It is a history of the capitulations in Morocco up to the end of the Madrid Conference of 1880. The archives of the interested Powers are at present available only until 1885, so the last stages of this remarkable story cannot yet be fully told. The dominating figure was Sir John Drummond Hay, who was British Consul-General for forty-five years, and acquired such a unique position in the country that it ultimately hindered him in his endeavours to secure an international agreement limiting the extension of the capitulations. It was essential to do this if the government of the Sultan was to be saved. The Sultan's chief reason for complaint was the number of his subjects who were withdrawn from his jurisdiction and became the protégés of consular-agents, to some of whom they became a principal source of income. The French, whose archives Mr. Cruickshank was not permitted to consult, opposed their reduction, and regarded Sir Drummond's efforts as directed against their trade. Bismarck also supported them in accordance with his policy to get their attention diverted to a colonial empire. The United States were also an obstacle, though their interest in Morocco was slight and their consul, after surviving one inquiry, was eventually dismissed for the offence. The Madrid Convention, which rectified the position in some respects, in the end did more harm than good, for it legalised practices which had hitherto had only the controversial justification of custom. Thereafter the Sultan's government seem to have sulked, and made no attempt to effect the reforms which Sir Drummond urged on them. Finally, the *Entente Cordiale* left the way open for France to step in and take over a country which had been misgoverned for at least two centuries. A most interesting and well-documented book. H. A. Wyndham.

60. Sir George Goldie, Founder of Nigeria. By Dorothy Wellesley. 1934. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. xi + 195 pp. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

This memoir of Sir George Goldie contains an historical introduction by Stephen Gwynn giving an account of the Niger Company until its charter was resumed by the Imperial Government. Sir George, like Cecil Rhodes, was the architect and builder of his schemes, and no imperial operations have been conducted on more efficient or more disinterested lines. The second part is an intimate account of the friendship between Sir George and Lady Dorothy Wellesley, which started when the latter was a child. It gives an interesting

insight into the character of the man to whom the Empire owes Nigeria. His life indeed deserves a fuller treatment, but he deprecated a biography and destroyed his papers. This is a fitting, though inadequate, memorial to him. H. A. WYNDHAM.

61*. LE SÉNÉGAL. Par G. G. Beslier. 1935. (Paris: Payot. La. 8vo. 225 pp., map. 15 *frs.*)

THIS account of the French connection with Senegal is concerned mainly with missionary work, the results of which are described in somewhat emotional terms. It is also a general history of the French on the coast of West Africa in which there are some inaccuracies, and some evidence of the anti-British bias which is all too common in French books on Colonial history. It is surely time that this should be eradicated. Why, for example, does the writer assert on p. 102 that the British proposed to exchange Portendic, which did not belong to them, for the French factory at Albreda in the Gambia? As a matter of fact the British never claimed to possess Portendic. What they had a right to under the Treaty of Versailles of 1783 was the right to trade there for gum, and it was this that they eventually bartered for Albreda in 1857. The description of missionary work is interesting, especially the experiences of the sisters of Saint Joseph de Cluny.

H. A. WYNDHAM.

FAR EAST

62. STORM CLOUDS OVER ASIA. By Robert S. Pickens. 1935. (New York and London: Funk and Wagnalls. 8vo. xi + 251 pp. $1.50.)

THE author is a well-known American journalist who writes with professional liveliness about "Jumpy Japan," "The Clever Chinese," "The Manchurian Graveyard," etc. The book is brief and readable, in a fleeting sort of way; it informs, though it does not instruct; it errs in the direction of the "tabloid." It contains curious errors and distortions such as that Yunnan is virtually a French province and that Tibet is under the protection of Great Britain. It blames Great Britain for a good many things, notably for failing to support Mr. Stimson's "non-recognition" policy with regard to Manchuria. "The only thing positive about the British policy was its negativeness." Mr. Roosevelt's Far Eastern policy is approved; it is defined as a policy of "force in reserve."

The most interesting chapter is that which deals with the dangerous situation which the author believes is arising in the Philippines. Here he is supported by Mr. Theodore Roosevelt, junior, who writes in the introduction to the book:

> "With what Mr. Pickens says on the Philippines I am in thorough accord. The picture he paints of the dilemma in which they find themselves is clear and correct. When definitely outside of the U.S. Tariff wall, the people will be unable to maintain a government with general education, health work, etc., and the standard of living will fall to that of the surrounding countries. Furthermore, I gravely doubt if they can maintain their independence."

American policy is to grant "independence" to the Philippines, while insisting on preferential treatment for U.S. goods entering the islands but without reciprocal preference for Filipino sugar (63 per cent. of total exports), which is to be sacrificed in favour of the Cuban sugar interests. At least, that is how Mr. Pickens interprets the pro-

visions of the Hawes–Cutting Bill, which President Hoover rejected; the present Bill (Tyddings–McDuffie) is not mentioned in the book, which does not seem to be quite up to date on this point. P. J.

63*. Suppressing Communist Banditry in China. By T'ang Leang-Li. ["*China To-day*" *Series*, No. 1.] 1935. (Shanghai: China United Press. 8vo. xiii + 125 pp. $3.00.)

Mr. T'ang does not attempt in this volume to make anything in the nature of a profound study of the problem of Communism in China. He is content to set down an accurate and objective record of the main facts relating to the origin of the Communist movement in China in 1919, the foundation of the Communist Party in 1921, the admission of communists into the reorganised Kuomintang in 1924, the breach with the communists and the Russian advisers in 1927, and the efforts that China has made ever since, and is still making, to rid herself of this pest. Some explanation of the causes underlying this sequence of events would have been of great interest, but though this higher task has hardly been attempted, Mr. T'ang in this straightforward narrative has accomplished a useful piece of work which should be of considerable service to all students of Far Eastern affairs. A word of caution is, however, necessary. In matters relating to the "unequal treaties" and the "imperialistic powers" Mr. T'ang is not a reliable witness, with the result that one brief passage on pages 14 and 15 contains several absurd misstatements.

It is permissible for a foreign observer to draw the inference from the facts that Mr. T'ang has set forth that never did the Chinese demonstrate more clearly their political ineptitude in international affairs than when Sun Yat-sen walked into the Soviet trap and accepted the aid of the communists against foreign imperialism and Chinese militarism. It would be difficult to exaggerate the extent of the calamity that he thus brought upon his unhappy country. Apologists have spread the story that Sun Yat-sen only turned to Russia after he had appealed to America and England for assistance and had been refused. It has never been stated what sort of assistance he sought or what sort of assistance England and America could properly have given to a revolutionary against the Government with whom they were maintaining diplomatic relations. Chapter and verse, in short, have never been quoted for the story and Mr. T'ang's candid narrative shows that there is no substance in it. John Brent.

64. Lin Tse-hsü: Pioneer Promoter of the Adoption of Western Means of Maritime Defence in China. By Gideon Chen. Published by the Department of Economics, Yenching University. Obtainable from The French Bookstore, Peiping. $1.00 (in China).

Mr. Gideon Chen, Professor of Economics at Yenching, is planning a work to be entitled *Pioneer Promoters of Modern Industrial Technique in China*; of this the part dealing with Lin Tse-hsü (1785–1850) is now published as a separate monograph. Lin Tse-hsü is the "Commissioner Lin" familiar to all those who are acquainted with the events of the Opium War. He is not usually, as Mr. Chen remarks, "included among the list of reforming statesman of the period at the end of the Ching Dynasty, nor are the 'forties' generally considered to mark the beginning of the modernisation of China." But China first felt "the impact of the West" as a threat from "the South Sea barbarians,"

whose naval superiority gave them an ascendancy along the coast. "Maritime Defence" was the current phrase for the problem thus presented to China. The pride of the Chinese officials made them reluctant to admit that anything was to be learnt from the despised foreigners, and Lin himself seems to have shared this opinion when he went to Canton in 1839. The experience of the Opium War convinced him that China must "learn about and from the West." In the *Hai Kuo T'u Chih* or *Illustrated Record of the Maritime Nations*, published in 1844 and attributed to Lin by Mr. Chen for reasons which he sets forth, it is said:

"Let us now, in time of peace, adopt the superior skill of the barbarians in order to control them with greater effect. . . . [Since Canton has been open to foreign trade] at first curious things, then seditious religion, and afterwards opium have been forced in. But we have learnt nothing about their superior skill in manufacturing armaments."

Various experiments were made with new types of ships and guns, and though these first moves towards "Westernisation" of technique were in the long run frustrated by the opposition of conservative officials, especially in those provinces where the effects of the war had not made themselves directly felt, they are significant for the historian, and Mr. Chen has given a clear, comprehensive and well-documented account of them. G. F. HUDSON.

65*. THE SECOND-GENERATION JAPANESE PROBLEM. By Edward K. Strong, Jr. 1934. (Stanford University Press; Oxford University Press. 8vo. viii + 292 pp. 15*s*.)

IN the United States is a group of about 140,000 Japanese (in addition to the 140,000 in Hawaii). The majority are settled in the West, 70 per cent. being in California alone. They consist of the original immigrants—the first generation—the bulk of whom arrived between 1900 and 1915, and their children—the second generation—the two generations being nearly equal in numbers. In this book Professor Strong, who occupies a chair in Psychology at Stanford, sums up the results of a detailed survey of the second-generation group carried out by himself and various assistants during the last five years. It covers the Japanese immigration into the United States and the ensuing agitation against the immigrants; it works out the effects of the agitation on the second generation; the vital statistics are analysed; the mental and other social traits and the economic status and prospects are examined; and, perhaps most valuable of all, there is a psychologist's discussion of the race prejudice involved, and of the mental aptitudes of the American Japanese as compared with those of the American Whites.

With rare exceptions all immigrant groups in the United States have had to pass through a period of despised status. Benjamin Franklin's complaint against the German settlers in Pennsylvania is well known. But probably no group excited such violent antipathies as the Japanese. Citizenship and the right to acquire land were denied to them, and other discriminatory measures were adopted. In 1924 they were excluded from the Immigration Quotas although a Japanese quota would have entailed admitting only 185 per annum. At bottom the hostility was caused by economic competition and still more by the fear of it. This has nearly disappeared now. Further, the crime record of the group is so conspicuously lower than the American average and their general aptitudes so good (extensive and varied psychological

tests suggest that the difference between Japanese and other Americans is slight) that the prospects for a new tolerance and sympathy are good.

Perhaps the most encouraging sign is that such a book as this can be written by a man of the local standing of Professor Strong. It is painstaking and accurate, but it has rarer qualities—mind and reflection and wisdom. It can be recommended not only to students of American-Japanese relations but also to students of immigration and of race. W. R. CROCKER.

66. JAVA PAGEANT. By H. W. Ponder. 1934. (London: Seeley Service. 8vo. 305 pp. 18*s*.)

THE writer of this book went to Java some years ago and " fell in love with the place as a matter of course. . . . Love soon aroused curiosity . . . about this intriguing Eastern charmer. . . . What was her history? Why was Java so different from all the adjacent islands? " Mrs. Ponder found difficulty in satisfying her curiosity. The guide books were not very helpful, but why she did not resort to the voluminous literature on Java (she could read Dutch) or to the wonderful museum at Weltevreden she does not say. In the end she began to " manufacture " her own " volume of general information."

Mrs. Ponder writes interestingly enough of some of the superficial differences between Java and British Malaya, but her historical chapters show that she failed to answer her first question. That pre-Islamic Java had a remarkable history and was for awhile the centre of a great empire she does not appear to know; Madjapahit she mentions but once, and then by the way. The history of Hinduism and Buddhism in Java is no longer the confusion that Mrs. Ponder makes it out to be. Her short description of early Chinese relations with the island is not clear and her account of the coming of Islam to Java quite misleading.

If there is little satisfaction for the historian in this book, there is still less for the anthropologist. Mrs. Ponder's reference to the blow-gun (*sumpitan*) shows that she is not familiar with its distribution. The chapter on the rice-fields of Java is attractively written, but its author appears to know little of the origin and diffusion of rice terrace cultivation.

The book is primarily a description of every-day life and travel in Java. It is fresh and entertaining and throughout sympathetic towards the country and its people. *Java Pageant* ends in Java Paradise. A useful book for those who " Cruise to Java."

IFOR B. POWELL.

UNITED STATES

67. AMERICA'S HOUR OF DECISION: Crisis Points in National Policy. By Glenn Frank. 1934. (New York and London: McGraw-Hill. 8vo. 263 pp. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

ALTHOUGH " apt alliteration's artful aid " in moderation may be neither unpleasant nor unamusing to a majority of readers, it will detract from a favourable first impression on British readers of a book which uses it from five to ten times to a page, even four times within a couple of lines. However, the one other fault of this 250-page tract is of an entirely different order: its price; it should be available to all at a few pence, as a sort of " Citizens' and Statesmen's Guiding Principles of Government."

The President of the University of Wisconsin, in a prologue, nine

chapters and an epilogue, has given us in what he frankly describes as "a tract rather than a treatise, a document of appeal respecting issues that require . . . searching judgment and swift decision," a volume of value to a far wider field than the United States for and around which it is written. In simple language and telling phrases it analyses the major disease and most of the complicating maladies from which the Western world is suffering and clearly and convincingly indicates, if not the cure, at least the course of treatment.

President Frank has equally little use for what he regards as the Scylla of Socialism and the Charybdis of Fascism, two extremes between which a golden mean may be found; but only on condition that we wake up in time to the fact that we are "working in terms of an age of plenty, but thinking in terms of an age of scarcity." Backed as it is in most countries by the world's biggest and most powerful private property-owning organisation, and led individually by its members, Fascism may not perhaps be avoided so easily, nor ultimately a compensatory swing to Socialism escaped. But Mr. Frank convincingly presents an alternative case and there is a very great deal to learn from his clearly thought out and simply expressed exposition.

No attempt is made here to discuss the several subjects to which chapters are devoted, subjects on which revision of conventional thought is necessary, in America and elsewhere, if we are to emerge from the present political and economic chaos. Through the greater part of the book an economic motif is apparent:

". . . statesmanship . . . must reserve the term surplus production for goods not *socially* needed. . . ."

"The business of a mass-production age cannot but back-fire if a philosophy of the few dominates it. The market of a mass-production age dies if the mass lack ample leisure and adequate income. Only through such mass leisure and mass income is mass consumption possible on anything like the scale our productive capacity indicates."

"Poverty may regiment the lives of men quite as effectively as any rule of arbitrary power, and inequity may prove quite as destructive of liberty as any tyranny."

"We shall have to decide, without undue delay, whether we are to explore urther the possibilities of this age of plenty or execute a return to an age of scarcity. We cannot go on indefinitely with our enterprise in one age and our economics in another."

". . . we must move generally and promptly in the direction of higher wages, shorter hours, lower prices, and a narrower profit margin per unit of sale or service."

". . . we cannot save from collapse an economy of science, technology, and power production if we cling to the philosophy of wages that arose before the era of power production. We are still thinking of wages in terms of the pre-power age. We are still attempting to determine wages in terms of the number of hours a man spends on a job. It is too late to do that."

"If the hand of economic leadership could but be forced by a folk-movement to the general adoption of wage, hour, price, and profit policies that would effect a generous spread of income and establish a socially sound margin of mass leisure, economic leadership would find, not that it had been victimised by a proletarian robbery, but that it had been pushed by popular pressure into the only policies that can insure the survival and permanent profitability of capitalistic industrialism in a power age, the mass production of which is self-defeating unless industrialism itself assures mass consumption through socially sound economic policies."

Economic leadership (bankers and industrialists) has clearly been guilty, not merely of greed but of fundamentally incompetent thinking. Henry Ford alone, a decade or more before the Depression, tried to

boost wages in recognition of the essential necessity of "mass consumption." Mass production has reduced the aggregate amount of wages while increasing the amount of goods to be purchased with those wages; at the same time, it has piled up profits available for little else than the purchase of luxuries (not mass produced), investment in more mass production, or idle accumulation as bank credit. At least those have been the tendencies on the existing economy of low wages, long hours, highest obtainable prices and profits; and for no class has it proved a very intelligent ordering of the economic world.

Mr. Frank's clarity of apprehension and resultant expression of ideas may be expected to have some effect. It is interesting to note some corresponding thoughts to which Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace gave voice in his address on "The Need for Unifying Purpose" to the Annual Meeting of the Foreign Policy Association on March 16th, 1935. Mr. Wallace, at least a leading mind in the Roosevelt cabinet, said in part:

> "Let us concentrate our attack upon the economics of scarcity. That is our common foe. There are no words of condemnation too strong for it. . . . It keeps physical comforts out of the hands of millions, and cramps and stultifies the spirit of all of us."

And again:

> "I am convinced that the nineteenth-century brand of competitive capitalism can no longer serve. . . ."

Mr. Wallace concluded:

> ". . . I believe in the utmost development of each individual and each region and each nation, but always it has to take place within the bounds of the great, encircling whole, and if that can be developed as a philosophy in the minds of the warring individuals and classes and groups and regions and nations, the time will come when a sense of fairness will come as a part of second nature."

Mr. Glenn Frank could be expected to subscribe to that peroration, though he might, instead of "fairness," have chosen the American near-synonym: "intelligent self-interest." F. J. MAURICE.

68*. TARIFF RETALIATION: REPERCUSSIONS OF THE HAWLEY-SMOOT BILL. By Joseph M. Jones. 1934. (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press; Oxford University Press. 8vo. 332 pp. 12s. 6d.)

THE main thesis of Mr. Jones' book is that the repercussions of the Hawley-Smoot Tariff have been wider and more profound than has been generally realised. The author maintains that the Act, together with the retaliation and discrimination to which it has given rise, have been largely responsible for the absence of any widespread revival of international trade, and for the adoption of commercial policies and practices which make it improbable (whilst they persist) that any widespread revival can occur. To prove his case Mr. Jones undertakes a "full-dress" analysis in the true American style. If somewhat long-winded, his presentation of facts and arguments is admirably done and his documentation excellent.

Starting with a penetrating analysis of the nature and principles of the tariff policy of the United States, the author proceeds to consider, in detail, the influence of the Hawley-Smoot tariff on opinion and policy in Spain, Italy, Switzerland, France, Canada and Great Britain. He then deals with the controversy concerning the "most-favoured-nation" clause, and finally makes proposals for a new tariff policy for the United States.

Mr. Jones admits fully the part played by the Hawley-Smoot tariff in aggravating the world crisis, and—following Professor Siegfried—emphasises the increasing vulnerability of the United States to economic retaliation (both direct and disguised). He argues that the height and specialisation of the tariff have undermined the fundamental principles of the alleged policy pursued, with the result that foreign nations have lost their former sense of moral obligation to accord equality of treatment to the States. The "flexible clause" failed in its object, and the net result has been discrimination against the States, and a new type of reciprocity in Europe.

Eventually the choice before the United States is either adjustment to world conditions, or an attempt merely to alleviate some of the evil consequences of the present maladjustment. If the former, or "International," policy, is chosen, then commercial policy must undergo radical changes, which—according to Mr. Jones—should include the adoption of a conventional tariff, and the grant of treaty-making power to the President. Such a policy would, he maintains, enable the retention of the most-favoured-nation clause in commercial treaties, provided that reasonable modifications were accepted in its interpretation. It would have been interesting to have Mr. Jones' views on the Reciprocity Tariff Act of June 1934, but unfortunately his book was written before the Act was passed.

In conclusion it may be agreed that—even if Mr. Jones somewhat under-estimates other forces tending in the same direction as the Hawley-Smoot tariff—bold leadership by the United States in the sphere of commercial policy seems to be by far the most hopeful, if not the only, means by which the world may escape from the present vicious circle, whereby the low level of international trade leads to increased barriers to trade, and increased barriers prevent any far-reaching recovery. VERA ANSTEY.

69*. THE OPEN DOOR AT HOME. By Charles A. Beard. 1935. (London and New York: Macmillan. Demy 8vo. viii + 330 pp. *12s. 6d.*)

MR. BEARD calls his work a trial philosophy of national interest, and covers an immense amount of ground, historical, ethical, æsthetic and otherwise. His theme is that the United States should drop its policy of commercial imperialism and concentrate on "the most efficient use of the natural resources and industrial acts of the nation at home in a quest for security and a high standard of living." The volume was published with the aid of a grant from the Carnegie Corporation, and is a plea for clear thinking; but it makes heavy reading.

MESTON.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor,

International Affairs.

REVIEW OF LAUM'S *Die Geschlossene Wirtschaft*

SIR,

It is startling to see a reviewer in your columns tack on to "the great trend of European Conservative thinking" Herr Laum's study of Autarchy—a book which is rather a pathetic sign of the wilderness

into which the Social Sciences have drifted in Germany, and which is interesting only in a Freudian sense, as disclosing the driving wish beneath the mistily-mystical Nazi phraseology. I will let Herr Laum speak for himself.

First there is a conglomeration of facts concerning primitive social groups, as showing the roots of autarchy; then the book discusses its means, natural and politico-economical; and, finally, the effects of autarchy. The effects are described as both physical, an " accumulated strength" which grows with the length of segregation, and psychological, a fine spiritual balance and exceptional self-control. Moreover, segregation preserves purity of morals, while intercourse and trade deprave them. That is why, says Herr Laum, the high reaches of culture are linked in history with autarchy, and why island cultures are higher than continental, and inland regions reach a higher level of culture than maritime regions. That is the philosophical side of the argument. To suit the author's thesis it merely turns upside down the elementary fact that the ancient civilisations, and especially those which bred our own, developed precisely in maritime regions; and that the cross-fertilisation of two or more of them was the great means of advance.

Herr Laum is still more original when he comes to give concrete examples in support of his ideal. He regards as the perfect type of an autarchic State—the Roman Empire! "The limits of the Empire were so far-flung that . . . the Empire was economically altogether independent of the outside world." His modern and much-admired example is Japan, a country which, to him, proves that the longer the segregation the greater the accumulated strength. But that is not an end in itself: it merely makes possible, when the time is ripe, a " more elemental assertion of the urge to expansion " and a more " effective spreading out over a wider space." By the time Herr Laum has shown that the merit of isolation is that it enables a people to spread out thereafter more powerfully, like Japan, and that the ideal autarchy is one which spans half the globe, like the Roman Empire, so that " all the products of the settled world were at the disposal of its citizens," one is left wondering as to the fate of all the fine biological and psychological virtues which, as he had earlier demonstrated to his own satisfaction, were the exclusive fruit of the segregation of racial communities.

To return to your reviewer. She says: " This book does not aim at setting up an ideal of ' return to the primitive '." But that is just what Herr Laum does want to do. I quote from his concluding paragraphs:

> " One may, of course, argue about points of detail and method of execution; but there can be no doubt that the idea and end of National-Socialism in their core really show the way and the goal. *The return to the primitive and to totality* [my italics], the organic rejuvenation of the national body through segregation from the outer world which National-Socialism demands, are necessary for very existence. Briefly: *the inward truth of the guiding idea of National-Socialism is founded upon this, that it corresponds to a biological necessity.*" [Herr Laum's italics.]

Lastly, more startling than all the rest, is to see this pseudo-scientific apology for the " totalitarian " Nazi State described as being written " from a fundamentally Catholic standpoint."

I am, Sir,
Yours, etc.,
D.

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER, 1935

MODERN DIPLOMACY AND BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION[1]

By The Hon. Harold Nicolson, C.M.G.

I must begin with a few definitions and a few axioms. I shall be using the word "diplomacy" in its most general sense, meaning thereby the practice, rather than the theory, of international relations. I shall be using the term "democratic or modern diplomacy" as signifying a system under which the execution of foreign policy is subjected to the immediate, rather than to the ultimate, concurrence of the sovereign electorate. I shall proceed from the axiom that democratic diplomacy has in Great Britain superseded professional or oligarchic diplomacy. I shall thus take it as agreed that public opinion has now become a constant, rather than an intermittent, factor in the conception and execution of foreign policy; that the system of democratic diplomacy thus created has many virtues and several faults; and that, whereas its virtues are obvious and I hope enduring, its faults are obscure and, I earnestly believe, transitional. If, therefore, I concentrate my remarks upon the dangers and weaknesses of democratic diplomacy, I do not wish it to be supposed that I have failed to appreciate its safeguards, its inevitability and its strength.

My central theme, therefore, will be that of modern diplomacy and public opinion. My contention is that democracy, while claiming complete and constant sovereignty in foreign affairs, has not as yet learned how to exercise that sovereignty in a responsible manner.

Many members of this Institute have had occasion to address popular audiences on subjects connected with diplomacy and foreign affairs. Their experience has probably been similar to my own. They have found unexpected interest in the subject,

[1] Address given at Chatham House on May 28th, 1935, with the Right Hon. Sir Horace Rumbold, Bart., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., M.V.O., in the Chair.

considerable but wholly unco-ordinated knowledge, potential good sense, much unnecessary suspicion; and beneath it all a really alarming degree of perplexity.

I have been at some pains to analyse that perplexity, since it seems to lie at the root of popular incompetence in foreign affairs, at the root of that uncertainty of intention, or irresponsibility, which I consider the most serious weakness of the modern system. I would suggest that it is possible, while keeping within the area of practical argument, to separate that perplexity into causes and effects.

Of the causes of public perplexity in Great Britain, some are inevitable and some are not. Among the inevitable classes I should mention, first, the popular Press and, secondly, the multiplicity of British external preoccupations.

A popular Press depends for its subsistence upon a vast circulation : that circulation can only be maintained by alternating processes of appeasement and of stimulation : the appeasement is conveyed by varying forms of flattery, whereas the stimulation can only be provided by sensationalism and excitation. The patient judgment which is the essential basis of any sane appraisement of foreign affairs does not offer, and will never offer, even the most rudimentary form of news value. Our popular Press, therefore, only carries foreign news when some sensation is available. Yet even under this heading I am not really pessimistic. I observe, for instance, that the foreign correspondents of the secondary American newspapers are of a far higher quality than the correspondents of our own secondary newspapers. And since our popular newspapers have learnt most of their lessons from the United States it may well be that they will learn this lesson also. Yet for the present we must face the fact that the popular newspapers are apt to blur by atmospherics the correct transmission of information from abroad.

The second, and even more inevitable, cause of public perplexity is the multiplicity of British external commitments and preoccupations. There is Europe, there is the Empire, there is America, there is the Far East and there is the Pacific. The very diversity of such preoccupations arouses confusion and public lassitude.

I do not wish, however, to deal with inevitable causes. I wish only to discuss the evitable. And I should define the two main evitable causes of popular perplexity as lack of knowledge and lack of direction. I should define its two most damaging

effects as lack of confidence and lack of responsibility. Under the heading of "Causes" I shall concentrate mainly upon diplomatic theory: my examination of diplomatic practice will be postponed to my subsequent section, which I have called "Effects." Let me begin with the first of my two causes and examine the nature of popular ignorance of foreign affairs, or, as I prefer to call it, "general lack of knowledge."

I. *Causes:* (a) *Lack of Knowledge.*

You will agree that if the public are to be educated to a higher competence in foreign affairs it is necessary that we should be quite clear in our own minds regarding the nature and effects of public ignorance. Such ignorance can be divided into ignorance of foreign facts and ignorance of foreign mentality. Neither of these seems to me extremely important in itself. It is not ignorance that matters so much as the psychological effect produced upon the public themselves by the consciousness of ignorance. It matters very little, for instance, whether the electorate are aware of the precise location of Jehol or Yap, but it matters very much that the minds of millions should be distressed and disconcerted by a belief that they ought to know these things.

I say that this ignorance is unimportant in itself, since the requisite knowledge both of foreign facts and of foreign mentality should, under any reasonable system, be provided by the experts or professionals to whom is entrusted the actual conduct of affairs. On the other hand, it is the mental uneasiness created in the public mind by the unfamiliarity and complexity of foreign facts and feelings which precludes them from placing in the expert that confidence which is essential if he is to work with certitude, patience and calm. The average Englishman is exceptionally prone to uneasiness in face of the unknown. That mental indolence, which is one of the most valuable components of our stability, has its disadvantages. When faced with the unfamiliar, when obliged to make the mental effort of acquiring exotic knowledge, the average Englishman is assailed by feelings of distaste. These feelings create an instinctive desire to escape from intellectual effort, and this desire in its turn assumes such strange disguises as derision, suspicion and dislike. We are all familiar with the phenomenon of the average Englishman escaping from the effort of understanding a work of modern art by condemning it as comic, immoral or affected. He tries, in other words, to dismiss from his consciousness the unfamiliar object

and the disquiet which it occasions by pretending that it is neither serious, nor reputable, nor true. Something of the same sort happens when the average Englishman contemplates a problem in international affairs. He tries to escape from the effort of such contemplation by ridiculing Hitler's moustache, by regarding all diplomatists as his ethical inferiors, or simply by exclaiming, "No! I never read the foreign news. One cannot believe a single word those people say," or in other words by convincing himself that foreign politics do not, in any necessary manner, exist.

Our first task, therefore, should be to assure the British public that their ignorance of the details of foreign affairs is not a vital disability. We should try to persuade them that, for the exercise of their sovereignty, all that is required is balance, patience, trustfulness and good sense. If we can once induce them to be less afraid of diplomacy we shall go far towards teaching them to accord to diplomacy a more responsible and less intermittent attention.

I cannot but feel, also, that we, who are constantly concerned with international affairs, are apt to increase rather than to diminish this popular diffidence. Every time we use the expression "Quai d'Orsay" or "Wilhelmstrasse" in place of the expression "the French (or German) Foreign Office," we are impressing the untravelled, not so much with reverence for our cosmopolitanism as with distaste for their own ignorance and the subjects which remind them of that ignorance. I feel that with this in mind all technical exponents of diplomacy should impose upon themselves a self-denying ordinance under which the Boulé should in future appear as "the Greek Parliament," and "Monte Cittorio" as "the Italian Chamber." If the public are to attain to their essential confidence in these matters, we private publicists should avoid all gestures of expert vanity.

Yet it is not only by subordinating our personal desire for linguistic display to a social desire for group appeasement that we can still the hostility evoked in the British nervous system by references to the unfamiliar. We must also be very careful and courageous in the matter of red herrings. The British public, in its hatred of the incomprehensible, is terribly apt to grasp at the half-understood. We thus suffer much from red herrings which divert the appetite of the sovereign people from those quarries which they ought to pursue. Let me indicate a few of those red herrings which are at this moment being most fragrantly trailed across the scent of peace and order.

The most distracting of all these herrings is, in my opinion, the Treaty of Versailles. There are several million people in Great Britain to-day who believe sincerely that the main cause of existing international tension is to be sought in certain articles of the Versailles Treaty. They are not clear as to which articles are most to blame, but they are none the less prepared to make immense sacrifices, at the cost of other nations, in order that Germany may again become the rich and contented customer of, let us say, fifty years ago. They are especially generous in regard to the eastern frontiers of Germany and in regard to those of Germany's colonies which we did not seize ourselves. And they think it only fair that Germany should have an enormous army, provided, of course, that her navy and her air force are not allowed to become a menace to the British Empire.

I define this as a red herring, since it enables people, at small cost to themselves, to imagine that, in the way of international thinking, they have done their bit. In fact, of course, they have not thought at all. The territorial clauses of the Treaty of Versailles are perhaps its least assailable, and certainly its least alterable, features : most of the other and more flagrant anomalies of the Treaty have since 1919 righted themselves; what remains of the actual letter of the Treaty is either of secondary importance or else has, in the last sixteen years, hardened into shapes which it would be impossible, without immense disturbance, to shatter and remould.

I am myself a veteran among the revisionists, having formed one of that Light Brigade who became revisionists in the second week of January 1919. Yet I do not flatter myself that to change what is alterable in the Treaty will render the Teutons a race of grateful turtle-doves. Even if we accord them, as we ought to accord them, absolute equality of status, it will take many years before the habit of that equality heals the lacerated tendons of their self-respect. For the fundamental errors of the Treaty of Versailles were errors, not of mathematics or geography, but of morals. They were due to the fact that the victorious democracies were at the moment in a deplorable state of mind. The fundamental error was the spirit and not the letter of the Versailles Treaty. And if the democracies of 1935 are really to atone for the spiritual errors of the democracies of 1918, then they must start thinking, not in terms of the Polish Corridor, but in terms of extreme humility and self-sacrifice. Anything which diverts their attention from such severe moral atonement is to my mind a red herring.

Other red herrings are more fragrant but less important. Some of them, I am glad to notice, are already losing their distracting scent. The issue, for instance, between the new and the old diplomacy, between secret and open negotiation, is daily becoming a less ardent issue, since people have learned that, in fact, it means little and leads to nothing at all. The expression "National Honour," which is a terrible red herring on the Continent, is, I rejoice to say, coming more and more to be interpreted in Great Britain as synonymous with "National Honesty." There is, however, one small and very pungent red herring which seems to possess to-day a curious capacity for distracting attention from essential objectives. I refer to the private manufacture of arms. I am prepared to believe that occasionally, during the course of the nineteenth century, certain small countries were enabled, and perhaps encouraged, to make war owing to the generous terms offered to them by one or other of the great armament firms. But I am totally unable to believe that the judgment of Grey and Asquith, of Delcassé and Poincaré, of Tirpitz and Bethmann-Hollweg was influenced by any single member of the board of Vickers, Creusot or Krupp. Nor do I see myself how the danger of war would in any sense be diminished by obliging small countries to manufacture arms themselves. The prospect of State Armament Factories from China to Peru fills me, I confess, with grave disquiet. The balance of advantage may, and I think does, incline towards a more elaborate regulation of arms traffic than that at present provided by our Foreign Enlistment Act; yet the problem cannot rightly be stated in sensational and dramatic terms, and I think efforts should be made to discourage public opinion from being diverted from the main quarry of militarism by a red herring which, if followed too credulously, would allow militarism to escape chuckling to its lair.

Let me at this stage recapitulate my argument to the point which has now been reached. I started from the premise that the uncertain and irresponsible attitude adopted by public opinion towards democratic diplomacy was due to two main causes, of which the first was ignorance. I contended that the electorate's lack of knowledge regarding foreign facts and foreign mentality was not so important in itself as important in its effects. I defined these effects as mental uneasiness and suspicion. And I suggested that efforts should be made to decrease public diffidence in such matters, to diminish not so much their ignorance as their consciousness of ignorance, and above all to prevent their attention

being diverted from the main quarry of peace by such red herrings as textual revisionism and the private manufacture of arms. I feel indeed that if we could induce the people to see that what is essential to the right exercise of their sovereignty is not knowledge of facts but habits of correct and fundamental thinking, we should have done much to diminish the unfortunate disturbance in public psychology which is caused by their almost morbid sensitiveness to their own ignorance. Yet even then we shall be left with the problem of mitigating the second main cause of perplexity. Having examined "lack of knowledge," I shall now pass to "lack of direction."

(b) *Lack of Direction.*

I use the word "direction" both in its objective meaning of "guidance" from above, and in its subjective meaning of an inner sense of destination. The British public to-day are not explicitly told what are the basic purposes of British foreign policy, nor do they themselves possess any instinctive awareness of such purposes. It is this absence of any generally accepted purpose, as of any generally accepted standards, which differentiates (and not in foreign policy alone) the twentieth from the nineteenth century.

The average Englishman, let us say of 1886, felt instinctively that the purpose of British diplomacy was to safeguard the security of the Empire and to open new markets. The former could be achieved by overwhelming naval superiority; the latter, so he imagined, could be furthered by imperialism. Because of this general unanimity of purpose he was willing to leave the conception and execution of foreign policy to the Government and their trained advisers; and they, in their turn, took it for granted that the treaties which they negotiated would automatically be ratified and that, if a crisis arose, they could rely upon a sufficient homogeneity of public opinion, even if they demanded war. The dislocation of this central purpose and the consequent disunity of opinion has robbed the electorate as well as the Government of any basic conviction. Policy seems suspended between the two poles of nationalism and internationalism, flitting alternately to right and left. It is not surprising that in such circumstances the public should feel perplexed.

Nor is it the old purposes only which have become blurred; there has been a simultaneous dislocation of former standards.

In the nineteenth century the average standard was what

was vaguely known as "patriotism," namely, a belief in power mitigated by efficiency and good conduct. It was the old Roman theory of a chosen people exercising authority in the interests of peace and order. Those who held this theory, and throughout the nineteenth century they represented an overwhelming majority of the electorate, were thus able to reconcile their appetites with their conscience and to fuse into a generally accepted policy both the ideal and the real. The great problem of the twentieth century is that, to all appearances, the ideal and the real have become contradictory and even mutually exclusive.

It is, I think, this very gulf between the desirable and the practicable which is the cause of so much public and private uncertainty. Are there no means by which this gulf can be bridged?

Logic, so far from furnishing assistance, presents us with a dilemma which is to all appearances insoluble. In strict logic, those who adhere to the power doctrine must accept the ultimate justifiability of war. In logic, those who are opposed to the power doctrine must also be opposed to the force implicit in our imperial system. Logically, no individual can be a sincere supporter of both doctrines at the same time, nor can we hope in logic to exploit the peace doctrine in order to obtain collective security, while adopting the power doctrine in order to maintain our Empire.

The average Englishman finds himself, therefore, in an appalling quandary. He hesitates to subscribe unreservedly to the power doctrine since he feels that such a doctrine, if pushed to its ultimate conclusion, would end in the worst war that the world has ever witnessed. He hesitates to subscribe unreservedly to the peace doctrine, partly from fears regarding his own security, and partly owing to a dim dread that the abolition of force would entail the abolition of all authority which is based on national power, to the consequent collapse of Empire, and to the reduction of Great Britain to the status of a small and possibly disunited island. Finding no middle course between two such unpleasant alternatives he endeavours to compromise by half adopting both. And he thereby loses all sense of direction.

Yet is there no weak link in the logical chain which so fetters popular judgment? I think there is. The error arises, I think, from the habit of regarding war and peace as two absolute opposites of equal validity. This error, this absolutism, is increased by the ethical associations aroused by the word " peace,"

which is "good," and the word "war," which is "evil." Yet if we take the analogy of economics we shall agree that, although some extremists regard "capitalism" and "socialism" as two mutually exclusive opposites, there is a vast middle range of opinion which recognises that during the present transitional phase through which civilisation is passing it is prudent and possible to retain the safeguards and stability of the one as a familiar base from which to conduct experiments in the other. How can the public be brought to adopt a similar attitude of reasoned relativity towards the apparent antithesis between war and peace, between militarism and pacificism, between authority and consent?

It would first seem necessary to persuade them that war and peace, that militarism and pacifism, are not, as they imagine, two contradictory and mutually exclusive ethical systems, but that they represent two different stages in human progress. The fact that universal peace will only be attained after the passing of many human generations does not detract from its validity as an objective; it merely means that two or three more centuries will be required before that objective can be reached. All that we of the present generation can hope to do is to advance an inch or two closer towards this far-off divine event, and I contend that in comparison with previous centuries we have made amazing progress in that direction within the last fifteen years. If, therefore, the public could be taught to approach the problem in terms of history rather than in terms of actuality, in terms of gradualness rather than of impatience, in terms of evolution rather than in terms of immediacy, they would come to see that we are not engaged to-day in a conflict between two equally valid principles, but are passing through a transitional stage in which the principle of war is slowly dying and the principle of peace is slowly gathering life.

Once we could impart to them some such conviction it would be easier to persuade them that the middle course is far more logical, more necessary and more practicable than they suppose. One could point out that at the present moment certain non-expansionist countries, such as France, Russia, Great Britain and the United States, are, in fact, making great progress towards the ultimate objective, whereas less static countries, such as Germany and Italy, are still at the stage of dynamic discontent. One could argue that the static countries are compelled to protect themselves against the dynamic countries even when such protection implies the use of force. And one could insist that the

distinction between defence and aggression is a distinction which is legitimate, recognisable and extremely useful.

From such an argument the middle course would, I think, emerge with a certain distinctness. The formula would be as follows:—The human race is progressing by gradual stages towards the abolition of violence; at the present moment certain Powers believe in violence and certain Powers do not; it is not possible for the pacifist countries to convince the militarist countries in terms of theory, but only in terms of fact; it will thus become necessary for the pacifist countries to restrain the militarist countries in terms, not of pacifism, but of militarism; they are fortunately able to do so since they possess a preponderance of power; yet in so doing they must not confuse immediate expedients with ultimate purposes; thus, while demonstrating clearly that if it comes to violence the preponderance of power is on the side of peace and not on the side of war, they must avoid both menaces and moral superiority, which can only provoke fear and indignation; they are enormously aided in this stratagem by the existence of the League of Nations and by that brilliant device of modern diplomacy (due almost entirely to the initiative of Sir Austen Chamberlain) which is known as collective guarantees. Here, assuredly, is the middle course. And that, assuredly, is the course which the British Government, although with insufficient explicitness, is now adopting. If only we could persuade the public that the present policy is a consistent and logical pursuit of an ultimate aim, we might create a sense of direction and thereby diminish uncertainty and distrust.

You will question, however, whether any such simplification of issues could ever be placed before the electorate in a form which would capture their confidence and win their assent. I should recommend to those of you who feel pessimistic on this point a study of the history of duelling in the United Kingdom. You will find in the pages of that history many familiar arguments: duelling, it was said, would continue so long as human nature remained human nature; no man, it was argued, would ever consent to submit an affair of personal honour to the judgment of the courts; besides, it was contended, if you abolish duelling you also abolish those high human qualities of courage, loyalty, chivalry and self-sacrifice. How came it, therefore, that in spite of these overwhelming arguments duelling actually disappeared? It disappeared because in process of time more and more people came to regard it as an unintelligent, illogical and

uncivilised method of settling disputes. It gave to the professional dueller, who was admittedly an inferior type, advantages which were not possessed by the unprofessional dueller. It exposed valuable lives to wholly unnecessary danger, as when Castlereagh and Canning fought in 1809. And thus, very gradually, it came to be regarded, in Great Britain at least, as stupid, uncivilised, feudal and a trifle absurd.

Now is not this analogy a quite pertinent analogy? We have reached a stage in international opinion analogous to the stage of opinion attained in Great Britain regarding duelling in the year, let us say, 1820. It was a stage at which most people thought duelling wrong but inevitable; and a few people contended that something which was admittedly wrong ought never to be regarded as inevitable. In the succeeding two decades the realists diminished and the idealists increased. And thus in 1844, with the powerful backing of the Prince Consort, a stage had been reached when it was found possible to abolish duelling by law.

Yet I have dealt sufficiently with theory and must now pass to practice. I have quite arbitrarily chosen my causes of public perplexity as pegs on which to hang my suggestions as to how democratic theory might be improved. With equal lack of logic I shall now employ the effect of those causes as pegs whereon to hang an examination of modern diplomatic technique.

II. *Effects:* (a) *Lack of Confidence.*

I have already defined, for the purposes of this argument, the effects of public perplexity as lack of confidence and lack of responsibility. I shall first examine lack of confidence.

I do not wish to deal with the many considerations which tend to diminish public confidence in Cabinet Ministers responsible for the conception and execution of foreign policy. I feel myself that the ideal Foreign Secretary should be a man of the utmost simplicity and one who reflects the character, as well as the intelligence, of the race. But it would be invidious and unfair to pursue such examination any further.

I prefer to deal specifically with the relation between the professional member of the Foreign Service, in fact the diplomatic civil servant, and the sovereign people. I am under the impression that an unnecessary and very damaging misunderstanding exists in this respect between the public and its most valuable servants.

There are, I should imagine, some Englishmen who still

suppose that the European War was contrived by the machinations of the professional diplomatist. The number and quality of those who hold this opinion is, I rejoice to believe, rapidly diminishing. Yet there still remains a residue of impression that the professional diplomatist is a member of an exclusive caste, detached from the main currents of public opinion, ignorant of economics, speaking several foreign languages with an exquisite accent, and as such unworthy of confidence. The electorate have therefore felt that greater security is provided for them if the negotiation of all vital affairs is entrusted to ambulant politicians. I may be prejudiced in favour of the professional diplomatist, but I cannot regard this belief on the part of the electorate, if it really exists, as anything but imprudent.

The diplomatic service acts as a filter in the turgid stream of international affairs. Direct contact between British and foreign statesmen dispenses with that filter. I admit that the rush of water is thereby rendered more potent and more immediate: yet the conduct of foreign policy requires no gush or rush; it requires deliberation, experience and detachment. The politician, unlike the diplomatist, has no time to be deliberate, has little experience of foreign psychology, and is always more sensitive to immediate triumph rather than to ultimate interests. Should personal vanity or ambition intrude upon his judgment, should he be tempted to approach his negotiations from the angle of intellectual brilliance rather than from the more solid bases of character and tradition, then indeed he exposes his country to the terrible dangers of immediate personal success. The professional diplomatist is subject to no such hurried temptations: he is permanent, patient, persevering, and above all anonymous. I regard his comparative displacement under democratic diplomacy with the gravest disquiet.

I do not mean by this that I am opposed in principle to all diplomacy by conference. Obviously situations of acute and immediate seriousness must occur in which it is essential that those responsible to Parliament for the conception of foreign policy should take a direct part in its execution. I suggest only that gratuitous personal contacts between British and foreign statesmen should if possible be avoided. Many of us, during the last few months, have had occasion, either directly or indirectly, to learn the impressions of those responsible or irresponsible statesmen who have seen Adolf Hitler. Some of them have come to the conclusion that the Führer is demonstrably insane. Others have come to the conclusion that he is a man of immense modera-

tion asking only to be treated as a civilised being. The very diversity of such impressions indicates how dangerous it is for the directors of our foreign policy to indulge in personal, momentary and superficial contacts with those with whom they have to deal. In the atmosphere of Geneva such personal confrontations are valuable enough. But specific contacts, in that they entail publicity and therefore public expectation, should whenever possible be avoided.

Did I suppose that such continental contacts really increased public confidence, I should admit that their merits far outweighed their defects. I hold no such belief. I know too well that all such conferences entail fallacious communiqués, half-truths, speculation, and eventual suspicion and misunderstanding. It is not from foreign capitals or resorts that public confidence can be strengthened, it is from Westminster and Whitehall. We are apt to under-estimate the trust which the British electorate reposes in its civil servants: we are apt to over-estimate the reverence with which it regards its elected representatives. I believe that the nerves of the public are irritated rather than soothed by these frequent ambulations. I am convinced that what the public really desires is the maximum of democratic control coupled with the maximum of expert efficiency. And that desire, if only we are sensible about it, is what can quite easily be satisfied.

How, therefore, are we to create in the public mind the same degree of confidence in the experts of our Foreign Service as is readily accorded to the experts of the Treasury or to the rulers of our dependencies overseas? How are we to prevent any wastage of that traditional sanity, that balanced experience, that loyal integrity, that complete modesty and unselfishness which, to foreign observers, renders this particular branch of our Civil Service so worthy of admiration? There are many different methods by which this wholly unnecessary, and to my mind wasteful, gap in confidence can be bridged.

It would be useful in the first place if the public could be induced to realise the distinction which exists between policy and negotiation. At present they are all too apt to confuse these two branches, as I confess I have confused them in this paper, under the general title of "diplomacy." The effects of this confusion are damaging. Thus, whereas negotiation must always be secret and policy should never be secret, the public use the phrase "secret diplomacy" as applying to both, with the result that confidence, owing to what is little more than a

verbal confusion, is seriously diminished. It should be possible, by patient persuasion, to assure the public that British policy can never again be secret, in the sense that the men and women of Great Britain can never again be committed to the loss of life or property by treaties and agreements which have not been published and on which the representatives of the people have been given no opportunity to debate and vote. Once they are convinced of this, and it will be a slow and difficult task, then they may become more inclined to leave the conduct of negotiation in professional hands. I should go even further. I should like to see those unfortunate words "diplomacy" and "diplomatist" disappear from our political vocabulary, and to see them replaced on every occasion by such more accurate terms as "foreign policy," "negotiation," and "the Foreign Service."

A second expedient which would in the end go some way to remove public suspicion of our Foreign Service would be to place it exactly on the same level as other branches of the Civil Service. Except in one respect this has already been done, but this solitary exception, although in practice quite unimportant and ineffective, looms all too largely in the public mind. I refer to the rule by which candidates for the Foreign Service have to appear before a Board of Selection before they are admitted to the Civil Service Examination. I should wish to see this requirement abolished, since, while proving of small efficacy in the selection of candidates, it perpetuates in the public mind the illusion that the Foreign Service is composed of members of a privileged caste. My own experience is that social qualifications play a quite trivial part in the equipment of the younger members of the Foreign Service; to insist upon them merely creates public suspicion and ridicule.

A third expedient would be to publish from time to time some of the sane and brilliant memoranda which are daily written by members of the Foreign Office staff. At present the public are wholly unaware of the amount or quality of the work which the Foreign Service performs. From time to time Treasury memoranda have been published, as on the American Debt question, with very excellent effect. I should welcome it if from time to time similar memoranda were published from the Foreign Office. By such methods the public would acquire some idea of the overwhelming importance of facts in all negotiation, and would thus come to realise that negotiation, as distinct from policy, is a business which in ordinary circumstances the trained professional can handle better than the most gifted amateur.

I should wish you to believe that I am not influenced in these observations by any sentimental loyalty to my old profession. It is true that I consider the British Foreign Service the most reliable in the world. But I should ask you to trust me that this belief, that this conviction, is derived, not from any emotional loyalty, but from a perfectly hard-headed process of what I might call "comparative experience."

I shall now pass to the terrible, and I fear insoluble, problem of irresponsibility.

(b) *Irresponsibility.*

My main contention has been that public ignorance and public distrust have created lack of confidence. The ultimate result of this confusion is irresponsibility. I need scarcely emphasise the resultant dilemma. You will all agree that good diplomacy, whether as policy or as negotiation, necessitates something consistent, certain and precise. Yet now that democracy is sovereign in foreign affairs, policy becomes inevitably inconsistent, uncertain and vague.

I do not think we are even yet aware of the appalling unreality introduced into international negotiation by the system of democratic control. I do not question that control, I am in fact one of its most ardent partisans, but I regret that its dangers are not fully apprehended. There are moments, it is true, when we Europeans become aware that the promises and demands of American negotiators are all too often cheques which may be dishonoured. We must realise as an inevitable factor in democratic diplomacy that, in respect of contractual obligations, all countries have "gone off the gold standard." There is a great danger of the inflation of international contract-paper, and any treaty concluded to-day is worth little more than forty per cent. of its face value. Before that historic moment when the United States repudiated the signature of its own President it was worth some sixty per cent. We have to admit this depreciation. And our whole efforts, therefore, should be concentrated upon the stabilisation of diplomatic promissory notes. Locarno is a perfect instance. At the time of their signature, the Locarno Treaties were worth some eighty per cent. of their face value. They then dropped to forty. They are now worth somewhere about fifty-two. Such fluctuations of value are clearly damaging to international, and national, credit. Yet by what means is stabilisation to be secured?

The first principle, obviously, should be that no country should promise to pay more than its democracy is certainly

prepared to deliver. All blank cheques, such as the Kellogg Pact, which was mainly a forensic document, should be regarded with the utmost suspicion. The Locarno Treaties, admirable though they were, have depreciated in value to an extent which affects other securities. I should for this reason welcome deflation in all international treaties. A small treaty or contract which creates a belief in the certainty of its execution is far preferable to a vast treaty which at once slumps upon the exchange of international expectation.

Yet even should we reach a stage at which our negotiators would promise nothing which Parliament would not ratify and the electorate would not be willing to perform, we are still faced with the fact that the electorate do not themselves feel responsible for commitments undertaken in their name and with their tacit consent. We should be able to create a level of public awareness at which no popular newspaper could dare to advocate the repudiation of treaties of which, at the time of their conclusion, both Parliament and the people enthusiastically approved. We should be able to convince the people of their own sovereign responsibility, and to oblige them to admit that a commitment entered into with the approval and knowledge of their elected representatives represented a contract which must be accepted and maintained absolutely and without question. I should myself prefer a general election upon a definite treaty issue to the present inflation of the value of international credit.

And at this stage I return to my introductory arguments. The major disability of democratic diplomacy is that democracy regards foreign affairs as something detached from itself. This sense of detachment is created, partly by a consciousness of ignorance, and partly by a lack of direction. It manifests itself in lack of confidence in the professional diplomatist and creates a deplorable habit of irresponsibility. If we could only convince the public that their ignorance is immaterial, that their uncertainty is not justified, that their lack of confidence is misplaced, and above all that their irresponsibility is a national and an international danger, we might create habits of thought and feeling in Great Britain which would enable us to extract from democratic diplomacy every ounce of its value while eliminating from it that uncertainty which robs it of all its potential strength.

Summary of Discussion.

MR. S. B. COHEN said that he thought Mr. Nicolson was unduly optimistic in thinking that the desire for peace as opposed to war

was a new idea which would gradually gather strength. He would have thought that the idea of consent as opposed to power was one which certainly went back to the Middle Ages, to the ideal of the Papacy and the Empire, if not to Roman times, and that on the whole it was weaker to-day than at the end of the nineteenth century.

MR. NICOLSON, in reply, said that he was sure that, however serious a dispute arose between Great Britain and France, or Great Britain and the United States, the great majority of people in Great Britain and in France and in the United States would say, " The dispute is terrible but it cannot be settled by war." A belief had grown up in those three countries that war between them or any of them was not a possible or sensible thing whatever the provocation. But it was quite right to say that that state of mind did not exist in all other countries. He was convinced, however, that more had been achieved in the direction of peace as opposed to war during the last fifteen years than in the previous five hundred years.

SIR FRANCIS LINDLEY said that he thought that the lack of a sense of direction amongst the people of Great Britain was largely due to the enormous number of treaties which had been signed since the War. Treaties were international acts of law, and when laws were multiplied beyond a certain point no one had the slightest idea what the law was. The people knew about Locarno, but how much more did they know of Great Britain's treaty engagements? and yet none of them had been entered into without the people's full cognisance and approval. Moreover, there were some treaty engagements which had gone beyond public opinion. Foreign affairs and home affairs resembled each other and should be conducted on the same principles. A law which was far in advance of public opinion had no validity and, what was much worse, it brought other laws into contempt. He questioned whether the Kellogg Pact was not as far in advance of public opinion as Prohibition had been in America. He had consorted with foreigners almost exclusively during the latter years of his life and had never found one of them who even pretended to take the Kellogg Pact seriously. Treaties which went in advance of public opinion did much more harm than the British public realised. They not only were ineffective themselves but they brought into disrepute treaties on which the safety of Great Britain might depend.

MR. NICOLSON said that he agreed about the inflation of international paper and with what Sir Francis Lindley had said about the Kellogg Pact. But there had been a great many more treaties in existence before 1914, some of which were not even known of. The main point was that the democratic treaty was such a vague instrument and so full of " uplift " that nobody believed in it at all, whereas a treaty of the old diplomacy was given in return for some consideration of a definite character, and was not merely an idea. Nothing definite

was exchanged in the Kellogg Pact and therefore it was not "on a gold basis."

LORD HOWARD OF PENRITH said that Mr. Nicolson had said that Locarno was the one treaty which every Englishman understood and was ready to stand by. But he had also said that it was impossible to conceive that there could be a war between England and France or England and the United States, and that was probably true. But how did Mr. Nicolson reconcile the clauses in the Locarno Treaty which might possibly bring Great Britain into conflict with France with his statement that war between Great Britain and France was impossible?

MR. NICOLSON said that if France knew, as she ought to know for an absolute certainty, that the British public would with complete immediacy and unanimity execute the Locarno Treaties, she knew that a breach of the Locarno Treaties must mean war with Great Britain, and as war with Great Britain was unthinkable, so a breach of the Locarno Treaties by France was unthinkable.

MISS FREDA WHITE said that what Mr. Nicolson had said about perplexity in the mind of the people was perfectly true, but she quarrelled with his subsequent conclusion about the distrust of the people for expert diplomacy and the irresponsibility of public opinion. She had never noticed any popular distrust of the Diplomatic Service. Everybody knew that ambassadors were agents carrying out orders and that they carried them out with great skill. The most people thought was that the experts had not themselves the power to commit their governments to any policy. They therefore felt that there were occasions when it was possibly better for the principals who could commit their countries to meet direct.

But the people did distrust the politicians who were the diplomats' masters. Lack of confidence in foreign affairs was due to there being no continuity of purpose in foreign policy. Before the War there had been no party division in international affairs. Living under a European system which rendered war inevitable, the people, as a whole, had accepted their fate. After the War there was a fundamental cleavage between those who believed that the world must be subjected to periodic wars and those who believed that war could be averted. Any government, whatever its policy, would find itself opposed by one of those two groups.

The Treaties of Locarno, unpopular in the Dominions, had been popular in Great Britain when they were signed. If the Governments had continually said that they meant to keep to their engagements people would have continued to back them. The moral validity of Locarno had been destroyed by statements of responsible ministers one day that they could not keep their commitments, the next that they would do so. The one Treaty which the British Government

consistently said it would respect was the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Covenant had a voting value; no Parliamentary candidate dared oppose it because the nation took it seriously as an obligation of honour and expected the Government to support it. But then the Government did not keep it, and the nation distrusted them in consequence. The British Government's attitude towards Manchuria, for instance, had caused deep popular distrust.

MR. NICOLSON agreed that the shilly-shallying about treaties was one of the things which had perplexed the public more than anything else. He agreed also that the public did not on the whole distrust the professional diplomats; his contention was much more that there was absence of confidence than existence of distrust.

THE CHAIRMAN, SIR HORACE RUMBOLD, said that the subject-matter of Mr. Nicolson's address must be of great interest both to members of the Diplomatic Service and to those who had left the Service. The methods of modern diplomacy were being much discussed. *The Times* had lately published letters from two distinguished ex-Ambassadors discussing the advisability of what might be called the ambulatory policy of the Government and pleading that the Government's representatives, who had been specially trained for that purpose, should be allowed to do their proper work. In Mr. Nicolson's book *Curzon : the Last Phase* there was a supplementary chapter which reinforced the letters in *The Times*. He wrote :

> " Diplomatists should seldom be allowed to frame policy. Politicians should seldom be allowed to conduct negotiation. Policy should be subjected to democratic control : the execution of that policy should be left to trained experts "

And again, and he was convinced that Mr. Nicolson had no particular British Minister in view, he wrote :

> " A British politician, unaccustomed to negotiation with foreign statesmen, is prone to disturbances of vanity. The fact that his general culture, as his knowledge of foreign languages, is generally below the level of that possessed by those with whom he is negotiating gives him a sense of inferiority to which he reacts in unfortunate ways. Either he will air his schoolboy French to the distress of his audience and the confusion of business, or else he will be truculently insular. Upon weaker minds the mere fact of being, although abroad, a centre of public interest, the lavish hospitality of foreign Governments, the actual salutes of people dressed in foreign uniforms, have a most disintegrating effect. Affability, gratitude and general silliness result."

He (Sir Horace Rumbold) had been brought up in the old diplomacy and had survived to experience the new, and it seemed to him that the War had brought about two great changes. In the first place it had increased the tempo of diplomacy, which meant a great strain on ambassadors who were expected to work at lightning speed. The other great change was the institution of the League of Nations, which ought in theory to have relieved an ambassador of a great deal of his work, inasmuch as it had created a clearing house for a great many questions, such as minorities, Memel, Danzig and various other matters of that kind. But in point of fact the work of agents

and ambassadors had been increased out of all proportion. There was a point which he would like to emphasise, and that was that the personality of an ambassador counted even more now than it did before the War. The relations between two big countries were never static. There were periods of coolness between them, and if an ambassador had been able to acquire the confidence and friendship of the Government to which he was accredited he could, to a certain extent, by his own personality tide over the period of coolness until relations of friendship were resumed.

An ambassador was by no means at the end of a wire or the telephone, the Government listened to him and asked his advice, and then, at a suitable moment, he would carry out his instructions, and that was where training was so necessary. The trained diplomatist would know the right moment at which, and manner in which, to carry out what were sometimes very difficult instructions, whereas an equally intelligent but untrained man might not realise the psychological moment for, and mode of, action.

ARABIA TO-DAY[1]

By Mr. H. St. John Philby, C.I.E., F.R.G.S.

It is just about twenty years since I first went to Arabia, as a complete ignoramus in Arabian matters, and began my long connection with that country. It is just about twenty years since the beginning of that series of events which have since coloured the history of Arabia. It was also about twenty years ago that the British Government began to be aware that there was a country called Arabia. I think the real credit for realising that fact should probably be given to Lord Kitchener and his able lieutenant, Sir Ronald Storrs, as well as to others in Egypt at that time, who saw the possibilities of securing the support of this Arabian country in the Allied cause, provided the approach were made in the proper way. Lord Kitchener and the British Government aimed at putting an end to the propaganda, which was being circulated by the Turks and their allies, the Germans, that the British and their allies were engaged in fighting Islam. This naturally directed the attention of the authorities towards Mecca, the centre of Islam.

It was perhaps unfortunate, but inevitable, that we knew very little about Arabia in 1914. In India, where I was stationed at the time, we did not even know the Arabic name of the country we used to call Mesopotamia. Our ignorance of the whole of these lands was colossal. But there was one man who was aware of Arabia as a serious unit in connection with the War, and that was Sir Percy Cox, at that time Chief Political Officer with the army in Mesopotamia. He had the genius to realise that if he could get the ruler of the desert to enter into alliance with the British and their allies, they might sweep up the Turks with very little difficulty. He took a preliminary step in that direction; he sent out Captain Shakespear, and he influenced the ruler of Desert Arabia to make a move which was intended to crumple up the Turks. The Turks were then mainly concerned with the Mesopotamian front, and the crumpling up of that front might have hastened by several years the exit of the Turks from the ranks of our enemies. Unfortunately Captain Shakespear was

[1] Shorthand Report of an Address given at Chatham House on June 20th, 1935, with Brig.-Gen. Sir Percy Sykes, K C.I.E., C.B., C.M.G., in the Chair.

killed in January 1915, in the very first skirmish that took place between our Arab ally and the Arab ally of the Turks, and for some reason the British Government and Sir Percy Cox decided that they would not risk sending anyone else into the desert. The whole matter accordingly dropped until the British authorities in Egypt took it up in connection with Mecca and the then ruler of that city, Sharif Husain ibn Ali, Amir of Mecca.

Twenty years ago Sharif Husain announced that he was prepared to negotiate terms for entering the War. That is very important. Twenty years ago Lawrence had not been heard of, except by a few people with whom he was intimately connected—archæologists, scholars, writers and the like. Lawrence is now dead, and we are almost in a position to look upon his work in historical retrospect. The policy for which Lawrence must get the credit or the blame, which the British Government adopted largely under his inspiration, has continued to colour the policy of His Majesty's Government from that day to this. And we are in a position, as I hope to show, to judge to-day what there is left of that policy. The year that intervened between the beginning of the negotiations with Sharif Husain and June 1916 was filled with negotiations which were conducted on the British side by Sir Henry Macmahon, the then High Commissioner in Egypt, and it is very important to understand what were the terms offered by Sir Henry Macmahon in the series of letters which he and the Sharif of Mecca exchanged, and in which he laid down the conditions under which the British Government declared themselves bound to the Arabs and to Sharif Husain for all time, on condition that they were in a position at the end of the War, by victory, to implement those terms. The reward for Arabia, if we won the War, was Arab independence within a specified area, an area which was specified in the greatest detail and which covered the whole of the Desert of Arabia, including all its coasts with the sole exception of the British Protectorate of Aden, and the whole of Syria and Palestine. In those days we did not talk about Transjordania, because it did not exist as a separate unit; but the boundaries were laid down with sufficient detail to delimit the area which was promised to the Arabs as theirs for ever, provided they helped us to defeat the Turks, and so make a step towards the defeat of the enemy in general.

Sharif Husain accepted these terms, which were actively bargained for, and, on that basis, at the beginning of June 1916, he raised the standard of revolt against the Turks. Soon after

this Lawrence came into the picture, and it was his work which contributed very largely to the defeat of the Turks, and the ultimate capture of Damascus, and, finally, to the realisation of the conditions which had been laid down for the grant to the Arabs of independence in the area specified.

But while Lawrence and the Arabs were engaged in this task, into which they flung themselves without worrying whether there was any possibility that one of the parties to the agreement might fail to keep his word, we entered into negotiations with the French and the Russians in respect of the same sphere, and we came to an agreement with our allies to partition certain parts of the area, which we had already promised to the Arabs, into three parts, one for the French, one for the British, and one for the Russians. The Russians upset the apple-cart in the following year, when, in the first thrill and enthusiasm of the Bolshevist proletarian revolution, they revealed to the world the arrangements of the two imperial Powers. That revelation was a great shock to the Arabs, but they were assured that they need not worry. Things would come right in the end provided we were in a position to put them right; and in the same year, 1917, the famous declaration was issued in the name of Mr. Balfour, the Balfour Declaration, which gave away another part of these territories, Palestine. That again produced great searchings of heart among the Arabs. You will remember that King Husain demanded explanations of why this had been done, and he was again assured that all would be well in the long run. What was essential was that we should go forward together and defeat the common enemy; and so they did go forward and defeated the Turks, and the whole matter was finally thrashed out at the Paris Peace Conference.

Lawrence and Faisal were both at the Peace Conference, and the policy which they stood for was the policy which had the backing of the British Government throughout the negotiations at that time, namely, in so far as we were free to keep our promises and subject to certain whittling down in deference to the demands of the French, of giving Arabia its independence under King Husain. King Husain, to his credit, would not accept that position. He knew that he was, almost unconditionally, being offered a kingdom as large as any reasonable man could wish to rule over, that he was being offered complete independence to do what he liked. But he would not sign the necessary documents to secure himself in that position because it involved handing over Palestine to the Jews. That was the

crux of the situation which led to the rupture of the relations between King Husain and the British Government, and which led ultimately to his downfall and to his death in exile.

It was then that Lawrence and Faisal came to the front. They had very different ideas from those of King Husain. Lawrence had no personal ambitions and no personal terms to make, but he had a great bond of friendship with Faisal, and Faisal wanted one thing. He wanted a throne, a kingdom to rule in his own name, and Lawrence made it his business to get him one. Thus it was that Syria was given to him on condition that he made his peace with the French and made his own arrangements with the French authorities, which, in Paris, he was able to do. But when he got back to Syria to put into operation the agreement arrived at in Paris, he found that it was impossible to work with the French, and they found it quite impossible to work with him. In the result Faisal refused to accept certain military demands of the French authorities, and they sent their armies to enforce their terms, and Faisal left Syria for exile. He went to Italy and remained there, writing to tell Lawrence that he had broken his promise and that he expected him to fulfil it in another direction. And that was ultimately done.

The British Government had taken on Iraq as a Crown Colony, in fact if not in name. After they had done so the Mesopotamian revolution broke out, largely financed by Faisal and his brothers and probably by King Husain too. This forced the British Government to reconsider the position, and they promised to give Iraq what it wanted. But the one thing which they found Iraq did not want was Faisal. Lawrence, however, who had become adviser on Arabian affairs to Mr. Winston Churchill, induced him to offer Faisal the throne of Iraq, and there he went, and remained until his death a couple of years ago.

You may wonder why I have not mentioned the part played in Arabia by Ibn Saud; a part which was then, as some of us recognised, being played, and which has since become a dominant factor in Arabian politics. Ibn Saud was in those days an almost completely unknown quantity. After the death of Captain Shakespear the British Government had, as I have already said, qualms about sending out any of their officers to be killed in the desert as he had been. But two and a half years after his death, I went to Arabia, and I found it, as I still find it to-day, one of the safest lands in the world to live in, because I went there as the guest of its King, who, as I recognised at the time, though he was then Amir and not King, was destined to play

a dominant part in Arabian politics in due course. But when I came home and informed people here of my opinion they would not believe me. Meanwhile Husain, after the settlement in Iraq, being thoroughly disgusted with all that had resulted from his war-time negotiations, began to get obstreperous in the direction of Central Arabia, where Ibn Saud was ready to try conclusions with him. The matter came to a head in 1919, and the British Government discussed what should be done. They were advised that Ibn Saud was a negligible quantity in Arabia, while King Husain had trained armies, lots of money and masses of ammunition and arms—in fact everything necessary to give him the victory in the event of a conflict. At the same time the Government felt a little ashamed of the way they had treated King Husain in whittling down their territorial promises to him, and they gave his representative their fullest blessing and wrote to Ibn Saud telling him that he must not resist this encroachment on his territory because it had the approval of His Majesty's Government. That was the position in March 1919. King Husain moved his troops up to occupy part of the territory in question, and his armies, under the command of his second son, the Amir Abdullah, were annihilated in one night.

The British Government then, after some little delay, decided to call a conference. That was a well-meant attempt to achieve a settlement between the two rulers. They convoked the Conference at Kuwait, in 1923, and invited all the parties concerned to send their representatives. The idea was excellent provided the British Government could have brought themselves to allow the Arabs to settle the matter for themselves or to fight it out for themselves, as the case might be, without interference. But the British Government at the last moment could not do this, and they instructed the President of the Conference as to the result which they expected him to achieve from this meeting of all the representatives concerned. His attempts to achieve that result ended in the failure of the Conference to come to any agreement at all.

When the British Government decided to force the Conference to a definite decision they again did not reckon with one of the parties, namely, Ibn Saud. On that occasion I was still in the service of the British Government in Transjordania, and it was my business to be informed of the instructions which had been given to the President. When I heard of them I was so horrified that I wrote and explained my opinion. I made it quite clear that if a spontaneous understanding was not achieved among

the parties themselves, but was forced upon them, it would not be accepted by Ibn Saud, and that if the Conference failed to arrive at an agreed settlement, Ibn Saud would march on the Hejaz and, in my opinion, drive King Husain out of that territory. But the British Government were almost less inclined to listen to me then than they had been on the previous occasion, and they stuck to their guns, with the result that the Conference failed to reach any agreement and was called off in April 1924. In September 1924 Ibn Saud started his campaign with the massacre of the inhabitants of Taif, and the following month he entered Mecca unopposed, and within a year was King of the Hijaz.

By the conquest of the Hijaz, Ibn Saud had completed the expansion to which he had made up his mind when, as a very young man, he recaptured the throne of his ancestors by entering his old capital, which was then in the hands of the enemy, with half a dozen men. From that day he was destined to be the ruler of a great empire or to perish in the attempt, and by the conquest of the Hijaz he rounded off the territories which he regarded as properly falling within the orbit of an Arabian monarch. He was too sensible to challenge the position of Great Britain or France in the mandated territories. He made up his mind to stick to the rest of Arabia and to make it a great country.

That was the position when Ibn Saud found himself ruler of the whole of the territory which he governs to-day. Before that he had taken little bits here and there until his great conquest rounded it off, but there was one exception which has been a bone of contention between Ibn Saud and the British Government to this day. When King Husain found the Wahhabis were at his door, he got into his motor-car and hastened to Jidda, and from thence took ship and sought refuge in a little port called Aqaba, which was undoubtedly at that time a part of the territory of the Hijaz. The Wahhabi armies followed him, proceeding up the line beyond Medina, and at one time it looked as if they must come inconveniently close to the borders of Palestine, when the British Government were quite right in thinking that their presence might lead to very serious results. So instead of allowing the Wahhabis to occupy that part of the Hijaz, they sent down a part of the army to occupy the port of Aqaba and the railway stations of Maan and Mudawwara in the name of the British Government, notwithstanding the fact that they had declared their neutrality in the war between Ibn Saud and King Husain. That is the only territory which is in

dispute between Ibn Saud and the British Government to-day in Northern Arabia.

Now, having explained how Ibn Saud came to be the ruler of this great country, I should like to show how he has proceeded to rule it. He was always regarded in the early days as what he was, a Beduin Chief of great distinction, but also as a man who had had no experience of the outer world, and therefore as a man who was probably incapable of adjusting the fanaticism of the Wahhabi Arabs to the requirements of the modern world. That was a curious attitude to adopt, but it was fairly natural to anybody who did not know the man. Ibn Saud suddenly, by his victory in the Hijaz, came into contact with modern civilisation for the first time. He had only once before been out of Arabia proper, when he visited Sir Percy Cox in the early days of the War. He had never before been in contact with any Power but Great Britain, and he now found himself in occupation of a little town on the coast, Jidda, where a number of the Great Powers were represented by consular officers. It was generally thought that when the Wahhabis conquered the Hijaz the result would be to put an end to the pilgrimage to Mecca, or that it would be greatly discouraged and that obstacles would be placed in the way of trade. Exactly the reverse happened, and from the beginning. Ibn Saud was a man of very wide vision, and, although he had not been in contact with the modern world, he had spent much of his time in study, and had read newspapers from all parts of the world. He, therefore, had a wide general knowledge of the world before he came to Jidda, and his first act there was very instructive. King Husain had thought that motor-cars were suitable vehicles for the conveyance of monarchs and their relations from one place to another, but that it was not proper that common pilgrims should travel in such comfort. Ibn Saud's first act was to remove all restrictions from those who wished to import motor-cars and to place them at the disposal of the pilgrims travelling to Mecca and Madina. That has had a tremendous effect on the opening up of the country, for which Ibn Saud must be given the credit. No pilgrim can now complain of the lack of reasonable facilities for travelling to the holy cities.

The motor-car is an instance of the economic innovations which have largely changed the life of the Arab, and is sufficient indication of Ibn Saud's general attitude. Means of communication are of the greatest importance in any great desert country like Arabia, and wireless is a matter to which Ibn Saud has given

most serious attention, with the result that the principal towns of his country are connected with a network of wireless stations which enable him to strike, if necessary, in any direction. His wireless gives him information long before the Beduins can convey it to each other, and he can always reach any place where there is trouble before they are able to do so. That is a wise precaution, though it has not been very necessary under the present régime, since the personal influence of Ibn Saud has had an enormous effect in keeping the peace. He has only once or twice had to hit hard, but he has then hit so hard that he has discouraged anyone else from challenging his authority. For the rest he has tried to temper sternness of rule with clemency, a characteristic in a ruler which the Beduins much appreciate.

I will now deal with the political situation. Great Britain is more concerned with the political situation in Arabia than any other nation. The French and the Italians have minor interests there, but these are not to be compared with the very real interest which Great Britain has at almost every point where she has contact with the territories of Ibn Saud.

Seven or eight years ago, Arabia had no intrinsic interest for Great Britain or for any other country. But that is not the position now. In the last few years two factors have come into prominence in connection with Arabia which are of the greatest significance to us; I will refer to these factors briefly as Air and Oil. These two factors have made it exceedingly urgent that the British Government should understand the temper of the Arabs and so direct their policy as not to raise in that country a conflict which it would be very inconvenient to subdue. I do not for a moment suppose that Arabia is any match for Great Britain as a military unit; that would be a ridiculous supposition. But the enmity of Arabia, which would entail a great deal of military activity on the part of Great Britain, would be very inconvenient, and it is up to the British Government to direct their policy so as not to give rise to that enmity and not to allow it to go too far if by any chance it does arise.

I will take Air first. After the War, the British Government and the Governments of the Allies, full of good intentions, announced their desire to see all nations living in independence and in peace and agreement with one another. One of those nations was Persia, and Persia happened at that moment to produce a man of great genius, personality and strength, who was able to take the British at their word and to establish his predominance in what had almost disappeared, the once-famous

Persian Empire. Persia from the beginning adopted very much the same sort of attitude that Ibn Saud had always had in his mind; she would not have European penetration or European interference except on her own terms. One of the matters which caused a certain amount of trouble between Persia and Great Britain was the Imperial Airways route to the East. That route followed Persian territory on the fringe of the Persian Gulf for several hundreds of miles, and Great Britain used it as an air route at her pleasure during the years before the Pahlevi Shah began to assert himself. He asserted himself in such a way that we had not a leg to stand on in argument, but had to agree that Persia was quite within her rights in resisting the use of her southern shore by Imperial Airways, except upon terms dictated by her. Terms were offered, but they were refused by Imperial Airways because they were not convenient. Then an alternative route had to be found, and the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf was selected. The greater part of this coast is independent territory under the rule of Ibn Saud, but there are exceptions such as Kuwait, Bahrain, the Trucial States and Oman, which are independent territories under British protection. So Imperial Airways were able to establish a series of stations at Kuwait, Bahrain and Sharja without trenching upon Ibn Saud's independent territory or on any territory which was likely to be in dispute, though the territory intervening between these stations belongs to Ibn Saud.

It is, therefore, very important for Great Britain to secure facilities for using those intervening territories in case of need. One can imagine that an aeroplane, flying the several hundreds of miles that lie between the stations which they are permitted to use, might come to grief and wish to land on the coast of Arabia. If it did that without permission it might fall among hostile Arabs, who would probably treat it rather roughly; they would not be to blame if they did, because they know that no foreigner is allowed to land on the soil of Ibn Saud without the permission of Ibn Saud. However, I think there should be no difficulty, provided we are reasonable in our general policy with Ibn Saud, in getting permission to land at certain specified and suitable places along his coast; but we must realise that the arrangement must be made on precisely the same basis as we would negotiate with Italy or with France for permission to fly over their territory.

The second interest which we have in Arabia is Oil. The possibility of finding oil in Arabia is one which has been mooted

at various times during the last dozen years. As long ago as 1922 or 1923 a concession was actually given by Ibn Saud to a British group to prospect in the Hasa territory. That concession was given on decidedly reasonable terms from the point of view of the concessionaire, the British company. Unfortunately the company was not properly equipped to investigate the oil possibilities of any country, and after two or three years the concession lapsed. The same company had also received a concession on the island of Bahrain, where they had searched for oil, and, not having found any oil, they eventually transferred their interest to an American company, which, in its turn, under the general conditions of the formation of the Iraq Petroleum Company, had to dispose of the concession and pass it on to the present concessionaire, the Standard Oil Company of California, which proceeded to discover oil. The discovery of oil in Bahrain has totally altered things in Arabia. Bahrain is only a little bit of Arabia which has become detached; the water has somehow got round it and turned it into an island. So the presumption is that if there is oil in Bahrain the neighbouring parts of Arabia also contain it. A couple of years ago the Standard Oil Company of California came into the field to try to obtain the concession. At the same time the Iraq Petroleum Company, which is what we can regard as a British group for all serious purposes, since it has the blessing and the backing of the British Government, came in to challenge the Standard Oil Company of California's claim, and there was another little group in the field at the same time. But the concession was given to the American group simply because they offered the best financial terms. That was not a matter of great rejoicing to the British Government, and they have hastened to make treaty arrangements—rather one-sided treaty arrangements—with all the States bordering on the Arabian coast to the effect that they must not give away their oil concessions to anybody except to people approved of by the British Government. In other words, they have bespoken on behalf of the British oil companies, regardless of the local interests concerned, all the oil that is in Arabia other than in those parts of the country governed by Ibn Saud.

That is the position now, and it results in a very curious difficulty. The boundaries of these territories, with the sole exception of Kuwait and of the island of Bahrain, are unknown. Nobody knows where they are, and until now it has not mattered where they were, because the States themselves consist of little townships on the sea-coast solely engaged in the trade of pearl-

diving. Behind them was a howling wilderness in which there was nothing to be got until the idea arose that they concealed great stores of oil. So the British Government are faced with the problem of coming to an agreement with Ibn Saud as to where the boundaries of his State lie in the great area of the desert of Arabia which marches with the boundaries of these little villages on the Persian Gulf; and naturally Ibn Saud does not feel disposed to regard these boundaries as lying very far away from the coast. The villages used to enjoy a profitable trade in slaves and gun-running and that sort of thing, until the British Government put an end to it all, so that nothing now remains except the pearls, which have decreased in value since ladies seem to have given up wearing them. The villages would, therefore, like to find another source of livelihood, and if there are oil-producing territories which they can reasonably claim as their own they will make an effort to have them.

The Hasa province was, until 1913, one of the possessions of the Turkish Empire. The rest of Arabia was independent. The territory of Ibn Saud had never been under Turkish dominion, though the Turkish Sultan used to consider it vaguely as part of the Turkish Empire. The predecessors of Ibn Saud have never been in alliance with the Turks, but have been their traditional enemies since the Turks conquered their territory and abandoned it a hundred years ago. But in 1913 the province centring round Hufuf was in the possession of the Turks, when Ibn Saud, having more or less stabilised himself in his desert kingdom, suddenly descended upon the town in the middle of the night, and next morning the Turkish army was on the march to the sea-coast, whence it sailed for the last time. In 1913 Ibn Saud thus became master of the last Turkish province in Central and Eastern Arabia. A few months later the British Government proceeded to enter into negotiations in London with the Turkish Ambassador, and the result of these negotiations was an agreement as to the boundaries between the British sphere of influence in Arabia and Turkish territory. On the British side was included a part of this province which the Turks had lost to the Arabs a few months previously.

Then in the following year, in 1914, negotiations were again entered into with the Turkish Ambassador in London, who agreed to another boundary line continuing that previously agreed on the year before, so that the whole of the vast desert area fell, by the gift of the Turkish Ambassador in London, within the British sphere of influence. The British Government

put away these documents, which were all open to inspection as public documents, until such time as it might suit their interest to produce them. Thus it was only last summer that the British Government did produce, for the information of Ibn Saud, these two documents which formed the Anglo-Turkish Treaties of 1913–14, one of which had remained unratified and had become unratifiable on the outbreak of war. It was the first time he had seen them, though he could, of course, have seen them twenty years ago, as they were public documents. They were produced to him as the basis for an agreement to be entered into between the British and Arabian Governments as to the sphere of influence of Great Britain. Ibn Saud was very angry, and told the British Minister at the time what he thought of the proposals, which, I am glad to say, have been withdrawn for all practical purposes. The documents are not to be made the basis of discussions to be pursued between the two Governments, though the British Government still want to get as much of the area of the country as possible within their sphere of influence, so that they may derive the fullest benefit from any oil to be found there.

Thus these two recent developments of air and oil have made the situation between Saudi Arabia and Great Britain rather delicate, and these matters have to be taken into consideration now. The Treaty of Friendship between Saudi Arabia and Great Britain, made by Sir Gilbert Clayton in 1927, was for seven years only, and lapsed in September 1934, since when it has been kept alive for six months at a time and is subject to termination by six months' notice on either side.

It is well worth the while of the British Government to show a spirit of accommodation towards Arab aspirations in a matter which was decided by agreement between the British Government and King Husain so far back as 1915. In 1915 the whole of this area, with the single exception of the Aden Protectorate, was solemnly agreed as forming part of the territory in which the British Government guaranteed to recognise the absolute independence of the Arabs. If we agreed to give something to King Husain, there is no reason why we should not give it to Ibn Saud, and there is no reason why we should try to deprive Ibn Saud of territory which contains oil. The richer he becomes the better it is for us.

What is going to happen in Arabia in the event of Great Britain or her allies, whoever they may then be, getting into difficulties with another Power? The position is very delicate. One of the points involved is Zionism. Another point, of course,

is this imperialism based on air and oil which may or may not result in starting Arabian difficulties with the British Empire. Another is the French position in Syria. Another is the clamour of the champions of Zionism not only to keep what they have got, but to expand over Transjordania. Suppose, for instance, that Germany declares war on Great Britain, and France stands by her old alliance with us. Is it inconceivable that the whole strength of the Arabs will be thrown into the scale in favour of Germany? Germany has disgraced herself by her treatment of the Jews, but you cannot expect the Arabs, who regard the Jews as usurpers of their country, to object to what Germany has done towards her own Jews. And France is a great difficulty. France is the usurper of Syria, just as the Jews are regarded as being the usurpers of Palestine. The whole sentiment of Arabia is essentially anti-French on account of Syria. The Arabs are almost bound to throw their weight into the scale in favour of Germany against Great Britain and France, and whatever the Arabs may be worth from a military point of view, I think it is worth our while to try to avoid that extra bit of trouble which may be just the little bit more which we cannot bear.

Summary of Discussion

MR. ISRAEL COHEN said that Mr. Philby had implied that there was no doubt that the British Government had promised complete independence to all the Arab territories, though he knew that that was a matter of controversy, and he ought therefore to have made his statement absolutely convincing. Declarations had frequently been made by the British Government in various documents and in the White Paper of 1922 to the effect that Palestine had been excluded from the areas to which complete independence had been promised under certain conditions. If Mr. Philby had had any real proof of his statements, he (Mr. Cohen) imagined he would have produced his proof in large letters on the wall for all to see.

Mr. Philby had also implied that there was a definite agreement between His Majesty's Government and King Husain to the effect that independence would be conferred upon all Arab territories, but no such agreement had ever been published. Besides, the correspondence on the matter which passed between Sir Henry Macmahon and King Husain was never concluded. In his book *Around the Coasts of Arabia*, Ameen Rihani referred to certain articles of a so-called agreement, but all that those articles contained were certain demands of King Husain himself regarding the area on which he wanted independence to be conferred. Neither Ameen Rihani nor Mr. Philby was able to show that an agreement was made between the British

Government and King Husain which was signed by the accredited representative of His Majesty's Government.

If no agreement was made, it was untenable to maintain that independence was promised to King Husain in reference to the whole of the Arab territories. Not only was Palestine excluded from the agreement, but there were two other reservations: (1) that independence should be given only to those Arab territories whose population had fought on behalf of the Allies, a condition which was not fulfilled in the case of Palestine, and (2) that the British Government could not make any such binding promise in regard to areas in which they were not free to make any such pledge, an allusion to the fact that France was also interested.

Then what was the position of Faisal with regard to that so-called promise? He was present at the Paris Peace Conference in the spring of 1919 as the representative of his father, King Husain, but he never demanded that independence should be given to the Arabs in Palestine, or suggested that it had been promised. On the contrary, he wrote a letter to a member of the Zionist Delegation in Paris in which he expressed his approval of the aims of Zionism and said that he would welcome the Jews back to Palestine. Had a word ever been uttered by King Husain whereby he challenged the statements made by Faisal at the Peace Conference in 1919? It was not till the spring of 1921 that Faisal for the first time suggested to Mr. Winston Churchill that the promise which had been made referred to Palestine also, and then Mr. Churchill was able to prove to Faisal that he was mistaken.

Again, Mr. Philby was wrong in saying that Palestine had been given to the Jews. Palestine was governed by the British Government through the High Commissioner. The Jewish people were not represented in the government of Palestine and had no influence on its policy. From the beginning of the British administration of Palestine the Jews had had the utmost difficulty in securing the admission of as many Jews as they wished into the country. There was also the important question of the Legislative Council which the Palestine Government wished to impose on the country in opposition to the wishes of the authorised representatives of the Jewish people.

COLONEL R. MEINERTZHAGEN asked how Ibn Saud got his money. He was building roads, importing a great deal of material, erecting very extensive wireless stations, keeping hosts of officials, and the country was apparently extremely poor. He (Colonel Meinertzhagen) assumed that the pilgrimage revenue was not very large, and he would like to know what Ibn Saud's budget was and how he got his money.

QUESTIONS. Was the influence of Italy being felt in increased measure in Arabia, as one was led to believe by the Italians? It was suggested that that influence was being exerted to the disadvantage of Great Britain.

Had Mr. Philby meant to imply that the foreign policy of the present ruler of Saudi Arabia did or did not accept the *status quo*? Was his aim one day to merge in his Empire Transjordania or Palestine?

What was Mr. Philby's view as to the present line of action taken by Italy with regard to Abyssinia, and how far did it affect Arabian and British interests?

What economic improvements had been made in Saudi Arabia other than the increases in the number of motor-cars used there? What had been done in regard to public health, education, medical services, or roads, under the present government?

If the relationship between Ibn Saud and England had been so strained, what led Ibn Saud to send his son to England?

Mr. H. St. John Philby, in reply, said that he was surprised that Mr. Cohen expected him to come with a wall-map and a photographed version of the famous Macmahon letters. The British Foreign Office authorised Sir Henry Macmahon to inform the Sharif of Mecca that they accepted the promises referred to in his letter, but he (Mr. Philby) was prevented by modesty from bringing the standard work on the subject, because it was his own book. He would refer Mr. Cohen to the book under his name, published by Ernest Benn in the "Modern World Series," for which he took full responsibility because he believed that every statement in it was true, in which were set out in full the terms which the British Government approved. He agreed that there was no formal signed agreement, but the British Government gave its word in a formal manner.

What Mr. Cohen said about Faisal was true. The aims of King Husain and the Amir Faisal were not identical. It was true that Faisal wrote in approval of the aims of Zionism and he received the throne of Syria in consideration of that letter. The reason why he made the contrary suggestion to Mr. Churchill in 1921 was that by then he had lost his throne and, as no one offered him another one, he went to the British Government and threatened to go back on what he had said in 1919 and to declare that Britain had not kept her promise, so they offered him another throne, that of Iraq. But he was regarded by the Arabs largely as a traitor to his own cause, especially as a result of the 1919 settlement.

The only serious source of revenue which Ibn Saud had was from the pilgrimages. That brought in the money required to finance the necessary imports. The pilgrimage revenue in a good year might reach the sum of two and a half million pounds sterling, but in a bad year it would only amount to about three or four hundred thousand pounds. But Ibn Saud did not need money for roads. He had made one experiment and spent £30,000 in building about 30 miles of macadam road, but decided that the desert made a better road than he could build. The desert made the best road in the world. He had to pay salaries to his officials, but in bad years those salaries tended to fall

into arrears. With regard to the expensive wireless stations mentioned by Colonel Meinertzhagen, Mr. Philby had had the pleasure of negotiating the supply of those wireless stations to Arabia, and they had not been paid for yet.

It was not so difficult to administer a country like Arabia without having sufficient funds to do so. The country was certainly a little in debt, its national debt was about £300,000, but it was reckoned that one good year's pilgrimage would put that right. The country was a frugal one. The people lived on the products of the land, and the pilgrimage money provided all that was necessary for imports.

There was no essential connection between the present action of Italy in Abyssinia and Arabian politics. Abyssinia was on the other side of the Red Sea from Arabia, but apart from that there was no possible point of contact. Abyssinia was a Christian country, whereas Arabia was not only Moslem, but rather fanatically Moslem, and except in so far as they would like to see an Imperialistic Power humbled, he did not think they cared whether Abyssinia was swallowed up by Italy or not.

With regard to Arabia's policy towards Transjordania and Palestine, there was a treaty between Transjordania and Iraq and Saudi Arabia laying down the boundary which was a freely negotiated boundary, so he supposed his questionner was referring to the area where the agreed treaty line ended. The present position was that the British Government were *de facto* administering that area which Ibn Saud claimed as his *de jure*. But until the question was settled, Ibn Saud accepted the *de facto* position because he knew that he was not strong enough to impose any other.

He did not want to suggest that there was any great strain between Ibn Saud and Great Britain. Ibn Saud was very clear as to his relations with Great Britain. He did not love the British. They were not people of his blood or of his religion. But Great Britain was by force of circumstances his only European neighbour on every side and was too strong for him to oppose with success, and therefore he had so to conduct his policy as not to earn her enmity or give any cause for the invasion by her of his territories. That was his attitude, and, to be perfectly frank, there was no country in the world with whom he would rather be on cordial terms than with Great Britain. But the British policy of acquiring territory gave cause for thinking that perhaps Great Britain might not feel very friendly towards Ibn Saud, and the real and complete success of Ibn Saud might prove to be incompatible with the present lines of British policy.

NEWFOUNDLAND TO-DAY[1]

By Mr. Thomas Lodge, C.B.

Since February, 1934, an interesting constitutional experiment has been attempted in Newfoundland, an experiment involving an apparent renunciation of all the principles of democracy which have underlain the political development of the British Empire. A community previously enjoying complete autonomy has of its own will surrendered all its powers of direct mandatory influence on its Government and is ruled to-day by an oligarchy appointed by an outside authority.

It is too early to attempt to decide whether the experiment will succeed and it is obvious that I am not the person to try to defend the original policy of His Majesty's Government. I share no responsibility for the events which led up to the decision to adopt this policy. I am merely one of the agents of what I conceive to have been the desire of His Majesty's Government to demonstrate the solidarity of British peoples. The demonstration of that solidarity may cost the taxpayer of the United Kingdom a million or two. It is the price perhaps of the luxury of sentiment. But in 1914 Newfoundland threw herself whole-heartedly into a quarrel which, had they stopped to consider it detachedly, must have seemed extraordinarily remote to all but the small fraction of Newfoundlanders who maintain direct contact with the country of their origin. Sentiment for sentiment, I should not like yet to have to decide where the balance of obligation will be.

You will find in the Report of the Royal Commission[2] over which Lord Amulree presided an account of the political events which led to the substitution of Government by Commission for Responsible Government. It is not an edifying history, at least so far as the events of the last twenty years are concerned. I do not minimise the sordidness of much of the political life of the island during that period, but I doubt nevertheless whether it is in the shortcomings of Governments that the determining factors in the breakdown of their political system are to be found.

[1] Address given at Chatham House on May 21st, 1935, with Mr. Clement Jones, C.B., in the Chair.

[2] Newfoundland: Report of the Royal Commission 1933; with Appendices and Maps. Cmd. 4480 of 1933–34. H.M. Stationery Office.

Fundamentally Newfoundland has been attempting to reconcile economic incompatibilities, the dependence of the community on one hazardous calling prosecuted in a more or less mediæval fashion, and the functioning of a Central Government attempting to shoulder responsibilities towards its constituents out of proportion to its material resources.

For centuries the Newfoundlander has regarded the catching and curing of codfish as the be-all and end-all of his economic life. Before the opening up of the iron ore deposits on Bell Island and before the late Lord Northcliffe turned his eyes to Newfoundland for the source of the raw material for his newspapers, economic activities outside the fisheries were absolutely negligible in the island. It is true that during the last twenty-five years there have been important industrial developments in the shape of the creation of the two large paper mills owned by the *Daily Mail* and International Paper Company respectively, and the working of the lead-zinc deposits at Buchans made possible by the researches of the American Smelting Company. But these developments were to the Newfoundlander essentially excrescences; profitable excrescences if you will, but still unnatural growths only made possible by the introduction of foreign capital on a relatively vast scale. They gave remunerative employment to important sections of the people, they introduced and made possible higher standards of living over limited areas in the country, but they were inevitably directed by outsiders who, whatever influence they may have exercised as individuals on the various Governments, were never fully absorbed into the body politic and consequently failed to make any change in the normal life of the people outside their immediate spheres.

Codfishing as pursued in Newfoundland is a highly individualistic calling. It appeals both to the sense of freedom and to the gambling instinct. In the nature of things it is not a calling which can be pursued for six days a week and fifty-two weeks a year. The average fisherman can fish to-day and idle to-morrow if he thinks fit. He has no master to drive him to work if he happens not to wish to work. The chance of a lucky day's fishing may give him a return out of proportion to what could be the average return.

It is a calling suitable enough for a people prepared to live a life of extreme simplicity with few wants outside the primitive needs of food and shelter, and prepared to take the consequences in suffering and hardship which periodic abnormalities in the movements of the cod inevitably brought about. In Newfound-

land this calling has resulted in the scattering of the population over an enormous length of coast-line of an island in which communication between one settlement and another is extraordinarily difficult except by water and of which a considerable part is ice-bound for nearly half the year.

The last century has seen throughout the white world the steady extension of the directing influence of central governments on the everyday life of their citizens, in the realms of education, health and employment. This movement has been paralleled in Newfoundland without much regard as to whether the economic production of the island was on such a scale as would make possible the discharge of these functions.

The physical facts of the island, the distribution of a population of roughly a quarter of a million over 6000 miles of coast-line made the use of a general tariff as the foundation of the country's revenue inevitable. The War brought to Newfoundland a relatively excessive and quite unstable prosperity. It enabled the Newfoundlander to sell his dried codfish to the Latin world at prices out of proportion to the relative utility of the product, when world production in general began to tend towards the normal. Once the War was over, deflation of prices brought to successive post-War Governments in Newfoundland problems which were to its members certainly uncomprehended and perhaps incomprehensible.

It is relevant here to emphasise the fact that for generations a steady progress of negative selection has been in operation in Newfoundland. Local opportunities for brains and energies above the average have been so limited that right up to the crisis in the United States of 1929 there has been a steady exodus to the American continent of the best individuals of all classes. In a reasonably favourable environment, the Newfoundlander is a resourceful, energetic, adaptable person and it is common knowledge that those who so went abroad achieved success. But that their departure lowered the general standard of both ability and character in the people seems to me incontrovertible. What Maine and the Maritime Provinces of Canada gained, Newfoundland lost, and that loss is manifest in the post-War political life of the island.

Post-War Governments found themselves confronted with a succession of problems due to causes outside both their influence and their comprehension. Unfortunately for them they found also not a solution of their difficulties, but a temporary palliative in the readiness of the external investor to make loans to a Dominion

Government without any exacting investigations either of the ability of the country to carry the burden of the loans indefinitely or of the uses to which the money so supplied was to be put.

Governments borrowed, perhaps recklessly, but they also made some attempt to improve their financial situation by increasing taxation. That increase in taxation could only in general take the form of increasing the tariff. The increase in the burden of the tariff inevitably weakened the power of the fisherman to compete in a world market with the product of the Norwegian and the Icelander, who live under what is practically a free trade system. It went further than this in that it probably defeated its own object and failed to raise a real additional revenue. It was a vicious process which in a period of deflation could only have one end, the collapse of the borrowing powers of the country.

When that collapse came it found a country with roughly one-third of the population unable to produce for itself even the meagre standard of living to which the Newfoundlander is accustomed and dependent upon the Central Government for a part or the whole of its bare necessities in food. Moreover, the collapse found a population whose initiative and independence had been undermined by a decade of ineffective Governments which, doubtless with every desire to relieve the distress and want which were prevalent, had adopted means which only increased the ultimate difficulties. The construction of roads which served no need for communication but were undertaken solely to give employment, the building of useless wharves, the institution of free ferry services, the multiplication of government posts, all these palliatives postponed the day of reckoning, but made the reckoning itself more disagreeable.

Had the Government of the United Kingdom declined to intervene and assume at any rate temporarily the responsibility for its finances, there can be no doubt that Newfoundland would have been compelled to default wholly or partially on its external loans. That default would, so far as I am able to judge, have resulted probably in the complete collapse of the machinery of Central Government. It would certainly have brought about widespread distress on a scale which is hardly conceivable to people in Great Britain. It is important to realise that the maintenance of life in the most elementary sense depends over a large section of the island on the normal functioning of a service of coastal steamers run by the Government, and that even a short interruption of these services would at certain times and in certain places result in something approaching starvation.

There can be no question but that the acceptance of the principle of Government by Commission was practically universal. No Government could have lived which had attempted even to delay the change. And the acquiescence of the people in the renunciation of their theoretical independence was not merely a willingness to accept irksome limitations on their freedom in return for material benefits; it was far more a positive feeling that here at last was the possibility of a sound stable Government which gave a hope of a completely new era.

I am not blind to the obvious fact that those in authority are apt only to hear what it is considered pleasant that they should hear. But one incident will remain in my mind for ever. With two of my colleagues I travelled over the island a few weeks after our arrival. At the various settlements where we stopped we held meetings in the public building at which we listened to anything the inhabitants had to say. At one of these, after we had heard the usual list of local grumbles, one hefty fellow got up and said—I can quote almost verbatim:

"Gentlemen, I hold a Commission in His Majesty's Army. Many of my pals are buried in Gallipoli or France. We owe it to their memory that there should be a decent Government in Newfoundland, and I pray to God that every man who is a voter to-day will be dead before Government by Commission ceases. Good-bye."

And he strode out without another word.

I would not, of course, argue that acceptance of the principle of Government by Commission is quite so enthusiastic or quite so universal to-day. Happily for all of us, memories of past troubles grow dimmer as the years pass by. A spirit of criticism is developing and it is healthy sign that it is developing.

To-day in Newfoundland there is a small, a very small, section of the community which bitterly resents our presence. But it is led by men whose past records hopelessly discredit their present bona fides. The very virulence of their invective defeats their own ends. The average Newfoundlander may not be a highly educated person, but he is not lacking in shrewd common sense. It is hopeless to try to persuade him that the sole aim of the United Kingdom Commissioners is to grind the last cent out of the taxpayer in the island in the interests of the bondholders, when he sees that the Commission of Government, fortified by the credit of the Government of the United Kingdom, has increased the scale of relief, restored a great part of the cuts in the wages of teachers and civil servants and has made an appreciable start in reducing the taxation which bears on the ordinary man

and woman. He may smile at a picturesque speech or article, but he is otherwise uninfluenced.

There is another small section of thinking Newfoundlanders who do in their hearts resent what they consider their present condition of political inferiority in the world, who acquiesce cheerfully enough for the moment in the actual form of Government, who are quite happy to co-operate in what they agree to be honest attempts at a rehabilitation of their country, but who look forward to a not too distant future in which they will have regained their political independence.

As against this section there is another—perhaps an equally small section—which is enthusiastically in favour of the Commission, which regards it as impossible that so small a community as Newfoundland, one so isolated from the outside world, can hope to throw up an efficient Government under any system of popular election. They openly advocate the continuance of the Commission system, at any rate until such time as a complete reform in the system of education shall have produced a much more enlightened generation.

In between there is the great mass of the community, completely indifferent to academic questions of representation but vitally interested in the quality of the Government under which they have to live and therefore prepared to give a fair and sympathetic trial to this new system.

Some people may have read in part of the English Press lurid accounts of alleged happenings in St. John's during last winter. It was suggested, practically in so many words, that only the rifles and bayonets of the police prevented rioting and that the Commissioners were in constant need of armed protection. If it were not for the effect on the outside world these reports would have sounded so childish as hardly to need an answer. It is true that the police came out one morning with their rifles, but it was to form a guard of honour to welcome His Excellency the Governor. It is true that various meetings of unemployed were held to vent their grievances, but it is significant that these meetings were usually held in the afternoon round the entrance to one of the Government offices which happens to be in the middle of the town, built a little away from the road and approached by a flight of steps which provides a very convenient platform for the orator. The unemployed would certainly have thought it unreasonable if the Commission had prohibited their use of this spot. On the other hand, they would probably have thought it equally unreasonable if their use of it should have

restricted access to the building. So every afternoon on which a meeting was held they waited quietly until the Commissioner concerned had walked up the steps before they closed round the speakers, and not a single hostile word was ever said to him.

Unemployment is relatively as serious a problem in St. John's as it is in the rest of the world. The town has a good harbour, but apart from that it has few material advantages. The fact that it has been the centre of government and the channel through which a large proportion of imports and exports pass has attracted population from the outports to an extent which makes a high percentage of unemployment inevitable. The difficulties have been aggravated by a short-sighted policy on the part of those who have been responsible for labour in the past, which has tended steadily to drive business away from the port. The result has been a town in which rates of pay are high but aggregate earnings for all but the highly skilled worker extremely low.

In the relief given to the unemployed there never has been any element of insurance, which would have been administratively unworkable in Newfoundland. I should be quite ready to admit that in comparison with the assistance which the workless get in England, the dole in Newfoundland is apparently on a low scale. But unfortunately it is not on a low scale in comparison with the general standard of living in the island. Nothing would have been easier than for the English Commissioners to have acquired a little cheap popularity immediately on their arrival by means of a radical improvement in the dole. But in the winter of 1933–1934 roughly 35 per cent. of the population were receiving government relief in one form or another, and it is pretty clear that when a country is at this stage, it is not far from collapse. Anything which made dependence on the Government more attractive was too dangerous in a country where local communities have developed a feeling that everybody is entitled to share in what the Government distributes to a degree which sounds incredible to an outsider. But it is the literal fact that over and over again men have abandoned their own work to share in the work of road-making, which was only paid at half the rates they were earning, merely because they could not bear the idea that their fellows would get some government money and that they would not. On the whole I think to-day that we are more criticised in the island generally, though perhaps not in St. John's, for giving too much rather than too little in unemployment relief.

That a substantial improvement in the condition of the people has coincided with the functioning of the Commission is unquestionable. All the material indices confirm this; the movement of passengers and freight, the consumption of gasolene and alcohol, the profits and turnover of the merchants, the number of individuals who have required relief. I would not myself argue that this improvement is due wholly or even mainly to any concrete measures taken by the Commission. I am only too sensible of the limitations under which every Central Government labours when it comes to the active direction of the economic activities of a people. But I am confident that the mere existence of the Commission has been an indispensable factor in making this improvement possible. It has given a feeling of stability and continuity and thereby elicited the cordial co-operation of all classes. It has eliminated a good deal of the friction and removed some of the inertia which militated against progress in the past.

Government in Newfoundland in the old days was government by amateurs, amateurs to whom administration was a half-time occupation, amateurs who knew that within a short period of time they would give place to the opposition. It is not surprising, therefore, that government was inefficient, judged by English standards.

In Newfoundland departmental decisions were really taken by the Ministers. Ministers decided who should get the contracts for printing and stationery, where a road should be built which would give much-desired employment, who should be appointed to a minor clerkship in the Post Office. Is it astonishing that in a small community, where everybody knows everybody and everybody's politics, contracts and appointments and local works went in the direction in which they could be hoped to confirm a Government in its tenure of office?

For the first time for generations the Commission has given to Newfoundland government by full-time experts, who can disregard politics and creeds, who can make a beginning in the establishment of an independent Civil Service—perhaps the most important of all the tasks which the Government has to perform.

Of equal importance is the reform of the education system of the island, which no political Government has ever been strong enough to tackle. Unfortunately from many points of view, the population of Newfoundland is almost equally divided among three churches, Anglican, Catholic and Methodist, and these religious differences, which go very deep, have reacted disas-

trously on their political life. Not only has the educational system itself been denominational, in that every school had its definite sectarian character, but the whole administration of education has been so denominational that any central control of efficiency or policy was almost completely lacking, in spite of the fact that practically the whole of the cost of running the schools came from State funds. That there should be a distinct religious atmosphere in the schools may well have its merits in a country where the Church is almost the only centre of local culture. I do not think that any member of the Commission has any desire to impose upon the people any changes in this respect, other than those which grow naturally and are universally or almost universally endorsed. But the fact that the State accepts the financial responsibility for maintaining denominational schools is no justification for the abandonment by the State of its responsibilities for secular education and for the existence of a body of reasonably qualified and reasonably paid teachers able to train the youth of the country for the life which they must live.

I am impressed by the limitations of the powers of any Central Government in Newfoundland to interfere usefully with the economic activities of the people. It may be difficult to find such a solution to the problem of Newfoundland as will result in her people enjoying a reasonable standard of life. It is not difficult to state the problem and to view it as a moderately simple whole. Her difficulties arise, not from obscure causes hidden in a complex industrial organisation, not from the complications inherent in involved international arrangements, but essentially from the dependence of a population of nearly 300,000 on one calling, and that calling prosecuted in a highly individualistic way. The root of her troubles is to be found in the difficulties experienced by this main industry in adjusting itself to modern methods and modern circumstances. Fundamentally the fishing industry is endeavouring to produce, by methods not far different from those employed centuries ago, a food-stuff which has to be sold in a world market in competition with other food-stuffs which are the result of a mass production. The fishermen of Newfoundland produce annually between 60,000 and 80,000 tons of dried codfish, worth when it leaves the island between one million and one and a half million pounds sterling. If one adds to this the value of all the subsidiary production, salmon, herring, lobsters, the residuary benefit to Newfoundland of the four important industries run by external capital, the relatively small agricultural production, one gets a total production for which

the absence of statistical data will only allow a very approximate estimate, but which is certainly appallingly low judged by any home standards. I doubt myself whether the average production per family in Newfoundland is worth more than £60 annually. It most certainly is not worth more than £80. In other words, the average earnings of the whole mass of Newfoundlanders is not more than, and is probably substantially less than, the average earnings of the agricultural labourer in Great Britain.

The War brought an unreal ephemeral prosperity to the island, and the memory of that prosperity fostered the growth of the illusion that during the last decade Newfoundland has been passing through a period of abnormality which must end somehow and somewhere and give place once more to a period of prosperity. But I can see little that is particularly abnormal in the state of the island. For the moment they have difficulties in some of their foreign markets in getting currency exchange for their products, and these difficulties may grow. But so far at any rate Newfoundland has managed to dispose of the whole of her production. Newfoundland appears to me to produce, in real things, roughly as much as she ever did, and what she produces is worth, in other real things, roughly as much as it ever was. I can see the possibility that changes in external currency values may alter considerably the number of dollars for which a unit of codfish is exchanged, changes which would affect in a corresponding measure the number of dollars which the Newfoundlander has to pay for the commodities he must import. But I cannot nourish any hope that in any general price movement the price of codfish will increase relatively to the price of other commodities. In my own experience dried codfish is one of the easiest things in the world to do without.

The difficulties of the industry are inherent in its situation. They are complicated, but not determined, by the defects of a credit system which are universally recognised but for which no one has as yet found practical remedies capable of immediate application. It is easy to criticise the local merchant for alleged excessive prices and for the effective serfdom to which the fisherman may be reduced. High prices are undoubtedly charged, but in the mass, so far as I can judge, the result in paper profits is nullified by the bad debts which inadequate production makes inevitable. I see no evidence that the whole body of local merchants does succeed in extracting effectively any abnormal remuneration for services rendered, without which, at present at any rate, the industry could not be carried on.

It is probable that some modification will have to be made in the whole supplying organisation to bring it within what is possible for a relatively small industry and a thinly populated country to carry. It may be that the blighting effects of insupportable debts can only be remedied by the interposition of some fresh legal entity between the fisherman and the merchant which can give the merchant a feeling of security which is only too rare to-day, and give the fisherman a return for his toil more nearly commensurate with his needs. But it is devoutly to be hoped that the self-interest of the producing classes will bring these necessary changes about more or less naturally and that increasing interference with and direction of the fishing industry by the Central Government will be avoided. No one, and least of all the Commission, would view a socialisation of the industry without grave apprehension and extreme scepticism.

I am not pessimistic about the ability of the industry to effect real and radical improvements. It ought to be able to produce a better article and stimulate in the world a better demand. Evidence is not lacking that real constructive efforts in this direction are being made. But even if these efforts are rewarded by a considerable measure of success and even if they do result in an industry which gives to its members a tolerable standard of living, they will leave untouched the main problem of the Commission. The very modernisation of the industry must almost inevitably tend towards a reduction of the total numbers employed. The task of finding employment for those who cannot at present make an adequate living, and for the increase in population which emigration restrictions make inevitable, still remains.

Obvious alternatives to the fishing industry are not easily found at present. The island has the advantage of the presence of two important newsprint producing companies, but in the world generally and in North America specially, there is to-day a very large surplus of potential capacity. This is a fact which cannot be ignored and one which must necessarily prevent expansion in the immediate future. At the same time it is within my knowledge that those who are responsible for the direction of these two concerns are fully alive to the responsibilities which they share towards the inhabitants of their districts and very anxious to explore possibilities of development.

The present position of the newsprint industry is paralleled by that of mining, at any rate of mining other than for gold. Newfoundland has one of the greatest iron ore deposits in the

world. This enterprise, however, is meeting with difficulties arising out of the financial difficulties of its chief European customer, Germany—difficulties which are wholly outside the sphere of influence of any Newfoundland Government. In other mining directions patient investigation is proceeding, which may result in increased employment in a not too far distant future, but at present this is only a possibility which may or may not materialise. Mining developments usually involve the investment of capital on a very large scale and therefore normally require prolonged and cautious study. It looks as though the most that can be anticipated without excessive optimism is that the existing important industrial concerns may be able to absorb the natural increase of population in their own areas.

The only other raw material which the island is known to possess in any quantity is timber, but it is a timber capable of relatively few commercial uses. At present it can be sold in the form of pitprops or pulpwood for definitely more than the costs of production, and it is therefore a real asset to the island. A somewhat short-sighted attitude on the part of previous governments, which hoped by prohibiting the export of the raw material to ensure the production of articles of a more advanced degree of manufacture, was responsible for the fact that little was done in this direction until the advent of the Commission. The trade is susceptible of development, and what little the Central Government can do to foster its development does not necessitate the employment of fixed capital on a large scale. But however markets may develop, timber production outside the two paper companies can hardly ever be anything but a subsidiary occupation, and it is perhaps fortunate on the whole that it is widely available in the island as a subsidiary occupation during a period when no other activity is possible.

If surplus population cannot be absorbed in fishing or mining or industry, the only alternative is settlement on the land. Here an experiment has been begun which promises a remarkable measure of success—an experiment which removed the doubts which I confess I felt in the first months of office as to whether there really was a tolerable solution for the island's difficulties. I can lay some emphasis on this experiment because, though the Commission will gladly accept the responsibility, they cannot claim for themselves the credit for its initiation or even, except in a limited measure, for its development. It began with the association over city relief during the winter of 1933-1934 of the most incongruous quartette in the world—a lawyer whose hobbies

were music and odd languages, a Dutchman, a Scottish doctor who might have stepped out of a kailyard novel, and a young business man, the acme of American salesmanship.

In the early days of the Commission these four came forward with a request that the Commission should advance to them as trustees the bare cost of relief maintenance for two years of ten families and they offered to make themselves responsible for the transformation of these into self-supporting citizens. I was present in April at the actual departure of these ten men from St. John's, ten men who had found the difficulties of life too great for them, under-nourished, ill-clad and with obviously lowered morale due to years of partial or complete unemployment. I would not have been surprised, I don't think that anybody would have been, had at least half of them found sustained toil too much for them. I saw them again only after a couple of months during which I had been absent from the island, and I was profoundly impressed by the moral transformation which had taken place.

By the end of June it was clear that the question of the moral recovery of men of this class presented no insuperable difficulty. Temperamental failures there might be, but the percentage of these could not, on the realised facts, be high enough to endanger the success of either the particular experiment itself or of a considerable extension thereof. So long as men could be relied upon under the stimulus of hope or the sense of property or even merely the desire for a better standard of life, to do a good day's work, the problem of enabling them to extract a living from the soil must be capable of solution. It therefore appeared to the Commission very desirable that the scale of the experiment should be extended as far and as fast as the available organisation would allow.

The extension of the experiment, under the influence of the Government even though with the enthusiastic co-operation of the Trustees, necessarily involved a change of orientation. What had begun as a philanthropic effort by a few men was developing into an experiment which affected the basis of the social reorganisation of the country. What was perhaps their main object in the first days of Markland, the name given to the settlement, that of restoring the families to independence at the earliest possible moment, had to give way to the necessity for sound planning for a future in which philanthropic effort could not and indeed ought not to be relied upon for the restoration of family independence.

I may be allowed to speak with more enthusiasm about this

experiment if I make it clear that I personally had no share in the original decision to embark upon it, and that it has been carried on under the direction of my friend and colleague Sir John Hope Simpson. I have followed the experiment, certainly with sympathy but also critically, with a view to discharging adequately the special responsibility which the United Kingdom Commissioners have for the proper expenditure of money for the finding of which His Majesty's Government is responsible. During the year some 140 men have been established on this and neighbouring areas and are now well on the way to becoming independent self-supporting citizens. So far it has involved finance at the rate of about £200 per family, but I am satisfied, and I am confident that any impartial business man who visited the settlement would be equally satisfied, that there have been created real values in the form of cleared agricultural land, buildings and equipment certainly equal to and probably substantially in excess of the total cost. In other words it has been demonstrated that agricultural settlement can be successfully achieved in Newfoundland without any element of charity. It is a business proposition which merely requires adequate finance and adequate organisation. I doubt whether this could be claimed for any other schemes for land settlement for the unemployed in any country of the world.

It is the most hopeful thing which has happened in the island during our year of office, and it is the more hopeful in that the success so far of the experiment is due to the inspiration and enthusiasm of men who are Newfoundlanders either by birth or by adoption. When all is said and done, a benevolent mother country may be able to provide the wherewithal to relieve distress, to tide the country over a transitional period of organisation, but the ultimate permanent rehabilitation of the people, if it is to be permanent, will have to be achieved by their own exertion. I have every hope myself that a policy of land settlement will in a comparatively few years result in a Newfoundland which is self-supporting on a standard of living very much superior to that which has ever previously existed on the island. That it will ever be a very rich country is perhaps doubtful, that it can be a country of independent men living a tolerable life and happy, in so far as material conditions can give happiness, is to me certain.

I would not, however, like to predict that the technical balancing of the budget and the resumption of complete responsibility for the services of the external debt are likely to be attained

in a very near future. There is a great deal to be done in the island which will entail appreciable capital expenditure, which, however, will be represented by real assets. In particular, the Health Services on the island are appallingly inadequate judged by any European standard. There is a stretch of 200 miles on the south coast, with settlements dotted along it at intervals of a few miles, where there is no doctor between the two extremities. There is hospital accommodation on the island on a scale of about one-quarter of that which would be considered essential in England. Efforts will have to be made to overcome the isolation of large sections of the community by the construction of roads and even by internal migration on a large scale.

Whatever credit may be due to the Commission for any improvement in the general economic situation, it is unquestionable that it has given to the island an efficient instrument of technical government. It does administer law without fear or favour. The coalescence of legislative and executive functions in the one body may be open to all sorts of academic objections in more complex communities, but in Newfoundland at any rate it works. It has worked so well as on the whole to surprise its own members. The proof is that, looking back over the thousand and one specific decisions recorded in the meetings of the Commission, there are extraordinarily few that would not be unanimously re-endorsed by the Commission with the fuller experience and knowledge that twelve months' working has given us. We started with the great advantage that we were none of us committed in advance to any doctrinaire theories which we felt bound to impose upon the community. Consequently, if we do make mistakes, we can rectify them when enlightenment dawns upon us without any resentment at having to haul down colours which we have publicly nailed to the mast. In this connection it is due to our Newfoundland colleagues to pay them a tribute for the cordial whole-hearted way in which they have co-operated with us. I am not going to suggest that there has never been division of opinion inside the Commission, but it is the literal truth that on no single question on which opinion has been divided has the difference been Newfoundland Commissioners versus English Commissioners. Further than that, there have been extraordinarily few instances in which division of opinion existed when either trio was solid on one side.

Commission Government could never function in Newfoundland if the people generally actively or passively resented its existence. I doubt whether it would last very long if the general feeling towards it was less than one of cheerful acquiescence.

I have no doubt myself that that is the general feeling to-day. The local Chamber of Commerce co-operates cordially. The trade unionists' leaders come to us with their grievances against the employers, and the employers on their side come and expatiate on the unreasonableness of the men. Both of the daily papers in St. John's are supporters of Commission Government, in spite of the obvious fact that in the world of journalism the temptation to oppose either the Government or your contemporary, or both, must be one of the most difficult to resist.

But for myself I rely on evidence still more convincing, and that is the attitude which the man in the street adopts towards me. Twice a day I walk through St. John's to my office. Over and over again I am stopped by men whom I cannot identify, who just want to chat for a minute or two, who don't want anything from me, who are interested to know what I think and who feel that I am interested in knowing what they think. The average Newfoundlander is a simple, kindly, hospitable soul. He may have his limitations, but nothing will convince me that an elaborate duplicity is one of them. He may think that I am unreasonable because I cannot find a job for himself and all his friends. If he does think this he does not hesitate to say so, but he says it politely with a recognition that perhaps I am just as much entitled to my opinion as he is to his. I have never been in a community which was so effectively democratic as Newfoundland and where the idea of a personal tyranny is so incongruous. Tyranny after all demands a certain atmosphere of pomp and display. It can hardly flourish in a small town in which there is no army, no navy; where for five months of the year what the Americans call "rubbers" are an indispensable item of wear and where the most exciting social functions are Burns dinners and flipper suppers!

I have myself no enthusiasm for dictatorship in the abstract. If I were forced to express an opinion in an academic state like Ruritania, I should reply emphatically in the negative. But when it comes to the actual problem of what will happen in Newfoundland I am not at all dogmatic. I shall on the whole be surprised if they do not develop a kind of affection for this odd body and combine a willingness to grumble at it on every possible occasion with a very definite disinclination to get rid of it. A poor thing perhaps, but after all our own!

Summary of Discussion.

SIR WILLIAM GOODE said that he thought Newfoundland was peculiarly fortunate in having a Commission which represented some of

the best men in the British Civil Service. But although the system of Commission Government in Newfoundland was not only inevitable but probably the best in the existing circumstances, it was only acting until a representative political system was developed. He believed that such a system would always continue to be the most desirable form of government in the British Dominions and Colonies.

He was very grateful to the Commission for the selflessness with which they were putting themselves into their work and he wished them all success in it.

MR. IAN T. D. KIRKPATRICK said that he was the late Commissioner for Trade and National Service for the City of London and represented in London a number of the British Port Authorities and Public Bodies. He was engaged in endeavouring to resuscitate the trade of Newfoundland with the Port of Poole in Dorset, which had one of the closest associations in Great Britain with Newfoundland.

It had been most delightful to listen to Mr. Lodge's address on a matter of such importance and interest to the British Empire. It was, indeed, of great moment that people should understand to the fullest extent questions relating to the Empire.

THE HON. W. R. HOWLEY said that he had been most interested in Mr. Lodge's statement of conditions as they existed in Newfoundland before the coming of the Commission and at the present time. It would be an affectation to say that the Members of the Commission always saw eye to eye with one another, but the utmost harmony and good feeling had prevailed among them. Like a couple just married it had taken them a year to get to know each other, and they could all appreciate each other better than at the beginning, which was a great step forward towards the effective working of the Commission.

He had been much struck by Mr. Lodge's summing up of the possibilities of the future. The task was no easy one. The difficulties were very great and it was only by care and attention and absolute disinterestedness that they could hope to achieve the results which Mr. Lodge had predicted. But Newfoundland and Newfoundlanders were sound at heart. The stories which were told of graft and dishonesty were not true stories of Newfoundland as a whole, but applied to a small section of the people such as could be found in any part of the Empire. The Newfoundlander was really industrious and honest, and the country had always prided itself on being the most ancient and loyal British colony, and he believed that every Newfoundlander, who was worthy to be a Newfoundlander and a citizen of the Empire, was actuated solely by the desire to restore the credit and prestige of Newfoundland and to make her worthy of the mother country which had come to her assistance in her hour of need.

MR. WILFRID GRENFELL, Junior, asked Mr. Lodge four questions.

(1) He had heard that one of the difficulties about assuring the future of the paper industry was the lack of adequate conservation of the forests

in Newfoundland, and he would like to know what steps were being taken to prevent forest fires. It had been said that in Labrador especially forest fires had been allowed to burn themselves out simply because of the lack of adequate fire services.

Were any measures being taken to stop too rapid cutting down of trees? He had been told that the companies concerned had assured people that the forests would not be depleted too rapidly because they were cutting down just enough to allow the trees to grow up behind and that in thirty years there would be a new growth.

(2) Was the same difficulty experienced in the south of Newfoundland as was experienced in the north, *i.e.* that the summer was too short to allow the establishment of adequate agricultural facilities?

(3) Could it be said that the comparative lack of educational opportunities in the past had accounted for the lack of leaders and the resulting difficulties of the island? In the north they had had great difficulty in getting back to the island people who had been sent to the United States and to England for their education.

(4) Was it true that the comparative lack of communications between Labrador and Northern Newfoundland made it more difficult for the Government to control economic policy?

MR. LODGE said that so far as the preservation of the forests was concerned the two big paper companies in their own interests maintained an organisation which did its best to put down forest fires as far as was possible in a country which was so sparsely inhabited. The Government was prepared to give every possible assistance, as by sending aeroplanes out to discover where a fire was.

So far as replanting was concerned or too rapid cutting, he happened to be a Director of one of the companies, as representing the Newfoundland Government, and his association with the other company was very close, and he thought that both companies were satisfied that they were not cutting down more than the annual growth of the island, if as much. Both companies were satisfied that there was no point in artificial replanting. The forests reproduced themselves by seeding.

The summer in Newfoundland was so short as to make the growing of wheat, except in very favoured places, probably impracticable. In the northern part of the island, and particularly on the west coast, they were able to raise all the ordinary vegetables and to ripen oats and anything which could be grown successfully in Scotland.

He did not know that he could go further in suggesting what were the causes of the failure to produce adequate leaders. But he had no doubt that the educational problem did contribute to the difficulties.

The lack of communications between Labrador and the northern part of the island, if they were present, did not add seriously to the difficulties of the Government. There was a very sparse population both in Labrador and the northern part of the island. In the summer it was possible to get across by water, and in the winter it was impossible, however good the communications were.

MR. J. H. PENSON said that the meeting had been peculiarly fortunate in having so lucid and balanced an account of the problems being faced in Newfoundland and of the measures being taken by the Commission Government to grapple with them. It would not be an exaggeration to say that conditions in Newfoundland a year or two before had been such as no other part of the Empire, inhabited by a white population, had seen in recent years. He had been struck by the extreme modesty which the speaker had shown during the course of his address. The task which Mr. Lodge and his colleagues had undertaken was an immense one. Moreover, it was not one of mere direction but of getting down to details, and doing so to a large extent unassisted. The results of the work which had already been done by the six Commissioners under His Excellency the Governor was a remarkable tribute to the powers of recuperation which lay, under the worst conditions, in the British people. The population in Newfoundland was not only English and Scottish but also Irish. One-third were Irish, and, whatever misunderstandings there might unfortunately be as between British peoples in the British Isles to-day, in Newfoundland all three had worked together to face their problems in circumstances of extreme difficulty, and had achieved already a considerable measure of success.

He was glad that Mr. Lodge had said something to contradict the view that the sole cause of the troubles in Newfoundland to within a year or two had been "graft." That was not so. There had been some outstanding examples of misgovernment, but there were other causes still more deep-seated. Great Britain owed a great deal to the little Dominion of Newfoundland. She had discharged her obligations in the past by giving Newfoundland self-government, and leaving her largely to her own devices. But that was not enough. Now, however, the people of that Dominion were being given an experience of good government and sound administration on modern lines such as they had not known at any time before. He had been very thankful to hear Mr. Lodge's conclusion that there was every probability that the people of Newfoundland would in due course find the means of earning a happy livelihood from their own soil and their own seas.

He had been particularly interested in Mr. Lodge's references to education, and glad to hear what the Commission Government had in mind for the improvement of education. It had been said that education in Newfoundland must be on directly practical lines, but it meant something more to the Newfoundlanders than a qualification for earning a living. He had been struck by the avidity with which the people had been prepared to listen to lecturers and their anxiety to obtain information about the outside world by personal contact. Education meant an immense amount to them, including the power of being able to get into touch with the great intellectual movements outside their own country. It was going to be of great value whenever Newfoundland came back to a political régime.

THE RÔLE OF POLAND BETWEEN GERMANY AND RUSSIA[1]

By Dr. Stefan Litauer

I propose to introduce my remarks by a short analysis of the relations of Poland with Russia and Germany during the past fifteen years.

Polish relations with the Soviets started with the Treaty of Riga, which marked the close of Poland's successful war with Soviet Russia. The Treaty of Riga determined our frontier with the Soviets and became the basis of our mutual relations as neighbours. Some nine years ago, a few days after the *coup* of May 1926, during a luncheon given by Mr. Zaleski, then Polish Foreign Minister, M. Vojkov, the Soviet Minister in Warsaw who later came to such a tragic end, asked Marshal Pilsudski: "Marshal, what are your designs in regard to the Soviets?" To this question, which clearly betrayed the Soviet distrust of the intentions of Pilsudski, he replied as follows: "My dear Minister, I won the war of 1920; do you think that on my part there is any reason for starting a new war, which always entails a risk?" Yet, Soviet distrust of Poland has never ceased and has even been sown outside Russia. Even to-day, after the death of Pilsudski, some political writers make absurd assertions of his alleged hatred of Russia and conjecture that Polish policy will now swing more towards the Soviets. These mistaken ideas about the attitude of Poland towards the Soviets arise not so much from the war of 1920 as from the fact that the Polish army embarked upon a campaign into the Ukraine and occupied Kieff. Ever since that time aggressive intentions towards the Ukraine have been imputed to Poland. Let us first consider this problem. The Kieff campaign started in the spring of 1920—that is, at a time when the Soviet authority was by no means yet established in the Ukraine. From the outbreak of the Russian revolution to the entry into Kieff of General Rydz Smigly, who has now become Chief of the Polish Army, the capital of the Ukraine had changed hands perhaps a dozen times. In this motley of different governments the only government which appeared to possess real power and

[1] Address given at Chatham House on May 23rd, 1935, with Mr. George Glasgow in the Chair.

was able to gather around it the most enthusiastic and vigorous national elements was that of Hetman Petlura. An appraisal of the situation in the Ukraine at that time shows that the only force capable of reviving the Ukrainian movement was the movement which centred around Petlura. The Bolshevik movement, emanating from Moscow and Petrograd, which opposed it, was not only militant Communism, but possessed definitely Russian traits, which from their very nature were inconsistent with the national features of the Ukrainian movement. Pilsudski was thus faced with a choice of three possible courses: one was to entrench along a certain line and not to bother about what was going on east of that line; the second was to bury the hatchet and to come to terms with militant Bolshevism; the third was to support the reviving Ukrainian movement and to assist in the creation of a new Ukraine which would be an ally of Poland. The first course meant an unsettled frontier, the abandonment of Vilna, Grodno, Volhynia, and the confinement of Poland within the frontiers of a small State, thus jeopardising her existence as an independent Power, and exposing her continually to the danger of being inundated by Bolshevism from the east. The second course would have led directly to the adoption of a Bolshevik system by Poland and would have brought a Communist revolution to the doors of Berlin. There remained the third course, leading to victory, to a strong Poland, to a weakened Russia, to the creation of an ally with whom Poland could co-operate without any fear for the fate of her civilisation, and in alliance with whom a solution could be found for such an important problem of internal Polish politics as is the question of the Ruthenian population in Eastern Galicia. Pilsudski chose the third course, as the only policy possible. However, he miscalculated one thing, and that was the capability of the new Ukrainian movement to create a State. Had Pilsudski, at the time that Rydz Smigly entered Kieff, followed in the footsteps of the German and Bolshevik occupations and established an administration of the country by Polish military and civil authorities, the Ukraine might even now have been detached from Russia and the whole problem of security in Eastern Europe would have presented an entirely different aspect. But Pilsudski, being an honest revolutionary, who did not accept the Marxian theory of materialist interpretation of history, believed in the dynamic force of the Ukrainian national movement and trusted that Petlura and his followers would be able to organise a Ukrainian State. The movement of Petlura failed. After the Treaty of Riga the remnants of the Petlura

group from time to time made desperate efforts to revive the movement; but its influence on the Ukrainian masses was waning, especially when a little later the Soviet authorities embarked on a so-called Ukrainisation. During the period immediately following the Treaty of Riga, the after-effects of the Ukrainian campaign told seriously upon the relations between Poland and the Soviets. From April to October 1921—that is, during the six months following the resumption of normal diplomatic relations—Poland and Soviet Russia exchanged over thirty diplomatic notes dealing with mutual claims and grievances arising from attacks along the frontier. In those days the Polish-Soviet frontier, which extends over 1412 kilometres, was the scene of continual incidents which were often of a serious nature and involved bloodshed. All kinds of irregular guerrilla action emanated from Soviet territory, in addition to the constant Bolshevik party propaganda conducted by the Komintern at great cost and with a host of agents. In the field of diplomatic activity Poland at that time clearly defined her Eastern policy as being based upon her great interest in the maintenance of the Baltic States as independent territories. The diplomatic activity of the Soviets, however, consisted mainly of attempts to frustrate and defeat Polish influence in the Baltic States. When these attempts failed, the Soviets had recourse to such devices as the organisation of a Communist rising in Estonia in 1924, which was suppressed by General Laidoner. Looking back now, it seems altogether surprising that peace was then maintained. There is not the slightest doubt that if similar conditions were to prevail in Eastern Europe to-day it would be impossible to maintain peace. That peace was not then violated, however, is due only to the fact that the Soviets were not sufficiently consolidated and had no organised and trained army, besides being greatly menaced from within by the remaining anti-Bolshevik elements and hit by a terrible famine. They, therefore, could not risk a war and, whenever matters came to a head, always retreated, surrendering their demands. Poland, on the other hand, as is shown by the above quoted words of Marshal Pilsudski to the Soviet Minister, Vojkov, neither needed nor desired to risk a second war. Had Poland really entertained any warlike intentions, had Pilsudski really had any designs regarding the Ukraine, there would have been no difficulty in starting a war in 1923 with a good chance of success. Germany was then sufficiently weak to enable Poland to eliminate any fear of attack from the rear. If Pilsudski did not force war with the Soviets at that time it was because he had no desire

for it, and because he then realised that the Petlura movement could not find sufficient support in the Ukraine. Pilsudski had achieved what he wanted; the Polish-Russian frontier was determined under the Riga Treaty, and it now was his object to consolidate this frontier. Furthermore, the Soviet Union as a political entity had certain advantages for Pilsudski. The Soviet Union in those days, as a proletarian State built upon the slogans of international revolution, was not imperialistic and had no ambitions of territorial expansion. Moreover, the Soviets could not aspire to play an active part in international diplomacy, owing to the gulf which separated them from the whole capitalistic world. They were not members of the League of Nations, which they condemned as an anti-Bolshevik plot, and the diplomatic borders of Europe ended, so to speak, at the Polish-Soviet frontier. There is no need to conceal the fact that Poland profited from this state of affairs and that it was to her interest that it should be continued as long as possible. Whenever the diplomatic position of the Soviets in Europe became aggravated, there was an improvement in the direct relations between Poland and the Soviets.

When, after the coup of May 1926, power in Poland became concentrated in the hands of Pilsudski, he initiated a deliberate policy of *rapprochement* with Russia. On February 9th, 1929, the Litvinov Protocol was signed in Moscow. Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Roumania, and the U.S.S.R. affixed their signatures to this Protocol, which made binding upon them the provisions of the Kellogg Pact. This Protocol served in two ways as a precedent for the future: first, because Poland secured, after great efforts, the consent of the Soviet Government to the participation in it of the Baltic States jointly with Poland; and, secondly, because Poland succeeded in breaking the ice between the U.S.S.R. and Roumania. The active pacific part played by Poland in regard to the Soviets is apt to be forgotten now and deserves, therefore, to be given some attention. On July 25th, 1932, Poland signed with the Soviet Union a pact of non-aggression for three years. On May 5th, 1934, this pact was prolonged until December 31st, 1945, the provision being made for its subsequent extension automatically every two years. That is the stage which Polish-Soviet relations have now reached.

But we must take into consideration the changes which are rapidly occurring in the relations of the Soviet Government with the outer world. The gulf which ten years ago separated the Soviet Union from the capitalist world no longer exists;

the Soviets are members of the League of Nations; they have concluded pacts resembling alliances with France and with Czechoslovakia; they have resumed diplomatic relations with countries with whom they had until recently no contact. M. Litvinov presides over the meeting of the League Council; Mr. Eden goes to Moscow and is followed by M. Laval, and Messrs. Beneš and Titulescu go there too. The capitalist States are now relying on the assistance of the Red Army in case of emergency and the Soviet Union on its part is assuring itself of the armed assistance of capitalist States. Finally, the Soviets quite intentionally paralyse the activities of the Komintern in order that they should not provoke the bourgeois capitalist world. The best example is the Franco-Soviet communiqué in which Stalin approved of the French armaments increase in spite of the policy of the French Communist party. Such a radically changed situation leads the Soviet Government to new roads and opens up to Soviet diplomacy a wide field of action. The future course of Polish-Soviet relations, for whose friendly neighbourly development there exists the necessary treaty basis, will depend in a large measure upon the diplomatic activity of the Soviet Government. We do not yet know what will be the strength of the diplomatic activity of the Soviets, nor do we know its direction. If, however, this activity should be directed towards the Balkans and Central Europe, if it should tend to revive and develop ideas of pan-Slav solidarity, to promote Turkish interests in the Dardanelles Straits, to play off Lithuania against her other neighbours, to frustrate existing alliances, like, for instance, the Franco-Polish or the Polish-Roumanian alliances, then I am afraid that the active partnership of the Soviets at the diplomatic chessboard will not make it easier to play the game. And if the Soviet Government should depart more and more from Bolshevism and go back to a nationalist Russia, a move which lies within the bounds of possibility, then the difficulties of Soviet-Polish relations will be intensified.

Now I propose to outline the progress of Poland's relations with Germany. There can be no doubt that after the Bismarck era Polish-German relations became so strained and the feelings of both countries were taxed to such an extent that the view grew up that the most virulent hatred existed between the two nations. This view is historically wrong. There was no historical hatred between the old Poland and the old Germany. In the monumental work *Deutschland und der Korridor*, published in 1933 for purposes of German propaganda, the eminent German nationalist

historian, Karl Christian von Loesch, contributed a chapter entitled " How the Eastern Territories of the Reich were lost," in which he wrote as follows :

" There is no historical hereditary enmity between Germans and Poles. For during the history of over a thousand years of mutual relation there were hardly ever warlike disputes. They are rarer than between any other independent neighbouring people in Europe. For apart from the quarrel with the Teutonic Order, which was rather a winding-up of a struggle with Lithuania than a fight with Poland, and which was continued by Poland after her union with Lithuania, only the Swedish Brandenburg War against Poland is to be recorded, which led in 1655 to the capture of Warsaw. However few the laurels gained by the German armies on German soil, those carried off by Polish armies in Germany were still fewer."

While Loesch is right when he says that there was, in fact, no hatred between the old Germany and the old Poland, the position radically changes if we replace the word Germany by the word Prussia. From the moment when, at the instigation of Frederick the Great, the partition of Poland was effected, the Polish people adopted a decidedly anti-Prussian attitude. Further, the wars with the Teutonic Order and the war with Brandenburg mentioned by Loesch were fought against Prussian expansion and not against Germany. This anti-Prussian attitude of the Poles was aggravated in the nineteenth century when Prussia consistently pursued an anti-Polish policy. In this policy Prussia even went to the extent of assisting Russia in 1831 to suppress the Polish November rising. Bismarck, in his *Gedanken und Errinerungen*, complains that Prussian policy rendered its services to Russia gratis during the suppression of the Polish rising of 1831. In another place Bismarck states that " if it were not for us, Russia could hardly have tackled the Poles." A similar attitude was taken up by Prussia in regard to the Polish insurrection of 1863, which fact is also referred to by Bismarck in his memoirs. When, after 1871 the Prussians became dominant in Germany, when the policy of extermination and extirpation of the Poles from their own country started, when the "Kulturkampf" and the Germanisation of children in schools and the expropriation from the soil began, Polish-Prussian hatred became synonymous with Polish German hatred, but only then and not before. As late as 1848 the Parliament of Frankfort passed its memorable pro-Polish resolution and German poets were eulogising Poland and her martyrdom. The unhappy stages in Polish-German history undoubtedly are an aspect of the Polish-Prussian conflict. There

fore when the Germans lost the War, when the Hohenzollern dynasty was deposed and when the Weimar Republic was established after the revolution, when it seemed that Prussia's supremacy in Germany belonged to the past, when Polish lands, which for one hundred and twenty years had been under Prussian rule, were returned to Poland, the desire was expressed on our part to maintain friendly neighbourly relations with the new Germany. When, after November 11th, 1918, the disorganised German army of occupation found itself cut off and helpless on Polish territory, not a single German soldier suffered any harm. The German revolution set Joseph Pilsudski free from the Magdeburg prison and, on his arrival in Warsaw, the leader of the Polish nation organised and secured for the German occupants peaceful and undisturbed retreat. This fact is now accepted as a matter of course, but if we judge it in the perspective of November 1918, it must be pointed out that this was a great and noble gesture, the more so since in those days human life was not of much account, and, as German occupation had created a good deal of bitterness, feeling ran high among the Polish people. Unfortunately the German revolution did not produce what was essential for the stabilisation of the Weimar Republic, that is, it did not remove the supremacy of Prussia. An examination of Germany's evolution during the first years after the War leads one to the conclusion that this revolution, the most remarkable symptom of which was that Prussia retained her hegemony, was mainly due to the fact that the victory of the Great War was not followed up with such consistency as was shown by Bismarck in 1871. Although the Prussian officer was the representative of the fallen régime in Germany, and had been completely defeated, although his abilities proved to be nothing more than a mechanical training, often lacking in intelligence, he was still regarded by the majority of Germans as the hero who had saved Germany from foreign invasion. Those who were defeated in 1918 gradually began to return to the forefront of affairs in Germany and, in the struggle between the old and new régimes in the German Reich, they helped more and more to turn the scales in favour of the former. Such development was consistent with certain inborn traits of the German character, especially with those which make up its Prussian elements. I am referring to the three psychological factors which, to my mind, should be regarded as the Prussian elements in the German character : first, an inclination for militarism resulting in a systematic distortion of character; secondly, servility and an exaggerated sense of allegiance which in the

upper classes led to what is perhaps best described as "Byzantinism," and in the lower classes to a complete decay of the critical faculty, and which produced the type known as "der Deutsche Untertan" on whom the Hohenzollerns relied for support; thirdly, the so-called Prussian spirit, "der Preussische Geist," that is to say, those psychological motives by virtue of which the Prussians exploited Germany, by virtue of which Prussian imperialism was transformed, after the defeat of Austria, into the German Reich, and by virtue of which Bismarck was able to impose on the German nation a unity that by no means represented an act of the will of the people but was the outcome of an imperialistic expansion of Prussia. These three psychological factors were not blotted out by the German revolution. In these circumstances there was little ground for confidence in Polish-German relations.

On the other hand, the return to Poland, under the Peace Treaty of Versailles of the provinces taken from her during the Partitions, which had been the mainstay of Prussia's imperialistic power and of the development known as the "Drang nach Osten," was bound to assist in the maturing of the natural historical process of abolishing Prussia's supremacy in Germany. During the decade 1920 to 1930 the efforts of the various German Governments were directed towards checking this natural historical process by making capital out of Polish-German questions for the purposes of the Prussian *raison d'État*. The governments both of Hermann Müller and of Brüning served these ends; they were also the goal of Treviranus, and especially of Gustav Stresemann as is shown in his Memoirs. Even such an idealist as the socialist Rudolf Breitscheid was not able to shake off the narrow outlook of the Prussian *raison d'État* and to join those few courageous Germans, like Professor Förster and Helmut von Gerlach, who struggled against it and who understood that Germany could proceed on the road of real Western civilisation and democracy only if a strong Poland was created and Prussia was deprived of her hegemony in the Reich. Unfortunately also the Great Powers did not see this and were misled by the illusive mirages drawn by Stresemann. The Powers did not at that time go deeper into the fundamental issues of the Polish-German question and they underrated the implications for Europe of the restoration of Poland as a great country; they thus indirectly gave moral support to Prussia's claims against Poland, for instance, by introducing into the Locarno Treaties a discrimination between the western and eastern frontiers of Germany. Locarno

recognised Germany's right to lay a claim to Polish territory. How often have we heard highly coloured stories about the so-called "corridor" told by German propaganda. The fact that this territory is Polish, that 90 per cent. of its population is now Polish, has been completely ignored, but a ready ear has been given to such arguments, as the one which claims that it was only owing to Polish acts of violence and pressure that the Germans had to leave Pomerania and that in this way the Poles artificially brought about a Polonisation of these territories. Luckily enough, German propaganda sometimes supplied us with proofs which expose the falsity of such arguments. In the German propaganda book *Deutschland und der Korridor* it is stated on p. 103 that from 1840 to 1910 nearly four million people had moved into central Germany: that is—

from East Prussia	. .	739 thousand persons
„ West Prussia	. .	603 „ „
„ the Poznan district	.	878 „ „
„ Pomerania .	. .	744 „ „
„ Silesia	. . .	673 „ „

The author of this work remarks that the main efflux took place after the year 1870. He further points out that "the peasant colonisation which was started by the Prussian State in 1886 and was later continued by private enterprise could only slightly counteract this movement." We get some idea of this peasant colonisation from the former German Chancellor Prince Bülow. In the chapter "Ostmarkenpolitik" of his work entitled *Deutsche Politik,* which forms part of a book edited jointly, in 1914, by several authors under the title *Deutschland unter Wilhelm II,* he says that, between the years 1886 and 1911, 394,398 hectares of land (which is nearly one million acres) were given to German settlers in the Polish part of Prussia. Of this, 112,116 hectares were actually taken away from Polish nationals. During this period 150,000 German colonists were settled on this land, 450 new villages were created, and the percentage of the German population was increased in 300 other villages. In spite of all this the Poles did not emigrate and, rather than leave their lands, suffered persecution and humiliation. In these circumstances the real native inhabitant of this territory is so indisputable that it is difficult to understand how German propaganda can throw dust into the eyes of so many people. The Germans emigrated because they were an alien element, the Poles remained, and always will remain, because they are native to the soil. One is sometimes really startled by certain statements, even to-day. The

diplomatic correspondent of the *Sunday Times* wrote, on Sunday, May 19th, 1935, as follows:

"It has been frequently stated by responsible German spokesmen that the Third Reich cannot rest content with its existing eastern frontiers. What the Germans would like, I hear on good authority, is a plan by which Poland should be given facilities, by a radical alteration in Russia's western frontier, for side-stepping her population to the east. This, it is argued, would enable Germany to obtain a compensating adjustment of the Polish-German frontier in an easterly direction."

The following day the *Daily Telegraph* even spoke of a German plan "to move the Poles bodily on the map." It is beyond comprehension how serious newspapers can pay any attention to such considerations, which are only likely to be ridiculed in Poland, where they create the impression that somebody's leg was pulled.

In these efforts to exploit the Polish-German question to serve the Prussian *raison d'État* the successive German Governments have received a good deal of moral and material support from outside, and not the least from Great Britain. It is surprising that certain political quarters showed such short-sightedness and evidently failed to realise that, by giving support to the Prussian *raison d'État* against Poland they were at the same time contributing to the strengthening of those Prussian elements in German psychology which are manifested in Germany's militarism. This observation applies equally to Great Britain and to France. Briand's flirtation with Stresemann was said to have as its object the consolidation of peace; in reality, however, it was owing to this peaceful courtship that the Germany of Stresemann was in a position to rebuild her armed forces untroubled and in defiance of the Peace Treaty. It is astonishing that, after Stresemann's great success in the international arena, namely, after the Locarno Treaty and the evacuation of the Rhineland, Germany's military budget showed a steady increase.

The expenditure on the *Wehrmacht* alone, was, in 1924–25, *RM.* 491,000,000; in 1925–26 it rose to *RM.* 633,000,000; in 1926–27 to *RM.* 704,000,000; in 1927–28 to *RM.* 769,000,000; in 1928–29, the last year of Stresemann's influence over German politics, it increased to the colossal figure of *RM.* 827,000,000. The figure for the expenditure for the German *Wehrmacht* in 1934–35 was *RM.* 894,000,000, the total increase being not quite *RM.* 70,000,000.

The expenditure for the Reichswehr of 100,000 soldiers, the

so-called Army Command, was in 1924–25, *RM.* 2,780,000; in 1925–26, *RM.* 4,160,000; in 1926–27, *RM.* 5,180,000; in 1927–28, *RM.* 5,590,000; and in Stresemann's last year of office, 1928–29, *RM.* 6,000,000. In 1913 the expenditure for the regular German army of 500,000 men, which then constituted the Army Command, was only 4,850,000 marks.

A comparison of the expenditure incurred on account of a single soldier in the armies of the following countries in 1927, when Stresemann's power was at its height, shows the following: in Poland, 1116 Swiss francs; in France, 2210 Swiss francs; in Soviet Russia, 2983 Swiss francs; in Great Britain, 7009 Swiss francs; in Germany 7486 Swiss francs.

It is also a well-known fact that the Reichswehr co-operated with the Red Army at that time. Stresemann for all his professed pacificism never entertained friendly feelings towards Poland, and it is clear that he acted as the representative of the Prussian *raison d'État.* During the whole period from 1920 to 1930 successive Polish governments, especially after Pilsudski's accession to power, were constantly endeavouring to find a means of establishing a *modus vivendi* for normal neighbourly relations between Poland and Germany. All these efforts, however, met with no response from the German side. In 1925 Poland took the initiative and proposed a commercial treaty, the negotiations for which dragged on for five years; and when finally the treaty was signed, its ratification was sabotaged by Brüning's government. Along the Polish-German frontier, which extends over 1900 kilometres, there was a constant atmosphere of tension and of mutually suspicious animosity. German diplomacy tried everywhere to undermine the position of the Polish Government, by instilling the belief that the new Polish State was of a transitory nature. This propaganda was felt most strongly in Danzig, where it was impossible to establish the *modus vivendi* so essential to economic collaboration, and in Lithuania, where the German Minister von Moraht could claim that he had helped to aggravate the Polish-Lithuanian conflict to such an extent that Pilsudski was obliged to go to Geneva in December 1927 and, at the table of the League of Nations, to put to Voldemaras the categorical ultimatum: "War or Peace?" Until recently, also, we met this propaganda at the League, where successive German governments did everything in their power to inflame feelings with regard to the problem of the German minority in Poland, feeling that time works in favour of Poland and that the actual German possessions on Polish soil were gradually disappearing.

In these circumstances Polish-German relations not only did not improve, but on the contrary became increasingly difficult. For Poland there remained only one course to pursue in such a situation, and that was to increase her defensive force by strengthening her army. This was accomplished by Pilsudski, who was fully aware of the fact that Poland cannot rely on anyone but must depend upon her own strength. Some will probably ask with surprise: What about France? What about the Franco-Polish alliance? To give a frank and straightforward answer, it must be admitted that we cannot count on France very much. The Franco-Polish alliance was signed in 1921, when Poland was unable to negotiate as an equal partner, and the Franco-Polish alliance bears the stamp of this position to this day. Locarno was the first heavy blow to the Franco-Polish alliance. By the Treaty of Locarno France admitted that she would not defend the present Polish frontiers against Germany. Briand's flirtation with Stresemann marked the next chapter. Then came the notorious Four Power Pact. These diplomatic maladies of the Franco-Polish alliance would not perhaps have been felt so much had France carried out its terms more willingly in the field of financial assistance and thus helped Poland to reinforce her frontiers and their defence. But unfortunately the alliance failed even in this respect.

I should like to take this opportunity of correcting some inaccurate reports which are to be found from time to time in the British Press, namely, that the French have put billions into Poland. The total private French investments in Poland, in banks, industry and commerce, amounted as at January 1st, 1934, to 841,000,000 zlotys, which equals about £33,000,000 sterling. Poland's adverse trade balance with France for the years 1922 to 1934 amounted to 889,353,000 zlotys, which considerably exceeded the total sum of French investments in Poland. The total amount of credits which Poland has received from France since the conclusion of the alliance amounted to 808,000,000 zlotys. Of this sum not more than 180,000,000 zlotys, that is £7,000,000, consisted of loans, at a high rate of interest; the rest were credits in kind, on which France made a substantial profit. That is how France's attitude as an ally of Poland appears in the light of figures. Is it then surprising that in these circumstances Poland did not seriously count upon the assistance of France against Germany? Moreover, the internal political situation in France during the last few years did not place the potential strength of our ally in a very encouraging light.

Such was the position when Poland came face to face with Hitlerism. It would be absurd and politically unwise to estimate the Hitler movement only in the light of the atrocities which it has committed, and to explain its victory over the German nation solely as a result of terror. There can be no doubt that Hitler represents the second German revolution; its trend is not yet clearly defined. But one result of the National Socialist revolution is already apparent, and that is the transformation of Germany from a Federation of States, with Prussia occupying a dominant position, into a so-called "Einheitsstaat" (Unitary State), in which the hegemony of Prussia has been at least formally destroyed. The further development of events in Germany will show whether this hegemony has only been removed in principle, whether the Prussian spirit which led to the world conflagration continues to animate the "Einheitsstaat," or whether it has actually disappeared. It is, of course, not impossible that the Prussian spirit will revive and will endeavour to divert Germany from her new line of development, but in that case an even more violent reaction can be expected, and a new catastrophe. In some quarters Hitler's policy of rearmament is treated as equivalent to Prussian militarism. To me it seems doubtful if such an interpretation is correct. The main characteristic of Prussian militarism was a chauvinistic trend for the expansion of Prussian power, the domination of the whole life of the nation by representatives of the Prussian military caste, and the submission of the interest of the country to the narrow interest of their own mentality. It seems to me very doubtful if Hitler's so-called "Wehrhaftigkeit," if his "Wehrgeist," which may be translated as the religious spirit of a soldier nation, can be regarded as Prussian militarism. Anyhow, the representatives of the Reichwehr are not dominating Germany to-day, and as to the future, we have to wait and see which road Hitler will take. For us Poles it is quite obvious, and we have no illusions about it, that even a temporary victory of Prussian militarism and a new domination of the Prussian over the German *raison d'État* can be effected only to our disadvantage. Hence everything that makes the return to the Prussian *raison d'État* more difficult will find our support.

When Hitler assumed power, it was clear to Pilsudski that we must reckon with the consequences of the potential growth of Germany's strength. Two courses were open: one was to counteract the revolutionary movement before it could spread like wildfire, consuming everything on its way; the second was to extend a friendly hand and earn its goodwill. Pilsudski at first contemplated the first course, and turned to sound the

attitude of the French ally. France declined, as she did not feel strong enough to start a preventive war. Pilsudski therefore challenged Hitler on his own account. As Pilsudski had once challenged Voldemaras at Geneva, with the question "Peace or War?", so he faced Hitler with the same ultimatum, "Peace or War?" Hitler chose peace, and to do him justice one must admit that he really meant it. What Poland was not able to achieve with Brüning or with Hermann Müller, or with the notorious "Geist der Versöhnung" (Spirit of Reconciliation), Stresemann, she actually managed to obtain with Adolf Hitler. She managed to obtain an agreement which for a period of at least ten years introduces the spirit of reconciliation into Polish-German relations. In his speech on May 21st, 1935, Herr Hitler went even further and expressed his willingness to renew the ten years' pact indefinitely. So far we have had a two years' experience. During the past two years, since Pilsudski's challenge to Hitler, Polish-German relations have been more friendly than ever before. As a direct result of the agreement the anti-Polish propaganda, which consciously or unconsciously served to promote the Prussian *raison d' État*, ceased immediately. As if at the touch of a magic wand all those were silenced who in newspapers and at meetings used to wring their hands because the map of Europe presents such an unæsthetic appearance with the so-called Polish Corridor cutting across Prussia. All the arguments for the return of the Corridor to Germany have been forgotten; they appeared to be valid only so long as this was to the interest of the Prussian *raison d'État*. It became manifest that Germany could exist with the so-called Corridor, that the transit from Germany to Eastern Prussia through Polish territory can be carried on without hindrance, that even the Storm-troopers can freely travel there and back, as I myself witnessed last year in Danzig. It has been shown that normal neighbourly intercourse along the existing Polish-German frontier is absolutely practicable, and that it is neither a "burning" nor a "bleeding" frontier. It has been shown that the German minority in Poland can exist without continual complaints in Geneva; in short, it has shown that the whole of the ballast which weighed down Polish-German relations during the terms of office of Stresemann, Treviranus, Müller, and Brüning, and which was given such credit in London, can be dismissed. "Augur," in his excellent book *Peace in Europe* (1927), asked one thing in regard to future Polish-German relations, namely, that Germany should learn to look upon Poland as an equal partner, and to talk to Poland in all matters on a footing of equality.

No one can deny that this footing of equality has now become an accomplished fact. On May 16th, 1935, the *Deutschlandsänder* sent out from all German broadcasting stations a most sympathetic tribute to the late Marshal Pilsudski. The broadcast began with a funeral march, which was followed by addresses by two speakers giving a short description of the life and work of the late Marshal. The programme was notable for the emotion with which the deeds of Pilsudski were described. It was said with great loyalty that he fought against Germany and that he had been imprisoned on this account in Magdeburg. The climax was reached in the final call: "Beat the drum in honour of Marshal Pilsudski—who is now in the heart of his nation." Thus ended a beautiful broadcast which touched the heart of every Pole. The *Deutschlandsänder* then ordered a three-minutes' silence at all German stations in honour of the dead Polish national hero. To my mind such facts are bound to have an influence on the German people, and especially on the younger generation, which was formerly taught to ridicule and sneer at everything in Poland. I cannot help mentioning with regret that the Paris Radio did not find it possible to arrange for such a broadcast. At the requiem mass for Marshal Pilsudski in Berlin, Chancellor Hitler was present in person. At a similar service in the capital of our ally, France, President Lebrun was represented only by General Braconnier.

Having thus described the atmosphere in which Polish-German and Polish-Soviet relations have developed, I will now consider the rôle which Poland has come to play between Russia and Germany. This rôle has only lately been realised by many politically-minded people, and this realisation is directly due to the foreign policy which during the last few years has been conducted by the Polish Foreign Minister, Beck, under the inspiration of Marshal Pilsudski. Polish tactics concerning the original form of the proposed Eastern Pact resulted in more serious attention being given to Poland's rôle in Eastern Europe. For many long years the Western Powers did not take the slightest notice of Eastern Europe, which was for them a kind of semi-Asia, for had it actually been Asia, interest would certainly have been greater. Soviet Russia was for a number of years outside the bounds of international diplomatic action, Poland was treated as the vassal of France, and the Baltic States were altogether looked upon as transitory phenomena. German interest in Eastern Europe was regarded as a convenient outlet for the reviving Prussian spirit, which made it possible for Stresemann to play the part of an angel of peace in Geneva. Polish policy in the years

1922, 1923, and 1924, as a consequence of which the Baltic States have to this day retained their independence and consolidated their existence as sovereign States, was neither understood nor appreciated in the West. If Polish policy had met with support of the Western Powers at that time, if at Locarno, in addition to the consolidation of the western frontiers of Germany, it had also been decided to consolidate her eastern frontiers, and to establish a neutral bloc between Germany and Russia consisting of the Baltic States, Poland and Roumania, then European diplomacy would have been saved the troubles which are now accumulating in Eastern Europe. From the moment the Rapallo Treaty was signed in 1922, Poland's foreign policy has consistently aimed at the protection of the existence of the Baltic States, whose independence is regarded by Poland as the *conditio sine qua non* of the Polish *raison d'État*. If these territories, that is to say, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, had been guaranteed under the Locarno Treaty as neutral countries, we would to-day have had a vast territorial bloc, representing a surface of over one million square kilometres of land, separating Russia from Germany. Mr. Eden said recently (May 16th, 1935) in a speech at Fulham: "Since the re-creation of the great Polish State, a State which was both ready and able to play its part, and a very considerable part, on the European stage, the possibility of an aggression by Russia upon Germany has become a geographical anachronism." Mr. Eden pointed out that the distance from the German frontier to the Russian frontier through Poland is about the same as that from London to Switzerland. We are grateful to Mr. Eden for his words, but regret that it was not until 1935 that the British Government became fully aware that between Germany and Russia there is Poland. I would like to draw attention to the fact that in the reports of this speech in the French Press, for example in the most authoritative *Le Temps*, the whole passage dealing with the position of Poland between Germany and Russia has been deliberately omitted. Evidently the leaders of French foreign policy had some apprehension lest Mr. Eden's argument of the geographical anachronism, according to which Germany had nothing to fear from Russia, should be interpreted as being true also in the opposite sense, namely, that Russia also has nothing to fear from Germany, being separated by Poland.

It is difficult to understand the purpose of the recent Franco-Soviet Pact. Does the French General Staff seriously count upon the military assistance of Soviet Russia? As to the Soviet Government, I am quite certain that Messrs. Litvinov, Voro-

shiloff, and Stalin have no illusions about the possibility of obtaining military assistance from France in the event of a conflict with Germany. The idea of a mobilisation by France, if she is not attacked by Germany, to come to the aid of Soviet Russia, appears to anyone who has even a superficial knowledge of French conditions simply absurd. On the other hand, armed assistance from the Soviets is, of course, out of the question at sea and is very problematical on land. To her western frontier, extending over two thousand kilometres, Russia has only three railway-lines for the transport of troops: one from Leningrad via Pskow and Dünaburg; the second from Moscow via Smolensk and Minsk; and the third from Kieff via Berdyczow-Szepietowka; and the present state of these lines is well known. Along the whole of this frontier section there are no high-roads suitable for motor traffic. How can there be even talk about military assistance? Unless, of course, France intends really to grant to the Soviets a large loan for the construction of a strategic railway system to the Baltic and Polish frontiers. But France would then find herself involved in glaring contravention of her commitments under the Franco-Polish military alliance. There remains armed assistance by air, but this also is not so simple. To fly over Poland in defiance of the wishes of the country is far from being easy or advisable, since it also possesses anti-aircraft artillery. It appears to me that if the French General Staff has free choice, it will decide for military assistance from Poland rather than from the Soviets. It is up to France to give to the Franco-Polish alliance such significance as will enable it to exist for the mutual and equal benefit of both partners. As for us, we have no desire to allow Soviet or German troops to cross our territory. We have not sufficient trust either in the one or in the other to accept them on our territory as real friends, and, moreover, any partiality on our part increases the chances of war, since it makes it less risky for one of them. Our policy remains consistent:

(1) We aim at the closest collaboration with the Baltic States, whose independence is also a condition of our existence as a strong and independent Power. From this point of view, we regard the territories of the Baltic States as the sphere of our influence and we shall allow neither Germany nor Russia to endanger them. This applies equally to Lithuania, although we have so far no normal relations with her.

(2) Together with the Baltic States we desire to play the part of a neutral bloc in Eastern Europe which would prevent a clash between Germany and Russia. We shall support any pacts of collective security in the east so long as they enable us to retain this neutral position together with the Baltic States.

(3) We wish to maintain good neighbourly relations both with Soviet Russia and with Nazi Germany. Just as the internal structure of the Soviet Union does not adversely affect the course of Polish-Russian relations, so we have also no reason to assume beforehand that the National-Socialist régime will adversely influence the future of Polish-German relations. On the contrary, just as the overthrow of Tsarism and of old Russia and the creation of a new Russia established on a system to which territorial expansion is foreign, forms the basis of Polish-Soviet relations, so the downfall of the Hohenzollern Empire and of old Prussia and the re-birth of a new Germany, organised on a system representing the unity of the whole State, may be the basis for the re-shaping of Polish-German relations.

(4) Any attempts at reviving old Russian tendencies of imperialism and Pan-Slavism, or tendencies representing the Prussian *raison d'État* manifested in the *Drang nach Osten*, will meet on our part with an equally definite refusal and active opposition.

Just as the experiences of the last ten years have shown that Poland can maintain friendly relations with the Soviets, so the experiences of the last two years induce us to believe that the relations of Poland with Germany will also be friendly. In any case, as a result of our past experiences we prefer Hitler to Stresemann or Treviranus who, though carrying the olive branch, were breathing Prussian hatred in regard to us. But if Hitler should change his tactics and return to the Prussian *raison d'État*, then he will have to face the united front of the whole of Poland, which has not yet been lulled into security by the present friendship with Germany.

With Hitler's Germany, as it were, in the scales on one side and Soviet Russia on the other, Polish foreign policy will aim at maintaining an equilibrium between them, holding the key position of peace. Thanks to the work of Joseph Pilsudski, we are now in a position to play this rôle with a full sense of responsibility. The more this rôle is understood in Great Britain, the better it will be for the cause of peace.

Summary of Discussion.

A MEMBER asked if there was any desire in Poland to extend the neutral *bloc* southwards, and if there was any feeling in Poland in respect of the new developments that had taken place in Czechoslovakia in the recent elections.

DR. LITAUER said that the question of Czechoslovakia had no relation to the question of Eastern European neutral territory because Czechoslovakia did not geographically or politically belong to Eastern Europe; if, however, she felt the need to join such a neutral *bloc* it was up to her to make the suggestion. Unfortunately from the infor-

mation received during the past week it appeared that Czechoslovakia had chosen another way.

MR. V. POLIAKOFF said that the problem which interested everybody directly or indirectly was the problem of German relations with the rest of Europe, and there was one essential thing which had happened in Europe of late which had a bearing on that problem. After the War the axis of politics in Europe had been from east to west and from west to east. To-day it had turned round and went from north to south and south to north. The development of a powerful Poland had hastened that process. It could not be denied that the ultimatum of Pilsudski to Hitler, which was the origin of the good relations between Poland and Germany, was the menace of an act of force by which Poland would close the eastern frontier to Germany, and although Hitler continued to speak of the menace of Russia it was, as Dr. Litauer had shown, very difficult for Germany to get at Russia and vice-versa. The result was to throw Germany towards the south. " Drang nach Osten " had given way to " Drang nach Süden," and Germany and Italy had become the chief protagonists. Germany was squeezed between the western *bloc* which centred round the Anglo-French Entente and on the east Poland backed by Russia.

Thus Poland had rendered a tremendous service to France by making possible the Franco-Italian *rapprochement*. It was only because of the danger of " Drang nach Süden " that Italy had reversed her policy and that M. Laval had been able to make his agreement with Signor Mussolini whereby the armed frontier on the Franco-Italian frontier had been dismantled.

It was from that point of view that Franco-Soviet relations should be judged. The Franco-Soviet Pact, which he thought would turn out to be an intermediate phenomenon and which had led to the Russo-Czechoslovakian Pact, had its origin in the general Eastern Pact which had been invented in France and intended to include Poland and Germany and Russia, but which had been defeated by Berlin. The important result was the break-in of Russian influence in the valley of the Central Danube. After the War the quarrel between Roumania and Russia about Bessarabia had been the determining factor between Russia and Europe. But under pressure of circumstances Russia had moved far from her original position, and in July 1934 Litvinov practically surrendered his claim to Bessarabia. That brought Russia into direct contact with the Little Entente. The Little Entente overlapped the Balkan Group which ended with Turkey, with whom Russia had a close alliance, and this led Russia through Roumania into touch with Czechoslovakia. The latter thus might be considered part of an eastern combination.

There was the Franco-Italian agreement on the one hand and the Russian penetration into the valley of the Danube on the other, and if the position were completed by an Italo-Russian agreement a new problem would be created in Europe, caused by the change of German orientation from east to west to north to south.

A MEMBER asked what was the truth behind the published stories which had been corroborated by British Members of Parliament of the oppression of Ukrainian units in Polish territory?

DR. LITAUER said that unfortunately he could not answer that question as he would wish because it would require too long a reply. Not everything that the Polish Government had done towards the Ukrainian movement had been good, nor had everything been wrong. And the same thing applied to what the Ukrainian movement had done towards Poland. It was a difficult question, but the Polish Government would certainly like to come to an agreement with the Ukrainians. Until recently the Ukrainian movement had been protected by some German organisations, so the subject was connected with the question of German-Polish relations. Now that the Ukrainian movement was cut off from German organisations he hoped that the Poles and Ukrainians would be able to get closer to each other. General Tarnavski, who had been the chief commander of the Ukrainian and Galician troops in 1919 when they were defeated by Pilsudski's armies, had sent a very warm tribute to the Polish Government offering very moving condolences on Pilsudski's death. Such facts greatly helped the cause of a Polish-Ukrainian *rapprochement*.

LT.-COL. MALONE said that he was grateful to Dr. Litauer, who spoke with some official authority, for his specific explanation and repudiation of the suggestion that there were secret clauses in the German-Polish Pact. But there were two sides to the question. German aspirations were very definite, as appeared from the writings of Herr Hitler and Dr. Rosenberg and other sources, and, until they were repudiated as definitely by Herr Hitler as they had been by Dr. Litauer, there would always be some fear of German anxiety to carry out a policy of "Drang nach Osten." It was strange that the Polish repudiation of those secret pacts did not take place until, and coincided with, the recent agreement between Japan and Soviet Russia in the Far East.

He hoped that the *rapprochement* between the Ukrainian movement and the Polish authorities would take place, but would the new Constitution of Poland, which entirely abolished the party system and disenfranchised minority groups, be likely to improve the relations between the Polish parties and minorities?

DR. LITAUER said that the new Polish Constitution did not exclude the representation of the Ukrainian minority. It merely introduced a different system from that which had previously existed. They no longer had a party system, but a system whereby organisations would have more to say than political parties. As was known, in Eastern Galicia the Ukrainians had been able to build up a splendid co-operative system, and as they played a very important rôle in all the autonomous organisations it was quite certain that the Ukrainians would have quite a considerable representation in the future.

THE POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS SITUATION IN MEXICO[1]

By Mr. Kenneth Grubb

The principal significance of Mexico in America is that Mexico is, so to speak, the leader in social experiment. What Mexico is doing to-day the republics of similar position and population will probably do to-morrow. It is generally recognised that the Mexican Administration has tackled the political and social problems of the country in a way which is altogether new to Latin America, and, as a result, other governments faced with similar problems are studying the Mexican experiment, as it is called, with interest. Mexico is the chief Indian Republic in Latin America. In the extreme south is Argentina, which is destined to be the White Man's Land of Latin America. Argentina has its own problems and has dealt with them in its own way. But Mexico is destined to be the land of the indigenous Indians of America, or one of their lands, and it is solving its problems in a way that conforms more with the Indian mentality than with the outlook bequeathed by the colonial settlements in Latin America.

The principles underlying the complicated political and religious situation in the Mexico of to-day can only be understood in the light of the developments that have taken place in the country during the last century.

The great change in Mexico dates from the achievement of independence, and the currents of feeling which led to independence were really two. Among the mass of the Mexican people there was a very genuine desire for social and economic change, and that desire was particularly expressed in the outlook of one of the two great Mexican heroes of the independence, the Priest Morelos. The other great leader was the Priest Hidalgo, who may be said to have expressed the political outlook. The political interests were mostly those of the *criollos*, that is the descendants of the whites who were destined to become the ruling class if the political connection with Spain was severed, while the more vague social and economic desires were those of the mass of the population, which was Indian.

[1] Address given at Chatham House on July 4th, 1935, with Mr. H. R. Cummings in the Chair.

The first attempt at Mexican independence in 1810 failed, but independence was finally achieved in 1821. It followed the declaration of Liberal Reforms in Spain in 1820, which so alarmed the higher clergy and *gachupines* in Mexico that they decided to strike for independence from Spain, with the result that the Mexican *criollos* obtained political independence, but the social and economic aspirations of the mass of the Mexicans remained unsatisfied. The true revolutionary elements, *i.e.* the mass of Mexicans, were under the leadership of Guerrero, against whom was sent Agustin de Iturbide, the military leader then in charge of Mexico. Iturbide came to an agreement with Guerrero based on what is known as the Three Guarantees (or Plan de Iguala); these guaranteed the position of the clergy; the political status of the *criollos*, whereby the government was left in their hands; and independence from Spain, with the suggestion of an independent limited monarchy. The rebel leader Guerrero was sufficiently taken in by these Three Guarantees to accept them, and as a result the independence of Mexico was declared a political fact but the social aspirations of the masses were ignored. In 1823 the monarchy was repudiated in favour of a republic.

The next great step took place in 1857, when the Mexican Liberals, having obtained political domination over the country under the leadership of the revolutionary patriot, Juarez, proclaimed a Constitution in which were incorporated the Laws of Reform, as they were called, of 1855 and 1856. These dealt mainly with the privileges of the Church. Mexican historians maintain that at that period the Church still owned about one-third of the real estate of Mexico; it also owned a great many privileges of the kind familiar to students of Latin America. Under the Laws of Reform education was secularised and was made lay education. The cemeteries were also secularised and thrown open to all and sundry. The property of the Church, except the actual church buildings, was nationalised, and the ordinary reforms associated with Liberalism in Latin America were carried through.

The results of these reforms were twofold. In the first place, the protests of the Church against the interpretation of the Liberal aspirations of Mexico provoked the French intervention which led to the offering of the Crown of Mexico to Maximilian of Austria. He never, however, dominated the nation and was finally captured and executed in 1867. Even then the Liberals were unable to carry out their reforms and the government fell into the hands of a Dictator, Diaz, who ruled from 1876 to 1910. Diaz established his position by building up around him what is known as

his "Circle of Friends." Whenever an insurgent chief was disposed to dispute his authority he invited him into his government, gave him a comfortable post, and the rebellion was thereby solved.

Diaz's policy with regard to the reforms of his predecessors was one of non-opposition. Not one word of the previous Constitution or Laws of Reform was abrogated; Diaz simply encouraged the various parties in the Church and foreign capitalists to live on the margin of the law. The Church immediately began to acquire property and, between 1876 and 1910 gathered to itself property to the value of about 800,000,000 pesos. The establishment of foreign religious orders had been forbidden under the Laws of Reform, but Diaz succeeded in getting them re-introduced into Mexico. In these and other ways the social and economic aspirations of the masses were sacrificed to the maintenance of political ascendancy. Even in the matter of education, where the aspirations of the masses were for popular education, Diaz consolidated his educational programme around the Positivist teachings of the French School, and concentrated on secondary and university rather than primary education.

In foreign policy Diaz followed the line of encouraging foreign investment under all sorts of conditions. The railways, mines, petroleum and finance of Mexico were all more or less controlled by foreign interests. That situation lasted until 1910 and then began the period which is known as the Mexican Revolution; the Mexicans refer to it as *the* Revolution. It can be divided into two phases, first the belligerent phase which lasted from 1910 to 1920, and secondly the pacific phase which has lasted for the past fifteen years.

The Revolution reveals no clear-cut policy. There was a general feeling that Diaz as Dictator had injured some of the best interests of the nation. Some people wanted a constitution which would prevent a Dictator holding the reins of power for an indefinite period or for life; some people wanted education, some wanted land; and some people fought because they wanted to fight. Nevertheless, through the belligerent period certain ideas did emerge.

The first leader of the rebellion was Madero, who stood for the promotion of an effective vote among the people and no re-election; a President was not to be eligible for re-election after his term of Presidency, a point which is now considered as essential by the Mexican people.

The second leader whom I want to distinguish is Zapata, a guerilla chief who fought mostly in the south of Mexico and

who represented what was a genuine need of the Mexican people, agrarian reform.

The third chief was Carranza, and he definitely stood for giving to the nation a constitution which would cover its political needs, which would guarantee the rights of its working men, and would promote the formation of trades unions and generally define the political rights of their people.

These revolutionaries did not work in harmony one with another, and as a result the Revolution was long drawn out. Moreover, there occurred in Mexico a process familiar to students of Latin America and which is very like that of " stealing thunder." For example, Madero, who was appointed President after his triumph, built up around his person a ' Maderoism,' that is a group of personal friends who held his doctrines and who believed in what he was fighting for. His principal general was Orozco, who won most of his victories for him. Then there grew up an ' Orozquism ' which superseded Maderoism. After that there was a counter-movement led by Huerta and there grew up a ' Huertaism.' Huerta was superseded by Carranza and there grew up a ' Carranzaism.' Then came Villa and round him there grew up a ' Villaism.' Finally, there came General Obregon, who superseded Villa, and round him there grew up an ' Obregonism.'

This period of confused fighting between these revolutionary chiefs lasted up to 1920. There were then left in virtual domination of the political control of the nation three men, of whom the two most important were Obregon and Calles. As the result of subsequent fighting Obregon managed to prevail. He secured his triumphs very largely because, instead of allowing some subsidiary general to go out and fight for him, he himself took command of his troops and led his victorious armies, and so did not allow any " ism " to grow up round any subsidiary chief. The personal triumph which he thus secured provided a basis on which he was able to build up a constructive programme. It was really under the Obregon régime that reforms in education and land and hygiene began to become facts. Obregon put into the presidency General Calles, who is still the strong man of Mexico, and a constructive policy was followed until about 1926. In 1926 the religious conflict broke out and it became acute with the murder of Obregon, which, it was maintained in Mexico, was directly provoked by agents of the Church. There is no actual proof that that was directly the case. What was proved was that the assassination was promoted by very fanatical persons.

The murder of Obregon, who was then President-elect, very

nearly threw the nation into armed conflict again. It provoked a serious crisis which was surmounted by the firm tactics of General Calles, who made an important speech which may be regarded as the turning-point in Mexican politics, in which he said that he did not intend to allow the nation to form itself around personal leaders: "We have passed from the régime of persons to that of institutions." He stated that he intended to take charge of the nation and to build it up on the basis of institutions. That certainly was a change in ideas in Mexico and through it came a change in the political development of the nation.

Calles strengthened his position by following the tactics of Obregon and not allowing any leader to take the field in his name, but himself led his troops. The year 1926 saw what was really the first vital conflict with the Church and provided the first evidence of the fact that Calles definitely meant to come out on top.

The nation had been given, in 1917, a new constitution, which is a very remarkable document and is generally regarded as such. It has been amended frequently since its promulgation, but it still remains the outstanding constitution of the Republics of Latin America. It has certainly influenced the drafting of the new Spanish Constitution and will undoubtedly influence any constitutional revisions that are to be made in the future in other republics of Latin America.

The Mexican Constitution is frequently compared with the Constitution of Soviet Russia, but the two constitutions are not really comparable for the following reason. The Russian Constitution is a derivative of a definite body of Marxist doctrine. The Mexican Constitution is an embodiment of the aspirations expressed from time to time by the different sections of the people. It corresponds more nearly to the real aspirations of the people. In its general basis it goes back to the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and to the North American division of powers. I personally do not think it is a socialist constitution; it is really a liberal constitution with advanced socialist tendencies, although effect has recently been given to socialist doctrine by the reform of Article 3 of the Constitution dealing with education. The best-known article is Article 123, which provides conditions for the workers such as are ordinarily known in western society. It fixes an eight-hour day, guarantees a rest of one day a week, and a minimum wage, which, however, is not always forthcoming. It also makes various regulations for the protection of women in industry,

and is so popular that one of the best-known streets in Mexico City is called Article 123 Street, and parents have been known to call their children Article 123. Article 27 is also important; it fixes the limit of private property and prescribes the breaking up of *latifundios*.

The Constitution also provides that only Mexicans may acquire land, but, within these provisions, it guarantees the protection of private property.

Although the new Constitution was decreed in 1917, a considerable time elapsed before any of its social provisions were put into effect. This was due partly to disturbances in Mexico, partly to lack of effective leadership, and partly to the fact that, as the Constitution had been framed to meet the immediate needs of the situation, there had been no very clear thinking on the part of the dominant politicians on many points of organisation. Since 1921, however, there has been a very marked development in political and social doctrine in Mexico and in its application.

The Agrarian Situation. The greater part of the rural population of Mexico are peons, who are more or less in a condition of economic slavery. By a Decree of January 6th, 1915, the Government created a National Agrarian Commission, and this Commission was charged, under an extremely complicated scheme, with the division of the land in various ways. That division has gone ahead gradually, though there are 2,780,260 peons who, even today, have not benefited from it. The most interesting feature of the scheme of division was the establishment of a unit known as *ejido*. This unit, which can best be described as a parcel of land, is given to a village, which usually does not consist of more than a hundred families. The procedure is as follows. The village elders get together and make a petition direct to the Agrarian Commission; it is important to notice that this petition goes direct to the Commission, as that makes a great deal of difference to its success. The Government then sends an engineer to the village, who generally stays long enough to coach the villagers in the development of their lands, and then the village is given a plot of land. That plot is divided into individual allotments, but every effort is made to persuade the people to form co-operatives and to market their produce co-operatively. Agrarian reform during the last few years has thus been greatly accelerated. In 1930 there were over 500,000 *ejidatarios*, or peasants who held plots of land, of which the general maximum

area is a little over twenty acres. In 1933 there were nearly 950,000 *ejidatarios*, of which 742,315 had definite grants and 214,411 provisional grants, the latter being nearly always ratified.

The land which had thus been disposed of among the people of Mexico up to 1932 covered nearly twenty-five million acres, but, even so, the allotments amount to only fourteen per cent. of the cultivable areas of Mexico, these areas themselves being only 11 per cent. of the total area of the country. It is not easy to say where the allotments come from. They come in part from the breaking up of great estates, in part from land not previously developed, in part from undeveloped lands seized from private owners or companies or the Church. The Mexican Government maintain that Mexico is still the first country in the world in its need of agrarian reform and that the process has only started.

The peasant has, I think, benefited only slightly from these reforms. In spite of all his disabilities the peon used to earn about 200 pesos a year for his family in occasional services on the property of his landlord. He earns about the same now. If it is asked whether the agricultural production of the country has increased, I think the answer is, after something like ten years of application, no. The Government itself virtually confesses that, but adopts the attitude that it has undertaken a campaign of very great importance on behalf of the peasants and, whether it gains or loses, it must carry out its agrarian reforms.

Industry. The attitude of the present régime is roughly that of protest against foreign penetration in industry, and it has attempted to meet the alleged foreign financial domination in a number of ways. Legislation has been enacted upon the employment of technical experts, upon sub-soil rights and so forth, which is quite complicated and, in a number of instances, more especially in the case of the petroleum companies, has caused a good deal of inconvenience. If the Government is asked how it proposes to meet the loss in industrial development which will be caused by the crippling of the enterprise of foreign countries, it generally replies, that it will do so first by the development of small modern industries, secondly by increasing co-operative organisation of production and industry. These proposals in a country like Mexico, are still ideals rather than realisable facts. The total sum invested in industry in Mexico is about 979 million pesos and the value of their production is about 900 million pesos. Only in the production of food-stuffs is the

value of Mexican capital greater than that of foreign capital; foreign capital predominates in the production of textiles, in mining and in petroleum production. Mexico relies a great deal, however, on the promotion of small industries, more especially those which are the expression of the natural bent of the people, and particularly in small artistic goods which constitute an important factor in the economic balance in Mexico. It is also pertinent to observe that although the Government has very seriously limited the operation of many foreign capitalist concerns, a considerable amount of capital has entered Mexico from abroad during the last fifteen years. It is generally brought in by Syrian traders who have kept almost entire control of the trade in textiles and, in some cases, of the production of textiles.

The actual condition of the industrial worker is a much-disputed point. The Constitution of 1917 permitted the organisation of trades unions and syndicates, but their formation is not always in response to the spontaneous request of the people. For instance, the Government wishes to deliver a blow against the Church: it may send someone with reasonable experience of organisation to the district in question, and say, in effect, "We will organise you into a trade union provided we are also permitted to encourage you to adopt a hostile attitude to the Church." This is an important point in connection with agrarian reform.

The number of people who are directly interested in the organisation of industry and labour in Mexico is very small. About 262,000 workers are enrolled in trades unions to-day, a number which is negligible compared with the agrarian population. But as the industrial workers generally live in the cities and are more accessible to organisation, and as the agrarian population is in a rudimentary state of education, the influence of the organisations of industrial workers in Mexico is greater than that of the agrarian masses. So although Mexico is an agrarian country the organisation of industry is becoming the dominant factor politically.

Communist agitation exists principally among the workers in the cities. Though the communist is not *persona grata* in Mexico, and though the Government has taken quite a strong stand against communism in any form, it nevertheless exists and during the last fourteen months has developed considerably. The President has made several very emphatic declarations of his attitude towards communism which is distinctly adverse to the importation of communist doctrines. A noted labour leader

in 1930 said, "We are not in favour of anything manufactured in Russia, especially since it does not fit our situation in Mexico." That would fairly represent the general attitude of the labour groups in Mexico towards communism, but I should not like to conceal the fact that a good deal of interest in communist agitation comes to the country via Barcelona. The difficulty with communism in Mexico is that it has not evolved a political doctrine more suited to the needs of the people than that of the Government. It therefore tends to become a kind of Marxist fundamentalism, which is fatal to any proper interpretation of communism.

Education. In 1794 the then Viceroy of Mexico stated in his report to the Crown of Spain that there were not more than ten primary schools in the whole of Mexico. The republican governments gave some attention to this situation and in 1843 it was alleged that there were 1310 schools in the whole of Mexico. It is possible that between 1843 and 1867 there was some decline in that number. The next step was taken in 1867, when an Educational Law was promulgated which reorganised education in conformity with the outlook of the positivist school in France and declared primary education obligatory. This Law led to the building, on a limited scale, of a series of urban schools. About that time, or somewhat later, private education, by the Church or by Protestant missionaries, was considerably more important than State education. That is not so to-day.

Although concentration on urban education was peculiarly unsuited to the Mexican people, this situation lasted right through the dictatorship of Diaz and through the belligerent phase of the Revolution, because no one had any time to give to the education of the people. A new movement started in 1921 and, to anyone who knows anything about education in Latin America, it is a very remarkable movement. It had three leaders—José Vasconcelos, Moises Saenz, and Rafael Ramirez, all of whom are alive to-day. José Vasconcelos was the prophet of the movement. He saw the vision of an educated Mexico but had very little real idea as to how that vision could be realised. But he knew how to set it before the country, and that is very important to educational reform in Latin America, which always fails because the idea of it has only reached a small minority and has not yet roused in the minds of the masses a real desire for enlightenment. Moises Saenz was the administrator of the movement; he drew up the leading lines on which it could be pursued. Rafael

Ramirez, who is in the Education Department to-day, was the business director and organiser of the movement, and worked out the details of its application.

Moises Saenz saw at once that it would be impossible to foist education on a rural people like the Mexicans. Unless there was goodwill in the villages it would be impossible to maintain the movement. Groups of teachers, called by the Government " missionary teachers," were, therefore, sent through the country. They founded no schools, but simply travelled from one village to another, giving the people a picture of what education could mean to them. That was the first step. Ramirez and Saenz then set out to rectify the current conceptions regarding the significance of the Indians of Mexico. It was claimed that though, for the present, since they lacked education, the Indian masses might have to look for leaders outside their own class, in the long run the Mexican peasant was the Indian peasant. But until recently the prevalent thought was this : " We the governing classes must incorporate the Indian." In adopting that attitude they completely overlooked the fact that, throughout Latin America, the Indian has shown himself practically impervious to that kind of penetration. The present approach to the problem is that the basis of Mexico is the Indian element and into it must be incorporated all the other currents of thought and activity and manners of living. The Government has accordingly undertaken the establishment of rural schools. These represent only a fraction of the educational programme, but they will be the principal factor in the future. Three or four village schools are co-ordinated into an educational circuit and one of them is made the central school. Up to 1930 the Revolutionary Government had created nearly 2500 rural schools divided into over 700 circuits. These schools were attended by 97,000 children, and evening classes were attended by 48,000 of the parents of these children. This development was followed up by cultural missions, consisting of groups of teachers who have been trained abroad, chiefly in the United States, who go from place to place conducting special classes, in accordance with the latest teaching methods. In some places centres have been established which are like agricultural farms, and, more recently, a number of rural normal schools have been organised.

The rural school teacher is not just a teacher. In the future he will occupy the place which the priest has occupied in the past, or, perhaps, the place which a solicitor holds towards the modern man in western civilisation. He is a government official but the

friend of the community. The school itself is not merely an academic institution. Nearly all have a little theatre for the performance of Indian dramas, twenty acres of land, a small farm, a small carpenter's shop, and so on. The development of adult education is encouraged and the rural school teacher pays almost as much attention to the parents as to the children. He is also expected to guide in the organisation of a co-operative, so that it can be worked alongside the school and the community can market its produce co-operatively and buy its necessities co-operatively. The co-operatives are the weakest part of the whole scheme because moral stamina is required to run them, and this is not very prevalent in Latin America.

In 1928 the total number of primary schools in Mexico was 17,453; to-day the total number is in the neighbourhood of 20,000. The number of pupils has risen since 1928 by nearly 400,000. Twenty-three per cent. of the schools in 1928 depended directly on the Federal Government, to-day the figure is thirty-nine per cent. In 1910 seventy per cent. of the population was illiterate, in 1930 the figure was said to have dropped to fifty-nine per cent.

Foreign Relations. The foreign relations of Mexico are mostly concerned with the United States. To understand the animus which exists in certain classes in Mexico against the United States it must be remembered that Mexico lives border to border with the United States along a stretch of about a thousand miles and that, by the accession of the south Texas to the United States, Mexico lost more than half its territory. A leading Mexican author and journalist has stated the reasons for the lack of better feeling between Mexico and the United States as follows :

"Absence of mutual acquaintance and comprehension has been a source of misunderstanding. The sense of racial superiority proudly professed by the average North American clashes with the national pride of the Mexicans. This is aggravated by the fact that it is not always the best type of Mexican who is known in the United States, just as the majority of Mexicans are only acquainted with the crude North American type of quite ordinary go-getter or the extravagances of the common tourist. In neither case are the best qualities of both nations represented. American financial investments in Mexico have been in recent times the principal cause of the recent spirit as between both countries."

The landing of the American Marines in 1914 at Vera Cruz added to the difficulties of the position, and the punitive expedition

of General Pershing to avenge the murder of Americans instigated by Pancho Villa was a further contribution to them. The subsoil and petroleum laws, which became effective in 1927 but were modified later, made relations still worse than they were already.

But a real change in the relations of the two countries began in the same year when Dwight Morrow started on a new policy of conciliation; just at present the situation is a little delicate because of the alleged existence of religious persecution.

The Six Years' Plan. The Six Years' Plan was promulgated in 1933. It is an interesting plan of its kind and its object is to provide Mexico with a planned economy in all branches of activity; it proposes to provide modern credits for the development of the land, to strengthen the organisation of the syndicates, to protect the country from foreign competition by a defensive economy, and to improve communications. It attaches great importance to the promotion of public health. In education it proposes to raise the percentage of the budget devoted to public instruction from fifteen per cent. in 1934 to twenty per cent. in 1939, and to establish 8000 more rural schools at the rate of about 2000 a year. Last year and so far this year the full quota of schools has been established.

The principal achievements of the Mexican Revolution may thus be summarised as follows :—greater economic opportunities for the individual have been established in the rural communities, especially in regard to the possession of land ; a new conception has been given of the dignity of manual labour, which has a very definite significance in Latin America, in view of the traditional belief in the inferiority of manual labour; there has been an educational awakening of a very remarkable character; a new emphasis has been laid on industrialism; and finally, a national economy has been introduced which is strongly nationalistic in character and prejudicial to foreign interests.

Where is Mexico going? Is the Mexican Government really developing, under the name of Liberalism, a definite socialist policy or not? I suggest that it is not doing so for the following reason. There is no doubt that, in the name of socialism or something very like socialism, the leaders of the régime in Mexico to-day have greatly enriched themselves; the principal men in the Cabinet are the largest landowners in the country. But one fact which is certain is that Mexico is not now relying upon the foreign-dominated capital of the Diaz régime. Mexico

has never in the past known the middle-class capitalist, such as western civilisation in Europe has known. There is now emerging in Mexico a middle-class capitalism, and the middle-class capitalists are the leading politicians. Thus in place of the foreign-dominated capitalism a middle-class Mexican capitalism is being built up in the name of something like socialism. I think that Mexico is not driving towards the Left but is working towards the building up of a *bourgeoisie*, towards a new "capitalism of the Left." The attitude of the administration to-day, is roughly in favour of totalitarianism. The dominant party in the State is the National Revolutionary Party; all the opposition parties have been practically suppressed. The discipline of the Revolutionary Party is very strong. For instance, government employees have to be members of the National Revolutionary Party and the funds of the Party are supplied by a tax on the salaries of the government employees. But, whatever else the administration may be, it is not communist.

The Religious Question. The historical background of the religious question is the traditional background of Latin America. There was constant friction between the Church and the civil power; there was also a constant problem arising over the Church, and its teaching. The Church set up educational establishments, but in the opinion of many people they were not the kind of establishments which Mexico required, they were not the primary schools which the masses required. We have seen how, in spite of the Laws of Reform, the Church recovered political power under the benevolent dictatorship of Diaz. When the Constitution of 1917 was drawn up the drafters looked back and saw how, time after time, either through the manipulation of the patronage of the Spanish Crown or through the manipulation of the laws, the Church had always managed to maintain what the Liberals considered its abuses. Therefore the Constitution of 1917 was framed in such a way as to deprive the Church of all political influence. When the Articles of the Constitution became known they provoked the protests of Mexican bishops living abroad but there were no important protests in the country itself. For some years the Government was too much occupied with other things to pay great attention to the position of the Church under these Articles, but matters were brought to a head by the holding of a religious ceremony at which two Papal delegates were present. The Constitution prohibits foreign religious ministers of any kind from taking part in a

religious ceremony and the Government demanded that the two foreign Papal delegates should be expelled, and they were expelled. The Church thereupon made a strong protest. Obregon replied by inviting the co-operation of the Church in the social aims of the Mexican Revolution. However, a deadlock was created on both sides and the application of the religious provisions of the Constitution was begun. These provisions allow the Government to determine how many religious ministers there shall be, and as a result many priests have been expelled. In addition to providing for the nationalisation of Church property the Constitution gave the Government the right to close all churches except those which it considered necessary; twenty-five churches in the capital are now open.

The Government first demanded the registration of churches. Thereupon the clergy said they could not conscientiously consent to the registration of churches by the civil power. They said it was a question of conscience and called upon all the Catholics in the country to declare an economic boycott. The boycott failed and several priests subsequently led armed groups into action. On July 31st, 1926, the priests, as a protest, abandoned the churches, which were then closed throughout Mexico. This caused agitation in the United States and the Vatican. The Archbishop of Durango made the following statements:

> "Catholic theology teaches the people that it can defend itself by arms against tyranny when pacific measures have become completely exhausted."

And again:

> "We have never provoked this armed movement. But, when peaceful measures have been exhausted, and granted that the movement exists, we say to our Catholic sons who have risen in arms for the defence of their social and religious rights (after having thought deeply on the matter before God and consulted the wisest theologians of Rome): Be calm in your conscience and receive our blessing."

This unsatisfactory situation continued until, in 1928, the armed risings were suppressed and the Government remained in control of the situation. In 1929 Portes Gil held the presidency temporarily, and he started a vigorous social campaign in the country, whereupon the good offices of Dwight Morrow were used to suggest that the Church might find means of conciliating the Government by co-operating with it in its social drive. Co-operation was achieved on that point, peace was made between Church and State and the churches were thrown open for worship.

This was followed in the Catholic Church by a kind of Catholic revival and a genuine attempt to promote a higher type of religion within the Church itself. But the situation again became delicate with the publication of the Pope's Encyclical, *Acerba Animi*, and with the enforcement by the Government of the legislation limiting the number of priests.

The present position is roughly this. Article 3 of the Constitution was reformed about a year and a half ago and was the signal for a new eruption of the religious conflict. The Article had formerly laid down the laicisation of education. Now it reads as follows :—

"The education which the State imparts will be socialist, and besides excluding all religious doctrine, will fight fanaticism and prejudices, to which end the school will organise its instruction and activities in such form as to permit the creation among youth of an exact and rational concept of the universe and of social life."

I have no idea what "a rational conception of the universe and of social life" is, but by the application of that Article all private religious schools were virtually forbidden and so religious education is not allowed.

The limitation of priests is in the hands of the State Governments and has developed to such an extent that to-day, among the seventeen million people of Mexico, approximately 190 priests have a licence to preach, though there are, I believe, about 3000 priests living in hiding in the country. The data supplied by the Archbishop and the Government differ slightly, but I think that the above figures are fairly accurate. All ministers of religion must be nationals. The priests have been dealt with in some States quite liberally, but in others somewhat summarily. An extreme anti-religious State is that of Tabasco, where there have been no public religious services for seven years. The Cathedral in the capital has been levelled to the ground; the Protestant churches have been turned into schools. But the more liberal States, as for instance San Luis Potosi, are fairly normal.

Then, again, apart from the Government's action in enforcing the Constitution, another movement has grown up which is anti-clerical and, in the opinion of some, anti-religious, and which is backed by some of the most powerful Cabinet Ministers. This definitely anti-religious campaign works through various means, and particularly through propaganda of an anti-religious kind against the organisation of the family, against the ordinary conceptions of Christianity, caricaturing the person of Jesus and

so forth. It also works through the various professions. In the State of Michoacan all school teachers have to sign a declaration which includes the following statements:

"I declare *categorically* that I do not profess the Catholic religion or any other.

"I declare *categorically* that I will not practise any act of private or public worship of the Catholic or any other religion.

"I declare *categorically* that I will fight by every means the Catholic religion and other religions."

There are, therefore, two phases to the anti-clerical or anti-religious movement. There is the enforcement of the provisions of the Constitution, which has left Mexico with so few priests, and there is the anti-religious propaganda, which is not official but which has the support of a powerful minority in the Government.

The reply of the Church is rather weak. Its position would be stronger if it were to confess that it had neglected its social duties in the past and expressed the wish to start on a new line in the future. The Archbishop agrees that the Church had very great property in the past, which provided its means of existence, but argues that it never had as much as its enemies have tried to prove. He says that the Church has been robbed of so much by the Government lately that it is in great financial difficulties.

I think the future of religion in Mexico is extremely gloomy. The Archbishop himself says as much; but it is possible there may be a change in the situation. Two things are certain. The *political* power of the Church in Mexico has, I think, definitely disappeared, though even that may be a rash statement to make in view of the well-known power of the Church to recover. The future of the Church as a *religious* influence is a very different matter and depends very largely upon its own attitude. I do not think that the Administration in Mexico would go to the point of persecuting the Church for the sake of religious persecution. The Mexican Administration is very anxious to obtain the good-will of foreign countries, and especially of the United States, with regard to its social experiment, and I do not think it would risk provoking a quarrel with the United States on the matter of religion. It is certain, however, that the present Mexican Administration will insist upon a limitation of the political rights of the Church as they existed in the past. The attitude of the Government at present is to enforce the Constitution. The attitude of the anti-religious community is to use whatever methods of anti-religious propaganda it can to drive out all religion. Between these two bodies stands a group of

government officials who definitely wish to interpret socialist education as irreligious education and to use the great educational machinery to drive out of Mexico all religious ideas.

To what extent the anti-religious movement will be successful I do not know. I am inclined to think that the Mexican people are fundamentally religious. The Government by no means approves of any influence tending to break up the family; President Cardenas said in April:

"The Government is going about to strengthen family ties, making the home an institution protected against misery, unemployment, and insolvency which disintegrate the life of thousands of homes."

This should be compared with the statement of General Calles in Guadalajara on July 21st, 1934:

"We cannot hand over the future of the country and of the Revolution to the hands of enemies. With all enthusiasm reactionaries and clericals say that the child belongs to the home and the youth to the family. This is an egoistic doctrine because the child and the youth belong to the community, to the 'collectivity'; and it is the Revolution which has the indisputable duty of controlling consciences, banishing prejudices, and forming the new national soul."

There is no doubt that the Catholic Church in Mexico, since 1926 and more particularly since 1934, has suffered very gravely. Its purely religious activities have been impaired; its ministers have suffered grave inconveniences. But I do not think it is right to say that religious persecution as such exists in Mexico, though there have been acts which seem to contravene the provisions of the Constitution, as, for example, the Decree of February 12th, 1935, forbidding the use of the post for certain types of religious correspondence. But this decree was revoked by the President on June 25th. On the other hand, it must be recognised that this anti-clerical government of the last seventeen years has done more for the social alleviation and the political organisation of the Mexican people than has been done in the whole period of the four hundred years of conscious Mexican history.

Summary of Discussion.

QUESTIONS: What provision existed for university or technical education in Mexico? Did the young men go abroad for higher technical training?

MR. GRUBB said that technical education had been neglected in Mexico in spite of the fact that the number of foreign experts allowed in the country was limited. A foreign expert could only be attached to a foreign company on the understanding that he would train a Mexican to take his place. Great difficulty was being caused by the belief of

the Mexican people that they could train their own technicians and it affected the efficiency of production; but the Government was prepared to have a lower output if it could secure a general raising of Mexican civilisation. A number of the young men went to the United States for their technical training.

University education was in a different position, though the University of Mexico was out of favour with the Government largely over their attitude on the reform of Article III of the Constitution, and as a result the Government had taken up the position that it was not interested in the ideals of university work. The university had been given a sum of 5,000,000 pesos and told to carry on with that.

DR. J. D. ROLLESTON referred to the International Congress on Alcoholism held in London in August 1934 and presided over by Lord Astor. Almost the only Ambassador present had been from Mexico, and he had spoken of the active campaign against alcoholism in his country. That showed an interesting resemblance between the Mexican and Soviet Governments, both of which were also anti-religious.

MR. GRUBB said that the Anti-Alcoholic Campaign in Mexico was started by President Portes Gil when he was Governor of Tamaulipas, which was one of the most progressive States. When he became temporary President after the death of Obregon he made it a nation-wide campaign. Anti-alcoholism was in some cases definitely linked with anti-religion. A leading anti-alcoholist was for twelve years Governor of Tabasco.

In reply to a question whether there was any particular need for anti-alcoholism in Mexico, Mr. Grubb added that there was a need for the abolition of drinking to excess at fiestas.

QUESTIONS: Was the grant of land to the villages absolute or conditional? If the land were left uncultivated and one peasant acquired land which had been given to his fellow-villagers, would the Government be able to stop him?

Was there any movement for compelling the purchase of foreign capital investments in Mexico? Was the Government contemplating any scheme of that kind, and if so, what chance of its success was there in view of the economic situation in Mexico?

MR. GRUBB said that the distribution of land in villages to the peons was done in two stages. First there was a provisional grant, which was made to the village. If, after the probationary period, the villager showed capacity to develop his parcel of land the grant was made absolute. Supervision was then invested in the local Committee of the National Agrarian Commission.

He did not think that the Government was working towards the acquisition of the holdings of foreign industrial companies. Conditions certainly were extremely difficult for the foreign companies, particularly the Petroleum Companies, and they might become so difficult that

the companies would not be able to carry on. But the Government knew that it had not sufficient technical experience to administer a vast concern like a petroleum company. What was likely to happen was that with the development of the new Mexican middle-class capitalism behind the screen of a kind of socialism, the companies would have to convey their interests to ordinary industrial companies formed by Mexican capitalists. But it would be a good many years before that could be done.

QUESTION: Were the Mexicans attempting to grow crops for export or for home consumption?

MR. GRUBB said that the Government wished to export, but exportable crops had declined during the last ten years on account of the agricultural policy. The Government was trying to improve the position in various ways. Thus in the case of sugar it had established a kind of close co-operative of producers, in which the principal producers were really powerful capitalists. The Board fixed prices, though it did not always follow that the private producers got those prices. Such attempts to produce an exportable surplus had made it difficult for the private producers.

QUESTION: Were bribery and corruption to any extent prevalent in Mexico, and was the Government, in its policy of accumulating capital and building up a political bourgeois capitalism, unduly influenced by political or financial considerations in the selection of the agents of such a policy?

MR. GRUBB said that the Government as a unit was not becoming a capitalist government in the sense of itself forming industrial corporations or making itself the single capitalist as was being done in Soviet Russia. For example, in the case of sugar, the dominating factor in the situation was the concern known as El Mante, which had been formed as a company by a number of leading politicians, and in which they held the capital. These men got a considerable loan from the Bank of Mexico and from the Agrarian Commission itself. Their political position was enabling them to become the middle-class capitalists of the future.

As to bribery and corruption in the ordinary sense, many Government officials, especially in the Federal Government, were commendably free from it. That was because the prophets of the revolutionary movement had instilled in them a real sense of vocation.

QUESTIONS: What was the Government doing about the problem of the younger son? It frequently happened that, when the latifundia of a country were broken up and distributed among the peasants, the scheme worked only for one generation. The difficulty was to maintain them in their broken-up condition under a law of primogeniture, which meant that successful farmers must be followed by unsuccessful ones. But if there was a law that the owners of the

land should be allowed to distribute it throughout their families, it meant that the farms would become very broken up and would become hopelessly uneconomic.

What ideals of education was the Mexican Government pursuing? People were too prone to bow down to statistics and it was not enough for the Mexican Government to say that its educational scheme was founded on liberal ideals. That attitude might easily lead to the destruction of the old standards and values which had been taught by the Catholic Church and which, though they were over-laid by many superstitions, were yet founded on ideals of western civilisation, and to the substitution in place of those standards and values, of a lump of information which was useless to the person who received it. In so far as the present Mexican ideals of education were socialist they had merely replaced the old superstitions by new ones. When it was said that the ideal of Mexican education was to teach a child an exact and rational view of the universe, all that they were really teaching was the untrue doctrine of the nineteenth century, without any reference to the discoveries of men like Einstein, Jeans and Eddington.

MR. GRUBB said that the problem of the younger son had not really been taken into account in connection with the division of land, nor was it sufficiently dealt with in the complicated Agricultural Code. But the Government was now considering the problem with a view to action in the future.

He had no sympathy with the recent reform of Article III of the Constitution. It was quite absurd to talk about a rational concept of the universe. Professor Rafael Ramirez of the Department of Education had said in a series of lectures that the school must be rationalistic, that it must train men of materialistic mentality of logical thought, free from pernicious beliefs, superstitions and prejudices and disposed to fight them systematically and constantly. Socialist education must be "de-fanaticising." Beliefs about supernatural beings and things, fanaticisms and prejudices had in all ages been the most serious obstacle to the economic, cultural and social progress of the country; the school, where the generations of the future would be moulded, was the most suitable agency to free and emancipate the conscience of the new society. By utilising scientific data wisely and opportunely in the different subjects taught, the school ought to free the child from all religious prejudices, dogmas or superstitions which obstructed the free and spontaneous development of the personality and disturbed or hindered collective progress. Lectures, discussion, conversations, dramatic representations, incidental explanations, etc. were measures adequate for that end, without the necessity of introducing irreligious teaching as a special subject.

That was the nearest he (Mr. Grubb) had got to an official pronouncement on Article III. But he admired the rural school programme because it was intimately connected with life, though it did not place before the people any ideals. When the Government woke

up to that fact, it would probably seek to meet the need by placing before the people the familiar ideal of an exaggerated Nationalism.

QUESTIONS: Was the condition of economic slavery of the peons subject to the abuses of the past, which resulted in the loss to the peons of their holdings and in their perpetual indebtedness.

Was any capital provided by the Government in order to make the peons small-holders? Were their holdings sufficient for them to live on? Were they on good lands or had the allotments been uncultivated land before they were given to the peons?

Were not the peons extremely superstitious as they had always been, quite apart from their religious superstitions? Was it not the misfortune of religion in Mexico that it was to some extent confused with the ordinary country superstitions? Had the Mexicans, in largely restricting religious observances, abandoned the services of the priest in connection with the three fundamental events of a man's life, *i.e.* birth, marriage and death?

MR. GRUBB said that economic slavery existed but that its conditions had been gradually alleviated. The system would probably continue for some time because some of the principal landowners, who were also owners of peons, were leading politicians in State Governments.

The Government was unable to provide capital for the development of the peons' holdings at first, and it had definitely discouraged the allotment holders from the use of modern machinery. But the Six Years' Plan contemplated the provision of agricultural credits on a rather complicated system to enable the allotment holders to develop their property.

The condition of the peons' land was a moot point. On the whole it depended upon the local branch of the National Agrarian Commission. In some fertile zones the small-holders usually could get no good land because the powerful politicians had got it all. There were other complications. Sometimes the people would not accept the best land because it was a considerable distance from the village. On the whole the people had got about the best land they could expect within those limitations.

What had been said about superstitions was perfectly true. The Catholic Church had been set the almost impossible task of planting Christianity in Mexico, and it had never been done. The people were really baptised pagans. He himself criticised the Church because it had caused unnecessary political confusion and because it had not done in many directions and in modern times what it might have done for the welfare of the people. But it was impossible to remove the superstitions. The anti-religious groups, on the ground that it was impossible to remove superstitions and leave nothing in their place, were inventing new superstitions. The extremists in some places were going so far as to take children out into the open and perform a ceremony known as a "socialist baptism."

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Any book reviewed in this Journal may be obtained through the Publications Department of the Institute. Members of the Institute wishing to cable an order may use, instead of the title of the book, the number which it bears, e.g., "Areopagus, London: Send Book Twenty May Journal: Smith."

Books marked with an asterisk (*) are in the Library of the Institute.

PROBLEMS OF SECURITY

1*. DISARMAMENT IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY. By Rolland A. Chaput. 1935. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 432 pp. 16s.)

AMIDST the ephemeral literature poured out on the subject of disarmament this scholarly and close-packed volume by a French Canadian, who has spent three years of research and observation at Geneva, presents a refreshing contrast. It is a carefully documented study of British policy from 1919 onwards in regard to naval, land and air armaments. The three aspects are dealt with successively, and the story is traced in each case with full references to the available sources. These are collected at the close in a well-arranged bibliography, extending over 55 pages, which is enough by itself to render the book indispensable to future students of the subject. Particularly useful are the references to Mr. Hunter Miller's *Diary*, which has not hitherto been drawn upon so systematically for this purpose. This brings out, what has tended to become forgotten in the later phases, how closely the armaments discussions at the Peace Conference were bound up with general political considerations, both in foreign policy (as, for instance, in their bearing on the new United States navy) and in domestic policy. Few people remember that General Smuts, in his famous pamphlet on the League of Nations, written in December 1918, declared that the general limitation of armaments was an impracticable policy, or that Foch was opposed to the idea of imposing disarmament upon Germany in the Treaty, on the ground that " we can no more limit the number of men trained to arms in Germany than the Germans could limit the output of coal in England." It was Mr. Lloyd George who insisted on abolishing conscription in Germany because conscription was unpopular in Great Britain and he had thus pledged himself at the election to secure its abolition in all countries, regardless of their traditions and circumstances. He therefore took the responsibility of sending back the military terms, as drafted by the generals, to be revised, saying that, as Mr. Miller records, " no General's opinion would shake his decision," with incalculable consequences for Germany and Europe.

Mr. Chaput is severely objective and seldom pauses to draw conclusions from the record, still less to moralise. But an introductory chapter, setting British policy in its historical and geographical framework, and a conclusion, in which he emphasises the bearings upon foreign policy of unilateral measures of disarmament, round off his record. These aptly enforce his dictum (p. 376) that those who insisted, in

defiance of all previous experience, in making disarmament "an immediate and pressing issue," defeated their own ends.

ALFRED ZIMMERN.

2*. WHEN BRITAIN GOES TO WAR. By Liddell Hart. 1935. (London: Faber and Faber. 8vo. 339 pp. 8s. 6d.)

3*. SECURITY: A STUDY OF OUR MILITARY POSITION. By Major-General H. Rowan-Robinson. 1935. (London: Methuen. 8vo. xi + 212 pp. 5s.)

"THE foremost military critic in Europe" is usually worth reading, and if we do not always agree with his criticisms they serve, at any rate, to stimulate thought. Captain Liddell Hart's book suffers somewhat from being a *réchauffé* of a previous work, *The British Way in Warfare*, with a certain amount of new, and rather desultory, matter thrown in to bring it up to date.

He first directs his slings and arrows against British strategy in the War, maintaining that instead of supporting France with our maximum effort on the Continent we should have pursued our traditional policy of subsidising allies to fight our battles on land, while using our sea-power to pick up colonial plums. But what would France have said to an alliance of this nature, and would it have helped Belgium to maintain her struggle for independence? Alternatively Liddell Hart would have had the British Expeditionary Force at Antwerp instead of on the Marne, forgetting that it was the presence of the British Army on the Marne which caused the German retreat. He seems, indeed, to exaggerate the effect of sea-power, which, though a most valuable adjunct to strategy, can never be the decisive factor except against an island Power.

Another of Liddell Hart's pet theories is the decisive nature of air bombing, but his arguments are apt to lead him into absurdities, were his precepts to be followed literally. For instance on p. 57 he says: "Wise statesmen would give as much attention to reducing the target as to developing their air force." But "the target" consists of munition factories, power stations, ports and aerodromes, which must be multiplied in direct proportion to the development of air forces. Moreover by reducing the number of basic targets the enemy's choice of objectives is rendered not only easier but more dangerous. It would seem that safety lies rather in the multiplication and dispersion of targets than in their reduction. But the author goes still further astray in his chapter on "Air and Empire," and has apparently been convinced by extravagant propaganda of the decisive influence of air bombing on the tribes of the North-West Frontier. The true facts of the case are set out fairly in General Rowan-Robinson's *Security*, reviewed below.

It is a pity that Chapter VI on "The Future of Armament" was included in the present edition, as it was written in 1930 and involves the author in a number of contradictions. He is rather too fond of working off cheap gibes at the professional soldier, and the British soldier in particular. "The armed forces of the Great Powers browse happily in their accustomed pastures, undisturbed by the march of science," and "The soldier-in-office is the Micawber of the modern world" may sound smart, but lose their point when we read in Chapter X that "All armies, our own more than any, have made more progress in the last decade than in any previous decade of peace." Yet even this considerable achievement is "utterly inadequate" to satisfy the author, who advocates wholesale mechanisation. He airily sweeps away all

objections as to the vast expenditure involved by such a rapid change-over by asserting that all infantry and cavalry are obsolete and should be scrapped forthwith. Fortunately for our national safety and for the taxpayer's pocket our military policy is directed by more cautious and practical minds; it might be disastrous if we were to " put our shirt " on the wrong machine. However, the author's theories on mobility and mechanisation are always stimulating, and are well worth reading.

The chapter on " The Armies of the World " forms salutary reading for uninformed pacifists, though unfortunately it is by no means up to date as regards Germany. The author sets forth clearly the difficulties which beset the problem of disarmament, and in particular the impossibility of finding an agreed basis of comparison for national armaments, in view of the different conditions and requirements of each case. As he truly says, " any arithmetical scheme of disarmament is a house built on sand."

Finally, the chapter on " The Territorial Army " is full of excellent points and should be read by everyone, although it is not quite up to date. The remark about the Territorial Army being " one of the hardiest of British plants, as it grows in financially stony soil without even being watered by moral encouragement " may have been true at one time, but is certainly not so under the present Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

One or two misprints should be corrected in a later edition, especially the one on p. 288, which, by the omission of a decimal point, equips our infantry brigades with 8-inch anti-tank guns!

It is a relief to turn from the didactic sophistries of Liddell Hart to the more refreshing fare provided by General Rowan-Robinson. His first three chapters, entitled " Policy," " Menace " and " Strategy," are the best in the book, and most soldiers and civilians will applaud the author's sane remarks on the subjects of disarmament and collective action. General Rowan-Robinson is a firm believer in the League, but he advocates revising the Covenant so as to cut out completely the resort to sanctions, which has in fact proved unworkable, and to reduce the voting power of backward and ineffective States. Like General Smuts, the author would strive for still closer co-operation between the British Commonwealth and the United States. One of his concrete suggestions, however, seems more open to criticism: in order to direct more effectively our policy and strategy in the Middle East (of which he has first-hand knowledge) he suggests on pp. 27 and 28 that we should establish at Cairo a sort of super-Ambassador, backed by a combined Army and Air Force Commander, to control all our interests in Palestine, the Canal Zone, Iraq and Persia. In view of our delicate political position in Egypt, it is doubtful if this proposal can be regarded as a practical one.

The author does not fail to stress the decisive influence of the air menace on our national security, and in consequence demands a thorough reorganisation of our fighting forces. On this point he is almost as strongly " agin the government " as Liddell Hart, and, like that apostle of military reform, uses the air bogey to emphasise the need for replacing men by machines. He also supports Admiral Richmond in roundly criticising the Admiralty building policy, and in demanding that battleships should be reduced in size to about 12,000 tons (p. 156); perhaps the best answer to this is the fact that Germany

has started her new naval programme by laying down battleships of 26,000 tons. The author's remarks on naval policy, indeed, form the least convincing part of the book. After a most inadequate appreciation of the tasks of our fleet he comes to the conclusion that, as regards naval strategy, " the most important requirement for our security is that we should remove our battle-squadron from the Mediterranean " (p. 136). Nor will many sailors, with the exception perhaps of Lord Strabolgi, endorse his advocacy of our abandoning Gibraltar.

General Rowan-Robinson, however, touches even more controversial points when he returns to dry land. " Nations," he declares on p. 152, " will soon discard long intrenched lines and fortifications." The French General Staff, rightly or wrongly, think otherwise ; they may be wrong, but they have considered the problem of security at least as earnestly as the author. In consequence, General Rowan-Robinson wants us to create more air and mechanised formations at the expense of our ground troops; this of course is the Liddell Hart doctrine, but our author approaches it rather more circumspectly. On p. 155 he proposes to " disband all pre-war troops not required for the defence of India and our Imperial communications," although he must know well enough that our home forces are calculated, and in fact are only just sufficient, to fulfil this very purpose. Following many other critics he proposes on p. 117 to abolish the Cardwell System, but like those other critics he fails to produce a satisfactory alternative scheme.

On the other hand the author does not go as far as Liddell Hart in suggesting that the Royal Air Force is capable of taking over the entire policing of the Empire, and perhaps the most illuminating, if unexpected, page of his book is the one in which he demolishes from first-hand experience and knowledge the claims of the R.A.F. to be able to deal effectively with problems like that of the Indian North-West Frontier. " Its pretensions," he rightly says on p. 147, " have been both extravagant and ill-balanced . . . it has continually lauded to the skies insignificant successes in minor warfare, with the object apparently of establishing itself as the Warden of the Marches in all our borderlands." He quotes facts to support this indictment, which forms a much-needed corrective to the harmful pabulum provided by Liddell Hart on this subject.

But the main thesis of the book is a reiteration of the familiar arguments in favour of a joint Ministry of Defence superimposed on the Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry. This idea, which at first sight may seem attractive, bristles with difficulties of policy and technique when examined in detail. Its advocates were so decisively refuted in both Houses of Parliament last year that it is unnecessary to reopen the question; the broad facts are that the conditions of the sea, land and air services are in their nature so dissimilar that no single person or body can command them collectively in war, or administer them jointly in peace, save the supreme responsible government which controls the nation's destinies.

Apart, however, from these false doctrines and a few other minor heresies, General Rowan-Robinson's little book contains a great deal of valuable food for thought, and deserves the attention, though it may not always win the approval, of every student of Imperial Defence.

J. H. McC.

4*. OUR FUTURE IN THE AIR. By Brigadier-General P. R. C. Groves. 1935. (London: Harrap. 8vo. 128 pp. 2s. 6d.)

5. War from the Air: Past, Present, Future. By Air-Commodore L. E. O. Charlton. 1935. (London: Nelson. 8vo. vi + 183 pp. 6s.)

6*. A Plan for the Organisation of a European Air Service. By Rear-Admiral R. N. Lawson. (*New Commonwealth Institute Monograph.*) 1935. (London: Constable. 8vo. 44 pp. 2s. 6*d.*)

On one point the distinguished authors of these three books are on common ground—realisation of the immense power of the air weapon and of the profound change in the structure of human society caused by the advent of the flying machine. Each of them is plainly appalled by the possibilities of destruction inherent in the aeroplane. Brigadier-General Groves sees a remedy in wholehearted adoption of a policy of large-scale expansion of the Royal Air Force. Air-Commodore Charlton concludes that an international air police force is essential, though he does not attempt to suggest how it might be set up and under what kind of political machinery it would operate. Rear-Admiral Lawson, with daring befitting an officer of the Royal Navy, deals not only with the general principles that would govern the working of an international force, but puts forward definite proposals and a plan.

Of the three, Brigadier-General Groves has his feet most solidly on the ground. His little book, temperately worded and buttressed with impressive statistics, discusses calmly the present inadequacy of Britain's air forces, examines the suggested palliatives of air warfare, such as the international air force, only to dismiss them as impracticable and visionary in the present state of the world, and arrives at the conclusion, shunned by so many well-meaning Britons, that only by a whole-hearted national scheme can the immense disparity in the air between Great Britain and other countries be made good, and our homes and commerce secured. He was writing before the announcement of the government scheme to expand the Air Force; that programme may go some way to satisfy General Groves on the military side, but his book shows that he must still be awaiting concrete evidence of real determination to initiate a correspondingly large expansion of British civil aviation.

Air-Commodore Charlton believes that aircraft, which he bluntly describes as an invention of the devil, will soon control world events. He takes the 100 per cent. view of air might, first so ably expressed by the Italian General Douhet. For him, the flying machine supplants army and navy, except for use as "fencing material" along the frontiers and to prevent ingress to a narrow waterway. The world, he says, has succeeded in antiquating its armies and navies. He points out that every nation which wants to compete for air power is starting at scratch, from which statement, given his opinion of the obsolescence of armies and navies, it is a short step to the proposition that a new Air Power to world leadership may emerge anywhere.

Many readers will disagree with his view that air war is bound to be unrestrained and to be directed indiscriminately against capital cities and other packed centres of population. Apart from the practical deterrent of the vast regiments of aircraft that would be needed for such wholesale attacks, human law is surely not to be considered impotent in face of the peril. Modern armies do not nowadays poison water supplies, or massacre prisoners. Such practices have been forbidden by international law, and there is no reason to believe that an

agreement to restrict air attacks would not similarly be respected. But Air-Commodore Charlton is nothing if not thorough in his belief in the infinitely destructive potentialities of the aeroplane—in his own words, that destructive efficiency "is not even approaching its zenith"—and in his conviction that they will be barbarously and ruthlessly employed. The reader is left with an impression that he has overstated his case in an artistic effort to produce an argument that should lead smoothly to his conclusion that an international air force is essential and that the most humane and sensible means of providing such a force would be to internationalise commercial aviation and turn it into a kind of European special constabulary.

I find the value of Rear-Admiral Lawson's book difficult to assess, because it demands prior acceptance of the international air force idea. It is a book for the converted. There are many thinking people, who cannot be styled imperialist or military-minded, who find grave objections to the mere idea of an international force, and the Admiral does little to dispel their doubts. In my view, he attempts to prove too much, with the result that occasionally he is betrayed into apparently glaring contradictions. For example, in one place he disclaims any attempt to supersede national sovereign rights, but two pages later postulates for his international force "absolute powers" in the air. The difficulty of civil aviation would be overcome by setting up a European monopoly, closely associated with the international force by organisation and even by the interchange of personnel. Further, "air police must be powerful and numerous," and they must possess initiative to act immediately, without consultation or delay. Plainly, whatever Rear-Admiral Lawson may think, such an organisation and such powers would involve at least a profound change in conceptions of national sovereignty, even if they did not destroy it altogether.

F. HANDLEY PAGE.

7*. THE PRICE OF PEACE: THE CHALLENGE OF ECONOMIC NATIONALISM. By Frank H. Simonds and Brooks Emeny. 1935. (London: Hamish Hamilton. 8vo. xxviii + 352 pp. 10s. 6*d.*)

FOR a number of years Mr. Frank Simonds has devoted himself to the interpretation of current politics for the benefit of American readers; European readers sometimes doubted his readings, and occasionally resented them. In *The Price of Peace* Mr. Simonds reaches a level of understanding and exposition which will make the book acceptable and instructive even to those who hold a very different standpoint. It is a real achievement. Mr. Emeny's part was to supply the "economic background," which is strongly marked, and the suggestive maps and charts.

Mr. Simonds' aim is to review the policies of the larger States in the light of the severe change in political climate which has taken place between the time of Woodrow Wilson and that of Adolf Hitler, and to estimate how this affects the system created at Paris for the maintenance of peace. The characteristic and sinister feature of the new situation, in his opinion, is the economic conflict between the nations—"waged by economic and not military weapons, but fought in the same spirit as an armed conflict and producing a devastation hardly less complete than that of authentic battle." It is waged as ruthlessly by the great democracies which have kept their traditional institutions, as by those countries which have foresworn them. The effect was more upsetting

in Germany and Italy merely because they suffered more, being less well provided with resources, so that the new economic methods intensified their inferiority. That was equally true of Japan, who being out of reach took matters into her own hands; what Japan has done in Manchuria is but what Italy and Germany would like to do elsewhere. And because their national policies were irreconcilable with the international conception upon which the League was founded, Japan and Germany revolted and broke away from the latter so as to have a free hand with the first.

"Ethnic nationalism," says Mr. Simonds, "had, in the end, destroyed the system of Vienna. Economic nationalism was now visibly beginning to submerge that of Paris." Therefore the problem of peace is becoming at once broader and deeper. It is becoming increasingly a world problem rather than an European issue, and an economic problem rather than a political one. No amount of relaxation, *e.g.*, in the restrictions imposed upon Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, would solve her difficulties. Nor will any amount of peace machinery help to establish political security until the peoples have been given economic security. So far the more fortunate peoples, especially the British and the American, have sought to combine the profits of exclusive nationalism with the benefits of internationalism. It is a sense of that inconsistency which explains "the most striking paradox of international relations to-day, that paradox constituted by the universal hunger for peace and the similarly universal preparation for war." That does not mean that the League is dead or even dying; it simply means that, having been created as a machinery for preventing war, it cannot perform that function so long as the chief States persist in neglecting, or even intensify, the causes of war—"so long as no peaceful means can be discovered to abolish inequalities which in the eyes of those who suffer from them seem intolerable injustices."

Mr. Simonds' book covers such a wide field that it is not easy to review in more detail, but the line of his argument is clear, it is worked out impartially and courageously, and with a wealth of material. Just because it is so convincing the book invites the obvious criticism that it stops where the question really begins. It provides an impressive diagnosis, but nothing of treatment and cure. Mr. Simonds may fairly retort that that is a matter for students and statesmen, and that so far few of them have shown that they are aware of what he has set out to demonstrate. Within these limits the book deserves unstinted praise.

D. MITRANY.

8*. THE CAUSES OF WAR. By Dean Inge, and others. 1935. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 105 pp. 3*s*. 6*d*.)

THIS is a most readable and engaging collection of broadcast talks by eight distinguished authorities.

Dean Inge sets the ball rolling with a wise and witty summary of the underlying factors: economic pressure, surplus population, the struggle for raw materials and markets, etc. "But the main cause of modern war," as he rightly says, "is unquestionably Fear." His views are eminently sane and he holds no brief for unilateral disarmament. "To disarm and trust to the good feeling of our neighbours is too much like leaving our houses open at night. There are too many burglars about." Nor does he advocate scrapping patriotism, which he considers "about the purest and noblest emotion of which the ordinary man is capable." But the Dean offers us no constructive remedy,

except the somewhat prophetic advice: "It is worse than useless, it is foolish and criminal, to make pledges which we should not redeem if the demand were made."

Sir Norman Angell shows by logical deduction the futility of the Balance of Power as a method of preserving peace, for, as he points out, a new alliance made by any single Power is sufficient to upset the whole equilibrium. Unfortunately he leads us nowhere; he appears to rely on collective action to prevent war, but indicates no method of ensuring joint action.

Lord Beaverbrook, with still more ruthless and incisive logic, goes straight to the point; as he sees them, the causes of war are threefold, and may result from depending either on (1) the Balance of Power, (2) alliances, (3) the League of Nations. He indicates clearly enough how the first two policies have led in the past and will in the future lead inevitably to war. He proceeds to argue trenchantly the danger of relying on the third alternative. As the League has failed to attract all the great Powers, "it inevitably becomes not an instrument for peace but a menace to peace. It must in time become an alliance of those who are in the League against those who are outside it." Even if we fail to accept this condemnation, his next shaft strikes a shrewder blow: "The main purpose of the League has been the defence of the Treaty of Versailles. It has been the private property of the French Republic. It has been used to sustain not the cause of peace but the hegemony of France in Europe." Lord Beaverbrook can consequently offer us only one remedy, that of Isolation. Locarno, he holds, is dead, killed by the action of France and Germany alike, and therefore no longer binding on us. We may not all agree with this conclusion, but we must admit that Lord Beaverbrook argues very convincingly the advantages of isolation, *à l'américaine,* from entangling alliances and commitments.

Mr. Aldous Huxley strikes a less realistic note. "All the causes of war," he says, "are psychological," and he would therefore seek "to sublimate the impulses which at present find satisfaction in nationalism and war." His idea of eradicating the predisposing causes of war by inducing a new train of reflexes in the subconscious mind hardly seems, however, to afford an effective antidote.

Mr. G. D. H. Cole is a visionary of another order. The powers of darkness are represented in this world by Capitalism and the Armament Industry; were these two sources of evil suppressed wars would promptly cease.

From this dogmatism we turn with relief to the more practical causation of Major Douglas, who holds that economic rivalry is the most potent irritant in international relations. "It is not the irritation which causes the economic war, it is the economic war which causes the irritation." He joins Dean Inge in putting in an exonerating word for the much maligned armament firms. But alas! we find that Major Douglas too has a "bee in his bonnet"; we must revise our banking system so as to produce what he calls a "National Dividend" which will provide a living wage for all, thus "removing the prime motive for aggressive war."

This economic theory is sternly opposed by Sir Josiah Stamp, who traces the causes of war only in part to economic factors such as population pressure and rivalry for possession of raw materials, but more fundamentally to "excessive nationalism." Sir Josiah Stamp quotes interesting figures regarding the distribution of essential minerals, the

ownership of which is largely monopolised by certain countries, which lend point to the argument for "mineral sanctions."

The varied opinions of these authorities are ably summed up by Sir Austen Chamberlain, who pins his faith to the principle of collective security under the League of Nations. J. H. M-C.

9. DEMOCRACY AND MILITARY POWER. By S. B. McKinley, Ph.D. With an Introduction by Charles A. Beard. 1935. (New York: Vanguard Press. 8vo. xxiii + 313 pp. $3.00.)

THE outlook of the American Fathers when they planned the Constitution was thoroughly realistic. They gave Congress power to raise an army and a navy without any limit to size and to draw into the military service, if necessary, the last able-bodied man and woman and the last dollar in the country. They reasoned that, as the "United States cannot limit the power which other countries may bring against it, there can be no limitations" set to the power of Congress to raise and employ armed forces. They retained civil control over the services by forbidding military expenditure without the sanction of Congress and by making the President Commander-in-Chief.

Jefferson "understood the ancient truth that, where military power is highly centralised and separated from the masses of the people, the latter are in peril of losing their liberties." He therefore advocated "a militia on a democratic basis, so that the people who voted could also shoot and make ballots effective by bullets if necessary." And he succeeded in amending his Constitution accordingly.

The "Fathers of the Republic viewed the question of war from every angle. . . . They believed in preparing for war and for the possibilities of a revolution." Then for a century the subject dropped into the background to emerge again when America found herself economically, if not militarily, part of a world community. In the meantime, however, the fighting forces had become divorced from connection and sympathy with the people. If it can be truly added that

"the technology of contemporary warfare [has] utterly destroyed the popular base of the army . . . *the supreme topic* [1] for discussion in this country is that of providing economic security for the masses of the people and the re-ordering of military and naval establishments, including munitions industries, in relation to some conception of the social order to be maintained and the 'national interests' to be defended. As long as these questions are considered academic, and the teachings of the Fathers are ignored, our civil and military minds are destined to wander in 'gray and lampless wastes.'"

Such is the gist of the interesting introduction by Mr. Charles A. Beard. He indicates the problems and says that the author provides "an illuminating background for an intelligent attack upon them." But neither he nor the author makes an attempt at solutions.

Professor McKinley points out that, having enjoyed a far-flung democracy for a hundred and fifty years, we are inclined to regard it as the normal form of government; whereas, actually, the history of civilisation shows it to have prevailed only in two previous periods—each of some two hundred years: in Greece prior to the Peloponnesian wars and in Rome during the Republic. His general thesis is that democracy depends for its existence on an effective form of citizen infantry that is easy to train, inexpensive to equip and is not required for foreign service; and that, just as these conditions but rarely obtain, so is the democratic form of government but rarely encountered.

[1] The italics are the reviewer's.

The author indulges in much special pleading and in many misreadings of history. He supports his case, for instance, on the German infantry of 1870 though it was under autocratic control, highly trained and expensively equipped, and on the infantry in the Great War which proved wholly ineffective in attack. He puts to the credit of bullet and bayonet the immense increase in numbers in modern warfare, whereas the true cause lay in the advent of steam which rendered their supply possible. And he ignores the fact that the two most important democracies, Britain and America, have relied for their land-defence on small professional armies.

Nevertheless he proves his case in large measure. There is undoubtedly a close connection between forms of government and forms of military power. When all citizens are armed with equal and simple weapons, it is exceedingly difficult for a particular group to seize and maintain control. Such action is, on the other hand, fairly easy when weapons are of great power and out of reach of the common folk and when there are standing professional armies. The authority exerted by democracy, which reposes on a broad basis, is too diffuse for the decisive exercise of force. In protection against foreign foes, it can build and it has built all over the existing world powerful armies, navies and air fleets; but, having from its *raison d'être* no individual aims to serve, its domestic attitude must be that of passive defence. Consequently, when one of the periodic economic or military emergencies offers an opportunity, the autocrat or the oligarchy grasps not only the power but also the weapons; and, by means of the latter, deprives the democrat of the possibility of counter-attack until such time as some cheap and simple antidote shall have been found against them. That has been true in all history, and it is particularly pertinent to note its implications at the present moment. In some fourteen States, of recent years, power has been assumed by minorities of various types, and in hardly a single case have they been dispossessed. In these days of scientific, complicated and destructive weapons, the leader (or the oligarchy) surrounds himself with a well-armed bodyguard placed so as to operate along good communications radiating from a carefully chosen centre. The odds are then heavily against the rebel. Never in history has it been more difficult for the people to regain the power that they have lost. Lenin and Stalin have been far more trenchant in punishment than were the Czars; Hitler far more so than the German Emperors. Mustafa-Kemal, Reza Khan and Mussolini have for long years retained their seats with an assurance unequalled by the soundest and longest of dynasties.

What then is the lesson for us? In Great Britain it would be obviously absurd to discard modern weapons and to base our internal security upon a citizen infantry, for then we should be immediately swallowed up by external foes. The solution lies in educating the electorate. They must be asked to look around in their own country and abroad to judge if a freedom and a standard of living such as ours exists elsewhere than in the Empire. They must be shown the troubles of those that lie under the hand of minority rule, and they must be warned not only against the action of minorities but also against those of any group that may hope to obtain a temporary majority and whose programme embodies the threat of a definite restriction of action.

The matter is of the first political importance. It has no doubt been sub-consciously long in our minds and has without our knowledge afforded the motive power to some of our actions. It may, for instance,

have been the reason of the slow and hesitating mechanisation of the French army by a republican government. H. ROWAN-ROBINSON.

10*. FORCE. By Lord Davies. 1935. (London: Constable. 8vo. x + 242 pp. 3s. 6d.)

LORD DAVIES's theme is too well known to need much further exposition. The application of coercive force, or its threat, is in his view the only concrete and final argument with which the principles of international law and justice can be supported. The problem, as he conceives it, is not how to abolish force but how to use it; "force," he says, "can only be rightly employed when it has been scientifically organised as the sanction of international law in the form of an international police force"; and again, "the application of force is morally justified only in the performance of the police function."

Lord Davies goes to some length to convince us that the use of force can be reconciled with democratic principles. He tackles this question boldly, and shows that forceful systems of government, like that of the British in India and of mandated "backward" territories, are fully justified in view of the chaotic welter which ensued in China after the break-up of the Manchu Empire in 1911. The question of mandates brings him to the League of Nations, which is powerless to exert any authority over the mandatory trustees so long as it remains a sanctionless body. In this connection he does not seem to give sufficient credit to the force of international public opinion.

The author then turns to the place of force in the sphere of international relations, where "we are faced with the task of abolishing the duelling system and substituting a policing system in its place." In fact he falls back on Hobbes's dictum: "Covenants without the sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all." From this he deduces that any international tribunal, such as the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague or an *ad hoc* Commission like the Lytton Commission of 1931, must be provided with a "policeman" to enforce the execution of its awards. This postulates "the centralisation of force under the direct control of an international authority."

Lord Davies then digresses from his main argument to discuss the use of force by political factions or irregular organisations like the Sinn Feiners and Black and Tans. He is no supine pacifist and has no sympathy with the resolutions of modern youth to stand aside from the defence of their country. "The doctrine of non-participation," he says, "is stupid and futile because it leads nowhere. . . . It is divorced from realities." He pours scorn alike on the conscientious objector for his misconceived attitude of neutrality and on the Christian Churches for their shirking of the problem presented by the legitimate use of force. The author proceeds to scare us thoroughly with the possibilities of a future war, and shows that the only logical alternative is to harness the forces of destruction in the service of an international organisation under the orders of the League. The attractiveness of this idea unfortunately exceeds the feasibility of putting it into practice, and Lord Davies skates rather too airily over the practical difficulties. "From the technical standpoint," he declares, "even the pitfalls of nationalism can be circumvented, as the existence of military organisations such as the French Foreign Legion and the Shanghai Police Force amply proves." He could hardly have chosen less appropriate examples. It is a pity that Lord Davies does not descend to plain

realities; he does not even give us an outline of the organisation of his International Police Force, nor does he touch on the many and complex problems connected with its command, staff work, location, recruiting, composition or equipment. But all these practical difficulties are dominated by the unanswerable question whether there exists, or ever will exist, the international unity of purpose necessary to wield such an instrument. The readiness with which the members of the League rush to the rescue of Abyssinia may perhaps give us some indication of the rapidity with which an International Police Force can be mobilised against an aggressor, when it does not suit the individual convenience of the policemen to don their helmets. J. H. M-C.

11. FREEDOM OF THE SEAS. By Earl Willis Crecraft. 1935. (London: Appleton-Century. 8vo. 304 pp. 10s. 6d.)

THIS book bears a formidable title and claims on the jacket to be "authoritative" and a "permanent treatise in international law" dealing with "one of the greatest problems of the day." It is really an able propagandist pamphlet in favour of a traditional American view as to maritime law that has become obsolescent as circumstances have caused it to be modified in practice.

At the outset on p. 2 the author states the issue as one of the peaceful commerce of the neutral on the one side, and, on the other, the use of a belligerent navy to cripple this commerce while protecting its own. A single cargo of 6000 tons of copper was consigned to a Swede (neutral to neutral) and went straight to Stettin, possibly to make the driving bands of nearly seven million shells. Is that "peaceful commerce"? The warehouses and quays of Sweden were choked with cotton, German owned, so that local spinners could not get any.[1] It was going straight into explosives to feed the guns at the front. Was that peaceful commerce? No wonder the United States put a stop to the whole business when she came into the War. The real blockade was late because the United States was late in coming into the War, and we are not likely to forget it. For that reason many of us do not deplore the old American view as to the freedom of the seas, for it is a strong brake on policies that might involve us in European wars. As Mr. Baldwin has said: "We wish to know what America is going to do first!"

The professor need not have been at his desk so long to prove that neutrals still exist. They will continue until the theoretical ideal of a supreme league of all nations, without reservations, and a watertight Article 15 is reached. At present our author tells us the said article is "beautiful in theory but repulsive in practice." Nations, he says, both great and small "have avoided making use of it since first it saw the light of day."

Mr. Crecraft writes of the "American Attitude," though it is doubtful if this exists any more than in regard to the World Court where we see the eagle struggling to release itself from a constitutional network that was a comfortable nest in bygone times. Surely it is a burlesque of democracy when the minority rules through the inability to obtain a two-thirds majority in the Senate. The emphasis in the book on pre-telegraph wars such as 1812–1814 is but the echo of unhappy far-off things. If I mention the American Civil War it is not for the purpose of citing precedents contrary to the freedom of the seas, but to suggest to the professor that he might have given us a few marks for the heroism

[1] Consett: *The Triumph of Unarmed Forces.*

of the Lancashire cotton workers, suffering from the blockade, yet faithful to the cause that brought them low.

The author has everything out of focus because of insensate suspicion of British policy. Whatever Great Britain does is wrong. The world is told on p. 182, that France was given to understand that the British could not guarantee her security in the Mediterranean because if they blockaded they might endanger their relations with America. I thought this read like a point in our favour, but no—" Thus Great Britain endeavoured to shift to America any blame which might result from French disappointment over the British safety-first attitude."

Too much importance should not be attached to this survival of bygone antagonism. We are reminded of a famous professor in a Virginian university who, into the present century, supplied the *Saturday Review* with fiery articles denouncing the United States; he was still living in the period of the Civil War. Whatever our author may think, it remains true that the British Commonwealth of Nations is not going to quarrel with the United States and that war is " unthinkable." For that very reason we are often too precipitate in our diplomacy, as when we made the alliance with Japan and later had to hedge backwards so as to leave out all actions against the United States. So again in regard to the League of Nations Covenant, it is not the fact that, as the professor says on p. 218, that " the British accepted the Covenant—thus hoping to enforce their future blockades under the guise of police measures," but because we thought America was not only the proposer of the League, but in the League. No, the British are not Machiavellian. The nearest we ever got to that was when America sent a ship to test the blockade, and we acted on a pro-Ally American ambassador's suggestion that, as Lafayette's countrymen could do no wrong, we should arrange that the French should seize her!

Sometimes the count against Great Britain is a little surprising. On p. 12 we are told that " the League idea was satisfying to the British as long as they could retain the command of the seas; and as long as they could assume that the League's navy and their own navy were one and the same thing."

If I quote such statements as that " By joining in the war the United States has merely convinced England and France that she was an easy mark though powerful, she has convinced the British that their navy ' did the trick,' " (p. 26), I do so merely to show the sort of controversial method that men like Dr. Nicolas Murray Butler and Mr. Walter Lippmann have to contend with, and not with a view of intervening where Americans themselves will see that truth prevails.

The professor makes his best point, one none the worse for having been made before by the late Viscount Grey, when he cites the precedent of our embargo on arms to both belligerents in the Manchurian war, irrespective of the merits of the case, and says if America had done this it would have deprived Great Britain of all her American war equipment.

It was open to Mr. Crecraft to have written a treatise on the different schools of thought, in regard to the important issues raised by the freedom of the seas on the lines of other works in this " Century Political Science Series," such as the valuable book by Francis W. Coker on *Recent Political Thought*. He has preferred to illustrate how, when the professor turns politician, so much the worse professor. Politically, the very word freedom has been a curse to America, because it became somewhat of a fetish. It almost betrays the author on p. 122 into

an argument for a more lenient view of Germany's submarine operations than for the British blockade! Where is the sense of proportion when neutral Norway lost 49·6 per cent. of her mercantile fleet and more than 2000 seamen, through this fiendish mode of war, and, but for the defence of the British Navy, her overseas commerce would have been brought to a standstill? I forbear to give the proportionate British losses compared to the Norwegians lest it should provide the professor with new conjectures of British cunning.

The thoughtful American view is that put forward by Mr. Norman Davis on May 22nd, 1933, as authorised by the President:—

> "We are willing to consult the other States in case of a threat to peace with a view to averting conflict. Further than that, in the event that the States, in conference, determine that a State has been guilty of a breach of the peace in violation of its international obligations and take measures against the violator, then if we concur in the judgment rendered as to the responsible and guilty party, we will refrain from any action tending to defeat such collective effort which these States may thus make to restore peace."

If we go back to President Wilson's affirmations in favour of the freedom of the seas, we find it is to be "the *sine qua non* of peace, equality and co-operation" (Jan. 22nd, 1917), and again it is not to be an American view but "under rules set up by common agreement." As the second of his fourteen points there was the suggestive corollary "except when closed by international action for the enforcement of international covenants."

No gaga inheritance from the dead bones of history can ever make the idea tolerable that a military power, cutting off all trade on land by her military forces, should yet be freely supplied with the sinews of war through neutral connivance by a sea trade that never existed during peace and when the blood guilt is with that belligerent Power. But before that question arises there is a long way to go. There is the mobilisation of world moral sentiment, the withdrawal of diplomatists, the prohibition of exports of munitions, the refusal of imports, and during all this time the world, inclusive of the United States, will have had time to consult as to what is feasible. CARLYON BELLAIRS.

12*. FUTURE OF SEA POWER IN THE PACIFIC. By Walter Millis. Prepared under the auspices of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations. [*World Affairs Pamphlets*, No. 9] 1935. (New York: Foreign Policy Association. Sm. 8vo. 51 pp.)

MR. MILLIS in this pamphlet sets out to analyse the problem presented to his countrymen by their share in "modern navalism," which he defines "simply" (!) as "the eruption into (*sic*) the time-worn fields of maritime warfare of the intricate social, economic, political and technical forces released by the industrial age," but by which he actually seems to mean naval rivalry as expressed in competitive building programmes, with all their industrial reactions. In his view, though "its principal cradle was Great Britain," its father was Captain Mahan; but he concedes that that distinguished writer cannot "be blamed for the many shaky edifices of deductive reasoning raised by his disciples upon the foundation" of his works.

Readers who have studied the works of Mahan may well find Mr. Millis's reasoning as shaky as any, for there is little support to be found in them for the "navalism," in Mr. Millis's sense, of the United States, *i.e.* their determination of 1916 and since to provide a navy second to none. A closer acquaintance with them indeed might have

led Mr. Millis, instead of including Mahan amongst his countrymen whom he castigates, to enlist the powerful support of Mahan's authority for the castigation. To an Englishman, it appears that Mr. Millis is too apt to assume that what is true for the United States also applies to all other Powers. It is apparently as difficult for an American to appreciate the outlook upon sea power of the inhabitants of an island State which is completely dependent upon imported food, as it is for Englishmen to grasp the outlook upon neighbouring armies of the inhabitants of a continental country which has been invaded three times in a century. "Navalism," he writes, "is never required to state the precise objectives it is to serve"; he notes in another passage that no such statement was ever made public in the United States when they made their great plunge into navalism in 1916 or at any time since; and he assumes that the justification for Great Britain's provision of sea power is as obscure to Britons as that of the United States is to Americans, and indeed everybody else. Yet Englishmen will agree with a great deal of what he has written, notably that the future of sea power in the Pacific, after the lapse of the Washington Treaty eighteen months hence, depends chiefly upon the action of the United States.

He does not recommend action; but he points out that there are five alternatives open. The "Marxist" solution, which of course is not open until all the countries concerned become Communist; "Parity," a word of great power"—Englishmen will hardly agree with him here; Collective Security in the Pacific, by which he apparently understands an Anglo-American Alliance to restrain Japan; a new naval race, unrestricted; and what he calls "the Beard view," meaning abandonment by the United States of the determination to have a navy equal to the strongest other navy in the world, and a return to the principle of providing only such naval strength as they need for security. Mr. Millis looks with favour on this project, though he despairs of its being adopted—it is "too new an idea." But as there is probably no single action that would conduce so much to a return to sanity in the naval policies of the world, one may be permitted to hope that Mr. Beard will secure a greater following than Mr. Millis expects.

H. G. T.

GENERAL

13*. STATESMANSHIP AND RELIGION. By Henry A. Wallace. 1934. (New York: Round Table Press Inc. 8vo. 139 pp. $2.00.)

THIS remarkable little book contains in an expanded form three lectures given in 1934 before the Chicago Theological Seminary, and one delivered in 1933 before the Federal Council of Churches by Mr. Henry A. Wallace, the Secretary of Agriculture in President Roosevelt's administration. It represents many years of thought and study by one who, as he explains, was raised in the United Presbyterian Church, passed at College through a phase of scepticism, attended Roman Catholic services for a time and finally found a spiritual home as a member of the high Episcopal Church in America. Mr. Wallace, though making no claim to be a theologian, has therefore wide spiritual experience, and he cannot be regarded as being other than well equipped as an economist and administrator.

Those who have read Mr. Wallace's speeches and writings on economic subjects will expect a clear attractive style. They will not be disappointed and they will find in this little book a charm of per-

sonality which has perhaps less chance of outlet in purely economic or political writings.

The question which he sets out to answer is " Have we souls rich enough to endure abundance? "

Many will agree with him that " the chief difficulty is with human hearts and human wills," as also that " if we are to continue with modern science and the application of methods of mass production, we must also continue with the perfecting of social machinery "; also that " our hope lies in the fact that the great bulk of labouring men, farmers, and business men are neither bitter nor rapacious "; and with his remarks which find frequent expression in different form throughout this book on the need for " voluntary social discipline."

Dr. Oldham in a recent pamphlet entitled *Church, Community and State* written at the request of the Universal Christian Council, to which the Bishop of Chichester has written a short introduction, asks " What place in God's purpose does the nation hold? What is the relation of the Church to the communal life with which its own life is inseparably entwined? "

Mr. Wallace in this book in some measure answers part of this question. To use his own words,

> " It is the job of Government, as I see it, to devise and develop the social machinery which will work out the implications of the social message of the old prophets and of the Sermon on the Mount; but it remains the opportunity of the Church to fill men's hearts and minds with the spirit and meaning of those great visions."

Mr. Wallace's survey is catholic in the widest sense of the term, and there is a curious parallel in some of his views with those of Professor Rudolf Otto in his Religious Essays, though the line of approach is necessarily a little different. C. WALEY COHEN.

14*. A STUDY OF HISTORY. By Arnold J. Toynbee. 3 Vols. 2nd edition. 1935. (*Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.*) (Oxford University Press. Demy 8vo. xvi + 476 pp.; vii + 452 pp.; vi + 551 pp. Set of the three vols., 52*s*. 6*d*. To members of the Institute, 35*s*.)

IN this second edition of the first three volumes of *A Study of History*, the writer has been able to make a number of corrections and improvements in detail which he owes to the kindness of reviewers and private correspondents. On the other hand, he has not attempted to make the large alterations which might be necessary in order to do justice to the even more important criticisms and suggestions which he has received on some of the general ideas of which the book is an exposition, as he believes that he will have better opportunities for this in the forthcoming volumes (Part IV is already in typescript, and Parts V–VIII are now being written).

The conception of Challenge and Response, which is one of the main ideas underlying the Study, has not evoked any strong opposition, as far as the writer can judge from the public and private criticisms of the book that have come to his knowledge. K. R. T.

15. STUDENTS MAKE THEIR LIVES. By Winifred Wilkinson. 1935. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 260 pp. 6*s*.)

THIS book is a description of student life in three countries, Germany (1921–23), America, and England. It is well worth while for its first, and longest, part, which is an account of relief work in Germany during the period of inflation. Miss Wilkinson had the rare experience of

working among the semi-starving German students who, in conditions of incredible hardship and poverty, contrived to keep alive the faint embers of scholarship and culture. There is real tragedy in her story of this time, a tragedy which is accentuated by the extreme simplicity of her writing, by her absence of sentimentality and her sympathetic sense of humour. It is a story which everyone should read who wishes to get an insight into the minds of the young Germans who have since become the fervent followers of Hitler. Miss Wilkinson describes with a sure touch the bewilderment, frustration and despair which led many to suicide—and many to National Socialism. This was an extreme trial of German youth which was insufficiently realised outside Germany even by those who were contributing generously to the schemes for relief. It was scarcely realised at all by the older generation. From Germany Miss Wilkinson takes us to America, at the height of the boom, and then back to a student club in London. Her reminiscences of America are never lacking in interest and are coloured with a gentle humour. In London she describes, with the same kindliness and candour, incidents in the life of a student club frequented mainly by foreign students on the brink of destitution. She succeeds in portraying, with real insight, the insecurity and hopelessness which characterise the mental background of many students to-day, and which provide a rich soil for the growth of exotic political creeds. R. N. MAY.

16. VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODON. By "Politicus." 1934. (London: Methuen. 8vo. ix + 145 pp. 6s.)

AN excellent short study of Grey, the Man and the Statesman. The author approaches his subject from a purely personal angle. The perfervid angler and book-lover affords the key to the riddle posed for many by Grey's conduct of foreign affairs. For "Politicus" contends lovingly that Grey the Statesman was pre-eminently Grey the Man. No statesman ever lived more truly after the pattern of his own high moral and political standards. "Politicus" admits that Grey was "not made for the rough-and-tumble of party warfare." He does not seem to see that this is not very far from an admission that his hero—the book is in truth a eulogy of its subject—was unfitted for the conduct of international affairs. Essentially there is little difference between the two. International affairs are indeed only party politics writ large and with nations substituted for parties. The rivalries, personal and national, are hardly less intense, and, if the methods employed are more often those of the velvet glove, it must not be forgotten that it generally conceals a mailed fist. "Politicus" is fair and temperate in his replies to Grey's critics and also in his presentation of their views. Opinions may indeed differ on the subject of Grey's foreign policy. Grey the Man needs no defender. IAN F. D. MORROW.

17. THE TRUTH ABOUT "THE PROTOCOLS OF ZION." By Herman Bernstein. 1935. (New York: Covici, Friede. 8vo. 397 pp. $3.00).

IT may well be that many who read this review will never have heard of "the Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion" and that to them the name itself sounds fantastic. Nevertheless "the Protocols" have been a useful and cruel weapon in the hands of anti-Semites; they materially helped to stir up both Tsarist pogroms and anti-Jewish atrocities in South Russia in Denikin's time, are made much of by Nazis, and have

been published in many languages as authentic. Only this year the Swiss Courts have declared them a forgery in spite of every Nazi effort to support them. To Jews they are a horror taking second place only to the ritual sacrifice blood libel.

Apart from the introductory chapters, this book consists of reprints of " the Protocols," the sources from which they were plagiarised, and other interesting exhibits. Ironically enough the origin of most of the ideas, and many whole sentences, was a political tract published in 1864 against Napoleon III's régime, disguised as dialogues between Montesquieu and Machiavelli. This was plagiarised by a German historical novelist who put " Machiavelli's " sayings into the speech of a Rabbi at a supposed centennial Jewish world conference. " The Protocols " were based on this by Russian reactionaries as a method of supporting the tottering Tsarist régime, and were first published at the Russian Government Press in 1905.

The chief value of this book is therefore in presenting in convenient form the materials which expose a dreadful and only too successful calumny. I regret that I cannot praise the introductory chapters, which I found obscurely written and redundant. It is a pity that what should clearly summarise an intricate plot is itself so far from lucid. A. A. MOCATTA.

18*. LA VII^e CONFÉRENCE PANAMÉRICAINE [*Extrait de la Revue Générale de Droit Internationale Public*]. By J. G. Guerrero. 1934. (Paris: Pedone. 8vo. 18 pp. 10 *frs.*)

This is a reprint of the article contributed by the distinguished Vice-President of The Hague Court to the *Revue Générale de Droit Internationale Public* of Paris and it contains a valuable review of the work accomplished by the Seventh Pan-American Conference which assembled at Montevideo in December 1933. One of the principal objects achieved by this Conference was its general approval of the Saavedra Lamas Treaty under which the more important South American States gave their adherence to the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928. C. J. C.

19. A NEWSPAPER HISTORY, 1785–1935. 1935. (London: The Times Publishing Company. 4to. vii + 213 pp. illus. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

A handsome reprint of the special number issued with *The Times* of January 1st, 1935, to commemorate its 150th anniversary. Descriptive of the multifarious activities of the paper from its inception to the present day, it forms an agreeable supplement to the three-volume history of *The Times* now in course of publication. J. H.

ECONOMICS AND FINANCE

20*. SOCIETY AND ENTERPRISE. By A. T. K. Grant. [*New World Series.*] 1934. (London: Routledge. 8vo. 201 pp. 5*s.*)

THE author of this little book is trying to outline the changes after-War conditions are bringing about in our present society. His main thesis is that this industrialised society, relying for its proper functioning on private enterprise, is of pretty recent origin, and, this being the case, can lay no claim to undisturbed continuation. It has been the outcome of the industrial revolution, in its turn made possible by a philosophical creed enhancing the individual and decrying the State. We have, in the author's opinion, outgrown both the material conditions which brought about this attitude, and the philosophical conceptions on which it was based. As automatic self-adjustments are becoming more difficult and as a return to non-intervention is impossible, intelligent intervention is inevitable. The object of such a policy must be three-

fold: lessen the risks implied in a "specialised" system of economics, guarantee a reasonable amount of progress to society, and bring about a greater equality of income between its members. The book is a clear, often suggestive contribution to the discussion of present-day problems, though its historical perspective is not always quite just. It certainly over-stresses the rigidity due to specialisation (increasing division of labour); for experience has shown, particularly in the United States, that labour can be extremely mobile. With the increase of fool-proof machinery the specialised craftsman may become superfluous; his place will be taken by an all-round mechanic, who can easily shift from one trade to another. But these are mere details. The book is particularly pleasant to readers appreciating common sense, for its author plays neither at communism, nor at planning, nor at money-mongering. His observations about the woolly-headedness of many planners and his refusal to base economic policy more or less exclusively on money-mongering are very refreshing. Like other British authors he has had little experience of the reverberations of intervention on the political system; he does not answer the question whether successful interventionism is possible under a democratic system, under which the groups who advocate intervention do not always enjoy the wisdom, even if they have the political power, needed for carrying it out intelligently. The problem of intervention is really a political problem and as such a problem of "pressure groups." So far England has not yet had much experience under this head. If the author does not answer all questions to our complete satisfaction, this is not so much his fault as the fault of the problems he is dealing with.

MORITZ J. BONN.

21*. MONETARY OPINIONS AND POLICY, 1924–34. By Mary Theresa Rankin. 1935. (London: P. S. King. Cr. 8vo. vii + 158 pp. 6s.)

A DISCIPLE of the late Shield Nicholson, Dr. Rankin carries on his tradition of common-sense conservatism in economics. The essays which she collects in this little book are running comments on the movements of the last ten years, and bring with them a breeze of refreshing candour, as well as a welcome freedom from jargon. She is no respecter of persons. She buffets Mr. Hawtrey for his theory that trade cycles are entirely due to monetary policy; she makes mincemeat of the Macmillan Report; she scoffs at the idea of "controlled inflation," whether for the relief of unemployment or for the reduction of taxation; she has no use for Mr. Keynes' new-fangled notion of a monetary system from which gold has been eliminated; and she deals faithfully with the American policy of forcing up general prices. What she believes in is a return to a real gold standard, not the bastard product of our Acts of 1925 and 1928; a strengthening of the grip of gold on prices; "hands off" the Bank of England; and a re-marriage of industry and finance, at present divorced by the present tendency for a "re-distribution of wealth from the more productive to the less productive sources." The disequilibrium in our economics is to be redressed only by the lowering of our costs of production, to allow us to return to the gold standard. Until we do this, "we cannot lead abroad: until we can lead abroad, we cannot have a surplus of exports: until we have a surplus of exports, we cannot regain our ruling position as a financial centre and a creditor country." It does one good to hear so straight-forward a confession of faith. Equally simple is her cure for trade cycles:

" over-production [she says] takes place because on the whole it pays, and it only does pay because the real costs, the unemployment costs, are shifted on to other people. If the profits made in the boom were required to ensure the workers against the ensuing slump, there would be fewer booms."

MESTON.

22*. LA CLAUSE "DOLLAR-OR"—La non-application de la législation américaine aux emprunts internationaux. By Martin Domke. 1935. (Paris: Les Éditions Internationales. 8vo. 100 pp. 20 *frs.*)

THIS is an interesting study of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States and, incidentally, of the decisions of other Courts at The Hague, London and elsewhere, on the subject of the interpretation to be given in the light of legislation in the United States and other countries to clauses in contracts purporting to impose an obligation on a debtor, whether State or corporation or individual, for the payment of his debt in gold coin or its equivalent in gold value. The author, as his sub-title indicates, takes the view that the American decisions have not so wide an application as has commonly been imagined, especially in relation to international loans. The book brings together references to a large number of legal decisions, articles in newspapers and magazines and other publications, in which the subject of the gold clause is discussed, and should prove useful not only to students of economics but also to lawyers.

J. F. W.

23. INSURANCE AGAINST CREDIT RISKS. By Elia M. Shenkman. 1935. (London: P. S. King. 8vo. x + 358 pp. 15*s.*)

THIS work includes a full account of the British Export Credit Guarantee Department. The critical description of War-time and post-War experiments in governmental assistance to exporters, and of the history of the Department since its establishment in 1921, occupies some sixty pages. German experiments in the same field since the War are treated in equal detail; and a brief survey is given of similar developments in other European countries, and in Japan. Though these are perhaps the chapters of most general interest, they by no means constitute the whole of the book. The author reviews the history and theory of insurance against credit risks in international trade, in ancient as well as modern times. He maintains that the proper sphere for the State in this connection is insurance against "political" risks which are not assessable on a commercial basis. He attributes the failure of certain governmental schemes to State insurance against purely commercial risks of such magnitude that private companies could not assume them.

The book derives from a Ph.D. thesis. Though parts of it make somewhat tedious reading, it contains much that is new and of value.

B. S. KEELING.

24. VALORISATIONEN: EINE STUDIE ÜBER IHRE METHODEN UND WIRKUNGEN. By Dr. Kurt Langhäuser. 1935. (Hamburg: Hans Christians Drückerei und Verlag. 8vo. 296 pp. *Rm.* 4.80.)

A critical account of post-War schemes for raising the prices of certain raw materials, whether by price-fixing, by restriction of production, or by control of exports, and whether under governmental, semi-governmental, or private auspices. The book brings together in a convenient form a great deal of scattered material on the subject.

B. S. K.

PRE-WAR HISTORY

25*. DISRAELI, GLADSTONE AND THE EASTERN QUESTION: A Study in Diplomacy and Party Politics. By R. W. Seton-Watson. 1935. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. xvi + 590 pp. 21s.)

IT would be an impertinence to praise Professor Seton-Watson for the high standard of his scholarship and the outstanding literary quality of his work. One has come to expect these from him as a matter of course both as an historian and a writer. That being the case—what is left to the reviewer? Criticism upon matters of fact is not called for. An admirer of Disraeli might perhaps seek to rebut Professor Seton-Watson's severe condemnation of that statesman for having in the Eastern Question "receded from his original position, utterly abandoned Turkish integrity in Europe and consoled himself with an Asiatic policy which he afterwards lacked the energy to pursue to its logical conclusion." To do so he would have to write as learned and able a volume as Professor Seton-Watson and then would most probably fail to convince his readers. At the same time it must not be thought that Professor Seton-Watson is a blind worshipper at the Gladstonian shrine. On the contrary, he admits that Gladstone largely failed to realise his noblest ideals in the sphere of foreign policy, and he criticises his administration in the early 'eighties for being "one of the least successful examples of Liberal foreign policy." The contrast in personality between Disraeli, Gladstone, and Lord Salisbury affords Professor Seton-Watson an opportunity for political portraiture that he is not slow to seize. The lineaments of the minor players in the drama are sketched in a few deft strokes. Moreover, Professor Seton-Watson justly reminds his readers that the Eastern crisis that forms the subject of his study serves as an ominous warning to a present-day world in which a match carelessly let fall in a distant corner of the powder magazine may cause a gigantic explosion. IAN F. D. MORROW.

26. L'ITALIA ALLA VIGILIA DELLA GUERRA: La Politica Estera di Tommaso Tittoni. Volume I. By Francesco Tommasini. 1934. (Bologna: Zanichelli. 8vo. viii + 500 pp. *Lire* 25.)

THE title of this book suggests that it deals with the feverish diplomatic activity of the months before Italy's entrance into the War; the sub-title explains the author's purpose more clearly, but even that is not strictly accurate. The author, who was a distinguished member of the Italian diplomatic service and retired while still a young man to devote himself to the writing of history, begins with a survey of the origins of the Triple Alliance and ends in 1905. Signor Tommasini has been allowed to use unpublished documents in the archives of the Italian Foreign Office, and if there are no startling revelations he is able to give much information on the private hopes and fears, as well as the publicly avowed aims and successes, of Italian diplomacy during those years.

For foreign readers probably one of the most interesting portions of the book will be the author's careful and sympathetic study of the problems which confronted the Austro-Hungarian Empire. English historians and political experts are frequently ready to dogmatise as to what Vienna could and should have done to satisfy the many and conflicting claims of the different nationalities within the borders of the Empire. While sharing, as is natural, the aspirations of the Italian

irredentists, Signor Tommasini shows a remarkable understanding of the case for the other side.

Not everyone perhaps will subscribe to the author's almost uncritical admiration for Signor Tittoni, but it is pleasant to discover a writer, who is at the same time an expert, devoting his talents to serious historical research and finding so much to approve in the conduct and abilities of one of Italy's most distinguished foreign ministers. It is to be hoped that Signor Tommasini's second volume will soon be ready.

MURIEL CURREY.

27. THE ITALIAN PROBLEM IN EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY, 1847–1849. By A. J. P. Taylor. 1935. (Manchester University Press. 8vo. viii + 252 pp. 8s. 6*d.*)

AN admirable study by the Assistant Lecturer in History in Manchester University of a problem that forms the immediate historical background to many present-day European problems. Mr. Taylor writes lucidly and well. His judgments are always born of careful consideration of all the known factors and are supported by a convincing display of evidence. His study is indeed based throughout upon the diplomatic documents in the Vienna, London, and Paris archives; and a short critical bibliography will be of use to those of his readers who desire to explore some by-path for themselves. The work is a model of scholarship, and deserves to be read by all who are interested not merely in the history of the Italian Question itself, but also in the diplomatic history of Europe, to our knowledge of which Mr. Taylor has made a valuable contribution.

IAN F. D. MORROW.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

28*. PEACE BY ORDEAL. An Account from First-Hand Sources of the Negotiation and Signature of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921. By Frank Pakenham. 1935. (London: Jonathan Cape. 8vo. xii + 399 pp. 15s.)

29*. FACING THE IRISH QUESTION. By W. S. Armour. 1935. (London: Duckworth. 8vo. 271 pp. 5s.)

MR. PAKENHAM'S book is important for historical students and, if the right persons would read it in the right spirit, it might become of importance politically. For there are two threads in it which can, provisionally, be disentangled. It is an historical narrative, based on a wealth of hitherto inaccessible sources, of the negotiation and signature of the document usually called the Irish Treaty. It is also a sustained attempt to give to English readers a fair interpretation of Irish loyalties as they were in 1921 and as they are now, and thereby to show the way to that true and enduring peace between Englishmen and Irishmen for which the author so obviously longs.

As a book of history, Mr. Pakenham's volume has great merits. There is first of all the merit of contributing a rich store of fresh information. Next, there is great merit in the presentation. The literary style is clear and vigorous; the sketches of character and narrative of situations and episodes are vivid. The book is certain to be read by large numbers of people who will be fascinated by its literary quality and who will receive from it their original impressions of Anglo-Irish relations since the War. The historian, on the other hand, has been given by Mr. Pakenham just enough to make him wish

for more. He will not now be content until he is at liberty to consult, either in a printed collection or in manuscript, those Irish documents on which Mr. Pakenham has chiefly based his narrative. And he will then feel the need of examining the documents on the English side. Until these materials are available it will be impossible to criticise the detail of Mr. Pakenham's work. It is, however, possible already to examine its general thesis.

Mr. Pakenham shows clearly that the chief points at issue between Englishmen and Irishmen, between Irishmen and Irishmen, were, once self-government had been admitted, the symbols of that status, and the unity of Ireland. The Free State would have remained united if either had been won; but the Treaty secured neither. This made the civil war. The author insists rightly that it takes two parties to make a quarrel about symbols—" things which Lloyd George thought it hair-splitting of the Irish to bother about, though suicidal for Englishmen to concede." But, at the same time, he falls into an uncriticised assumption which fundamentally affects his whole interpretation of the negotiations. He assumes that behind the symbolism of the republic there was a real republic. The republic existed as a tangible reality that could be " surrendered " (p. 194), or " preserved " (p. 312): whereas the Empire was something which Saorstat Eireann might or might not " enter." To assume this is to accept in advance the case of the Irish delegation and, later, the case of the section opposed to Griffith and Collins. It is also to assume a political philosophy of natural rights. The republic existed as a claim of right; but it did not exist according to British law (of which Sinn Fein itself made full use in its various activities) or in international law. Dail Eireann, chosen by the Irish electorate, attempted to transform the right which it claimed into a republic *de facto*. Did it succeed? Mr. Pakenham devotes only one page to this crucial question, although materials for answering it exist. It is possible to separate those departments of the Irish government which functioned more or less effectively (*e.g.* local government and justice) from those which were chiefly make-believe (*e.g.* trade and commerce, fisheries, foreign affairs). Cynics might say that the republic was a " Coué " republic. It would be truer to say that a living Irish polity had begun to form within the shell of the British polity, but that it had not yet come into actual existence. It half existed. And from this fundamental fact sprang all the ambiguity of the negotiations. This was why there was no formal presentation and acceptance of republican credentials, why Griffith delayed to present the Irish plan of " external association," why this plan was never the basis of the discussions, and why Mr. De Valera himself, in his communications with the British, slurred the issue of a republic. And this was the cause of the eventual Irish split. It takes all sorts to make a world, and different Irishmen interpreted their loyalty differently. Some treated the republic as an existing polity which it was treason to deny; others treated it as an aspiration which as yet could only be approached. Mr. Pakenham seems to realise this and says finely—" Ireland had moved too rapidly to freedom to be unanimous as to where its essence lay."

Nations like the English and the Irish, though they may at times have deceived themselves by their own propaganda, nevertheless refuse in the last resort to aquiesce in " legends " and " noble lies "; but remain loyal to the search for truth. Both the English and the Irish should welcome this book because it is an honest struggle to

discover the truth, hampered, as all such struggles are, by limitations of material and by the fallibility of the author's judgment. There are lessons in the book for Irishmen: an attitude towards the struggles of thirteen years ago which may help to assuage the bitterness of faction to-day. But the reviewer would lay stress on the lessons which the book contains for Englishmen. In his opinion, it reveals the conditions of reconciliation between England and Ireland. Those conditions could not have been achieved in 1921. Can they not be achieved now? Professor Berriedale Keith asserts that there is no insuperable difficulty in an Irish Republic within the British Commonwealth of Nations. Mr. Pakenham writes:

> "We put only this question: Would any Englishman be proud fifty years hence to acknowledge that he had had the chance of associating Ireland on terms of permanent and close intimacy with England and that he had preferred to see her go her way, embittered, hostile, possibly affiliated elsewhere; and simply because the words in which she wished the relationship described, while providing an accurate description, had an unfamiliar and unattractive ring?"

Mr. Armour is the son of a northern Protestant Home Ruler, and has Canadian blood in his veins. By descent, and by experience also, he is an Empire Loyalist and also an Irish Nationalist. Repeatedly he asks the question why a Canadian Nationalist can be loyal to the Empire, and why an Irish Nationalist, presumably, can not? In India during the War and after he was a propagandist for the British Empire. His chief, Sir Harcourt Butler, instructed him—"Write the truth as you see it. Facts should speak for themselves." He was happy as a propagandist because he believed that in India the British Empire was really pursuing justice and fair play. He could do his work honestly, without disloyalty to his standard—the standard of British political philosophy and British constitutional doctrine, the standard of Burke and Dicey. But when, after the War, he became editor of the *Northern Whig* in Belfast, loyalty to this standard brought him into conflict with "the gods of the place." "The principles of Burke," he says, "have been used to mould an Empire in every single country but Ireland."

The words which occur most repeatedly in his book are "fair play," "justice," "a standard." These can, he believes, settle the Irish question, they can reconcile national loyalty and imperial loyalty as they have done in Canada. Why do they not operate? Because men have allowed themselves to be ruled by taboos. There is an English taboo which insists that the Irish are always wrong. There is the Ascendancy taboo which rules in Belfast, the taboo which makes loyalty to the principles of Burke and Dicey treachery to King, Constitution, and Empire. The greater part of the book is an analysis of this taboo: Mr. Armour sees here an anticipation of the party-State of Hitler, the technique of stimulating herd hysteria, of destroying liberty in the name of loyalty. There is in the Free State no taboo of comparable power and malignancy. But there is a strong disposition to assert the perpetual malignancy of the English.

The Treaty was the beginning of an escape from the taboos. Michael Collins and the Earl of Birkenhead escaped. They recognised in each other good will, and the desire for fair play. They began the work of establishing a standard, but the work could not be achieved at a stroke. "Many in England did not understand, nor did many in Ireland, and in each country the mentality remained much as before." Since then there has been a slipping back. In Belfast the taboos

have been undermined, but they still rule. And England still assumes officially that the Irish are wrong.

Mr. Armour appeals to the best in Englishmen and Irishmen: "Beyond the present frets and discords Great Britain and the Irish have fundamentally the same ideals." He has exhortations and warnings for Mr. De. Valera. To Englishmen his plea is that

> "The way out is very simple—not by economic wars or lectures on the sanctity of Treaties which till the case has been fully investigated by impartial opinion neither side can be adjudged to have broken. It is simply by an endeavour to apply to dealings with Ireland those principles which elsewhere have been the main secret of the successful sway which the people of these islands hold over a large part of the earth's surface."

Why not take up again the interrupted work begun in 1921, the work of fighting taboos, of trying to follow reason, of seeking a standard of good will and fair play? W. K. HANCOCK.

30*. CANADA, AN AMERICAN NATION. By John W. Dafoe. 1935. (New York: Columbia University Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. 134 pp. 10s.)

THIS volume consists of three lectures delivered at Columbia University in 1934, under the Julius Beer Foundation, by the editor of the *Manitoba Free Press*. Mr. Dafoe defines his purpose as the discussion of the "common foundation of early North American feeling and belief upon which the structures of government in both countries (*i.e.* the United States and Canada) rest." He begins, therefore, from the opposite end to many writers on the origins of modern Canada, stressing not the Loyalist sentiment of the founders of New Brunswick and Ontario, but their elements of likeness to the citizens of the new United States. He is likewise concerned to show how these common North American sentiments, above all that of democracy, played their part in the growth of responsible government in Canada. Yet he makes clear the "universal acceptance by Canadians of the British parliamentary system as the most effective agency of democratic government," in contrast with that known to the world as the American system. In his third lecture Mr. Dafoe discusses some of the issues affecting Canada's position as a neighbour of the United States.

Mr. Dafoe's brief survey, addressed to an American audience, is necessarily rather general, though it is well informed, clear, and vigorous. Some of his statements are rather too sweeping: the American revolution was less simple than he suggests, the British "principle of Empire," less rigid. To describe (p. 35) responsible government as an "alien principle of government" in the British Empire is inaccurate, as his own account helps to show. Nor is the division between a Second and a Third British Empire wholly satisfactory, though it is not Mr. Dafoe's. For if, as he rightly insists, the settlement of the issue of responsible government was "the critical and determining moment for Canada and the Empire," it was then, if ever, that a Third British Empire was really born. R. FLENLEY.

EUROPE

31. LE ORE DECISIVE DELL' EUROPA. By F. T. L. Gualtierotti. 1935. (Milan: Hoepli. 8vo. 240 pp. *Lire* 16).

THIS book seems to be a collection of short essays rather than a connected whole. The author expresses the usual hostility of all

Italian journalists to the "Manchester School." He argues that free exchange can only take place between equals, and when certain countries, either through priority of initiative or through natural resources, are much richer than their poorer neighbours, the relationship between them is not that of exchange but of domination. Every centre of manufacture becomes a centre of civilization. At first Europe was the only centre; now there are America, Japan and Russia. In considering Europe's chances in the world market in the future, the author urges that the people of the different countries of Europe should be taught to think as Europeans in defence of their position in the world. Alliances which leave each country sovereignly independent will never succeed in bringing about pan-Europa; some kind of common structure will be necessary.

Great Britain is, however, looked upon as the principal enemy of pan-Europa. While the British Empire is still the most important power in the economic field, the author sees a lack of structure and cohesion in it, the central government having no authority over the Dominions. Instead of a capital thinking for and guiding the Empire, he sees on the one hand a nation carrying the whole weight of defence, from whom every sacrifice is required, even to the lives of its men, while the Dominions, on the other hand, reserve the right to do what they please according to their particular interests. The Empire has declined into a Commonwealth and Great Britain is considered its slave, therefore the leadership of Europe is not for her.

France having ceased to be expansive, taking her stand solely on defence and security, is no longer the leader of Europe. Germany having been defeated through her mistaken policy towards Italy, the leadership should fall to Italy; but Italy has no raw materials.

The present capitalist system, with its necessity for expanding markets, is doomed, in the author's opinion, to end. Europe must return to herself and consume what she produces and produce what she requires. At the same time a return to individual production would lead to submergence in the world markets; therefore the Corporate State is a necessity, where industry, free from the control of a trust, still has the advantage of an individual head guiding and co-ordinating it.

From the foregoing summary, it will be seen that there is a definite clash of mentalities between the English state of mind and certain Continental states of mind, a mental rivalry which seems to say "my conception of the ideal in opposition to your conception of the ideal." Though this book need not be taken very seriously, it is interesting for English readers to recognise the existence of this challenge to our point of view, which is found in much of the literature appearing in Italian at the present time. G. L. VERSCHOYLE.

32. LA REFORME DE L'ETAT. By André Tardieu. 1934. (Paris: Flammarion. 8vo. 142 pp. 5 *fr.*)

The sub-title of this book, "Les idées maîtresses de l'heure de la décision," indicates its origin. It is a summary of the main thesis of M. Tardieu's "L'heure de la décision," published in January 1934, the English translation of which was reviewed in the July–August 1935 number of this Journal. E. D. G.

33. POLITISCHE GESCHICHTE VON BISMARCK BIS ZUR GEGENWART. By Wilhelm Mommsen. 1934. (Frankfurt: Diesterweg. 8vo. 261 pp. *Rm.* 4.80; bound, *Rm.* 5.80.)

IT is ironic to find an historian bearing the honoured name of Mommsen deprecatingly expressing the hope that he may perhaps

be permitted to contribute his small brick to the great edifice that is to contain the Nazi interpretation of history. Apparently German history can only be written in the future by historians inculcated with the Nazi outlook upon life. It is not very clear from Professor Mommsen's description of it what really constitutes this Nazi interpretation of history, or what causes it to differ from any previous interpretation. Nor, it must be confessed, does his own re-writing of world history from 1871 to the present day afford any clue to the mystery. For Professor Mommsen only differs from certain other German historians in the excellence and readableness of his narrative. An attempt to compress the history of a great epoch into the comparatively narrow compass of a single volume necessarily involves selection. And selection inevitably gives rise to criticism on the part of other historians who consider that their own special fields have come in for too little mention. Apart, however, from certain, perhaps unavoidable, omissions, Professor Mommsen has done his work well. His account of William II and his reign is notably free from the bias and bitter feeling that marks too many recent studies of that monarch's interventions in international affairs. Of the great quarrel between Bismarck and the young Emperor, Professor Mommsen writes temperately and assigns the blame impartially to both men. At the conclusion one is left wondering why Professor Mommsen found it necessary to write his self-explanatory and apologetic preface.

IAN F. D. MORROW.

34. EYES RIGHT! By M. M. Green. 1935. (London: Christophers. 8vo. 238 pp. 5s.)

Miss Green, formerly a member of the Independent Labour Party and now Reader in a German university, thinks that the good sides of National-Socialism have been unduly neglected by English commentators, and makes this modest attempt to redress the balance. J. H.

35*. OESTERREICHS DEUTSCHES ERBE: EIN EUROPAISCHES RAUMPROBLEM. By A. R. C. Jaschke. 1934. (Graz: Moser. 8vo. 263 pp. *Rm.* 7.40.)

THIS is a work of a type in which German authors delight, and in which they have the field almost to themselves. Some kink in the mind of the British public seems to prevent its members from taking seriously these "raumpolitisch" studies in which geography is simplified to a few military similes and the whole of history is surveyed in their light, with charts and arrows indicating the marches of Alexander the Great and Japanese trade expansion.

As a matter of fact, if one can approach such essays without prejudice, one finds there is quite a lot in them. Herr Jaschke's special theory is the old one, that Austria is the bulwark of the West against the East in that unending struggle which for him is history (and Western writers habitually under-estimate its importance); but by "Austria" he means the whole "bastion" whose outer defences are the Carpathians. Austria's rôle is a European one; the function of the Ostmark as eastern outpost of the Germans was only a transitory function of a special stage of historical development, now past. It is necessary in the interests of the world, not least Great Britain, whose connections with India are involved, that the old, larger, Austria should be restored. The turning-point in history, which brought about the present catastrophe, was the seizure of Silesia by Frederick the Great from Maria Theresa, which weakened the German element in Austria and prevented

her from fulfilling her geopolitical rôle. All this is illustrated by a wealth of historic detail and ingenious hypothesis.

C. A. MACARTNEY.

36. MODERN AUSTRIA. By Cicely Hamilton. 1935. (London: Dent. 8vo. 229 pp. 7s. 6d.)

MISS HAMILTON'S earlier books have shown us what to expect from her. She is a keen observer, with a fresh and original outlook. She has a singular gift of getting down to those factors which the ordinary political historian often ignores, but which nevertheless bulk so largely in the real life of a people: youth movements, social work, the character of education, and so on. Above all, she possesses a very easy and attractive style. Her volume on modern Austria is a good specimen of her work. It makes excellent reading, particularly in conjunction with the admirable photographs with which it is illustrated. It contains a considerable amount of first-hand information on the Viennese housing in its "social" and "political" aspects, on the "younger generation" and on various "odds and ends."

It also offers, in convenient form, a short account of the Dollfuss murder, of the new Constitution, and of certain other matters of present importance, such as the Constitution of the *Heimwehr*, and the prospects of a Habsburg restoration; and an interesting chapter on the South Tyrol. It may be ungrateful to complain that the whole book is a little in the style of "odds and ends," as the last chapter is called. Some very important aspects of Austrian life are left unmentioned, and even in the subjects treated there are curious omissions. The whole story of Dollfuss' murder, for instance, leaves untouched, except for a single oblique reference, the question of foreign implication in the planned *coup*; the question of Italian influence in recent events is equally omitted. There are a few small mistakes; for example, there was no plebiscite in the Burgenland, as suggested on p. 222, but only in Ödenburg; the Belt is not the Baltic (p. 184). Much more important, some of the sources used by Miss Hamilton give a distorted impression of many of the conflicts between the present authorities and the Social Democrats. For example, the affray of January 1927, which led up to the famous burning of the Law Courts, was not at all as described here. It was not "a fight, in which firearms were used" between Frontkämpfer and Schutzbund, in which two of the Schutzbündler were killed. The Schutzbund was parading when shots were fired out of the village inn and three persons were killed, including an old man and a child.

It is difficult to-day to get at the real truth of present events in Austria (one wonders why it is suggested that the atmosphere of dictatorship is absent); but records of the past are still available. Where Miss Hamilton has been able to observe for herself, she is less one-sided. C. A. MACARTNEY.

37*. A SHORT HISTORY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. By Dr. Kamil Krofta. 1935. (London: Williams and Norgate. 8vo. viii + 200 pp. 7s. 6d.)

IN this volume Dr. Krofta has contrived to give an unusually full account of the various ethnographical and racial influences which have culminated in the Czechoslovak Republic of to-day.

He brings out most clearly how highly the Czech, or rather Bohemian, culture was developed before the battle of the White Mountain in 1620,

and how flourishing Prague was until the Habsburgs took control; he acknowledges that on the artistic and architectural side great progress was achieved under the new régime, but Czech culture practically died out until the middle of the last century when a new patriotic spirit arose, and the establishment of an independent Republic only awaited the hour and the man. This final success was, however, prepared for by the general economic and educational progress of the Czech nation during the fifty years preceding the Great War. Dr. Krofta shows how a successful agricultural policy benefited the country and how assiduously Czechs penetrated into industry, trade and finance, thus creating a buttress and starting point for a future successful independent economic policy.

The very complicated political parties and their organisations are explained at some length, and the ever-present question of the minorities is discussed dispassionately; it is impossible to ignore the fact that these problems are not yet solved, but when the present generation is replaced by a younger one, which will hardly be able to realise the feelings which beset their elders, things will no doubt become easier. Dr. Krofta also seems to think that religious difficulties are gradually subsiding; this seems rather optimistic, as ever since the time of Huss, religion has been the cause of much friction in the country. The latest phases of the situation as regards Germany are not entered into, fresh questions naturally arise daily and matters are not rendered simple for any government; on the whole, however, Dr. Krofta holds out every hope that things are settling down and that all the powers of the government are definitely on the side of peace and stability. He says of the Republic

> "its social and economic conditions rest on solid foundations, and as it has succeeded in convincing the responsible factors in international politics both of its internal stability and of its significance for the peaceful development of Central Europe—indeed of Europe generally—the Czechoslovak Republic may, even at a period of crisis, economic, social and political, look forward with tranquillity and hope towards a future that, with God's blessing, will be both happy and glorious."

BLANCHE B. TUFNELL.

38*. MUSSOLINI'S ITALY. By Herman Finer. 1935. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 564 pp. 18s.)

WHETHER Signor Mussolini will eventually be reckoned among those who have made or those who have marred Italy is a question which must be left to the verdict of history. The verdict will depend partly on the answer to another question: whether Italy was so degenerate in 1922 that nothing but this drastic remedy stood between her and chaos. Dr. Finer, who has no doubt that Fascism is a demoralising, not a revivifying force, is not primarily interested in this parochial aspect of the matter. The value of his study lies in its searching analysis of the political philosophy which Signor Mussolini represents.

The political ancestry of Signor Mussolini must be sought, oddly enough, among the Idealists—in that romantic, individualistic school of political thought which, starting from Rousseau, gave birth both to democracy and to nationalism. Of the original doctrines of the romantic school he has retained only nationalism. He owes to Hegel, directly or indirectly, the conception of the totalitarian State. But in the main Signor Mussolini is the product of the decadence of political

Romanticism, of Bakunin (justly called by Dr. Finer the " founder of Italian Socialism "), whose love of freedom led him to reject democracy as well as autocracy, and finally landed him in the arbitrary solution of a " revolutionary dictatorship "; of Nietzsche, whose romantic individualism culminated in the doctrine of the superman; and of Bergson, whose Intuitionism was transplanted into the political field by Sorel, the renegade Marxist. From these philosophers Signor Mussolini has borrowed his emphasis on the Will (Dr. Finer is right in saying that, when Signor Mussolini speaks of " strong " government, what he really means is " arbitrary " government), his anti-intellectual bias, and his cult of the superman-dictator. Karl Marx and the Materialists are, of course, his sworn enemies. But he shares with them his contempt for the individual, his belief in force, and his hatred of liberalism and humanitarianism.

Many Fascist writers have emphasised that Fascism is a system of action rather than a system of thought; and Signor Mussolini's biography shows that ideas have been his servants, not his masters. He began, as is well known, as a socialist. He was not only anti-clerical, but definitely anti-militarist (apparently he fled to Switzerland to evade military service); and he was also anti-colonial, denouncing those who wanted a " vast " Italy. The change set in as the result of a period of residence in the Trentino, where he was carried away by Italian nationalism. But in truth, Signor Mussolini has never cared much for theory. Sorel described him in 1912 as " an Italian of the fifteenth century, a *condottiere*." Dr. Finer insists throughout that Fascism *is* Mussolini and nothing else. It has no idealogical basis of its own, no independent vitality. The paraphernalia of the Corporative State are mere outward show, the trappings of the Duce's individual will.

The apparently incidental quality of Fascist theory does not, however, discredit Signor Mussolini's claim to be regarded as a figure of more than Italian importance. Not himself an original thinker, he has given currency to a political philosophy which has captured a significant section of the European post-War generation. Dr. Finer's book is one more reminder of Signor Mussolini's position as the true and only begetter of German National-Socialism. Herr Hitler, unlike Signor Mussolini, has not been content with Hegel's deification of the State, and has gone to Herder and Fichte for the deification of the German race. But in essence he has had nothing to do but to imitate on a more wholesale and more efficient scale, substituting the concentration camp for *confino*, the rubber truncheon for castor oil, and the executions of June 30th, 1934, for the Matteotti murder. Recent Italian denunciations of Hitlerism should not be allowed to mask this fundamental affinity.

This is so important and so suggestive a work that it seems worth while to correct a few minor slips. On p. 40 the " First International " to which Signor Mussolini's father belonged was not the parent body, but the secessionist organisation founded by the anarchists who were expelled at The Hague Congress of 1872. On p. 46 the suggestion is made, surely without foundation, that the German Social-Democrat " Revisionists " took their ideas from the English " Fabians." On p. 47 " Dual Empire " is a solecism for the Dual Monarchy. On p. 98 there is the somewhat contentious statement that " Italy had no clear obligation to enter the War by any alliances or agreements even as binding as those of France, Russia and England."

JOHN HEATH.

39*. THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL POSITION OF ITALY. 1935. (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, St. James's Square. Information Department Papers, No. 15. vi + 61 pp. Mimeographed. 2s.; to members, 1s.)

THE authors of this memorandum start by pointing out that Italy's population is now increasing by nearly two millions in every three years, and that any attempt to raise the standard of living necessitates imports, if not of food, yet of metals and other industrial raw materials. They pass on to describe the Corporative State, the mechanism intended to subserve this and other purposes. Is the Corporative State a dream on paper or a working reality? This is a much disputed question, to which the cautious answer given in the memorandum is roughly this: The Corporations have some reality as organs of information and counsel, but there is no corporative policy distinct from the policy of the State, and no prospect of the Corporations coming to express a will other than the will of the Fascist State. Wind up the Fascist Dictatorship and the corporations would have no life left in them. This is an exceedingly grave opinion.

Through other organs the State collects and utilises the savings of the people for investment in public works, or for provision of capital to industrial or agricultural combines promoted with Government approval; without such approval the capitalist owners of industries can take no initiative. Government organs thus very largely determine the rate of productive activity.

The Duce stabilised the lira on gold in 1927, for purposes of prestige, at 30 per cent. greater value than the French franc. Until 1934 the aim was consciously followed of cutting down costs and prices and, for a time, slowing up public works and production in order to maintain the real value of the lira in correspondence with the nominal gold value. But the policy was reversed in 1934 with an expansion of credit to promote re-employment—the exchange value of the lira was meanwhile no longer preserved more than approximately near parity, and that not by overtly continuing gold exports (as in 1934) but by seizure of Italian holdings of foreign securities (early 1935) and their use as a secret exchange fund.

Since 1925 Italy has gradually, but at the cost of high internal prices, been rendered self-sufficing in cereals: great progress has also been made towards hydro-electric development to replace coal imports. Local petrol is produced behind a prohibitive tariff; petrol costs 3s. a gallon in Italy. Industrial production expanded greatly in Italy between January 1934 and March 1935, but in so far as this corresponds to public works and to production at home of substitutes for excluded imports, more work need not mean more prosperity. Taxation was said to amount to 29 per cent. of national income in 1933 and must thus be considerably more now. Official unemployment totalled about one million a few months ago: the benefit given is small; the authors mention no figure, but the reviewer has heard of 15 lire a week, or less.

The Budget is in chronic deficit since 1930, and much public expenditure, as well as much revenue, is not brought into the Budget at all. Internal national debt is now 105 milliard lire against 88 milliards in 1930, but some of this may be productive debt; that is, investments in public works.

As the authors recognise in a paragraph on the "Dopolavoro" (Workers' Leisure Organisation), the achievements of Fascism are largely non-economic. Order and organisation rather than maximum

wealth is the aim, a very dangerous aim if pursued too far in a country naturally poor and increasingly populous. C. J. S. SPRIGGE.

40*. SCRITTI E DISCORSI DI BENITO MUSSOLINI. Volume VII, dal 1929 al 1931. Volume VIII, dal 1932 al 1933. 1934. (Milan: Hoepli. 15 lire each volume.)

WITH these two volumes the publishers have now brought their great enterprise of publishing the most important writings and speeches of Signor Mussolini up to date. In future the volumes will appear every two years. From the historical point of view the most important speeches in the first of these two volumes are those which deal with the Lateran Pacts; from the human point of view the most touching are the few words with which the book ends—the speech made to the members of the staff of the *Popolo d'Italia* on the morning of the funeral of Arnaldo Mussolini.

Volume two contains the article on the "Doctrine of Fascism" from the Italian Encyclopedia, with the notes and also the speech in the Senate on the Four Power Pact. Every book in the series has been a valuable survey of the principal pre-occupations of Italy and Fascism during the last twenty years. They also provide a remarkable psychological study of the development of the character and intellect of Signor Mussolini. MURIEL CURREY.

41. PERCHÈ DIFENDIAMO L'INDIPENDENZA DELL' AUSTRIA. By Carlo Antonio Avenati. 1935. (Torino: Chiantore. 8vo. viii + 120 pp. *Lire* 9.)

42*. ITALIA E JUGOSLAVIA DAL 1915 AL 1929. By Gabriele Paresce. 1935. (Florence: Bemporad. 8vo. 327 pp. *Lire* 20.)

43*. L'OPERA DEI DELEGATI ITALIANI NELLA SOCIETÀ DELLE NAZIONI; Vol. I, 1920–24. 1935. (Rome: Pubblicazioni dell' Associazone Italiana per la Società delle Nazioni.)

AUSTRIA, Adriatic, Abyssinia are the three A's of Italian foreign policy. As the first two of these books are a few months old, while the last is a collection of speeches by Italian delegates to the League from 1920 to 1924, Abyssinia is unmentioned, save for the formal endorsement by the Italian Government of Abyssinia's acceptance in the League in 1923, which is on record in the third book. When Signor Avenati wrote his little book, with a commendatory preface by a personage of the régime, Austria was the object of the Duce's chief solicitude. Signor Avenati is concerned to show that Austria is in no need either of attachment to Greater Germany, or of inclusion in a Danubian-Balkan federation; while contrary to some Italian writers he further maintains that the union of present-day Austria and Hungary under the sceptre of a Habsburg is not a proper aim for Italian policy. But as the author makes no serious reference to economic problems, and assigns to independent Austria mainly the "magnificent mission" of propagating the doctrines of Italian fascism in Central Europe, an English reader will study the book more as evidence of the present Italian frame of mind than in the hope of seeing clearer into the problem of Austria's future.

Signor Paresce's work is a voluminous, fully documented chronicle of Italo-Jugoslav relations, hardly going beyond the first ten years of the Peace. The author, agreeing in this with Signor Avenati, regards the formation of the Jugoslav kingdom as a triumph of political

ambition over adverse circumstances: "The artificial conglomeration of fragments of geographical régimes inhabited by diverse races, making a political unity where there is no geographic, physical, or human unity." From this starting-point the relations between Italian and Jugoslav politicians from 1914 onwards are reviewed. Italy's programme of expansion to the Dalmatian Coast, endorsed by the Allies in the secret Treaty of London (1915) was obviously threatened by Serbia's design of a union to include all the South Slav territories in a kingdom ruled from Belgrade. Yet Italy and Serbia were allies fighting against the Habsburg Empire, and the other allies had the greatest interest in causing them to sink differences, at least until they had beaten the common enemy. But the Italian generals seriously suspected the Serb General Staff of maintaining a secret understanding with the enemy in order to hold Italian arms in check. Not until almost the end of the War could those Italian politicians, who put the total defeat of Austria before all else, induce their Government to fraternise with the plotters of Croatian and Slovene rebellion against Vienna, that is to say with the intending co-creators of the Serb–Croat–Slovene Kingdom. An unofficial Conference of representatives of the oppressed nationalities in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (Czechs, Poles, Croatians, Slovenes, Italians) met in Rome in April 1918. Mussolini was one of the Italians who took part, and he insisted afterwards that Italy's situation absolutely demanded this strengthening of links with the Slav allies. "The Rome Agreement," he said later, "was the price paid by Italy for the defeat of Caporetto." The agreement consisted in effect in an affirmation of the right of each nationality to form or complete its own national State. The Italian Premier gave this unofficial Conference his blessing, while London and Paris applauded. But Sonnino and his school watched the development with great suspicion.

Signor Paresce concedes that Italian policy was thoroughly involved in contradictions between the territorial claims under the London Treaty and the acceptance of national self-determination for each people. Further, Sonnino claimed that Wilson's fourteen points were addressed to Germany only, but Orlando, the Premier, apparently acquiesced in their extension to Austria-Hungary. At the Peace Conference Signor Orlando tried to base himself both on the Treaty of London as affording claims to Dalmatia, etc., and also on the principle of self-determination as giving Italy a right to Fiume (expressly excluded from Italian claims under the London Treaty). Wilson refused to recognise the Treaty of London at all (because it was "secret diplomacy") and stoutly supported the claims to Fiume and Dalmatia advanced by the representatives of the new Serb–Croat–Slovene kingdom. The story of the Fiume conflict makes up much of this book. The author claims no special merits for any of the Italian negotiators: he belabours Count Sforza with particular animosity. His book is published at a moment when the Duce is perhaps somewhat anxious for the long story of Adriatic conflict to be forgotten, having his hands full elsewhere, in fact with the other two A's, Austria and Abyssinia.

In the third of these books one may re-read the debate at Geneva in 1923 over Greece's appeal to the League after the Italian bombardment of Corfu. Signor Salandra made it quite clear that the New Italy would not accept League judgment on a military exploit which was not an "aggression" but an affirmation of Italy's national honour and prestige. The League Council discovered a way of avoiding

conflict with Italy, by referring the whole affair to the Council of Ambassadors, a relic of the Versailles Conference, with the promise of a report by that organ to itself. A still graver trial of the same sort for the collective system is now in progress on the shores of Geneva, which at best may issue in a similar triumph of diplomatic subtlety.

C. J. S. SPRIGGE.

44*. ESPERIENZA CORPORATIVA (1929–1935). Seconda Edizione Accresciuta. By Giuseppe Bottai. 1935. (Florence: Vallechi. La. 8vo. 770 pp. *Lire* 35.)

SIGNOR BOTTAI'S large book consists of newspaper articles and speeches for the most part written or delivered during the period when he was Minister of Corporations. They deal with both the theory and the practice of the Corporate State, and as they are grouped in order of subject and not in order of date, it is possible to study each section as an organic whole. This method has, however, the disadvantage of preventing any reader not very intimately acquainted with the subject from tracing the developments of the last few years. This difficulty is further increased by the omission of the articles and speeches which deal specifically with the creation and activities of the corporative organisations, which material is to be found in a book, *Le Corporazioni* (Mondadori, Milan, 1934). It is to be hoped that Signor Bottai will in the near future write a book which will make all his vast knowledge and experience available for students of the Corporate State. Meanwhile the excellent cross-indexing of the present volume makes it possible to find the answer to many of the problems which puzzle those who are interested in the new political experiment in Italy. MURIEL CURREY.

45*. LA NOUVELLE REVUE DE HONGRIE, 1934–1935. Société de la Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie, Budapest VI, Vaci-körut 3. Annual subscription: £1.

La Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie, although more than a quarter of a century old, took a fresh lease of life some three years ago, when M. Georges Ottlik, the well-known Hungarian publicist, became Editor, with M. Josef Balogh as Managing Editor. In its present form it is unquestionably one of the best conducted and most informative Continental periodicals, and it has been able to enlist the service of Hungary's most distinguished specialists, as well as many foreign writers. The general purpose is to present Hungarian affairs in a manner which will appeal to and enlighten foreign readers.

The point of view is thus necessarily somewhat different from that of a review for domestic consumption—we all, after all, put on our most ceremonious manners to strangers. Comparison of articles appearing in the *Revue* with parallel articles in the *Magyar Szemle*, which is closely concerned with the same group of writers, often reveals certain differences in attitude. The *Revue* is, however, far from being mere propaganda. It covers an exceedingly wide field, dealing with art and literature as well as history, politics and economics, and includes a "chronique du mois" and book reviews.

The *Revue* is most valuable for all students of Hungarian affairs, or indeed of Central European affairs in general; and for those who are not particularly anxious to seek out Opposition points of view, it also serves to give a clear and not unjust picture of Hungary's problems, institutions and personalities. C. A. MACARTNEY.

46. DIMITROV. By Stella D. Blagoyeva. 1935. (London: Martin Lawrence. 8vo. 124 pp. 2s. 6d.)

This biography gives a short sketch of Dimitrov's early life as a communist in Bulgaria, and then re-tells the epic story of the Leipzig trial. The latter is, however, not as well done as the previous accounts which have appeared in English, if only because of the introduction of irrelevant bits of propaganda, such as the description of some of the police-witnesses as "Fascist-Trotskyists." J. H.

47*. LES FINANCES DE LA GRÈCE ET L'ETABLISSEMENT DES RÉFUGIÉS. By André Rodocanachi. 1934. (Paris: Dalloz. 8vo. ix + 280 pp. 30 *frs*.)

THIS is a timely publication, for the Greek Government is engaged in a rather acrimonious controversy with its foreign creditors over the service of the loans raised for the purposes described in the book. The Greek Government has since 1932 failed to "transfer" more than a minor portion of the interest due abroad: but it declares also that it cannot afford to pay up the sums in question in local currency. And in fact, while the creditors' representatives are blocking the pledged revenues, the Greek Government is obtaining corresponding advances from the Bank of Greece, that is, in effect, expending them. The answer to complaints of the creditors is that the Government cannot avoid an active spending programme for defence and social purposes. New Greece's social problem is peculiar, in that virtually the same territory now has to support thirty per cent. more population than in 1922 through the immigration of refugees from Turkey. A million refugees entered the country late in 1922, and another half million from 1923 to 1925. To cope with their establishment Greece borrowed £12,000,000 at an effective interest rate of nearly 8¾ per cent., and in 1928 a further £6,500,000 at an effective 7 per cent. Mr. Rodocanachi claims that such interest rates were always excessive and are now intolerable, in view of the frustration of income expectations through the price fall. The creditors also concede this, but on the question by how much they should be reduced, disagreement is complete.

C. J. S. SPRIGGE.

48*. POLAND. By E. J. Patterson. [*Modern States Series*, No. 6.] 1934. (London: Arrowsmith. 8vo. ix + 152 pp. 3s. 6d.)

THIS is an admirable little volume for anyone desirous of learning something about the character and working of the new Polish Republic. Mr. Patterson's account of recent Polish history is objective and his presentation of controversial issues, like the German-Polish dispute, scrupulously fair. There could hardly be a better account, for example, of the Danzig question within the very restricted scope of ten short pages. Some "Bibliographical Notes" will guide the footsteps of those previously unacquainted with the maze of propagandist literature that has sprung up on the subject of Polish-German relations in recent years. A railway as well as a sketch map of Poland add still further to the usefulness of an excellent handbook. I. F. D. M.

49. PADEREWSKI. By Rom Landau. 1934. (London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson. 8vo. 292 pp. 18s.)

THERE could be no more difficult subject for a biographer than to write the life of the man who largely contributed to restore his native country to its former place among the European nations and who is also the greatest living pianist. The musician or the statesman will occupy the forefront of the picture in response to the personal pre-

dilections of the biographer. In Mr. Landau's biography it is the former Prime Minister of Poland whose lineaments are drawn forcibly and sympathetically. The account of M. Paderewski's political activities on behalf of Poland from the outbreak of war until his resignation from the Premiership in 1919 is interesting and well-balanced. Mr. Landau also contrives to reveal very clearly the incompatibility of temperament existing between the two greatest Poles of their day, Paderewski and Pilsudski. A reader soon comes to understand why Pilsudski triumphed and Paderewski returned to Switzerland and the piano that had been his lifelong companion. There is little that is new in this graphic biography for readers already acquainted with the tangled web of Polish politics. Nevertheless it may be read with profit at the moment when Marshal Pilsudski's death leaves the political stage vacant in that country. I. F. D. M.

50. LE MARÉCHAL PILSUDSKI. By Paul Bartel. 1935. (Paris: Plon. 8vo. viii + 251 pp. 13 *frs.* 50.)

A good popular biography in the French manner, full of rhetorical laudation, but devoid of any serious critical value. J. H.

U.S.S.R.

51. MOSCOW MIRAGE. By J. H. Rubin. 1935. (London: Geoffrey Bles. 8vo. 320 pp. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

52. THE TRAVELLER'S RUSSIA. By Burton Holmes. 1935. (New York and London: Putnam. 8vo. x + 246 pp. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

53. RUSSIA THEN AND NOW. By Brigadier-General Waters. 1935. (London: John Murray. 8vo. xv + 308 pp. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

Moscow Mirage is written in a lively sensational style which suggests that the principal aim of the writer has been to produce a vivid and readable narrative. It is pretty clearly a blend of fact and fiction of a kind which has become of late inconveniently common. In the absence of any criterion to aid in disentangling the two elements, it is impossible to assess the value of the book as evidence.

Mr. Rubin belongs to the large class of Russian Jews who settled in America in childhood and have since returned to visit the land of their birth. He landed at Odessa early in 1920, was imprisoned under the Denikin régime for being in possession of letters of introduction from American comrades to Lenin and Trotsky, served in the subsequent Soviet administration of the town, and then moved on to Moscow. There is an unconventional but convincingly human picture of Lenin, tired and irritated at being made the butt of useless interviews by inquisitive foreigners. Stalin appears as an unimpressive individual whom Mr. Rubin beat at chess. A conversation with John Reed shortly before the latter's death has a less authentic ring.

Mr. Rubin ends by describing how he secretly revisited the Soviet Union ten years later disguised as a Latvian doctor and " clothed completely in native Latvian dress." But here he is manifestly pulling the reader's leg.

The preface to *Traveller's Russia* refers to the non-existence of a Baedeker of the Soviet Union and to the deficiencies of the official Intourist Guide. This is however not a guide-book, but the record by a professional American traveller and lecturer of an Intourist trip to Russia. Its most attractive feature is a large number of excellent photographs. Mr. Holmes had visited Russia in 1901, and is able to accompany the inevitable comments on dirt and sanitation with the consoling reflection that things were just as bad before the revolution.

He is apt to be unduly sentimental about edifices which the Soviet authorities have pulled down. Many of them, like the Alexander II monument in the Kremlin, were artistic monstrosities.

The author of *Russia Then and Now* first went to Russia in 1888, was Military Attaché to the Embassy at Petersburg in the 'nineties, and was on a military mission in Russia during the War. He revisited the country, for the first time for eighteen years, in the summer of 1934. General Waters seems unable to get over his own surprise that a General, who had been closely associated with the old régime, should be broad-minded enough to look with a sympathetic eye on the Soviet experiment. The reader may share this surprise. But once it has been expressed, there is nothing else to be said about a purely superficial book.

JOHN HEATH.

AFRICA

54*. THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION. By W. P. M. Kennedy and H. J. Schlosberg. 1935. (Oxford University Press. 8vo. xxxix + 640 pp. 36s.)

MUCH interest and value attach to the first full treatment of the constitution of the Union of South Africa in the light of its actual operation. It is instructive to note how much, in various ways, the progress of the constitution has departed from what was expected by its authors. The provincial system has worked in one essential quite differently from what was desired and planned. It was hoped to eliminate the working of the ordinary party motives, but in fact this idea has not been realised, and the elections have normally been governed by party considerations of the usual type. Unexpectedly also this fact has from time to time given the Administrator the interesting but unusual duty of virtually controlling policy, when the Council itself has been equally divided in points of view. The authors recognise the difficulty of the position regarding the provinces, and make some interesting suggestions regarding the definition of their powers. It may be feared that their suggestions and those of the latest governmental investigations will be slow to be carried into effect.

On the vexed issues of the right of secession and neutrality the authors are eminently conservative in outlook, and this is unquestionably the proper attitude for an authoritative text-book of this kind. They are not prepared to concede that the position is vitally altered by the Status of the Union Act, 1934, taken in conjunction with the Royal Executive Functions and Seals Act, 1934. These measures, however, are of fundamental importance in regard to both these issues, for they minimise the technical difficulties which, prior to their enactment, might have attended action in either sense. In law there is nothing now to prevent the Governor-General from issuing a proclamation of neutrality on the advice of ministers or from signing a bill for secession, whatever the effect of such action on his part might be. In a very real sense, therefore, General Hertzog has redeemed his pledge to the Nationalists to legislate in order to place beyond legal doubt the issues of the divisibility of the Crown and the right of the Union to secede from the Commonwealth or to remain neutral in a British war. His aim, no doubt, in this action is to meet the suggestions of those who deny that the Union is really free so long as there are legal boundaries to her action, but it is plain that the mere absence of theoretic limitations will not reconcile republicans to anything short of formal republican status.

On the vexed issue of the government of the natives the authors give much sound information, perhaps too fully transcribed from the Official Year Book. They point out the serious inroads on liberty involved in the recent legislation of General Hertzog's régime. The Union, in fact, is laying aside as regards natives the doctrines of the rule of law as understood in Great Britain. That implies that the executive should have only strictly limited discretionary powers to affect either individual liberty or property, and the native régime in the union is rapidly ignoring this principle. Nor is there any sign that any solution is being found for the fundamental contradiction involved in seeking to develop society on the basis of the permanent inferiority of all members of the native race. It is not surprising that Tshekedi Khama and his people, as well as those of Basutoland and Swaziland, view with much dissatisfaction the prospect of transfer from British to Union control.

It would have been interesting also to know more of the exercise of martial law in the Union; there is abundant material available locally, but perhaps the subject may have been regarded as dangerously controversial. A. BERRIEDALE KEITH.

55*. WHITE MAN'S COUNTRY: Lord Delamere and the Making of Kenya. By Elspeth Huxley. 2 vols. 1935. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. 315, 333 pp. 25s.)

THE white settlement in Kenya is Lord Delamere's monument. He was its inspirer and its leader; and this book, tendencious and provocative as it is in places, brings out clearly the secret of his success. All his energies and resources were concentrated on the one object, which he pursued relentlessly, with no thought of his own personal safety or advantage. How he survived, either physically or financially, to the age of 61 will always be one of the mysteries of the period. But survive he did, carrying on his manifold activities to the end. His combination of active politics and large agrarian operations laid him open to various accusations of looking after his own interests at the expense of those of the public. Never was there the smallest justification for them. He leaves the stage entirely unscathed, and one is left with the impression of a man with an over-mastering passion which left no room for such trivialities as personal aggrandisement. That these accusations were made was typical of the atmosphere of conflict in which the Kenya controversy was conducted. Mrs. Huxley's book is a reflection of it. It is a continual discharge of light, albeit effective, artillery in defence of her case. The settlers were always on the defensive. That was the tragedy of the situation as Delamere saw:—

"I am always afraid of fear as an ingredient of policy. It is the most unreasonable and the most cruel of all human qualities. The progress and development of Eastern Africa has been held back by fear of three things in the last few years. Fear that Tanganyika would be handed back to the Germans—fear of an all-black policy which would submerge the Europeans—fear of swamping from Asia."

To this Mrs. Huxley adds her own testimony:—

"It was fear that had prompted them (the settlers) in the first place to ask for political powers, which reason should have told them were still beyond their powers."

She draws a parallel between the settlers' demands and the grievances of the American colonists at the time of the revolution:—

"Although the white population is far too small, the black masses far too large, for self-government to be anywhere within reach, that does not prevent

the same policies which stung America to revolt a century and a half ago from jangling East Africa's nerves to-day."

And so also did Delamere define the issue in 1920:—

"Financial action by the Secretary of State should begin and end in vetoing expenditure which would entail a grant-in-aid from the Imperial Treasury, the prevention of unfair taxation of natives, in seeing that this country fulfils its contracts, and in straightening out the exchange and the treaties. All other financial action should be transferred to the Legislative Council here. Every effort should be made to see that all financial problems are discussed openly and that they are not settled beforehand in confidential despatches."

Under Sir R. Coryndon and Sir E. Grigg "government by agreement" on these lines was more or less established, by, for example, referring the estimates for criticism to a Select Committee. It was the departure from this practice in 1931, which, according to Mrs. Huxley, embittered the last few months of Delamere's life. He saw in it the destruction of the system which he had worked so hard to build up, and the antagonisation of the colonists at a time when their goodwill was most needed, owing to the depression.

Is it too much to hope that some working arrangement, based on the admitted inadequacy of the settler population for self-government and its natural desire to be consulted on matters which so closely affect it, may not be arrived at for the benefit of all, including the Natives? We welcome Mrs. Huxley's book as a contribution to this end. It sets out the settler's case, to which every attention is due.

H. A. WYNDHAM.

56. ABYSSINIA AND ITALY. Information Department Paper No. 16. 2nd edition (printed), August 16th, 1935. (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 10 St. James's Square, S.W.1. 8vo. 47 pp. 2 maps. 2*s*. To members of the Institute, 1*s*.)

CHATHAM HOUSE has done well to issue this Memorandum. Despite compression it is comprehensive, informative and coldly impartial, and is the more useful in that it supplies the historical background essential to the judgment of disputes confused by rival claims and conflicting pretensions. Out of the Memorandum there emerge several salient points: notably, the intention in the past of Great Britain, France and Italy to maintain Abyssinian integrity, the desire of the first two Powers, particularly since 1919, to support Italian economic aspirations in North and East Africa, the anxiety of Great Britain to control Lake Tana in the common interest of the Sudan and Egypt, and the stubborn personality of Tafari the Negus. Part II of the Memorandum reviews the internal condition of Abyssinia and Tafari's administrative reforms. There is still much to be done. Slavery persists, military organisation languishes. Part III recounts the history of the Walwal incident, Abyssinia's appeal to Geneva, and the respective reactions of Great Britain and Italy. In each instance the facts are fairly stated, and Italy cannot complain of the presentment of her case. Some references to the physical geography of Abyssinia and her capacity for defence would have been acceptable. For example, Is the Abyssinian the master of guerilla warfare that common report declares? History is doubtful. P. G. ELGOOD.

57*. LIBERIA IN WORLD POLITICS. By Nnamdi Azikiwe. (London: Arthur H. Stockwell. 8vo. 406 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

THIS is the first book to present with any authority the Liberian case, the case for a country guilty in the past of much corruption, some excesses, and a general failure to live up to the ideal of its founders.

Mr. Azikiwe's study will encourage those of us who believe that the experiment may yet succeed.

There is plenty of good human material in Liberia waiting to be used, not only among the natives of the interior but among the few Liberians on the coast uncorrupted by the common notion of politics as a kind of "crap" game to be played with loaded dice. There are signs that the present Government is realising its responsibility better than its predecessor. Most of the abuses to which the Commission of the League of Nations called attention five years ago have been remedied (Mr. Azikiwe is right to point out that the chief abuse, the shipping of forced labour to Fernando Po, was as much Spain's responsibility as Liberia's), though Mr. Azikiwe is incorrect when he states that "forced labour on the roads and for other purposes, be they private or public, is no longer permitted under legal or Government sanction." Government officials are granted "privileges" in the way of free food and free labour, and in any case no law really runs in the hinterland; the native is at the mercy of the district commissioner, and so he will continue to be, while many days of travel by rough tracks separate him from the capital. The reviewer has met five, he imagines representative, district commissioners in the hinterland; one was an outstandingly fair and able man; two, more or less uneducated natives, gave an impression of honest stupidity; two were corrupt and despotic.

The only crime which can be traced to the present Government and which does not go back to President King's administration is the conduct of the Kru war under Colonel Elwood Davis. No good has been done by such extreme accusations as were made in the House of Lords. There were excesses, but Colonel Davis is not the "buccaneer" of Lord Cecil's description. Fear and bad discipline, a failure in *morale* which is not uncommon in African warfare, were responsible for the deaths of women and children; there was certainly no previously prepared plan of terrorisation. Mr. Azikiwe's account of this affair is on the whole adequate. Its bias corrects a previous bias.

His book is most valuable for its account of Liberia's foreign loans. Liberia has no mother-country to invest money in her development; again and again she has been forced to borrow on emergency terms. Each fresh loan has been largely spent in wiping out the previous indebtedness, leaving an almost useless surplus on which a swollen interest has had to be paid. In this book we see the tragedy of a country in the hands of moneylenders, and Mr. Azikiwe's attack on the Firestone loan and concession, a hard bargain and an unconstitutional concession, is not unjustified. GRAHAM GREENE.

58*. DISCOURS PRONONCÉ PAR M. J. BRÉVIÉ À L'OUVERTURE DE LA SESSION DU CONSEIL DE GOUVERNEMENT (FRENCH WEST AFRICA), DECEMBRE 1934. 84 pp.

THIS interesting and informative review of French West Africa during the year 1934 was delivered by the Governor-General at the opening of the Conseil de Gouvernement. The economic difficulties of the territories are described, and the necessity of reorganising the administration in order to bring it into closer touch with the people in spite of the reductions in personnel which the necessity of economising has imposed. The policy of reconstituting Native governments which were too hastily dismantled, and of ruling through the authority of the chiefs is emphasised. There are sections on the administration

of justice, education, and medical services. In his conclusion M. Brévié reasserts the unity of the French Empire. There is no distinction between metropolitan and colonial interests, but only French interests, and he states certain postulates which are necessary to make this unity effective.

"The Great War brought 200,000 combatants from overseas into France. The great crisis has proved that the faithfulness of the colonies is the best guarantee of the stability of the national economy."

H. A. WYNDHAM.

THE FAR EAST AND THE PACIFIC

59*. THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE JAPANESE–AMERICAN CRISES. By Thomas A. Bailey. 1934. (California: Stanford University Press. London: Oxford University Press. 8vo. x + 353 pp. 13*s*. 6*d*.)

ON February 23rd, 1905, just before the battle of Mukden, the *San Francisco Chronicle* formally launched the anti-Japanese campaign of that year by printing a nine-column article, flamboyantly headlined, on the menace of Japanese immigration. Immigration, land-ownership, right to the benefits of public education, these were the battlefields of the war waged by the State of California for the following three years, to the embarrassment and alarm of President Theodore Roosevelt. This period of anxiety closed with the World Tour of the U.S. Navy and its spectacular and successful visit to Japan (Oct. 1908), and with the negotiation of the Root–Takahira Agreement for maintaining the *status quo* in the Pacific and the Open Door in China (Nov. 1908). The first phase of the Japanese–American struggle was closed; and the Western shore of the North Pacific was thenceforth, by "Gentlemen's Agreement" between the two countries, to be shut against large-scale immigration from Japan. There have been subsequent developments and far-reaching results from this first check to Japanese expansion, but these are not within the compass of the present volume.

"The Japanese are proud, sensitive, war-like, are flushed with the glory of their recent triumph, and are in my opinion bent upon establishing themselves as the leading Power in the Pacific. . . . I do not pretend to have the least idea as to Japan's policy or real feeling, whether towards us or towards anyone else. I do not think that she wishes war as such, and I doubt if she will go to war now; but I am very sure that if sufficiently irritated and humiliated by us, she will get to accept us instead of Russia as the national enemy whom she will ultimately have to fight; and under such circumstances her concentration and continuity of purpose, and the exceedingly formidable character of her army and navy make it necessary to reckon very seriously with her. It seems to me that all of this necessitates our having a definite policy with regard to her; a policy of behaving with absolute good faith, courtesy and justice to her on the one hand, and on the other, of keeping our navy in such shape as to make it a risky thing for Japan to go to war with us."

These words are taken from a letter written by Theodore Roosevelt to Senator Hale in October 1906; they indicate a situation and a policy not inapplicable to the present day. Perhaps the second President Roosevelt is acquiring that touch on international politics which was characteristic of the statesmanship of the first President Roosevelt; perhaps it is time for the U.S. Navy to undertake another World Tour.

This quotation from the President's letter also indicates the theme of Mr. Bailey's careful and dispassionate study of dead controversies and a living flame. He goes very conscientiously into the details of

California's struggle with the Japanese and the President's struggle with California; and these details (carefully documented and reinforced by a judicious bibliography) will benefit the student of history; but for the general reader the main interest lies in the broad question of peace or war in the Pacific, and the bold and masterly handling by a great statesman of a situation of considerable danger both external and internal. P. J.

60*. JAPAN AND THE PACIFIC. By Nathaniel Peffer. 1935. (London: Hamish Hamilton. 8vo. 256 pp. 10s. 6d.)

MILDLY cynical of the actions and motives of other countries as well as of Japan, the book under review nevertheless provides a fair-minded and well-balanced picture of the background to much that has happened in the Far East and Western Pacific since the outbreak of the Manchurian trouble four years ago.

If criticisms are called for, they lie mainly in the tendency of the author to be rather too definite at times as to Japan's alleged aims and to talk of "when" war between Japan and Soviet Russia or the United States will come, instead of using the hypothetical qualification "if." It may be questioned, too, whether the word "conquest" is altogether correct for describing what has happened in Manchuria since 1931.

Apart from these relatively minor faults of expression, the only serious error meriting attention occurs in the description of the events that brought the former "Boy Emperor" of China to the Throne of Manchukuo. Here the author has got badly muddled in his facts and his dates, and uses words and expressions which ring strangely. He says, for example, that Pu Yi was "enthroned as dictator" within "a few days" of the Manchurian declaration of independence. He says, too, that "a few days after Japan's entrance into Mukden Pu Yi turned up in Dairen . . . in a way never quite satisfactorily explained." Worst historical error of all, he states that "on March 9th (1932) Pu Yi was elevated to his throne and Manchuria became a full-fledged State, its link with China formally severed. Four days later the Lytton Commission arrived in Shanghai on the way to Manchuria to investigate the dispute which had led to the Japanese despatch of troops to Mukden the previous September."

As an attempt to write history, this could hardly be worse. Anyone less like a "dictator" than the present Emperor of Manchukuo would be difficult to conceive; and when Mr. Peffer refers to his being "enthroned" as such within "a few days" of the formal creation of Manchukuo, he obviously has confused Pu Yi's appointment as Chief Executive of the new State in 1932 with his enthronement as Emperor two years later. This same confusion of facts is equally apparent in the assertion that "Pu Yi was elevated to his throne." four days before the arrival of the Lytton Commission at Shanghai on its way to Manchuria. Had this been true, the Lytton Report and some of its recommendations might have been written very differently. Incidentally, it was not just "a few days after" Japan's entry into Mukden that Pu Yi "turned up in Dairen," but two whole months.

To be so critical of a single passage in a book that, on the whole, maintains a high standard of accuracy, is perhaps unfair to the author; but the errors noted are so glaring that it seems advisable, both for his own sake and for that of his readers, that they should be pointed out, so that they may be rectified in future editions.

In examining the economic background to Japan's actions in (and to America's attitude regarding the principle of the Open and other closely related subjects, the author provides the intell reader with plenty of food for thought. On the whole, he is remarl sympathetic towards Japan and shows a good understandin Japanese psychology and philosophy. At the same time, he not hesitate to censure many of Japan's actions, just as he does of his own and other western countries. Considerations of t especially potential trade, rather than altruism, provide, in his opi the primary cause of the denunciations levelled by the United S and others against Japan for her actions in China; and he ı ironically, that although the Stimson Doctrine had the firm su of most articulate opinion in America, the Government at Washir would never have dared to act similarly "if Italy had swallowe Jugoslavia or *vice versa*." In like manner he remarks, *à prop* his country's refusal to agree to the rendition of the Kiao-chao Peni to Japan and its consequent repudiation of the Versailles Treaty

"It is both interesting and revealing that the American people co stirred, not by the transfer of the Austrian Tyrol to Italy or Hungarian Roumania—both of them worse violations of reason and elementary jus but by the award to Japan of a few square miles with a name they coul pronounce, and of which they had never before heard."

The reader may not be able to agree with all the conclusions d by the author or with all the views expressed, but he will find of interest, and not a little of value, in the pages of this well-bal book. M. D. KENNE

61*. MILITARISM AND FASCISM IN JAPAN. By O. Tanin and E. Y 1935. (London: Martin Lawrence. 8vo. 320 pp. 8s. (

In view of the important part played by the Army and the rea ary societies in the developments that have taken place in Japan the outbreak of the trouble in Manchuria close on four years a book such as the one under review is to be welcomed for the li throws on much that must have seemed almost incomprehensi people living in England and other countries far removed fron scene of these happenings. At the same time, it is perhaps unfort that the authors of this book are Soviet citizens and that the intr tion itself has been written by Karl Radek, as there must inevi be a tendency on the part of many would-be readers to brush it as a piece of Soviet propaganda and to discount its value accordi

That the authors have, in some instances, tended to fall int error of making the wish father to the thought and have, accordi expressed themselves as rather too confident of an eventual revol in Japan on communist lines is true; but, on the whole, despite and a fair sprinkling of the stock words and phrases beloved by Mo they have succeeded in producing a serious study of their sub matter in a very creditably restrained and objective form.

For the student of psychology and of social unrest, as well a the general intelligent reader who seeks to understand the backg of contemporary happenings in Japan, much of value and int should be found in this book. In it is described in detail the cu intermingling of the forces behind the reactionary movement, an authors do well to emphasise the essentially agrarian nature o unrest and dissatisfaction with which it is so intimately conne On the other hand, they are inclined to slur over the fact that, whe

peasantry denounce the capitalist system and the politicians so vehemently and uphold the Throne in one and the same breath, their expressions of loyalty to the Emperor are not mere empty words: No section of the country is, in fact, more truly loyal to the Throne than the hard-working, poverty-stricken, anti-capitalist peasantry, who provide the backbone of the Army; and, despite assertions of the authors to the contrary, it is doubtful if any section of the community, other than the farmers themselves, understands and sympathises with the peasantry more deeply than do the much-abused military authorities.

Whether the reactionary movement in Japan can properly be described as " fascist " is a moot point. It is not without interest, therefore, to note that Radek, in the course of the introduction contributed by himself, differs with the authors on their conclusions in this respect. The authors, however, are undoubtedly right in emphasising the difficulties in the way of uniting the large number of reactionary bodies (over 600 according to their own computations) into a single and indivisible corporate whole and in showing why it is that the Army is so anxious to maintain some sort of control over the general direction of the whole movement. M. D. KENNEDY.

62. SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT : With Bandit and General in Manchuria. By A. R. Lindt. 1935. (London : Cobden Sanderson. 8vo. 293 pp. 5s.)

63. THE MANCHURIAN ARENA : an Australian View of the Far Eastern Conflict. By F. M. Cutlack. 1935. (London : The Australian Book Company, 31 Great Russell Street, W.C.1. Sydney: Angus and Robertson. 8vo. 2s. 6*d*.)

HERE are two footnotes, Swiss and Australian, to the history of Manchuria since 1931 : the Swiss, anecdotal, incidental, entertaining; the Australian asking serious questions, and more than half answering them himself, sometimes on too flimsy evidence. Mr. Lindt traversed Manchuria by every means of locomotion, and in every sort of company. He gives vivid glimpses of Harbin and Manchuli in the midst of the turmoil of that time which the Japanese with characteristic modesty call the " Manchurian incident "; he draws a portrait from life of Ma Chan-shan, the intrepid Chinese bandit-general whose face was that " of any Chinese tiller of the soil " but whose hands were " the hands of a poet-philosopher of ancient China." Each page of his account adds the touch of personal observation; and though there is neither profound reflection nor political interpretation in most of them, they give the colour and movement of the moment with good effect.

Mr. Cutlack, on the other hand, is mainly concerned to press the point that the interests of the British Empire, and especially those of Australia, demand a reconsideration of the attitude of British opinion to the policy of Japan in North-East Asia. He would rather see Japan control Manchuria and Mongolia than Russia. He applauds the civilising mission of the Japanese Army in Manchukuo, and believes that the Lytton Commission failed to give a true account of the situation. He says that " we in Australia cannot contemplate the future with confidence if Japan's relations with the British Empire and the United States are to become embittered over this Manchurian issue " : and he hopes that Australian influence will be brought to bear in London and in Geneva to secure a " review of the League's judgment against

Japan, and a reconsideration of Britain's recent Eastern policy This is perhaps a natural Australian attitude which, if maintained the Commonwealth Government, must receive the serious attenti of Great Britain. Whether it springs from adequate reflection up the whole body of British Commonwealth interests may well doubted; but if Mr. Cutlack's booklet serves to remind us of t importance of Australia's opinion in the final judgment of Briti policy, it will have justified itself. It is, though brief, a serious effc to contribute an often-ignored element to the discussion of the proble of the Far East. A. F. WHYTE.

64*. MADE IN JAPAN. By Guenther Stein. 1935. (Londo Methuen. 8vo. 206 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

As its title suggests this is a book for the layman rather than f the expert. Not every reader will agree with the parallel drawn the opening chapter between Japan's rise as a commercial Power a that of Germany at the end of the nineteenth century, but within t limits which the author has set himself it would be hard to find a mc admirably lucid account of the Japanese industrial system and of background, social, political and economic. As a journalist of int national repute specialising in economic and financial questions, H Stein brings to his task a trained judgment and the ability to wr graphically without ever seeming to distort or over-simplify. Wa admiration for Japan and her achievements colours his narrative h and there, but the book as a whole is commendably free from perso bias of the kind that has marred several recent studies dealing with t subject. D. BARING.

THE UNITED STATES

65*. THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW DEAL. By Benjam Stolberg and Warren Jay Vinton. 1935. (London: Gollan 8vo. 94 pp. 2*s*. 6*d*.)

THIS little book has had wider reading in the United States than a other of its kind and size. It deserves its success as the best br analysis of the New Deal produced by the Opposition. It is brillia pungent and witty. Recent events rather enhance than detract fr its interest.

Much nonsense has been written concerning "Roosevelt's Americ experiment." It was no more experimental than is the drift "national" governments in Europe, unless it be in the sense that tight-rope walker experiments when he walks the wire. Neith Roosevelt nor the American people as a whole knew where they want to go. That is why they got nowhere. Designed as a piece of refor ism, the New Deal functioned as a lesson in the futility of trying please everyone. Or, as Benjamin Stolberg says, the whole p gramme was "in essence nothing but a well-intentioned synthesis errors," built upon "that strangest of all illusions . . . the dream making Big Ownership accept an economy of abundance. Unfort nately for this Utopian vision, Capitalism is an economy of measur scarcity."

Hence the tortuous course and contradictory pronouncements Mr. Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture. Hence, also, that "scarcit mongering machine" the N.R.A.

"Its whole purpose is the regulation of competitive greed, not the creati of more goods for consumption. It is infected by the anti-social obsession

restricting production in order to bring back ' prosperity ' through higher prices, which mean bigger profits. Big Business, which dominates the N.R.A., knows no other way."

In one sense, however, the New Deal was a negative experiment since, under it, some at least have learnt what cannot be done. The New Deal has gone; this book shows why no tears need be shed at its passing. But Man invariably conducts his own social education in the costliest and most painful manner, and the New Deal's short life should not be begrudged.

With the final conclusion, therefore, I cannot agree. Says Mr. Stolberg: "There is nothing the New Deal has so far done that could not have been done better by an earthquake. A first-rate earthquake, from coast to coast, could have re-established scarcity much more effectively . . . than the New Deal." But it would have taught people a good deal less.

Nobody need refrain from reading this clever little book for fear of its being out of date. The felling of the New Deal only makes the analysis of it more valuable as a "background" study and more interesting as a "yardstick" with which to measure present developments. Mr. Stohlberg's chapter on the New Deal's financial strategy and on Public Works should be read for themselves.

HARRISON BROWN.

66. LES GRANDS PROBLÈMES DE LA POLITIQUE DES ETATS-UNIS. By Firmin Roz. Collection Armand Colin. (Paris: Armand Colin. Sm. 8vo. 245 pp. 10 *frs.* 50, paper covered (12 *frs.*, bound).)

67. WHAT OF TO-MORROW? By Ogden L. Mills. 1935. (New York and London: Macmillan. 8vo. 151 pp. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

M. FIRMIN ROZ has compiled an interesting little book. His aim is to set the problems of modern America in their true historical perspective. The historical section of the book is remarkably concise and complete. For English readers, there is the additional interest that the book is based in the main on French and American sources. For instance neither Bryce's *American Commonwealth* nor Steel-Maitland's *The New America* are mentioned in the bibliography. Had he read the latter book, M. Roz would possibly have revised his chapter upon the working classes and socialism. So far from labour being generally organised since 1886, as M. Roz suggests, except for the four great Railway Brotherhoods—and the clothing, building, mining and printing trades—Trades Union organisation was remarkable by its absence. The membership of Trade Unions in the United States amounted to 2½ millions or just over 6 per cent. of the total number of workers before the War, reached a peak of 5 millions just after the armistice and fell to 2 millions in 1933.

M. Roz gives an able analysis of American economic crises and concludes that the present crisis differs from those of previous years and, in fact, amounts to a breakdown of the American economic system. M. Roz. recognises that Mr. Roosevelt is the first President to realise this but fears that circumstances may be too hampering to permit him to find a solution.

Mr. Mills' book is in the nature of a political pamphlet. Few will agree with him that President Roosevelt has inaugurated in America anything comparable with what is found under the Nazi Government in Germany or even in Fascist Italy. The Press and public opinion are

as free and untrammelled in America to-day as they have ever been. So far as "economic liberalism" is being supplanted by a centrally planned and controlled economy, the evidence is overwhelming that this *is* the public will. It is interesting to find that Mr. Mills believes that "the barriers that at present dam up the flow of international trade must be removed"; apparently he would include the Fordney Tariff and the Hawley-Smoot Tariff in these barriers which must be swept away and is in favour "of modifying recent tariff practices to some extent." Mr. Mills wisely recognises that the United States is committed to spending its way out of depression and as he neatly puts it "the problem resolves itself into a race between business recovery and the exhaustion of the National credit." In an interesting chapter on inflation, he describes the four stages of the rake's progress of unbalanced budgets, first, long term borrowing, second, shorter loans, third, short Bank Loans and, fourth, currency or credit inflation, and concludes that the United States, while not completely out of the first stage, has entered the second with the third in sight. Many will agree with him that "for all classes of the population save the speculator, inflation is as devastating as war." Napoleon in his early days held a similar view. Disagreement starts when the attempt is made to define inflation. The author is not so convincing in discussing the best form of unemployment insurance as in his treatment of the necessity for unified banking. This book should be read to understand the trend of intelligent Republican opinion in America. Most readers who are familiar with Republican opinions of the last ten years will meet with some shocks and surprises.

C. WALEY COHEN.

68*. AMERICA'S CAPACITY TO CONSUME. By Maurice Leven and others. 1935. (Washington: Brookings Institution. London: Faber and Faber. 8vo. xi + 272 pp. 13*s*. 6*d*.)

69. THE FORMATION OF CAPITAL, 1935. By Harold G. Moulton. 1935. (Washington: Brookings Institution. London: Faber and Faber. 8vo. xi + 207 pp. 13*s*. 6*d*.)

THESE two books are the second and third in a series of four arising out of a study of Distribution of Wealth and Income in Relation to Economic Progress in the United States. Of the two, the first is the more interesting. Shortly, both books suggest that the solution of America's economic troubles lies in an increase in consumption rather than a limitation of production. Even in 1929, 74 per cent. of the non-farm families had incomes under $3000 and therefore spent less than $800 on food—the minimum for an adequate family diet. The conclusion is suggested that the proper solution is to raise the income, by some means or other, of the section of the population now with low incomes. These volumes are full of interesting and valuable data, incidentally bearing on problems wider than those discussed. The per capita income of farm population in 1929 showed wide variation between state and state. The per capita income of the farm population in California was nine times that of South Carolina and nearly twice that of New Jersey. In fact, in California, it even exceeded that of town dwellers. This probably has some bearing on the immense migration between 1920–1930 of over one million persons from other parts of America to California. The most interesting conclusion in the third volume is that prosperity depends upon power to absorb consumers goods and that the demand for capital goods follows that for consumers goods. Two subsidiary points

follow. The crisis was largely due to maldistribution of income, since those on lower incomes save less and if they could have afforded it, could have consumed more. America was suffering therefore in 1929 from too much saving, which forced up share prices, and too little spending which unduly limited demand for consumers and therefore also for capital goods.

The authors confine their data on which these conclusions are based to the period of 1900–1929. This is probably wise, but it would be as well if in the final volume they tested the conclusions by reference to the years since 1929 also. Probably the suggestion that lack of capital has in recent years never held up desirable development and is unlikely to do so in the future would find striking confirmation.

The criticism of these volumes, if any, is that they treat America as if it were the planet Mars, isolated both in import and export from the rest of the civilised world. How far this will be remedied in the final volume, and an attempt made to fit the conclusions into a conception of America as an integral part of the civilised world, is not clear. But the value of this well-balanced survey would be enhanced if the picture were thus completed, or the position of the authors on this point defined. It would be interesting to know how far the authors think the superabundance of credit and capacity for production in America could be used to raise the standard of living in the rest of the world. In any case, the final volume will be awaited with expectations commensurate with the high standard reached in the preceding volumes.

C. WALEY COHEN.

70. MR. ROOSEVELT'S EXPERIMENTS. By S. H. Bailey. [*Day to Day Pamphlets, No.* 24.] 1935. (London: The Hogarth Press. Sm. 8vo. 48 pp. 1*s.* 6*d.*)

WITHIN the scope of a "Day to Day Pamphlet," Mr. Bailey gives the general reader all he needs to know of the subject in three chapters which might be tritely re-titled, Whence, How and Whither. The first and third—"Background" and "Consequences," respectively—will interest particularly the "lay" reader, although the second, "Policies of the New Deal," contains many facts and much commentary for him as well as for the student.

A key to the better understanding and appreciation of the United States, its people and its institutions, is a realisation that it is a country of extremes to a degree not found elsewhere. This applies with special force to almost any sense in which the word "morality" may be interpreted: personal, political, civic, or commercial. Within a generally corrupt political party are found ethical and conscientious workers and even leaders; alongside unscrupulous industrial and commercial institutions one finds firms and corporations with an ethical code worthy of imitation by their opposite numbers in the United Kingdom.

It may seem paradoxical that, in a country where the educational system tends to produce a type in some respects—Mr. Bailey's "external uniformity of American culture"—the divergence, in both directions from the characteristic datum line, should be so great. Mr. Roosevelt himself may be regarded as typical of his country in the respect described.

Prior to his Presidency and while Governor of the State of New York he was no reformer, scarcely a notable personality. From the moment of his inauguration two years ago he has been both. By turns, and even concurrently, he has introduced both socialistic and

fascist measures for "relief," "recovery" and "reform" into which Mr. Bailey well dissects the New Deal. This "series of experiments" had no "clearly defined and generally accepted set of social objectives" and their effective completion has been largely frustrated by "the diversity of interests pressing their claims upon the President" and by a more or less passive resistance, particularly directed against freedom of labour organisation.

That the National Recovery Administration has had the effect of encouraging industry to "introduce further mechanisation" may perhaps be worthy of further investigation, because one has heard so often in the United States, during the Depression, of labour-saving plans and machinery which are temporarily withheld for "social reasons." F. J. MAURICE.

71. THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. By Clarence A. Berdahl. 1932. (Geneva: Kundig. 8vo. 129 pp. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

THIS short monograph, consisting of lectures given at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, is a useful addition to the abundant literature upon American foreign relations. Professor Berdahl concentrates upon the apparent inconsistency of American policy with regard to membership of the League and its associated organisations. From the days of Noah Worcester and William Ladd to the formation of the "League to Enforce Peace" a growing body of opinion had consistently advocated a League of Nations, while American delegates at the first and second Hague Peace Conferences had pressed for the establishment of a regular international court. Yet the United States, in spite of an overwhelmingly favourable sentiment in the War-period, shared by Republicans and Democrats alike, rejected the League and failed to adhere to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

It is the thesis of these lectures that the explanation lies neither in a change of heart with regard to the desirability and need of international organisation in general nor in the opposition aroused by the supposedly tyrannical and ill-informed dogmatism of President Wilson. Indeed, the very special arrangements whereby Mr. Ray Stannard Baker and Mr. Tumulty kept the President in Paris fully informed, and the records of the President's joint conference with the Senate and House committees on foreign affairs in February 1919, are held to justify Mr. David Hunter Miller's statement that "the idea that he was wont arrogantly to reject suggestions of others is a myth of partisan hate." The explanation is to be found, in Professor Berdahl's opinion, in a series of party manœuvres conducted solely with domestic political ends in view. In a most valuable chapter he describes in some detail the campaign of Senatorial obstruction and political misrepresentation which culminated in the defeat of President Wilson and the rejection of the Covenant. President Harding cuts a particularly sorry figure as the political "yes-man" ideally suited to the purposes of Senator Lodge and his allies, "the irreconcilables," in 1921. Although he may tend to under-emphasise the personal unpopularity of President Wilson, Professor Berdahl makes out an exceedingly strong case for this interpretation. If it is correct, the gradual building up of the channels of co-operation between the United States and the League in the ensuing years marks not merely the minimal requirements of practice, but a return to a traditional objective of American foreign policy. The

next five years should serve to show whether American enthusiasm for the conception of a "society of nations" is both strong and realistic enough to carry the United States to Geneva and The Hague.

S. H. BAILEY.

72. NEW FEDERAL ORGANISATIONS. An Outline of their Structure and Functions. By Laurence F. Schmeckebier. 1935. (Washington: The Brookings Institute. 8vo. ix + 199 pp. $1.50.)

SINCE the advent to office of President Roosevelt the United States has seen the creation of an unprecedented number of organisations, established or remodelled, in order to deal with the problems of economic depression. Most of these bodies are engaged in work never before undertaken by a federal government, and this sketch, without attempting to discuss the merits of the President's policy, affords a clear account of the authority for the creation of each body, its purpose, the extent of the work which it carried out up to September 1934, and the expenditure involved therein. Both statute and executive authority have been called into play in the establishment of these organisations, and even the most cursory study affords impressive evidence of the amazing extent of the President's great undertaking.

A. BERRIEDALE KEITH.

73. INDUSTRIAL PROFITS IN THE UNITED STATES. By Ralph C. Epstein. 1934. (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, in co-operation with the Committee on Recent Economic Changes. 8vo. xi + 678 pp. $5.00.)

THIS is an extremely thorough and detached study of the earnings of business concerns in the United States in the years before depression. Professor Epstein has analysed data covering 2046 manufacturing and 664 trading concerns for the period 1919–1928. The appeal of a specialised study of this sort is, of course, limited, but any student of the international economic situation who wishes to examine the economic position of the United States in the years of post-War "prosperity" will find in these pages the most complete material for one important part of his study.

A. T. K. GRANT.

74. INTERNAL MIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES. By C. Warren Thornthwaite. 1934. (University of Pennsylvania Press; Oxford University Press. 8vo. x + 52 pp. 4s. 6d.)

THE immediate occasion of this enquiry, organised at the suggestion of the Social Science Research Council, is the current depression in America. With material far from complete, the author has with great ingenuity compiled maps of internal trends of movement of population for decennial periods from the 'nineties onwards, and in some cases earlier, and there is some information about movements since 1930. The author points out that

"current discussion indicates that we are by no means sure which way population should move even when and if prosperity returns" and adds that "there may be real danger of expending effort in placing people where they are not likely to stay."

How different is the problem in the United States from that in Great Britain is well illustrated by comparing some of the points in this enquiry with those made in the Report of the Departmental Committee on Transfer of Labour. In the United States less than half of the

families are bound to a locality by the ties of home ownership and since the depression migration has assumed the form of " bewildered aimlessness." The greatest single movement in the entire history of the country has been the migration to California in the last decade of over a million persons, a movement with some recruits from the East, but coming largely from the Wheat Belt.

Before 1930, the towns drew from the rural districts; since the depression the trend has been the other way. In Oklahoma and some other areas, before 1930 population moved from the poor to the better agricultural land. Since 1930, population has declined on the good land and increased on the poor land. The explanation seems rather desperate—" Poor land assumes an important rôle as a refuge for the industrially employed in time of depression."

This book is full of interest and of suggestive matter for those interested in problems of employment and population.

C. WALEY COHEN.

75*. PROBLEMS OF THE NEW CUBA: Report of the Commission on Cuban Affairs. 1935. (New York: Foreign Policy Association. La. 8vo. xi + 523 pp. $3.00.)

THE summer revolution of 1933 released Cuba from the iron hand of her oppressor but left unsolved the paradox of widespread hunger and deprivation in a land of abundant agricultural endowment. It says much for the future that one of the earlier acts of her Provisional President, the patriot Mendieta, was to appeal for advice to the Foreign Policy Association of New York and that that Association, with Rockefeller Foundation support, promptly sent a commission of eleven distinguished members, each an authority in his or her own sphere of economics, politics or social science, to survey the conditions and recommend what might be done. Their recently published findings as to the problems of the New Cuba paint a remarkably true and clear picture of that distressed land. It is, in point of fact, a matter for wonder that such an accurate, detailed and impartial statement of the facts could have been drawn up in the limited time at the Commission's disposal, especially considering that official records were incomplete or non-existent following at least three years of political chaos.

The main part of the book is descriptive and analytical and covers nearly all aspects of Cuban life, population, public health and social welfare, education, labour, economic position of the people, the sugar industry, money, credit and public finance and the vexed public utilities question. Causes are traced and a faithful effort is made to sift the real from the apparent. The last four chapters are the most important and are devoted to the suggested remedies.

Most of Cuba's problems are traced back to the familiar theme, in some lands of the New World, of a one-sided and ill-considered development of one type of agriculture, sugar in the case of Cuba, resulting in the creation of immense supplies of a commodity which are saleable only at a severe loss in the face of market restrictions on the part of older countries. A long succession of annual losses on the production of such foodstuffs has gradually pulled down the national income to incredibly low levels and led to widespread unemployment. Cuba's sugar machine is geared to produce over 5 million tons a year, can barely market 2½ millions, and apparently faces a permanent retreat to the latter figure. The situation is aggravated by the shortness of the producing season, which leaves without employment for six to nine

months of the year that large proportion of the population which is attached to the sugar mills. Lacking the land, the seed, the implements, the training and possibly the inclination necessary for subsistence farming, which should lead in such a climate and from such rich soil to the production of an abundance and variety of foodstuffs, the rural population have led a wretchedly poor existence. This situation and bad government have naturally reflected themselves in the cities, where heartrending scenes of poverty are common.

The Commission's proposed remedies are as practical as their vision is clear. They reject alike the theories of communist, dictator, inflationist and monetary reformer. They propose a programme of ten main points spread over possibly eight to ten years. They commence with an immediate setting aside of enough land (now idle) on each sugar estate for the production, under competent direction, of needed food for the workers and dependants of these estates. They then work progressively through soil surveys, food and plant research, education and co-operation to a return of each type of Cuban land to its most suitable use, some to remain in sugar, some to go to tobacco, some to a wide variety of tropical and sub-tropical food plants and trees, and some to forest, with a view to lumber production. They propose to leave with the present sugar mills ample land for the production of such sugar as can be sold, but they make provision for returning much of the rest of the land to the government, to be sold in small areas on long terms and low prices to those of the people who are able and energetic enough to acquire and work it in crops other than sugar. Problems of sanitation, medical health and education are expected to be met as the economic situation improves.

The view is held that Cuba cannot force unwanted sugar on the rest of the world but that she can gradually repair the damage of a heedless past development by a scientific utilisation of her own resources in such a way as to provide food, clothing and shelter for her common people at a much higher standard of living than any known so far. An agricultural bank under government supervision, a consistent effort to negotiate the widening of the scope of the Jones–Costigan and Chadbourne sugar control plans to embrace all important sugar-producing countries, the adoption of a dollar exchange currency system and the establishment of a public utilities commission are other important recommendations.

It is not to question the value of a truly fine piece of work to suggest that serious obstacles to the Commission's programme exist in the form of vacillation and indolence, in the intrigues of some of the politicos and in a political system not well suited to an emotional and largely illiterate people; but the book itself is most illuminating and can safely be recommended as dependable and thoroughly worth the time of any serious student of Latin-American affairs. F. H. BROWN.

LATIN AMERICA

76. FIRE ON THE ANDES. By Carleton Beals. 1934. (London: J. B. Lippincott. 8vo. 482 pp. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

THE task of writing books descriptive of strange lands and people has become very difficult. The map of the world no longer shades off into vague outlines, wherein the explorer could find material for his books which would be limited only by the capacity of his imagination.

It is no wonder, therefore, that the travel-writer of the twentieth

century should be tempted to call in historical research, psychology, and a hundred other branches of knowledge to eke out his observations and descriptions. But if he does, he should take care that he is accurate, and that this extraneous matter does not detract from the main theme of his book. As one turns the pages of Mr. Beals's new book on Peru, and finds archæology as fantastic as it is unwarrantable, pages and pages of psychological studies that leave one without a glimpse either of Peru or normal Peruvians, one wonders if the author has not done himself disservice.

Bad books are common enough, but this is not a bad book. When—or, one must regretfully write, if—the reader struggles through the first half of the book, he will find himself repaid. Mr. Beals writes sincerely and well of the tragic history and problematical future of the Indian race, drawing attention to the most serious problem that Peru has to face. His chapters on the Apra party and Haya de la Torre's programme are well informed and deserving of close attention. It becomes obvious that the writer has had personal contacts with some of the most significant figures of modern Peru. As it closes, the book begins to live.

Mr. Beals has had his pages illustrated by drawings, done by a noted Peruvian artist, which are as much a matter of opinion as the literary style of the text. J. Duval Rice.

77. South American Handbook, 1935. (London: Trade and Travel Publications, Ltd. Sm. 8vo. 650 + lx pp. 2s. 6d.)

The twelfth annual edition of a very useful and comprehensive guide and handbook to South and Central America (including Mexico). Each country is treated separately, and there are also sections on air, steamship and railway services, banking, insurance, sport, products of the continent, and a useful list of recommended books. The new edition has been thoroughly revised and brought up to date. Some of the statistics are open to question, but scarcely any publication dealing with Latin America escapes this criticism. J. A. G.

CORRESPONDENCE

Fascism at Work.

To the Editor, "International Affairs."

Sir,

I am not concerned with Miss Muriel Currey's opinions on my book *Fascism at Work*, which she reviewed in your June issue, but she has committed herself to mis-statements of fact which seriously misrepresent my work. I should have thought that, although reviewers do not always read a book to the end, they should, at least, read the beginning of it. Although Signor Nitti points out on the *first page* of the book that, among other reasons, I was well qualified to write this book owing to my "repeated visits to Italy," she states in her review that "Signor Nitti announces that the pseudonym 'William Elwin' conceals the identity of an Italian."

Secondly, my description of pre-Fascist Italy is not that of an Eden with a few local disturbances, as Miss Currey alleges, but of a country in a great economic and political upheaval, culminating in the "stormy days" (p. 31) of the occupation of the factories.

After this, her sweeping accusation of inaccuracy in my carefully documented treatment of the Corporate State is not surprising, but

I am naturally disappointed that you should allow a hostile critic to make it without the support of a single reference.

Yours faithfully,

(*Signed*) DR. WILLIAM ELWIN.

June 20th, 1935.
2A *Chalcot Gardens*,
*London, N.W.*3.

To the Editor, "International Affairs."

I regret that I fail to understand the first of Dr. Elwin's complaints. Why is he annoyed at my quotation from Signor Nitti's statement which in itself is a proof that I had carefully read the Foreword? I even quoted textually Signor Nitti's words that Dr. Elwin is "a man of competent scholarship and excellent academic qualifications." Reviews in the *Journal* are necessarily brief; consequently, I refrained from any attempt to catalogue Dr. Elwin's mistakes. Perhaps you will now allow me to give three examples: (*a*) he writes of the Charter of Labour as a "law," it is not and never has been a law; (*b*) he states that there is no provision in the labour contracts for payments for overtime, this is untrue; (*c*) he writes, "Whereas elsewhere the age of 14 has been recognised as the lowest for industrial labour . . . in Italy there is still child labour." In Italy the age is fixed by law at 15. These are matters of fact, not of opinion.

MURIEL CURREY.

August 13th, 1935.
23 *Courtfield Gardens, S.W.* 5.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

NOVEMBER–DECEMBER, 1935

THE LEAGUE'S HANDLING OF THE ITALO–ABYSSINIAN DISPUTE[1]

By ALFRED ZIMMERN

THE Italo–Ethiopian conflict can be regarded from various points of view. It is a study in Power-politics, that is to say, in the relations between a stronger and a weaker State, or between a group of stronger States, united by various mutual ties, and an isolated lesser State without allies or associates. It is a study in the particular form of Power-politics which has been termed "imperialism," that is to say, in the relations between a strong Power of European stock and "culture" and a primitive, if proud and ancient, non-white people. It is a study in Power-economics, that is to say, in the relations between a populous and strongly organised State in search of increased resources on which to base its military power and a relatively unorganised people occupying an unexploited territory suspected of being a reservoir of mineral and vegetable riches. It is a study in Public Opinion, that is to say, in the reaction of the civilised peoples to a flagrant and unashamed resort to force by a leading European Power in defiance of the recognised principles of civilisation. It is a study in World Unity, that is to say, in the degree of common feeling and public spirit that can be mobilised for a common sacrifice, or at least a common discipline, on behalf of those principles. It is a study in sanctions, that is to say, in the comparative efficacy of the various methods adopted in common against the outlaw State. What is, however, attempted in the following pages is none of these things, but simply a study of the conflict from the point of view of a student of the Covenant and of the machinery of the League as it has been developed since 1920. This record, no doubt, also has its lessons; but our first concern will be with the facts.

[1] The substance of this paper formed the subject of an address delivered at Chatham House on Tuesday, October 8th, 1935, with Sir John Fischer Williams, K.C., C.B.E., in the Chair. It has been rewritten and brought down to November 2nd, 1935.

The present conflict between Italy and Ethiopia took its rise in an affray between a small body of Italian native troops under Italian officers and a small Ethiopian force at the wells of Walwal, on or near the undelimited frontier between Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia on December 5th, 1934.

At that time Italy and Ethiopia were bound by three separate engagements restraining them from resort to war. One was the Kellogg Pact, of which both parties were signatories, in each case without reservations of any kind.[1] Under this the parties had renounced war "as an instrument of national policy" and had agreed "that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or whatever origin they might be, which might arise between them," should "never be sought expect by pacific means." A second was the Treaty of Amity, Conciliation and Arbitration of August 2nd, 1928, under which the two Governments undertook "to submit to a procedure of conciliation and arbitration," "without having recourse to armed force," disputes not settled by "ordinary diplomatic methods." A third was the Covenant of the League of Nations with its familiar provisions enforcing Enquiry and Delay.

Immediately after the Walwal incident the Ethiopian Government requested that the procedure of the Treaty of 1928 should be applied. The Italian Government, on the other hand, declared

[1] Baron Aloisi attempted to argue in the Assembly on October 10th, 1935, that Italy was acting in conformity with the Kellogg Pact. He based his argument on two grounds: (i) the right of self-defence, since "the Pact left all States free to decide on their own responsibility whether circumstances required resort to legitimate self-defence"; (ii) "the reservation made by the United Kingdom on adhering" to the Kellogg Pact. As to (i), all that need be said is that the Italian Government has here faithfully followed in the footsteps of Japan. The second argument calls for a few words of critical comment. The Italian argument apparently is that the Pact to which Italy adhered was not the Kellogg Pact pure and simple but the Kellogg Pact *plus* the British reservation, which, through the play of reciprocity, allowed Italy to claim a similar reservation. (On an earlier occasion at Geneva, Baron Aloisi stated outright that the Italian Government had explicitly made such a reservation; but he did not venture to repeat this in the Assembly.) It is perhaps hardly necessary to state in these pages that *there is no British reservation to the Kellogg Pact*, as can be verified by consulting the official record. The observations made by the British Government in the course of the negotiations were not a reservation but simply preparatory work to aid in the drafting. When Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia became signatories to the Pact the difficulty which the observations were designed to surmount no longer existed. This was clearly explained to the Members of the League by the British representative on the Legal Committee of the Assembly in 1930, when the "harmonisation" of the Covenant and the Kellogg Pact was under discussion. In any case, the British observations were designed to enable Great Britain to fulfil certain obligations for the *protection* of other States in the region in question, not, as according to the Italian argument, to free her hands for attacking them.

that there had been a sudden and unprovoked attack by the Ethiopians upon an Italian post, and could not see what question there was to submit to arbitration. Meanwhile the local situation grew worse until, finally, on January 3rd, 1935, the Ethiopian Government reported to Geneva an Italian aggression against the Ethiopian garrison at Gerlogubi and requested the application of Article 11, para. 2 of the Covenant. The request came before the Council at its January session. It then appeared that the Italian Government was opposed to any intervention in the matter by the Council, on the ground that direct negotiations under the Treaty of 1928 had not been broken off. Under these circumstances the two parties agreed to pursue the settlement " in conformity with the spirit of the Treaty of Amity of 1928," and Ethiopia agreed to the postponement until the next Council session of the consideration of her request.

From this time on until September 4th, that is, over a period of eight months, the question of Italo-Ethiopian relations did not come before the Council. During the whole of this time the Italian Government was openly making military preparations, the extent of which was known to the world, if only through the Suez Canal authorities. It was also well known that the campaigning season in Abyssinia would open at or soon after the end of September. At the same time it was well understood by all those closely concerned with the matter that the Italian Government considered it contrary to its dignity, either as a Great Power or as a European Power, that the issue between it and its Ethiopian fellow-member should be argued out before the Council. The Treaty of 1928 provided a convenient means for avoiding this.

When the Council met in extraordinary session in April the arbitrators for the settlement of the dispute, as provided under Article 5 of the Treaty of 1928, had not yet been appointed. Sir John Simon urged that they should be appointed before the ordinary Council meeting in May. The question was thereupon held over on the Council's agenda till May. At the May meeting it was found that the Italian Government had raised objections to the Ethiopian nominees on the ground that they were not of Ethiopian nationality. The Italian Government was now, however, ready to waive this point. The Council therefore resolved that the parties should be left full liberty to settle the dispute under the Treaty of 1928, but that it should " meet to examine the situation " if by August 25th there had been no settlement, and should also, if necessary, meet in the interval, at or about July

25th, if the fifth arbitrator had not been chosen by the other four, as provided by the Treaty.

The July session found the arbitrators at a deadlock over their terms of reference. A clarification of the issue was needed in order to set the arbitration machinery in motion. The Council therefore instructed the arbitrators that it was no part of their business to examine into the question of the disputed frontier. They were thus debarred from considering whether the Walwal affray took place on Italian or on Abyssinian soil. On the other hand, by an ingenious turn of phrase, they were allowed to " take into consideration, without entering into any discussion on the matter, the conviction that was held by the local authorities on either side as to the sovereignty over the place of the incident." The Council also decided, in any case, to meet on September 4th to examine the Italo–Ethiopian situation as a whole.

During August the four arbitrators agreed on the selection of the super-arbiter, M. Politis, and the five rendered a unanimous award on September 3rd, exonerating both parties from any responsibility for the incident of December 5th, 1934. The language in which this conclusion was couched was slightly more favourable to the Italian than to the Ethiopian authorities, and it may be that it was this, together with the desire to avoid figuring in a minority report, with the super-arbiter in the opposite camp, which led to its signature by the Italian representatives.

Certain points are worth placing on record in connection with this application of the Treaty of 1928.

In the first place, the existence of the Treaty provided the Italian Government and the Council with a colourable pretext for not discussing the larger issue at the Council. The Council could, of course, have discussed it, had it wished to do so, whilst the procedure under the Treaty was functioning; but it was easy for it to avoid doing so. Thus, in effect, the Treaty of 1928 was a trap which blocked, or at least hindered, the access of Ethiopia to the Council. The Treaty, it may be remarked, dates from 1928, the year of the General Act for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes and the high-water mark of the movement against League jurisdiction which found expression in that Act. Thus the criticisms made against that instrument by Sir John Fischer Williams [1] in his address at Chatham House in 1931 would seem to have been borne out by the event.

In the second place, the functioning of the 1928 Treaty left a

[1] "Treaty Revision and the Future of the League," by Sir John Fischer Williams. *International Affairs*, May 1931.

good deal to be desired in point of correctitude. The two Ethiopian nominees were, no doubt, independent persons with the recognised qualifications to be expected in an arbiter. With all respect to the Italian nominees, detachment and a judicial outlook was hardly to be expected from them : one of them indeed was an Italian government official. As for the super-arbiter, it was an open secret that he was chosen by the Council, or by certain members of the Council, rather than by the four arbitrators. His judicial qualifications and his knowledge of all that pertains to arbitration were indeed not only impeccable but almost unrivalled. Nevertheless, the fact remains that he was not an independent personage but a working diplomat, whilst, as for his detachment, his audiences with the French Premier during the days immediately preceding his appointment were reported in the Press apparently without any suspicion of impropriety. The whole incident provides an interesting corroboration of the doubts entertained by Lord Salisbury, in a famous despatch, as to the difficulty of finding the really independent arbitrator.[1]

The Walwal dispute having thus been cleared out of the way, it might have been expected that, when the Council met on September 4th, the sky would be clear; for there had up to that time been no further issue concerning Italo-Ethiopian relations before the League. In point of fact, the exact contrary was the case. The disposal of the Walwal incident revealed officially for the first time that there was a much larger problem behind.

The situation that thus resulted was well characterised in a frank speech by the Foreign Minister of Sweden, Mr. Sandler, in the Assembly on September 12th : " In studying the statement on the dispute in the Secretary-General's report," he said, " we cannot fail to be struck by the fact that the Council was not enabled to exercise its influence on the course of events at an earlier stage of the dispute." (Incidentally, this is a striking statement in the mouth of a representative of Sweden, a country which has consistently sponsored schemes, such as that of the General Act, for withdrawing disputes from the purview of the Council, on the ground of its political character.) He continued :

" I am not sure that this method of adjournment was a fortunate one. Nevertheless, far be it from me to criticise the Council at this hour. I realise that it had to base its judgment as to the scope of

[1] Despatch of March 5th, 1896, to the British Ambassador at Washington, reprinted in Moore : *History and Digest of International Arbitrations to which the U.S. has been a party*, i. 963-5.

the dispute on the statements submitted by the parties themselves. . . . The Italian Government stated [at the January Session of the Council] that the dispute submitted to the Council was not such as to threaten the pacific relations between the two parties. . . . The Council had therefore no reason to presume that there existed a dispute affecting the whole relations between Italy and Ethiopia. . . . The Council is . . . now faced with a wholly different dispute, whose character and true scope have been defined before the Council only at its present session. It was only in the first days of September that the Italian and Ethiopian delegations, following the report submitted by Mr. Eden on the tripartite negotiations held in Paris, laid their respective cases before the Council.

"It is not inopportune to point out that a fundamental change of position has taken place between the time when, on January 9th last, the Italian delegation made its declaration to the Council—a declaration according to which the dispute was not likely to affect the pacific relations between the two countries—and the present time, when the Italian Government has intimated that it claims a complete revision of the relations between the two countries and reserves to itself the liberty to effect this change, if necessary, by military action."

This statement calls for certain observations. *Was* the Council "bound to base itself on the statements submitted by the parties"? Was it really precluded from seeing anything in East Africa or on the road between Italy and East Africa which was not officially brought to its attention? Was it "bound" to close its ears to the speeches of the Head of the Italian Government? Such an ostrich-like doctrine is surely inadmissible. It must be remembered that, of the two parties in question, one was openly preparing for war and exhibiting its contempt for the Council, whilst the other was, to say the least, inexperienced in the ways of Geneva and anxious to do nothing which might estrange the support of powerful Council members. Under such circumstances was there not a duty incumbent on members of the Council to look at the situation with their own eyes, unblinkered by the statements of the parties? Mr. Sandler's remarks on this point seem to ignore the "friendly right" accorded to every Member of the League, whether on the Council or not, to take the initiative in a situation involving a danger of war. And they also seem to assume that members of the Council know nothing of the world beyond what is contained in League documents. How otherwise can we explain his statement that the Paris negotiations only became known as a result of Mr. Eden's report on them or that, until September, "there was no

reason to suppose" that there was any danger of a general Italo-Ethiopian conflict?[1]

However, in his succeeding remarks Mr. Sandler abandoned this excessively legalistic position and admitted knowledge of the "vast movements of troops carried out during the negotiations concerning the frontier incidents" and the fact that these had "singularly aggravated the situation." Indeed he went on, very pertinently, to remind the Assembly "that various League Committees have time and again, during discussions on the problem of security, emphasised the danger presented by military preparations" and to express regret "that the Council was not in a position—in accordance with the Resolution approved in 1927 by the Council and Assembly—to put a stop to military preparations at the outset," as a result of which the Council's task had been considerably increased.

It is worth while recalling the Resolutions of 1927. They were based upon the report of a Committee of the Council, composed of Lord Cecil, M. de Brouckère and M. Titulesco, which was appointed to make a special study of Article 11 of the Covenant.[2] Their report contains a list of measures which might be taken by the Council in various eventualities "in virtue of its essential duty, that of safeguarding peace." These measures, it is explained, "are only cited as examples," and include "those which, having been successfully applied, appear particularly effectual." These words were penned shortly after the Græco-Bulgarian incident, itself only one, although the most dramatic, of the occasions on which the Council had succeeded in preventing the outbreak of war.[3]

Amongst the measures suggested "where there is an imminent threat of war" was the taking of "steps to see that the *status*

[1] The same issue arose in the course of the Chaco War or, as it was officially called, the "dispute" between Bolivia and Paraguay. In the summer of 1933 the Council decided to send out a Commission in order to attempt to bring hostilities to an end. Thereupon the two parties, finding themselves for the first time in agreement, suggested that the departure of the Commission should be delayed and another effort at mediation made through the neighbouring Governments. The Council thought itself bound to accede to this request, however suspicious the circumstances under which it was made. The mediation came to nothing and the delay in the departure of the Commission caused it to arrive just too late to effect its object.

[2] The report was reprinted in Cmd. 2889 (1927).

[3] The two clearest amongst the other cases are the Yugoslav-Albanian dispute of November 1921, when Mr. Lloyd George threatened Yugoslavia with the application of Article 16, and the Paraguay-Bolivian dispute of 1928. The Corfu case is not so clear, but would Corfu now be in Greek hands if there had been no League of Nations?

quo is not disturbed in such manner as to aggravate or extend the dispute." "For this purpose," the report continues, the Council "may indicate to the parties any movements of troops, mobilisation operations and other similar measures from which it recommends them to abstain." "If the recalcitrant State still persists in its hostile preparation or action," we read in a later paragraph, "further warning measures may be taken, such as a naval demonstration." "Naval demonstrations," it is drily added, "have been employed for such a purpose in the past."

Why, we may ask with Mr. Sandler, were no steps of this kind taken on this occasion? Why was a State Member of the League allowed to make open and elaborate preparations for aggression upon another Member of the League not only without hindrance but without criticism or discussion of any kind at the Council?

The answer to this question is twofold. In the first place, the adoption of such action by the Council would have destroyed the last possibility of settling the dispute by conciliation. This may seem a strange conclusion, since the whole object of these precautionary measures would have been to prevent the aggravation of the situation and to give the parties a breathing-space, or what is sometimes called a "cooling-off period." But the fact is that, *in certain circumstances*, precautionary measures may produce the opposite effect from that for which they are designed. In the present case the Italian Government would undoubtedly have regarded the adoption of such measures as derogatory to its prestige as a Great Power. Thus the result of their adoption, so far from appeasing the conflict, would have been to bring it more rapidly to a head.

One effect of this might have been the withdrawal of Italy from the League of Nations. This is a threat which has constantly been put about by Italian spokesmen in recent years and has even formed the subject of official deliberations by the Fascist Grand Council. It has undoubtedly exercised, and to a certain extent still exercises, an influence over the other Governments and over public opinion. A more careful study of Italian diplomacy might have relieved these apprehensions. With so many claimants for permanent seats on the Council it was not likely that the "marginal Great Power" would lightly surrender its position. Moreover, no government has known better than the Italian how to make a skilful use of the League machinery whether in the Council or the Assembly or the Secretariat or in the proceedings of the International Labour Organisation. For the

present Italian Government, ever since it discovered it in 1923, the League has been an immense diplomatic chessboard, presenting fascinating possibilities for the exercise of ingenuity and finesse. Whether a government actuated by these motives is a valuable member of a co-operative organisation is quite another matter. Undoubtedly there is a great deal of confusion of thought on this subject. It seems to be assumed in certain quarters that the more universal the League membership becomes the more effective it must necessarily be; and in this belief invitations are constantly being held out to the absent Governments. The truth is, of course, that the contagious power of the "League spirit" is strictly limited in its possibilities and that, when a government is definitely non-co-operative in its outlook and policy, its presence at Geneva can only be a source of weakness and disintegration. There is good scriptural warrant for saying that there are some forms of evil spirit which it is a duty not merely to keep out but to drive out.

But, apart from these more general considerations, the question as to the use of preventive measures in the earlier stages of the dispute raises another and somewhat formidable difficulty—the problem of the "time-lag" in public opinion on foreign affairs. Supposing that the Italo-Ethiopian dispute had thus been brought to an issue in January, or in April or May, or in July, *before* the Italian forces had been fully assembled in East Africa, *before* the Italian Government had manifested its unwillingness to discuss the situation on equal terms with the Ethiopian representative at the Council, *before* it had refused the suggestions put forward in Paris, what would have been the state of public opinion in Great Britain and other League countries? The crisis would have been precipitated on what might easily have been represented as a secondary question or even as an unnecessary and humiliating demand. The fact remains that it was only *after* the aggravation of the dispute and *after* the prestige of the Italian Government and people had become too deeply engaged for withdrawal from the adventure to seem possible to them that public opinion in League countries was sufficiently aroused to enable the governments to take strong action. Abstention from the insistence on preventive measures has indeed made it impossible for the League to hinder the outbreak of war. But would the outbreak of war in October have been prevented if public opinion had become confused and divided over a wrangle on procedure in May or July?

This is far from being a convincing argument against the

adoption of preventive measures against a Great Power; but it does at least indicate certain difficulties which must have been in the minds of the statesmen concerned with the dispute.

Another argument against the adoption of preventive measures is that they would have required unanimity on the Council, including the vote of the Italian representative. This has become a routine plea for inertia ever since the Japanese used their veto in the autumn of 1931. But the difficulty is not insuperable. It is always possible to take *concerted action* without a Council resolution. Of the legal minds which delight in bringing forward this argument, so reminiscent of the Polish Diet of old times, we may say: "where there is no will, there is no way." The Covenant assumes a *will to co-operate* on the part of League members for League purposes.

Thus on September 4th, when the Council for the first time took the dispute under its own jurisdiction, the sands were fast running out. The rains would be over in four weeks, some said in less. A sword of Damocles was suspended over Geneva.

It was under these circumstances that the Council proceeded to apply Article 15 of the League Covenant. This Article provides first for a stage of *conciliation* between the parties and then, should this break down, for a report by the Council which is more in the nature of an *arbitration*. But the award, or recommendation, as it is called, is not binding on the parties. All that is laid down is that a party accepting it is protected by the Covenant even after the three months' limit laid down in Article 12. The other party is not compelled under the Covenant to carry out the terms of the "report"; but he cannot attack the conforming party without violating the Covenant and laying himself open to the sanctions of Article 16.

Between September 4th and the outbreak of hostilities on October 3rd, the Council was passing through the stages provided for in Article 15. On September 6th it appointed a Committee of Five to find a basis of conciliation under paragraph 3 of the Article. Its suggestions were accepted in principle by Ethiopia but rejected by Italy. It submitted its report to the Council on September 26th. The Council then proceeded to the task of drawing up the report provided for in paragraph 4. This it began to do through a Committee consisting of all the members of the Council other than the representatives of the parties. This new body—the Committee of Thirteen, as it was called—had not proceeded far with its work when hostilities broke out on October 3rd.

Would it not have been possible to adopt preventive measures at this stage? The Assembly was in session, public opinion throughout the world was keyed up; there was indeed pressure from many quarters, not least from Great Britain, in favour of strong action to protect Ethiopia. The speech of the British Foreign Secretary in the Assembly on September 11th was evidence of a new temper both in the British Government and in the country. Moreover, the Ethiopian Government was appealing for the despatch of observers to watch over the frontier regions. An aggression was plainly in preparation. Does not Article 10 lay it down in set terms that "in case of any threat or danger of such aggression" (*i.e.* aggression against territorial integrity and political independence) "the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled"? What might have been impracticable in May or even in July was surely practicable in September. Why then was nothing done?

The answer to this question is not to be found in general considerations. It is frankly particular and political. No preventive measures were adopted in September because the French Government was not willing to join in them, or even to make them a subject of serious discussion. By this time a large part of the British Navy was concentrated in the danger zone, thereby providing the nucleus for just such an international naval demonstration as had been contemplated by the framers of the report of 1927. Had it been joined by a few units from the French, Russian, Spanish, Greek and Turkish navies, the whole force operating on behalf of the League, it would have put a new face on the situation. But the French Government was unwilling, and the Italian Government knew that it would be unwilling. It knew also that, to say the least, it would be very reluctant to adopt not only the preventive measures which the Covenant *advises*, but the repressive measures which the Covenant *enjoins* in such circumstances as those which arose on October 3rd. There was, in fact, a Franco-Italian entente; and the existence of this entente was a major factor in Signor Mussolini's calculations. Thus the issue was squarely between the entente on the one hand and the Covenant on the other, or, as Mr. Eden has repeatedly put it, both at the Council table and elsewhere, between the old and the new order. The Italian Government was from the beginning in no doubt as to which was the stronger; and, in spite of M. Laval's speech in the Assembly on September 13th, up to October 3rd its calculations had been justified.

With the outbreak of hostilities the procedure under Article 15 was rudely interrupted. The Council hastily adopted the first part of the report of the Committee of Thirteen, dealing with the circumstances of the dispute; but what should have been the concluding part, the statement of the "recommendations deemed just and proper" in regard to it was put on one side. The Council merely reserved the right "to make subsequently such other recommendations as it" might "consider advisable." In other words, it is the Council, not the Committee of Five,[1] which remains on watch for an opportunity of putting forward terms of settlement.

The Council's next duty was to affix responsibility for the violation of the Covenant. There had, it is true, been no declaration of war. But fortunately President Roosevelt, in immediately applying the Neutrality Act, had recognised that there was a state of war. On October 5th, forty-eight hours after the outbreak of hostilities, the Council appointed a Committee of Six to "study the situation" and to "enable it to take a decision." This Committee had two questions to answer:—(1) Is there a state of war between Italy and Ethiopia? (2) If so, has there been recourse to war in violation of Articles 12, 13 or 15 of the Covenant? The Committee, having before it the proclamations of the Italian High Command, concluded that "the Italian Government had had recourse to war contrary to its engagements under Article 12 of the Covenant."

This report was submitted to the Council on Monday, October 7th, and the members of the Council were asked individually, by roll-call, whether they agreed with it or not, the parties concerned being asked after the other members. Of the fifteen members present all but the Italian representatives answered in the affirmative. Thus, four days after the outbreak of hostilities, the responsibility was affixed.

Here again there is occasion for brief comment. The Covenant does not provide that either the Council or the Assembly of the League should take a decision as to the responsibility for a break of the Covenant. The decision is left to the individual States. Since, however, the Council and the Assembly were in session it was natural, and indeed inevitable, that the Governments should use these organs for the communication of their individual decisions. This was the meaning of the roll-call, which was not a vote on a Council Resolution but an expression of fifteen individual opinions. A similar procedure was adopted in the Assembly, except that, whether to spare the feelings of the

[1] Appointed on September 6th, *vide supra*.

Italians or to make it more embarrassing for possible waverers, the *onus* of stating their case was laid upon those who did not accept the conclusions of the report, whilst silent acquiescence was counted as a vote in the affirmative. The Assembly proceedings took place on October 9th to 12th, on which latter date both the Council and the Assembly stood adjourned. Of the fifty-four States represented in the Assembly, fifty accepted the Council's conclusions, which came before the Assembly in the shape of the minutes of the Council proceedings, whilst four, Italy, Austria, Hungary and Albania, refused to accept them. None of the three last-named, however, based their refusal on a contestation of the facts on which the conclusions of the Council's report were based. The Albanian delegate stated bluntly that the terms of Albania's alliance with Italy took precedence of the Covenant. The other two arrived at the same result along more diplomatic lines. It was indeed impossible to find a flaw in the report of the Committee of Six. In effect, the three objectors were simply stating that, placed as they were, they proposed to violate their obligations under Article 16 of the Covenant. For this they were making themselves liable to expulsion under Article 16, para. 4. But since the application of this paragraph is not mandatory but permissive and there was as yet no prospect of its being applied to Italy herself, they ran little risk in that respect.

All this insistence on procedure may seem wearisome and superfluous to British readers. But no one who followed the proceedings at close quarters can doubt the value of having a written document such as the Covenant as a Charter of Co-operation in such an emergency. *Litera scripta manet.* The plain text confounded the waverers, the sceptics and the would-be *saboteurs*. And it afforded the loyal majority the immense advantage of being in a position to use the weapon of publicity—what has been called the mobilisation of shame—in case of need. The Covenant by itself would no doubt have been of little avail. But the Covenant with an immense public opinion behind it was a weapon which no government, least of all the French Government, with its traditional respect for written engagements, could afford to ignore.

With the adjournment of the Assembly and the Council the issue entered upon a new phase which lies beyond the scope of these pages. Article 16 came into play. But a few concluding observations may be permitted.

When, on the evening of October 7th, the roll-call on the Council had carried the League from Article 15 to the threshold of Sanctions, the first sensation in League circles was one of surprise,

almost of stupefaction. It was hard to realise that this massive weapon, that had grown rusty through disuse during fifteen years, was at last to be brought out and tested. For it is the one important article of the Covenant to which practically no attention had been directed since the very early days of the League. During the first year of the League, indeed, both the Council and the Assembly had devoted attention to the subject and an International Blockade Committee had been appointed to make recommendations. Its report was laid before the Second Assembly in 1921 and was adopted with a few amendments. These " Resolutions of 1921 " were the most recent guidance which the League had before it on the article in general. They are, however, in no sense binding, since they were only adopted " provisionally " at that time and, of course, do not amend the original text of the Article. Nevertheless, their broad effect is to strengthen the hands of those who wish to see Article 16 applied not at all in the spirit and as little as possible in the letter.

No one can read Article 16 with an unbiassed mind without recognising, firstly, that it contemplates that the economic sanctions under paragraph (1) and the military, naval and air sanctions under paragraph (2) would be carried out *immediately* and *simultaneously*, and secondly that the economic sanctions would be complete and not partial and piecemeal. Indeed, to study the origins of Article 16 is to realise that the economic sanctions were originally conceived of as supplementary to the military, as the contribution of the weaker States who had little else to give to the common stock. The Resolutions of 1921, however, blunt the edge of the Article both in respect of immediacy and simultaneity, though even in them there is no warrant to be found for setting aside altogether the enforcement of paragraph (2).

The " affectionate " relationship—the adjective is taken from the French press—between Baron Aloisi and M. Laval ruled out all thoughts of the expulsion of Italy from the League. This made it impossible for the enforcement of Article 16, however gradual and fragmentary, to be carried through by the League organs, on which the Italian representative retained his right of veto. This difficulty was circumvented by entrusting the " co-ordination " of the measures taken by the fifty loyal States to an independent international Conference, reporting back straight to the Governments. This Conference and its Sub-Committees do not sit in public and access to its private meetings has been limited to members of the League Secretariat specially named for duty in this connection. It has set to work on its complicated

task with energy and has succeeded in securing what is under the circumstances a remarkable degree of agreement. So within six and a half weeks of the aggression the economic sanctions will be put into force with a fair measure of universality. Thus at the moment of writing the issue between "affection" and principle, between the Franco-Italian entente and the Covenant, between equality before the Law and the conception of a "colonial war," in a word, between the old order and the new, is still hanging in the balances.

NOTE ON PROPOSALS FOR THE APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

On November 2nd, 1935, the sanctions against the Italian Government laid down in the five proposals recommended to the Governments of the Members of the League by the Co-ordination Committee set up on October 10th, were formally approved and passed for application on November 18th. Only certain technical details of their application, connected mainly with clearing agreements and questions of transit, remained to be settled.

The number of States concerned in the application of sanctions is 56, the number of Governments who have intimated that they will carry out the proposals being at present :

Proposal No. I (arms embargo), 51
Proposal No. II (financial measures), 51
Proposal No. III (refusal of Italian goods), 49
Proposal No. IV (embargo on exports to Italy), 49
Proposal No. V (mutual assistance), 41 [1]

Apart from Albania, Austria and Hungary, the Governments of which have signified their abstention from the working of the League Committees, only Paraguay has negatived all the proposals, its Government stating that in their opinion it was undesirable to take the necessary action.

The texts of the proposals adopted are as follows :—

Proposal No. I. With a view to facilitating for the Governments of the Members of the League of Nations the execution of their obligations under Article 16 of the Covenant, the following measures should be taken forthwith :—

(1) The Governments of the Members of the League of Nations which are enforcing at the moment measures to prohibit or restrict the exportation, re-exportation, or transit of arms, munitions, and implements of war to Ethiopia will annul these measures immediately.

(2) The Governments of the Members of the League of Nations will prohibit immediately the exportation, re-exportation or transit to Italy or Italian possessions of arms, munitions, and implements of war enumerated in the attached list.

[1] *The Times*, November 4th, 1935.

(3) The Governments of the Members of the League of Natic will take such steps as may be necessary to secure that arı munitions, and implements of war enumerated in the attach list exported to countries other than Italy will not be re-export directly or indirectly to Italy or to Italian possessions.

(4) The measures provided for in paragraphs 2 and 3 are apply to contracts in process of execution.

Each Government is requested to inform the Committee throu the Secretary-General of the League within the shortest possible tiı of the measures which it has taken in conformity with the abo provisions.

(To this resolution was attached a detailed schedule of arms a munitions.)

Proposal No. II.—The Governments of the Members of the Leag of Nations will forthwith take all measures necessary to render impossil the following operations :—

(1) All loans to or for the Italian Government and all subscr tions to loans issued in Italy or elsewhere by or for the Itali Government.

(2) All banking or other credits to or for the Italian Goveı ment and any further execution by advance, overdraft, or oth wise of existing contracts to lend directly or indirectly to t Italian Government.

(3) All loans to or for any public authority, person, or corpoı tion in Italian territory and all subscriptions to such loans issu in Italy or elsewhere.

(4) All banking or other credits to or for any public authorit person, or corporation in Italian territory and any further executi by advance, overdraft, or otherwise of existing contracts to leı directly or indirectly to such authority, person, or corporation.

(5) All issues of shares or other capital flotations for any pub authority, person, or corporation in Italian territory and subscriptions to such issues of shares or capital flotations in Ita or elsewhere.

(6) The Governments will take all measures necessary to rend impossible the transactions mentioned in paragraphs (1) to (whether effected directly or through intermediaries of whatsoev nationality.

The Governments are invited to put into operation at once such the measures recommended as can be enforced without fresh legislati and to take all practicable steps to secure that the measures recoı mended are completely put into operation by October 31st, 1935.

Proposal No. III.—(1) The Governments of the Members the League of Nations will prohibit the importation into the territories of all goods (other than gold or silver bullion and coi consigned from or grown, produced, or manufactured in Italy Italian possessions, from whatever place arriving.

(2) Goods grown or produced in Italy or Italian possessio which have been subjected to some process in another country, aı goods manufactured partly in Italy or Italian possessions and part in another country will be considered as falling within the scope

the prohibition unless 25 per cent. or more of the value of the goods at the time when they left the place from which they were last consigned is attributable to processes undergone since the goods last left Italy or Italian possessions.

(3) Goods the subject of existing contracts will not be excepted from the prohibition.

(4) Goods *en route* at the time of imposition of the prohibition would be excepted from its operation. In giving effect to this provision, Governments may, for convenience of administration, fix an appropriate date having regard to the normal time necessary for transport from Italy, after which goods will become subject to the prohibition.

(5) Personal belongings of travellers from Italy or Italian possessions may also be excepted from its operation.

Proposal No. IV.—(1) The Governments of the Members of the League of Nations will extend the application of paragraph (2) of Proposal I of the Co-ordination Committee to the following articles as regards their exportation and re-exportation to Italy and Italian possessions, which will accordingly be prohibited:—(*a*) Horses, mules, donkeys, camels and all other transport animals; (*b*) rubber; (*c*) bauxite, aluminium and alumina (aluminium oxide), iron ore, and scrap iron; chromium, manganese, nickel, titanium, tungsten, vanadium, their ores and ferro-alloys (and also ferro-molybdenum, ferro-silicon, ferro-silico-manganese and ferro-silico-manganese-aluminium); tin and tin ore.

List (*c*) above includes all crude forms of the minerals and metals mentioned and their ores, scrap, and alloys.

(2) The Governments of the Members of the League of Nations will take such steps as may be necessary to secure that the articles mentioned in paragraph (1) above exported to countries other than Italy or Italian possessions will not be re-exported directly or indirectly to Italy or to Italian possessions.

(3) The measures provided for in paragraphs (1) and (2) above are to apply to contracts in course of execution.

(4) Goods *en route* at the time of imposition of the prohibition will be excepted from its operation. In giving effect to this provision Governments may, for the convenience of administration, fix an appropriate date, having regard to the normal time necessary for transport to Italy or Italian possessions, after which goods will become subject to the prohibition.

Proposal No. V.—The Co-ordination Committee draws the special attention of all Governments to their obligations under paragraph 3 of Article 16 of the Covenant, according to which the Members of the League undertake mutually to support one another in the application of the economic and financial measures taken under this Article.

(1) With a view to carrying these obligations into effect the Members of the League of Nations will:

(*a*) Adopt immediately measures to assure that no action taken as a result of Article 16 will deprive any country applying sanctions of such advantages as the commercial agreements concluded by the participating States with Italy afforded it through the operation of the most-favoured-nation clause;

(*b*) Take appropriate steps with a view to replacing, within the limits of the requirements of their respective countries,

imports from Italy by the import of similar products from the participating States;

(*c*) Be willing, after the application of economic sanctions, to enter into negotiations with any participating country which has sustained a loss with a view to increasing the sale of goods so as to offset any loss of Italian markets which the application of sanctions may have involved;

(*d*) In cases in which they have suffered no loss in respect of any given commodity, abstain from demanding the application of any most-favoured-nation clause in the case of any privileges granted under paragraphs (*b*) and (*c*) in respect of that commodity.

(2) With the above objects the Governments will, if necessary, with the assistance of the Committee of Eighteen, study in particular the possibility of adopting, within the limits of their existing obligations, and taking into consideration the annexed opinion of the Legal Sub-Committee of the Co-ordination Committee, the following measures:—

(i) The increase by all appropriate measures of their imports in favour of such countries as may have suffered loss of Italian markets on account of the application of sanctions;

(ii) In order to facilitate this increase, the taking into consideration of the obligations of mutual support and of the advantages which the trade of certain States Members of the League of Nations not participating in the sanctions would obtain from the application of these sanctions in order to leduce by every appropriate means and to an equitable degree, imports coming from these countries;

(iii) The promotion by all means in their power of business relations between firms interested in the sale of goods in Italian markets which have been lost owing to the application of sanctions and firms normally importing such goods;

(iv) Assistance generally in the organisation of the international marketing of goods with a view to offsetting any loss of Italian markets which the application of sanctions may have involved.

They will also examine under the same conditions the possibility of financial or other measures to supplement the commercial measures in so far as these latter may not ensure sufficient international mutual support.

(3) The Co-ordination Committee requests the Committee of Eighteen to afford, if necessary, to the Governments concerned the assistance contemplated at the beginning of Part (2) of the present proposal.

(Reports submitted by the Legal Sub-Committee on the application of sanctions and (1) private contracts, commercial treaties and treaties of friendship and non-aggression, (2) the most-favoured-nation clause and (3) international conventions concerning freedom of communications were annexed to the proposals.)

On November 6th, 1935, the Committee of Eighteen adopted a Canadian proposal to extend the embargo on exports to Italy to the following raw materials and products: oil and its derivatives; pig iron, iron and steel; coal and coke and fuels derived from them.

THE WATER PROBLEMS OF ABYSSINIA AND BORDERING COUNTRIES

By A. Beeby Thompson

The mountainous regions of Abyssinia and Eritrea are responsible for a heavy rainfall in a part of Africa which is singularly arid and bare. All the bordering countries and the lowlands of Ethiopia, although deluged in rain at times, suffer from a water scarcity which is reflected in the sparsely populated and unfertile regions where a nomad existence is enforced by sheer necessity on the few inhabitants. In parts the rainfall may be equal to the average of England, but it is erratic in its distribution and incidence and quite insufficient to support a healthy vegetation where a fierce sun and dry wind quickly evaporate much of the rain precipitated. During the rains between May and September great volumes of water reach the main watercourses of Ethiopia, but the rugged topography tends to encourage its convergence to a few major valleys communicating with rivers which either reach the ocean or end abruptly in lakes or swamps where all is consumed by water plants (papyrus mainly) or lost by evaporation.

By far the most important discharge channel from Abyssinia is the Blue Nile, which rising in Lake Tana at 6000 feet elevation follows a circuitous course in gorges and deep valleys before entering the Sudan, where it is joined by two tributaries, the Dinder and the Rahad. The Atbara is another important river which supplements the Nile flow nearly 200 miles below the junction of the Blue and White Niles at Khartoum, but all other drainage from Abyssinia on the Sudan side, with the exception of the Sobat which joins the White Nile near Malakal and consequently supplements the flow from Equatorial Africa, spreads over the plains when it leaves the hill country, watering and fertilising fan-shaped strips of country where it does not reach depressions and form swamps.[1]

[1] The mean monthly discharges of the Nile and its tributaries are given by the Egyptian Irrigation Authorities as follows in cubic meters per second :—

	Maximum.	*Minimum.*	*Average for Year.*
Main Nile, Wadi Halfa	8520 Sept.	570 May	2790
Blue Nile, Khartoum	5720 ,,	120 ,,	1650
White Nile, Khartoum	1430 Oct.	570 ,,	840
Sobat	770 ,,	110 ,,	450
Victoria Nile, below Lake Kioga	740 Nov.	580 March	670

Not without justification is Egypt deeply concerned with events in Abyssinia, as it is upon the annual Blue Nile flood that the rich delta of that country depends for the annual fertilisation and watering of about 5,500,000 acres of cultivated ground. Unlike the White Nile which carries little suspended matter, its swift running waters are heavily laden with silt when in flood, and no serious evaporation losses are caused by dissipation in extensive swamps: also the contracted valley in which it rushes admits of little in the way of useful irrigation projects until the Sudan is reached. Aided by a dam at Sennar retaining some 700,000,000 cubic metres of water, no less than 700,000 acres of fertile cotton soil in the Gesira is irrigated for growing cotton and grain under suitable rotation, and this great civilising enterprise is undertaken by the Sudan Plantations Company in partnership with the Sudan Government.

Enormous volumes of water escape to the Mediterranean when the Blue Nile is in flood (up to 10,000 cubic metres a second), and so considerable is the rise of level (20 feet) that the waters of the White Nile are for a time held back at Omdurman, forming a useful reserve of clear water for later storage in the Assuan dam and eventual passage to Egypt when the silt-laden waters from Abyssinia have passed the sluices. Of interest is the fact that the Egyptian delta composing modern Egypt consists almost entirely of silt carried from Abyssinia, for little water reaches the Nile along a strip of over 1,700 miles of almost rainless country through which the Nile runs between Atbara and the sea.[1]

As the Blue Nile Valley does not lend itself to useful conservation works, main interest has long centred in Lake Tana, where much water can be effectively and inexpensively retained during the wet season. By controlling the outlet of this lake of 1200 square miles in area, it is calculated that no less than 11,000,000,000 cubic metres of water could be preserved for release when the silt-charged flood waters had subsided and water was urgently needed in Egypt for crops between March and June. Negotiations with Abyssinia for the construction of works to regulate the flow from Lake Tana have proceeded for years without concluding any agreement, for although it is not believed that the Blue Nile waters could be deflected into other channels or utilised to an extent which would endanger supplies to Egypt and the Sudan, it is regarded as particularly unfortunate that such

[1] During the period of shortage in Egypt, Hurst estimates that no less than 50 per cent. of the Nile flow is provided by the African Equatorial lakes.

useful and simple works should be hindered by purely political considerations.

The Jebel Aulia dam, now in course of construction on the White Nile, north of Khartoum, will help Egypt in the critical period with its storage of about 3,000,000,000 cubic metres of water from Central Africa, but other projects designed to deal with the water from the Central African lakes and its passage through or around the papyrus-covered swamps of the Sud area involve far more difficult and expensive works than the relatively simple Tana undertaking.

Two important cotton-growing areas in the Sudan owe their origin to silt and waters from the Eritrean mountains. North of Kassala the Gash has deposited over the plain a great fan-shaped stretch of rich alluvium where about 100,000 acres of land are annually watered sufficiently to support to maturity a healthy growth of cotton and other crops.

At Tokar on the Red Sea maritime plains the Baraka annually waters and enriches with new silt about 50,000 acres of ground spread fan-like over the plains, where an exceptionally high-grade cotton is raised together with the food requirements of the cultivators. At both places the problem of furnishing water for the workers and their domestic animals has only been solved by its conveyance by pipe line from a distance, for the fine silts only hold capillary water, and the occasional pockets of sand usually give water only for a period, and that generally too saline to drink in comfort. On both of these dry deltas works have been carried out to direct the flood water along directions where the ground is most fertile or the location more convenient for orderly development.

In the case of the Gash the Italians were in a position of being able to deflect its flood waters on to Eritrean soil suitable for cultivation, and only after long and delicate negotiations was it arranged that for certain considerations based on crop values a definite proportion of the annual flood should be taken for their use from its natural course by works constructed in the bed of the stream.

No rivers run into Kenya or British Somaliland from Abyssinia, although in Italian Somaliland two important streams carry water from the Abyssinian highlands to the Indian Ocean, namely, the Juba and Shibeli. The Dawa river constitutes the boundary between Kenya and Abyssinia for some distance, but this enters the Juba to the east and is dry most of the year. The two first-named rivers traverse swampy malarial depressions, but could

doubtless be trained to irrigate large areas of country if the expense was justified and the health situation could be remedied. Lake Rudolph receives the drainage of much hilly country but has no outlet, and the Sobat river runs into the White Nile near Malakal.

The Hawash river, which flows amidst malarial surroundings towards French Somaliland, never reaches the Red Sea but is lost in swamps in the unhealthy Aussa plains. All minor streams are ephemeral and either discharge over the plains or die out in swamps.

The scenery of the country round Abyssinia depends upon the nature of its relief, rainfall, elevation and the character of the strata exposed, but there is a great similarity of types on all sides. Depressed areas receiving the drainage of higher ground naturally support a more luxuriant vegetation than hilly regions from which much of the soil and humus is washed. A sinuous line of scrub or thorn bush generally defines in the plains the track followed by water during the rains, and the flood plains of the larger rivers or watercourses are often distinguished by a forested belt of large trees and dome palms with a fairly rank undergrowth. Glorious groves of palms and hardwood trees line some of the river banks and spread or contract with the width of the flood belt. "Forests" of gum (Arabic), frankincense and myrrh provide an occupation for many natives in parts where the trees are plentiful.

The great featureless or slightly undulating cotton-soil Savannahs have often an attractive park-like appearance with clumps of trees dotted about, or they may be no more than expanses of high coarse grass. Late in the season they are swept by fierce prairie fires from which flee in terror all forms of life, including insects which rise in clouds pursued by myriads of birds which, regardless of the heat and smoke, fly at the very edge of the advancing flame. On the more rocky soil giant and dwarf Euphorbia flourish, and in high country bastard cedars are occasionally found with bracken fern, but most of the very arid districts with little covering of soil are sparingly carpeted with grasses and may or may not be thickly overgrown with thorn bush. Very curiously, weeks ahead of the rains many of the shrubs break into leaf or flower, providing a striking contrast with the bare winter garb of the rest. Tamarisk also thrive in some of the more salty watercourses where other forms of vegetation will not flourish.

Here and there in these countries a veritable arcadia will

: found in some rather inaccessible, sheltered and watered)ot which high winds fail to reach and the usual pests seem to nore. Such a place is Medishi, not far distant from the Italian ontier on the coastal range of British Somaliland, at an elevation f about 6000 feet, the final retreat of the Mad Mullah when ressed by the British forces. In this sheltered narrow valley a overnment garden watered by a perennial stream grows in rofusion monster cabbages, cauliflowers, brussels sprouts, arrots, peas, asparagus, alongside limes, oranges, mangoes,)ananas and pineapples, a truly incongruous mixture.

Dotted about the semi-arid countries encircling Abyssinia are patches of soil well suited for cultivation of food crops, cotton and other products. Sometimes it is a rich decomposition product of volcanic or igneous rocks which has somehow escaped erosion by wind and water, but the successful cultivation of rain crops in such ground is dependent upon the amount of seasonal rain and of the near-by occurrence of potable water for the cultivators and their animals. Unless drinkable water is accessible such ground is useless except for grazing purposes in the rains, when superficial collections of water provide for the needs of the nomad herdsmen.

Hundreds of square miles of fertile black cotton soil (löess) occur in some parts where the absorbed rainfall is more than sufficient to support healthy crops, but these rich lands are valueless for cultivation unless within reach of one of the rivers or water-holes which do not fail in the dry season. This löess is a wind-blown deposit of the finest particles, and its black and fruitful properties are due to the annual assimilation of decayed or burnt vegetation through the medium of cracks which develop in the hot dry weather following loss of moisture. Soon after the rains cease a mosaic pattern of cracks develops on the surface, and these gradually expand until they may be inches wide and feet deep, rendering movements of men or animals very tiring and difficult. Even a car transmits an unpleasant vibration to occupants. When wet the country is almost impassable for men, animals or motor cars, as the soft, slippery mass prevents progress even if one is not bogged entirely.

A few feet of fissured cotton soil will readily absorb the whole of a 20-inch rainfall, swelling sufficiently in the process to seal all cracks and enclosing all loose organic matter which has been carried into the crevices. No watercourses traverse these plains as there is no run-off, and a rank growth of elephant grass 5 to 10 feet high often thrives and attracts game in great numbers.

All absorbed water being held in capillary pores, little, if any, can reach underlying rocks or run over the surface; therefore the conditions are very unfavourable for the location of lasting supplies of water.

Successful experiments have been made in the Sudan with earthen tanks, of about 1,000,000 gallons capacity, excavated in the cotton soil near some of the rocky hills which abruptly rise from the plains and from which all precipitated rain quickly runs.

However fertile the soil and favourable the water situation, crop cultivation is a precarious occupation in these arid and semi-arid countries, for quite apart from the ever-present vagaries of rainfall, insect pests and human and animal depredations are an incessant menace. Locusts, grasshoppers, birds, rats, mice, ants and other vermin descend on cultivation in clouds or hosts, ruthlessly devouring all in their path, leaving only devastation and desolation behind. Occasional hurricanes flatten growing crops, sand devils carve avenues of destruction through the fields of waving corn, and every herd of animals driven across the country enacts its toll from the unhappy cultivators despite watchmen perched on raised platforms, thorn hedges and other primitive devices to keep out marauders. No wonder the native shows a disinclination to grow crops, for from his own people he can obtain no redress except by force, which, if exercised, causes bloodshed and subsequent unwelcome attentions from the European officials bent on preserving order at all costs. Scorching winds and sandstorms may wither up crops approaching maturity after months of ceaseless and anxious vigilance.

One of the most serious problems faced by the authorities is the maintenance of peace along river banks where the cultivator has settled and irrigates his ground, for on the cessation of rains the hot, thirsty and hungry animals, being driven by the nomad shepherds to water, stampede into the cultivation, causing widespread damage to growing crops. Much is being accomplished by experts, but not until permanent water is developed at numerous and widespread intervals can these troubles be eliminated, for nothing can prevent the ravages of starving and thirsty animals suddenly thrown amidst plenty.

In all the countries around Abyssinia locusts constitute an ever-present danger which can never be fought by the native and are only imperfectly dealt with by Europeans. For hours or days the sky is darkened by their flight, in the path of which every scrap of vegetation is devoured, a situation made worse

by the deposition of eggs which a little later are the source of an invasion of ravenous hoppers which convert the earth into a crawling, moving black mass.

Everywhere the white ant flourishes, although it is more prevalent in some districts than others. No organic substance seems to escape its attention and it would be difficult to find a tree, shrub or decaying twig or leaf unattacked in many parts. Lying awake at night in a straw hut the incessant gnawing of these termites is heard and a fine powdery dust falls continuously on everything below. On the plains they encase all rotting vegetation with casts of mud which sets like cement, and they build up around decayed tree trunks massive castellated cement structures, 6 to 20 feet high, which are landmarks in the district.

Fierce gales of great intensity at certain times sweep over localised areas, raising clouds of sand or dust which render life nearly unendurable and causing great soil erosion. These are especially prevalent in the rich silty areas at the end of the cultivation period when the surface is parched and the wilted plants bleached. High winds preceding a storm lap up so much fine, dry silt in some districts that the sun is totally obscured for hours, and a veritable inferno of black dust overwhelms everything. As inhabitants of Khartoum and Medani know, there is no escape from the effects of these haboobs, indoors or out of doors, which with little notice and at intervals envelop everything and everybody in violently driven clouds of filth.

At Tokar, in the Sudan, incessant local winds of gale force continue for weeks, at certain periods carving wave-like furrows feet deep in the silty earth and causing such drifts that the houses have to be dug out each year from mounds which almost conceal their presence. Providentially this occurs just after the cotton crop has been harvested and the bulk of the population has left for a more agreeable place.

From the foregoing it will be gathered why there is little organised agriculture in the countries surrounding Abyssinia even where there is a moderate rainfall, but, if a less precarious occupation, the pastoralist has not an easy or uneventful life. With their herds and flocks of cattle, camels, sheep and goats, the natives are forced to wander hither and thither in search of grazing and water, for soon after the rains cease many waterholes dry up and the over-grazed vegetation is not replaced by new growth. As feed gets increasingly scarce and water becomes more difficult to find, longer distances have to be travelled by animals getting thinner and more weary every day until they start

to die of malnutrition or disease. So enfeebled do the sheep often become towards the end of the dry season that they are scarcely able to support their own weight, and often have to be carried by the shepherds and lifted out of the way of an approaching car. As a last resort branches of trees with foliage are felled and bulbous plants uprooted to give the animals something eatable, but as the need for water is even greater than the need for food, the approaches to all water-holes become barren, dusty wastes, over which thousands of suffering animals wearily struggle half suffocated in dust, only to return a little later along the same bare congested tracks before any meagre feed is reached. Camel flies, ticks and other insects never cease to worry the distressed beasts, and even birds suck the blood of those with sores. Predatory animals always hover on the fringe of sick and weak beasts and vultures appear as out of the blue directly a sick animal falls.

The scenes round important water-holes are truly fascinating, though distressing, for day and night an incessant stream of animals is driven to the mouth of the wells where tired, perspiring men and women draw water in skins whilst chanting monotonous songs.

Where water is not very plentiful long waits are enforced whilst it collects in the wells after exhaustion, and it is no easy matter to keep segregated the different herds striving to reach water. All large water centres become badly fouled, and at times the water is disgustingly dirty and malodorous due to the wash of animal excreta into the wells. In British Somaliland, where in parts the water is obtained from caverns in anhydrite or gypsum deposits, the organic acids act on the sulphates to produce sulphuretted hydrogen, which transmits to the water a nauseating taste and odour and a black colour, yet it is freely consumed by both men and animals. As an example of the straits to which the native is sometimes driven in getting water may be mentioned the methods employed in some parts of the Northern Frontier Province of Kenya near Wajir where fissures are followed in limestones to a depth of 100 feet or more, so that the excavations are very irregular, and water is raised by means of a chain of human beings who descend the crooked holes; no less than seventeen men and women were found in one well, each having secured a precarious foothold or toe-hold in notches scooped in the side. Uncomfortably if not perilously perched in this position, giraffe-hide buckets were passed down and up the well from one to another to the tune of a song. The empty vessels were dropped

upside down in order to convey air to those below, and as each empty one was let fall, a full one, flung from the man below, was caught. For hours on end this work continued to supply waiting camels at the surface.

Early rains are regarded as a god-sent blessing by the people, and no wonder they watch with intense anxiety for signs of approaching storms. The rainy season is usually heralded by sporadic and violent thunderstorms of very restricted dimensions, the news of which flashes through the country and is followed by wholesale migrations to the favoured district. Within a few days of a good storm the countryside is transformed, for grass springs to life, shrubs sprout and flowers appear, and a second deluge will complete the transformation. It is indeed an inspiring sight.

Although travel by motor vehicle is possible in most parts of tropical Africa not covered by the so-called rain forests or cut up by deep ravines or gorges, it cannot be regarded as easy or pleasant, for in the rains when vegetation thrives the undrained and unmetalled mud tracks, cleared only of scrub, become sodden quagmires at all points where the surface dips below the general level of undulating country, unless sufficiently extended periods of sunny windy weather dry up the mud. In the dry weather heat and dust render travel disagreeable and motor vehicles cut in the soft earth deep ruts from which it becomes increasingly difficult for the driver to escape. Deviations in the bush or scrub on either side are always adventures, for the car may sink in patches of softened ground or strike concealed roots of trees or loose branches which rip the tyres or damage the chassis. Splashing through wet watercourses is always fraught with risks, for the beds are soft and the banks washed steep after a torrential flow.

Although single light cars capable of being man-handled can traverse most of the prairies and scrub country of Africa in the dry months, and even make slow headway in the rains by clever utilisation of the topographical features, it is quite a different matter for laden lorries or convoys of vehicles to get about on mud tracks or in uncleared bush. A few hundred miles of low-gear work plays havoc with motor lorries in the tropics. At times the writer has emerged from stretches of mud with a Ford car unrecognisable as such, being simply encased in a coat of half-dried mud.

Excursions into any of the arid parts surrounding Abyssinia without adequate preparations and precautions expose the

participants to grave danger, for if water is lost out of range c places where it can be replenished, almost certain death await them. The aeroplane has greatly diminished the risk to those wh follow a prearranged route duly notified to officials, but failin this the only hope lies in discovery by a stray party of nomad who may be carrying enough water to share a little. On man recognised tracks over waterless belts the bleached bones of me and animals bear testimony to misfortunes which have befalle incautious travellers.

In all these territories the main want is water and its dis covery in regions where it was previously thought to be non existent is regarded by the ignorant natives as one of the greates miracles of the white man. Nothing induces greater respec and admiration for the authorities from the simple inhabitant than the development of permanent supplies of water where i was formerly absent or only present at limited periods. Taxatio for any other purpose than for water is repellent and popularl regarded as an inquisition, but for water the natives are prepare to pay. A restricted amount of water exploration has bee undertaken in the Sudan, Kenya, British Somaliland, as well a in the French and Italian territories, but the problem has hardl been touched, although sufficient is now known to make it ab solutely certain that important supplies of potable water can b tapped at numberless spots selected by the hydrologist experience in desert problems.

Experience to date does not encourage the belief that enoug ground water exists for the irrigation of crops, but that is quit a secondary matter to the discovery of potable water in quantitie adequate to supply the needs of men and animals. Once thi is demonstrated there are, as has been explained, vast region where sufficient rain crops can be grown to support village lif and attract settlement which would go far to relieve the anxiet of harried officials whose work is largely increased by chasin wandering tribes for their taxes and keeping them out of strif with their neighbours.

Without doubt the location of permanent supplies of wate of good quality is not a simple problem, even for the exper but the ignorance of the natives is surprising regarding matter of such vital importance to their comfort and existence. Th primitive nomads are content to suffer indescribable privation rather than explore for subsoil waters, about which they hol somewhat hazy notions. This neglect may be partly due t their Moslem teaching that an Almighty ordains all and wi

provide if he wills, and partly to their utter disinterestedness in works undertaken by others. Certainly they have neither the skill nor the tools for constructing works of a permanent nature, but they make no attempt to keep in repair wells which have been opened in the past by some more enterprising tribe or race.

Most native water centres are located in sandy watercourses where the line of saturation falls as the dry season advances, so the wells have to be carried to increasing depths to reach water, often to 100 feet. When the beds are unconsolidated they are usually lined with plaited brushwood or roughly-shaped branches, but each year when the floods appear the sides collapse and the shafts are filled with river wash.

Tube wells are being successfully introduced with hand pumps, for it is a complete misconception to imagine that the primitive methods employed are cheap. The wear and tear of ropes and buckets is excessive and much time is lost at critical periods in retrieving lost objects which have fallen down the wells, impeding or preventing the extraction of water. The reconditioning or reopening of the wells each year by native craftsmen also involves expense or compensation of some kind.

The foregoing information concerning the country described and the prevailing meteorological features shows how unsuitable are these inhospitable lands for European settlement in their present state, and so far as the writer knows no white planter has attempted to settle in the British-controlled territory to which reference is made. Along the low-lying coastal plains a trying humid and enervating heat prevails which saps energy and enforces frequent changes to more bracing climates to maintain health and energy, and it is only at elevations approaching 5000 feet that Europeans can live in reasonable comfort. The few irrigated areas in the Sudan to which reference is made are worked entirely by natives directed and supervised by Government officials and white supervisors, and there has never been any thought of encouraging or even permitting European planters to squat on the land.

Even in the highlands it is likely to prove very difficult for European cultivators of most crops to compete with natives, and the wild undisciplined tribes of Ethiopia and its borders are unlikely to settle quickly or patiently to the quiet existence of an agriculturist.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT [1]

By Mr. Raymond Leslie Buell

In his historic address at Geneva a few weeks ago, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, prefaced his remarks by attempting to explain the curious character of the English people. The Americans have inherited that character and probably made some changes in it. It is well to emphasise at the start that there is a continuous conflict within American life which explains many of the things we do. The American Republic was a new experiment at the time it was established. It was founded partly for religious and partly for economic purposes, but its founders were sincere, I think, in attempting to create a new place for the common man. At that time Europe was torn with dissension and ruled by governments which were not democratic in their spirit or in their nature. The American experiment was made in the belief that it would be possible to get away from this old system and establish something new, and out of that idea the principle of isolation arose. The American Republic was not strong enough to change the old system but, if left alone, it might build up a new system; and consequently it seems to me that isolation, at that time, was a tenable and, in fact, a necessary policy.

But there is a second motivation in American life which seems inconsistent with this first belief, and this is an impulse which we inherited from the British, a humanitarian impulse. It was not long before we believed that we had a mission to carry the ideals of the new society which we had founded into every other part of the world. As far as an international system is concerned we believed then, as we do now, in peace. We had a very small conception of what was involved in peace, but the record of the administration of Thomas Jefferson shows him to have been a man who desired ardently to get away from the old traditional system of power politics and to erect a new era based upon peace and order.

[1] Address given at Chatham House on October 1st, 1935, with Major-Gen. Sir Neill Malcolm, K.C.B., D.S.O., in the Chair.

Thus the desire for isolation has contended with this desire to bring about a new order, and to spread what we believed to be American ideals. But as a result of the growth of our nation and of our economic order we see a new idea arising, the idea of making the United States a Great Power, of playing the game of power politics as it has been played in Europe, of building up an army and navy and of seeking our place among the empires of the world. That tendency, conflicting with the ideals of isolation and humanitarianism, explains many of the apparently irrational features of our foreign policy.

When President Roosevelt came into office two years ago he was confronted with a difficult choice. He could have attempted to apply the traditional theories of deflation, which would have meant keeping on the gold standard and attempting to reduce costs to correspond with the new price level. But he rejected that theory for a number of reasons which I think were sound, and he embarked upon the opposite theory of reflation. He believed that that was the best, the most sound, and the most social policy so far as the United States was concerned. He hoped to float the ship of capitalism off the rocks by pouring money into the system and by gradually bringing about a rising level of prices. At the same time he believed that he could inaugurate a certain number of social reforms.

The policy, I think, of the recent administration falls under three heads :—

1. *Financial Policy.* President Roosevelt followed the British example, took America off gold and depreciated the dollar by about 40 per cent. He extended cheap credits to almost everyone in trouble. He embarked upon a programme of heavy expenditure for the purpose of relieving unemployment and of reconstructing public works. As a result of that financial policy he incurred a heavy burden of debt and has not attempted to keep the budget balanced.

2. *Industrial Policy.* In the second place he inaugurated the policy, which is now almost forgotten, of the N.R.A. He hoped to bring about co-operation within industry so as to do away with so-called unfair competition and to stop the spiral of deflation which was undermining the business system. Through the N.R.A. he hoped to restore profits to enterprise, while at the same time increasing wages.

3. *Agricultural Policy.* In the third place he attempted to give to agriculture a position of parity with industry. Confronted with the loss of the export trade of America as a result of

which the crops grown on about 40,000,000 acres of cotton and wheat land could not find a market, the administration imposed a tax upon the consumption of products such as cotton cloth and flour and handed over the returns from this tax to the farmers, who agreed, in return, to cut down their production so as to increase farm prices.

What have been the consequences of this recovery from the international point of view? As far as domestic affairs are concerned that policy, in my opinion, did stop deflation and falling prices, while at the same time it did something, perhaps not much, to raise the standard of living of the working classes. But from the international standpoint a price had to be paid for this policy, which was a policy of economic nationalism, using the term in the best sense of the word. It was an effort to bring about certain internal changes in disregard of the world economic system, or the international interests of the United States, and to bring about an increase in the American price level above that of the world as a whole. A result of that policy, obviously, has been an increase in the spirit of American protectionism, arising out of the depreciation of the dollar, and also a growing spirit of isolation, which is an inevitable accompaniment of this policy of economic nationalism. I do not mean to condemn the policy for that reason. It is inevitable that a country wishing to get through a process of social experimentation should be obliged, as Soviet Russia has been obliged, to cut herself off from the economic international system during a period of transition, and it is probably true that our policy has been little different from that of Britain or France. But, while the policy has achieved a certain number of immediate results, the fact remains that in the United States there are still ten million unemployed and that there are probably a few hundred thousand more unemployed now than there were a year ago. We are confronted with a serious loss of international markets, particularly of our cotton market. It is all right to subsidise the production of a purely domestic product but, if you attempt to raise the internal price of an export crop such as cotton, obviously you increase foreign production and you begin to lose the export market, and that is what is beginning to happen; and this loss of the foreign market is causing serious concern.

For these various reasons the Roosevelt administration during the last year or so has begun to interest itself in international economic policy. Now there can be, roughly speaking, two kinds of international economic policy. There can be the tradi-

tional orthodox idea of lowering tariffs, getting everybody on the gold standard and allowing the market to return to international competition, caused by the action and interaction of private forces. Obviously, however, if the policy of domestic economic planning is adopted, it is impossible in the international sphere to return to the old idea of *laissez-faire*. Although the Roosevelt administration has not yet given serious attention to the subject it has attempted to work out the idea of international planning in one or two spheres. Perhaps this idea has succeeded best in the case of sugar. The American people consume about six million tons of sugar a year. In the past about half this quantity came from Cuba, a certain amount was produced at home and a certain amount came from the Philippines. Under the old ideas of economic internationalism we should simply have reduced the tariff and allowed competition to determine where Americans should buy their sugar. Had that been done I have no doubt that American producers would have gone out and that Cuba would have soon dominated the market. But the administration did not do that, partly because in its opinion the world sugar surpluses were so large that a removal of the tariff would demoralise the market for generations, but partly because they did not wish to destroy an industry which was of considerable importance to the Middle West. So what they did was to undertake the Costigan Jones Plan providing for a quota system. The Government said, " We will reduce the duty on sugar from Cuba, but we will limit the amount of sugar to be imported from Cuba to about two million tons a year. We will impose a tax on sugar consumption generally and we will take the returns of this tax and pay them to the American sugar-growers not only to reduce their average costs, but also to improve the condition of the workers." The same thing was said to Porto Rico and the Philippines. The idea was that each of the different areas should be given a quota which should fix the limits of competition, that certain compensation should be paid through taxation and that in return for reducing production American growers should assume certain social responsibilities. The result of that planning from the standpoint of Cuba was remarkable; when the world price of sugar was ·80 cents, the American price was 1·94. It was an experiment in the international control of production which as a transitional measure, I think, has a good deal to be said for it.

There are two ways of looking at these planning agreements. They may be regarded as a permanent means of controlling international production, or they may be regarded merely as a

transitional step to the return of the free market. At any rate the administration, not only in sugar but also in wheat and one or two other commodities, has co-operated with other nations in an international effort at control.

The second feature of the commercial policy of this administration has been the reciprocity treaty programme. In view of its domestic recovery programme which has increased the costs of production for producers, the administration stated that it could not cut tariff rates generally, but it is attempting to negotiate agreements with foreign countries in an effort to determine where exchange would be mutually advantageous. We have established in our State Department a very remarkable section, in which dozens of economists are making an extremely careful study of international trade, its currents, its character, and of the whole domestic economy of the United States, in order to determine what industries are socially beneficial and what may be sacrificed for the sake of international trade. Another significant element in this tariff programme is that the administration is endeavouring to adhere to the most-favoured-nation principle.

So far this programme has been slow in getting under way. We have made a very important treaty with Cuba, embodying the interesting idea of seasonal duties. We have made an important agreement with Brazil which lowered the duty on manganese, which was a very high duty, and we have made a very interesting treaty with Belgium which lowers the duty on American imports of steel and lace. It is true to say that through these three or four treaties the United States has actually lowered half a dozen important duties, not only to the treaty Powers but to the whole world, which is a rather unique achievement in a period when duties seem to be increasing elsewhere.

This programme has met with a great deal of resistance. In Maine the producers believed that the Government was going to lower the duty on potatoes to the benefit of the Canadian potato growers, and a campaign of propaganda was begun in which the school teachers urged their students to write letters of protest to Washington. This indicates the extreme difficulty of lowering duties during a depression when you have over-production. A large number of Congressmen protested to the President against the reduction of the duty on manganese in the treaty with Brazil. Mr. Hull replied that the manganese industry had never produced more than a very small per cent. of the needs of the country and that it employed only 300 men. Nevertheless, the manganese industry is divided up among a number of states,

and if each Congressman feels it his duty to support a vested interest, these interests can exert a great deal of pressure.

The final phase of our economic policy has been a growing desire, which has not been voiced very loudly, but which is very real, in favour of international stabilisation of currencies. There is no doubt that the new tariff policy will not succeed until we have international stabilisation. It is almost impossible in my opinion to bring about an international reduction of trade barriers so long as there exists uncertainty in regard to the value of currencies, and if we do not get international stabilisation, the American Government, I think, must soon abandon its treaty programme of attempting to liberalise tariff policy, and adopt either a trade barter system which means the destruction of triangular trade, or economic autarchy, which is almost the same thing. Many Americans have been disappointed, to say the least, that when, for the first time in many years, a government has come into power in the United States which has looked with favour on tariff reduction and is attempting to bring about currency stabilisation, the American people have been confronted with the Ottawa Agreements and an unwillingness on the part of certain governments to stabilise. Recently I was talking with an economist in Geneva who had visited nine countries in Europe. He said that they were stagnant, if not sinking; that all were marking time until the Americans and British could get together upon this question of currency stabilisation. I will now briefly review the political relations of the United States with other parts of the world as they have developed during the last two years.

In regard to Latin America, President Roosevelt has continued the policy of non-intervention which was established by President Hoover. At the Montevideo Conference of the American States two years ago, Secretary Hull gave the American States the most complete assurance that they have had that the United States was opposed to the idea of intervention. President Roosevelt himself declared in his famous speech before the Woodrow Wilson Foundation that should a Latin American State fall into chaos, the task of restoring government would not be the exclusive responsibility of the United States, but the joint task of the American nations. As a result of such a statement some people say that the Monroe Doctrine has been abrogated. The first Rooseveltian interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, namely, that the United States should be the policeman of the Western world, has indeed come to an end. Nevertheless, the United States reserves the right to resist aggression by any outside Power

upon the American continent but, presumably, as the existence of our Arbitration Treaties show, we would not exercise or attempt to exercise that right until every effort has been made to settle a dispute by peaceful means.

In addition to these declarations the Roosevelt administration has terminated the Platt amendment giving us the right to intervene in Cuba, has evacuated Haiti, has made a new treaty with Panama, terminating our right of intervention, despite the Canal, and has revised the non-recognition policy in Central America. On the whole I think that the Latin American policy of the administration has been among its outstanding successes. But it has not been a complete success in two respects. The first relates to the Chaco War. For three or four years Bolivia and Paraguay carried on a perfectly senseless war. The League of Nations attempted to intervene. The Commission of Neutrals attempted to intervene. The United States attempted to intervene. I do not know where the rights and wrongs of the controversy lie, but it is admitted that the United States and the League were working at cross purposes, and that explains the delay in settling the Chaco dispute. The second criticism relates to Cuba. Although we have ended the treaty giving us the right to intervene in Cuba, our diplomatic representatives naturally have been anxious to prevent revolution occurring immediately in the island and have exercised diplomatic pressure and the expedient of non-recognition of internal governments. There is no doubt that the State Department threw its influence against a government which represented the one really liberal force in the country, and the result is that Cuba has been thrown into the hands of the army and counter-revolutionaries, and very little if any progress has been made in the direction of social reconstruction.

If, on the whole, our Latin American policy has been one of non-intervention a somewhat different situation arises in the Orient. It will be remembered that the United States took the lead in opposing the Japanese intervention in Manchuria, and Secretary Stimson enunciated the doctrine, which the League of Nations accepted, of non-recognition. The Roosevelt administration has said nothing about non-recognition or about an Anti-War Pact in the Orient, but it has given no indication of an intention to acquiesce in the advance of Japan in the East. On the contrary, the administration had proceeded, despite the protests of numerous Americans, to build up the navy to treaty strength and gradually to increase its army and air force. It has not

recognised Manchukuo, nor does it intend to do so as far as I know. But it has refused to consider Japan's demand for naval parity while at the same time proceeding to continue to withdraw from the Philippines.

One would gather that this policy of no longer invoking the war pact against Japan, coupled with a policy of transferring the Philippines to the Commonwealth Government, which will take place next month, indicates that the American Government is withdrawing from the Orient just as it is withdrawing from Latin America. But that opinion, despite its appearances, would, in my judgment, be unsound, because, whether rightly or wrongly, this administration does not intend to give Japan a free hand in the Orient; at least it does not intend to accept any treaty recognising Japan's claim to parity or Japan's claim to supremacy in the Pacific. To a certain extent this position is motivated by a desire for potential economic expansion, but it is largely motivated, I think, by a desire to maintain the principles of the "open door" policy which were the basis of the Washington Conference, and to maintain the idea of a collective system for the Pacific.

But the methods which we have followed in the Orient, unlike the methods which the British Government is following to-day at Geneva, are, to say the least, unilateral. In addition to building up the navy, we are developing an air force which eventually will have tremendous power. We are developing air bases in the Aleutian Islands and we are making plans for the fortification of the Pacific Islands when the Washington Treaty expires next year. Five years ago it was assumed that the Philippines would be evacuated immediately upon the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States, because the military men believed that these islands, being 7000 miles away, could not be successfully defended against Japan. But as a result of these new departures in aviation, and the invention of bombers, which apparently have a radius of 2000 miles, there are elements in the American administration which believe that, in co-operation with Russia, the United States can defend the Philippines. The present tendency, an underground tendency, is to strengthen the Philippines as an outpost against the Japanese advance.

The situation is complicated by the fact that the United States has promised independence to the Philippines and that a few months ago the Philippine people, in accordance with the Hawes-Cutting Act, gave a vote in favour of independence at the end of ten years. As a result of that Act the Filipinos have

already taken over the government of the islands and the United States is represented to-day only by a High Commissioner. There is a growing danger that under this self-government a revolution will occur in which Japan will be involved. Under the old system the United States were responsible not only for the protection but also for the internal administration of the islands. To-day, and for ten years, the United States has given up almost all control over the internal administration, but remains unilaterally responsible for the protection of the islands against Japan.

There are a number of Americans in intellectual circles who believe that the United States should withdraw completely from the Orient and allow Japan to take the Philippines, as some people think will happen when we withdraw. Others believe that the greatest safety for the United States lies in a policy of international action in the Pacific, particularly in co-operation with Great Britain; many Americans feel that it is very stupid, to say the least, for the United States, which probably has fewer material interests in the Orient than any other Great Power, to take a more active stand against Japan than any other Great Power. That means that we are carrying all the responsibility. We are defending the Asiatic empires of Europe against Japan, and, if we are not to withdraw, there should be some form of Anglo-American co-operation.

I think that American policy with regard to Europe itself is familiar. The Roosevelt administration finally recognised Soviet Russia. It did that with a considerable beating of drums announcing that a new era of trade and peace was about to ensue. But unfortunately only a series of misunderstandings seems to have followed recognition. In January 1935 we attempted to make a commercial treaty, but the negotiations broke down, as they have so often broken down in other countries, over the question of the Russian debt. And this summer, the American Government has become alarmed over the activities and speeches of the Third International, although, according to reports, this year's Congress of the International was the most conservative in its history. Relations between the United States and Russia are perhaps better than they were, but none of the underlying problems have been solved in so far as a revival of trade, or political co-operation, especially in the Orient, is concerned.

In regard to Europe proper, the Roosevelt administration had attempted to make several gestures. In May 1933 it recognised the relationship between security and disarmament when, at

the Arms Conference, it pledged the American Government not only to consult with other Powers, but, in case we decided that a given State was an aggressor, also to waive our so-called neutral rights in collective action against an aggressor. That declaration was contingent upon the conclusion of a disarmament convention which has not yet taken place. But it indicates a willingness on the part of the administration to co-operate with the League to a greater extent than any administration in the past.

The administration also supported, perhaps not too enthusiastically, the entrance of the United States into the World Court. But while the administration has been moving in this direction, it has been confronted by strong isolationist forces in Congress which have been strengthened by the domestic policy of the Government and by the general international situation. As a result of this combination of factors, probably the most outstanding feature of American foreign policy during the last two years has been a return to the policy of militarism. I use the word in the sense in which other countries are applying it, namely, the belief that the protection of the interests of the United States depend upon large armies and navies and air forces. The Hoover administration and the Coolidge administration did not build up the navy. They said they would be satisfied with the principle of parity but did not care about its substance. But we have learnt that if you write the principle of parity into a treaty it is extremely difficult to resist the urge of the big navy people to apply this principle to the utmost.

Probably the situation in the Orient has had more to do with this military policy than any other factor. But the fact is that during the present year we will be expending about a billion dollars upon our military establishment. With the possible exception of the new armaments of Germany, that amount is larger than the expenditure of any other Great Power. To many Americans this policy seems indefensible for two reasons. In the first place, we are not located, as you are in Europe, in a vulnerable position. It is impossible to conceive an invasion of the United States, and if our policy is isolation, as many Congressmen think it is, we do not need this imposing military establishment. In the second place, this policy is not accompanied by any international commitments. It is one thing to form part of an international organisation and be willing to accept the judgments of that organisation in regard to the use of your military establishment. But the particularly dangerous position of the American

Government to-day is that, while it has not accepted any real international commitments, it is building up an enormous military force which conceivably may be used to support the national interests of the United States in disregard of the League system.

This leads me to the final characteristic of our policy which is represented by the Neutrality Act passed by Congress last August. From the American view-point the situation in Europe seems much more serious and the danger seems much more imminent than it does to a person on the spot. Three or four months ago a newspaper reader in America would not have had any difficulty at all in believing not only that Mussolini was going to fall upon Abyssinia, but also that the League of Nations was a perfectly worthless instrument and that the entire continent of Europe within three months would be plunged into another general war. The desire to prevent being drawn into a new war, coupled with the revelations of the Senate Committee on Munitions, led Congress last August to enact neutrality legislation. The idea behind the legislation is that the United States should escape the consequences which are bound to befall Europe. The United States should not co-operate with other States to prevent war; this policy had failed. But we should sacrifice any foreign interest necessary to prevent our becoming involved. These people had been reading the history of how we got into the last war. An analysis of the figures will show that during 1914 to 1917 our munition exports to England and France increased by 700 per cent., and so people said "we must prevent that happening again, because once we obtain an economic interest in a belligerent we shall go in and join his side in order to save the investment." As a result of that attitude and despite the objection of the President, Congress passed a law which when analysed does not amount to very much. It says two things. That when war breaks out or is in progress, the President shall impose an embargo upon the export of munitions and implements of war, but shall impose it equally on all belligerents. The President and the State Department opposed that embargo on the ground that it was unfair, say, to Ethiopia and an encouragement to Italy, but Congress insisted on putting the law through. The President said he would accept it only if its provision lasted till next February only. So it was agreed that the whole question should be reconsidered when Congress reassembled in January, but meanwhile if the President imposes an embargo on the export of war material he must impose it equally on both Italy and Ethiopia.

The second thing which is provided by the Neutrality Act is

that the President may warn Americans going upon a belligerent vessel into the war zone that they do so at their own risk.

When one comes to analyse that Act, the President really can co-operate to a greater extent with the League of Nations in this present crisis than at first was thought possible. For example, the President may impose an embargo on the sale of munitions in co-operation with a League embargo.

If we had to have an international controversy of this type it is fortunate, I think, that the countries involved should be Italy and Ethiopia. Had France and Germany been at sword's point last month, or had war broken out over Austria, American opinion would have said, "This is a return to 1914," and American interest in the League would have been less than ever. But instead of that kind of dispute, in which the rights and wrongs are very difficult to determine, we have a case in which there can be very little doubt, if any, where right and wrong lie. And should the League, as it has already done, show a determination to press a settlement along lines of justice, I feel sure that such a decision will immensely strengthen that vast body of Americans which believes that the United States should accept its responsibilities in building a new international order. I might point out that the United States adhesion to the World Court was defeated, not by a majority of the senators, but by a minority, and there are thousands of Americans who feel that the League of Nations was born with the aid of the United States and still watch anxiously over its fate. I do not think that any marked changes in our policy should be expected as far as so-called commitments are concerned, but we have, during the last year, joined the International Labour Office, and if we can only work out some system of reconciling the aims and sanctions of the League with the American view of non-intercourse, I think that a greater degree of co-operation may finally be achieved.

Summary of Discussion.

MR. F. O. DARVALL said that he had gained the impression during a visit to the United States that the Neutrality Act might be very useful from the point of view of League Members anxious to discharge their obligations as such. If the United States was really determined not to be drawn into war nor to raise her neutral rights, it should be possible for a League Member to impose sanctions without fear of getting into conflict with the United States on account of her new system of neutrality. The American people seemed to be coming to the conclusion that the definition of neutral rights as originally conceived might actually involve the United States in war, and their desire to keep out of war might make them willing to submit to what they would

ormerly have regarded as acts of aggression. Would Mr. Buell agree hat it might suit the Members of the League to encourage such ımerican isolationist tendencies and the belief that the best way to keep ›ut of war was to sit quietly whatever interferences were attempted vith their trade by other Powers during a war?

Further, did Mr. Buell agree that, in view of the American deter-nination not to be involved in war or in commitments which might ›ossibly involve war, it would be dangerous for Great Britain to enter nto a policy of positive collaboration with the United States, such as night in the end involve war?

MR. BUELL said that there were two objects behind the neutrality egislation. One was to renounce the traditional view of the freedom of the seas and neutral rights which the United States had held from he beginning, and the second was to prevent a swelling of the American economic system as a result of the abnormal demands of belligerent Powers. If that policy were enforced it would mean that the United States would not export to England in time of war any materials in excess of her peace-time exports. If that policy had been followed in 1914 the Allies would have had a much more difficult task against Germany and might have been defeated. But apart from that aspect, Americans who believed in neutrality realised that they had got to pay he price of peace. They could not have neutral rights unless they were prepared to fight for them.

If there were a League of Nations which as a unit applied sanctions against an aggressor, such a policy would be of great value to the world. If an aggressor could not buy goods in the United States or if a League Member could impose a blockade on an aggressor without being con-fronted with the protests of the United States that the blockade was not effective or did not conform to the Declaration of Paris, the United States would be out of the picture and the League Powers could proceed. Something like that might take place providing the United States was really willing to sacrifice the profits of international trade and its neutrality rights. But he had very little confidence that the United States would sit back and see its citizens on the high seas killed and American property seized in belligerent countries. The policy of attempting to stay out of war by sacrificing interests was not nearly as good as a policy of co-operation in the prevention of war.

He did not oppose the Neutrality Act. If Great Britain and France and Russia stood together against Italy he thought the American people would be with them and would not allow Italy to defeat the League by buying in the American market. But there would be a terrific outcry from the people whose interests would be affected and there would be a contest between the material interests of such groups and the general humanitarian desire of the country which could be reconciled if the United States were successfully participating in an effort to build up a constructive international order. So although as an emergency policy the American Neutrality Act could be reconciled with League sanctions, he did not think neutrality would help very

much if Europe became involved in a general war, with Germany on the one hand and France on the other.

With regard to the question of the advisability of Great Britain entering into collaboration with the United States he would point to one great inconsistency in American policy. In spite of their desire to withdraw from Europe they were taking the lead in a policy of intervention in the Orient, and the answer to the question was the same as that which Sir Samuel Hoare had recently given to France. When the United States accepted a commitment it would stand by it, but it must be understood that the President could not make a commitment. The policy of the United States in the Orient was probably doing Great Britain a great deal more good than it was doing the United States, in the protection of Hong Kong, the Straits Settlements, and North Borneo. For that reason he thought the question was a little gratuitous, as the United States had already done three-parts of the co-operating in the Orient.

MR. R. H. HERFORD said that Mr. Buell had spoken of stabilisation as almost the first essential for any great improvement in world relations. But while the United States continued to hold its creditor position and its enormous stocks of gold and silver, it did not seem possible that there could be any fixture between sterling and the dollar as it stood.

Mr. Buell had also spoken of co-operation in the East and the lack of co-operation in Manchuria, but the damage done to China by the Japanese invasion was as nothing to that done by a small handful of men interested in silver who pressed on the American President the policy of buying at a high price. The policy formerly had been to lend silver to China, but the present policy of buying it in almost incredible quantities was doing much more harm than the Japanese had done.

MR. BUELL said that he had criticised the silver policy as strongly as his questioner. His impression was that there had been some relief in China during the last few months. As the result of depreciation and new discoveries in gold he believed that each of the great Powers had an ample supply, certainly in England, France and the United States, to facilitate a return to the gold standard in the immediate future, which he did not think was impossible. Once stabilisation was effected, coupled with a revision of trade barriers, there would be a resumption of international gold movements so that its inequalities would soon be equalised.

MR. F. N. KEEN said that before the War America was strongly humanitarian. Mr. Buell had said that her humanitarianism was then the great force against isolationism. At the time of the Hague Conference in 1899 and 1907 she stood out as a world leader. Elihu Root's letter of instruction to the delegates of the United States was the *locus classicus* on the principles of world peace. What had happened to

that spirit of humanitarianism in the United States? Mr. Buell had attributed her recent re-entry into world affairs entirely to economic motives, though at the end of his lecture he had said something about the movement in favour of her joining the World Court and her interest in the League of Nations. Had the spirit of humanitarianism gone into cold storage? Was there a possibility that it would revive, and that in the future America might again be a great world leader from the humanitarian point of view? There had been a suggestion of such a revival in the American promotion of the Kellogg Pact, to which Europe had attached a good deal of importance. What degree of interest did the people of the United States take in the Kellogg Pact? They had so far made no move to establish any kind of organisation or to join any organisation to put the Kellogg Pact into operation and see to its observance and enforcement. In 1934 the International Law Association at Budapest had given certain interpretations of the effect of the entry of so many States into the Kellogg Pact, the result of which was held to be that war was put into the position of something that was illegal under International Law instead of something that was recognised as legal. What attitude was taken in the United States with regard to those interpretations?

QUESTION: If the Kellogg Pact, which had been ratified by the American Senate, was regarded in America as a binding international obligation, the United States should regard an aggressor under the Kellogg Pact as committing an act of war against itself, and was there not, therefore, some hope that Europe might expect from the United States, not merely acquiescence but positive co-operation in taking steps to assist a non-aggressor?

MR. BUELL said that the Anti-War Pact required the United States to renounce war as an instrument of international policy. The reservations made by the United States and the other Powers at the time of the making of the Pact resulted in the Pact not meaning very much.

Anglo-Saxons (and the American people were no exception) had the reputation of being humanitarian and of being hypocrites. They wanted peace so long as it did not cost them anything. But in the United States humanitarianism had become more realistic during the last few years and the Roosevelt administration was animated by a sense of social justice which was perhaps unique in American history. From that standpoint humanitarianism was growing in American life. Americans had farther to go than the British. Their idea had been that the free play of competition would produce, as it had produced, a high standard of living for everyone and large fortunes for some. They were now coming to realise that that system was ended and that they must develop a new one. But the administration was becoming conscious of its responsibilities, as was shown by the expenditure of hundreds of thousands of dollars on unemployment insurance, govern-

ment relief, etc., which had been rejected a few years ago by President Hoover.

PROFESSOR WEBSTER asked if there were a Roosevelt policy as distinct from that of the United States, and suggested that President Roosevelt never had had any foreign policy. It was not a thing in which he had been much interested before he came to office, and he had never devised for himself any consistent foreign policy or had any idea how to apply it. He had made a violent attack on the League just before his nomination. He had been conducting his country through an internal crisis of great extent and had no time to think about foreign policy. He had changed his mind on foreign matters almost as often as Mr. Walter Lippmann.

The abandonment by the United States of the policy of defending neutrality was as great a change as the defence by the British Government of collective security in Europe. But did the Neutrality Act represent something permanent in the attitude of the United States or was it one of those quick reactions towards the European situation?

With regard to the Pacific, Mr. Buell had implied that the United States was not building up a position there for defence of the United States against Japanese aggression, but that she was preparing strategic and naval bases for an attack on Japan, presumably to rescue Manchuria. Was that a permanent policy or was it just part of the economic policy?

MR. BUELL said that obviously every government which had been overwhelmed by the depression had resorted first to domestic policies, but it was a mistake to imply that the President did not know anything about foreign affairs. People who had talked to him said that he had a remarkable grasp of the international situation.

It was difficult to predict whether the abandonment of neutrality was permanent. Next year the President would ask for discretionary power to impose embargoes, but for the purpose of co-operating with the League of Nations and not for the purpose of defending American neutral rights. The President and State Department had stood out for the right to co-operate with the League of Nations. It was Congress that wanted complete isolation.

The United States was not contemplating an invasion of Japan or the restoration of Manchukuo to China. But, realising that the world system was based on potential force and that diplomatic notes would be respected only if backed by a demonstration of force such as the British had given in the Mediterranean, they were determined to supply that backing in the Pacific, and although a few years ago they had decided to get out of the Philippines and let Japan walk in, they now seemed determined to hold the islands, if need be by military force. The danger was twofold. Unlike Europe, where there were a number of States operating against an aggressor, the United States was alone in the Orient. And the Philippines were a very sensitive spot, because

the United States were responsible for protecting them against Japan though they had relinquished control over the internal administration.

MISS SCOVELL asked if there were not an economic motive behind the American policy in the Orient, and whether one reason for the pressure in the United States on their Government to adopt its present policy was not the development of China?

The three countries which had the most trade in China were Great Britain, Japan and the United States, and of these the United States was the greatest. She was handicapped in her European trade by her own high tariff walls and by holding at present about 42 per cent. of the gold of the world. As her citizens were not investing in their own country, the banks needed an outlet for the capital lying idle, and we had been told by other American speakers that the present policy was to invest American capital in China in order to develop the enormous potential markets. Should not this be added to the other motives mentioned by the speaker?

MR. BUELL said that only about 10 per cent. of the foreign trade of the United States was with Asia, and 80 per cent. of the trade of the United States with Eastern Asia was with Japan. Japan was the chief purchaser of American cotton and the United States the chief purchaser of Japanese silk. If the Americans were thoroughly materialistic they would allow Japan to take the entire Orient and restore order there so that their trade might increase. As John Hay said in 1899, although the United States did not want the Chinese market at the moment she might a hundred years hence. There was a potential market there of 400 to 500 million people, but it was not of any value at present. The profit on the Chinese trade was very slight. So the motivation for American policy was psychological rather than economic. The idea of power and unwillingness to acquiesce in a claim by any single State for predominance in the Orient, especially of a State of non-white race, raised all sorts of psychological emotions which one might attempt to rationalise on economic lines but which could be explained only on their own terms.

MAJOR C. B. ORMEROD asked what the point of view of the United States administration would be if the League of Nations invoked sanctions against Italy and took action under Article 16 of the Covenant against trade between Italy and the United States.

MR. BUELL replied that the Davis Declaration was not in force and the United States was under no obligation to acquiesce, but the President, by virtue of the general powers and implications of the Neutrality Act, had complete discretion to acquiesce in a blockade and would probably do so. Recent actions of the administration had indicated that it was not going to interfere with the League in seeing the Italo-Abyssinian matter through.

THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

By ÅKE HAMMARSKJÖLD

THE Royal Institute of International Affairs has asked me to write a short paper indicating as broadly as possible what the Permanent Court of International Justice has done towards the building up of a code of international law, and showing what the general trend of the Court's work has been, without special reference to individual decisions.

This task, which I accepted with a due sense of the honour and responsibility involved, is perhaps less easy, even to a person fairly familiar with the Court's decisions, than would appear at first sight, and this for the following reasons, amongst others:

The Court normally comprises judges of fifteen different nationalities; and its composition is entirely changed every nine years, except in so far as former judges are re-elected. It follows that the difficulty of evolving an *esprit de corps* is greater than in the case of most other tribunals and that in reality several nine-year periods must elapse before it will be possible to say whether the tendency of the Court is to develop a consistent case law—or, rather, whether the tendency of governments is to use their powers over its composition in a way enabling it, and perhaps encouraging it, to do so.

Further, the *dicta* of the Court are almost always carefully limited to particular situations arising in concrete cases; and if one takes these *dicta* as a basis in estimating the Court's contribution to positive international law, there is always the risk of generalisations which may only correspond remotely to the Court's past and present views, to say nothing of the opinions it may adopt in the future. Many of the admirable works which have already been devoted to the Court's jurisprudence (in the continental sense of the word) have not succeeded in avoiding this danger. The safest course no doubt is the one adopted by the German standard work on the subject,[1] which confines itself

[1] Fontes Juris Gentium. Series A. Sect. I. Ts. 1 and 3. 1931 & 1935. Berlin.

to extracting verbatim from the reports of the Court's decisions the relevant *dicta* and arranging them according to a complete logical system. But this method obviously cannot be applied in this paper.

Finally, having regard to the limited number of cases so far decided by the Court, it has only in exceptional cases had an opportunity of affirming a given principle or rule. Often there exists only one *dictum* on a given point. It is always difficult to judge whether such a *dictum* should or should not be deemed to represent a more general tendency.

Before attempting, subject to these remarks, to give a brief outline of the Court's contribution to positive international law, while avoiding as far as possible the pitfalls just referred to, it is necessary to say a word about the form which this contribution assumes, the weight which it carries and the domain in which its effect will be felt.

Under the fundamental constitutional rules which govern its activities, the Court is empowered to give judgment in such disputes between States as fall within its jurisdiction and to give advisory opinions upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly. There are also Orders "for the conduct of the case" which for all practical purposes are equivalent to judgments, though they are different in form and lack the force of *res judicata*. Further, according to the Court's Statute, the judgment must state the reasons on which it is based; it has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of the particular case in issue; in the event of a dispute as to its meaning or scope, the Court may be called upon to construe it; finally, dissenting judges are entitled to deliver a separate opinion.

In accordance with a consistent practice, these rules also apply, except, of course, the provision concerning the binding force of judgments, to advisory opinions.

It follows that the main source from which a view of the Court's jurisprudence is to be derived is the statement of reasons which precedes the "operative part" of each judgment or advisory opinion; the operative part itself is not very illuminating, for in all cases submitted for judgment by virtue of a special agreement between the parties, and in all advisory cases, it merely affirms or negatives the question contained in the terms of reference.

In the statement of reasons the Court itself has established a

distinction between arguments which are, and those which are not, indispensable for the purpose of arriving at a decision on the contested or litigious points; only the former, together, of course, with the operative part, can form the subject of an authoritative interpretation by the Court. It is clear that these arguments also carry greater weight when it comes to establishing what is the Court's jurisprudence on a given point than do the *obiter dicta*, the latter being rather in the same category as the separate opinions delivered by dissenting judges. The reason why provision has been made for these separate opinions is to allow "the play of the different judicial lines of thought to appear clearly." As a matter of fact, the *obiter dicta* contained in the statement of reasons are often individual opinions, in the sense that several judges may arrive at the same finding for different reasons, all or most of which may have to be placed on record.

However that may be, the statements made by the Court *ex cathedra*, whether they constitute mere *obiter dicta* or are arguments constituting the essential basis of the operative part, do not carry the weight of binding precedents but are only the expression of what the most authoritative judicial body holds to be the international law on a given point, having regard to a given set of circumstances. The Court itself is entirely free to alter its views; and the opinions expressed by it may, when discussed by governments and legal authorities, be deemed not to correspond to the present conception of the international law on the given point. But the Court will be careful not to alter its jurisprudence without expressly stating its reasons; nor will States lightly discard opinions expressed by the Court.

During the first years of its existence, the Court displayed a tendency to discuss and to give its views on most of the important questions of principle which arose in the cases submitted to it because it held that to contribute in this way to the restatement of international law was not the least important of its tasks. Subsequently, however, and, curiously enough, more particularly after 1930, in which year the abortive Conference for the codification of international law took place, the tendency has rather been, following the example of municipal tribunals, to avoid pronouncing upon questions the solution of which does not appear to be indispensable for the decision of the case.

On points concerning the law of international arbitral procedure, important indications concerning the Court's jurisprudence

are to be found in the Digests of administrative decisions which are regularly published in the Court's Annual Reports, and also in the Minutes of public sittings and in the correspondence with parties, which are reproduced in the volumes containing the memorials filed, the statements made and the evidence produced. Pure questions of procedure will not, however, be dealt with in this paper.

Apart from this domain of procedural law, the Court's jurisprudence has so far dealt partly with questions concerning the jurisdiction of international tribunals, more particularly its own, partly with a great variety of questions of substantive law. In both of these fields the rôle of the Court has mostly been to construe existing international agreements of various descriptions; this is why the working out of a satisfactory method of treaty interpretation plays such a prominent part in its jurisprudence. It has only more occasionally been concerned with the application of general principles of law, except where they come into play in connection with the ascertainment of the meaning and scope of treaty provisions. The Court's work in the field of the method and technique of treaty interpretation will be dealt with in the last part of this paper.

The jurisdiction of the Permanent Court, like that of any truly international tribunal, rests, of course, on the consent of the parties, and this consent can be either general, referring to a certain class or category of future disputes, or special, contemplating one or more concrete existing disputes. As concerns the Court in particular, only States (or Members of the League of Nations) have a *locus standi* before it.

The Court has been called upon, in its practice, and having regard to the development of events and ideas, to work out these fundamental principles somewhat in detail.

Thus, in the first place, it has laid down the rule that the submission of a case need fulfil no particular conditions as to form in order to be valid. Applying this rule, the Court (in a suit already pending as the result of a unilateral application) has accepted as a binding special agreement for arbitration an agreement inferred from the memorials filed in that suit and extending the scope of the Court's jurisdiction, as limited by the terms of the compromissory clause under which the original suit had been submitted. It has even made similar inferences from simple *acta concludentia*, such as the submission of arguments on the merits by the respondent in a suit submitted

by unilateral application. On the other hand, the Court has firmly maintained that States appearing before it in advisory proceedings cannot by means of agreement enlarge the scope of the questions put by the Council.

It is not, however, to be inferred from this that the Court has adopted the maxim: *boni judicis est ampliare jurisdictionem.* On the contrary, it has emphasised over and over again, that, as its jurisdiction is limited and exists only in so far as it has been accepted by the parties, its existence cannot be presumed but must be clearly established. When an objection to the jurisdiction is lodged, the Court must decide whether the subject-matter of the dispute is such as to fall within its jurisdiction and, if so, whether the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction are also fulfilled. The question is always: Did the parties intend that the Court should have jurisdiction over this particular dispute? In answering this question the Court cannot rely merely on the wording of the terms of reference; it has not been satisfied with a *prima facie*—or, as it has said, a "provisional"—conclusion; it has required full proof. For this purpose it has sometimes felt obliged provisionally to go into the merits of the case; sometimes, on the other hand, faced with this necessity, it has preferred to join the question of jurisdiction to the merits and to examine the case as a whole at one and the same time. In the end it may affirm jurisdiction over a part of a suit, declining it as regards the remainder. Moreover, the Court has recognised that, even though the parties have accepted its jurisdiction, it cannot exercise such jurisdiction if the same suit between the same parties is already pending before another tribunal of the same order or if, by treaty, such a tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction, or jurisdiction by preference to the Court itself. But the Court must be satisfied that by giving way to another tribunal it does not create a negative conflict of jurisdiction, depriving the aggrieved State of all redress.

Within these limits the Court is always competent *ratione materiæ* if the parties have accepted its jurisdiction; it does not matter, for instance, whether the dispute relates to facts rather than to international law, or to municipal law rather than to facts. There may, it is true, be yet another proviso—which, owing to the circumstances in which it was formulated, is mentioned only with some hesitation: the Court has said on one occasion that it is not its rôle to assist parties when the dispute separating them turns on questions which depend on the interplay of economic interests and with regard to which governments

cannot afford to be controlled by outside organs. But under its Statute it is competent to deal with every dispute of an international character duly submitted to it.

Ratione personarum, the Court has somewhat attenuated the rigour of the general rule excluding private persons from appearing before it by conceding that when a State takes up the case of one of its subjects before the Court it is in reality asserting a right of its own, namely, its right to ensure respect for international law the infringement of which is threatened in the person of the subject.

But this principle cannot be adduced to upset the general rule : in order that the Court shall have jurisdiction in a given dispute, the latter must exist between the parties appearing before the Court. A State cannot compel the Court to accept jurisdiction of a suit which is in reality between one of its subjects and a foreign State, simply by appearing as a sort of attorney for its subject : the State must have made the suit its own, must be the *dominus litis*. One consequence of this is that when, in a dispute of this kind, the State taking up the case of its subject sues for damages, it must do so in its own name ; and the damages, if any, must be paid to the State (which is, however, obviously free to transfer the amount to the private citizen if it thinks fit) ; if the claimant estimates the amount asked for by the damage actually suffered by the subject, this is accepted only as a convenient measure of the redress or reparation claimed by the State on its own behalf.

It should perhaps be mentioned, in this connection, that the Court has been most careful not to overstep in practice the rule, laid down in the League Covenant itself, that advisory opinions can only be asked for by the political organs of the League of Nations. It has, for instance, declined to give any decision on submissions presented by a party in contested cases when it has been satisfied that the object of the party has rather been to obtain a legal opinion than a binding decision. On the other hand, however, it has affirmed that it is one of its duties, and not the least important, to give abstract interpretations of treaty provisions, in other words, to give declaratory judgments.

The Court in principle applies international law : it has even declared itself the "organ" of international law. This, however, does not prevent it from also applying, incidentally, municipal law, that is to say, when such law is relied on in argument, or referred to in the relevant texts. But while the Court

is reputed to know what the international law on a given point is, this is not expected of it as regards municipal law.

One of the tasks of the Court, accordingly, is to ascertain what the international law is. In the carrying out of this task it must, of course, have due respect to Article 38 of its Statute, under which the Court must apply :

> International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognised by the contesting parties; international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations; judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.

It should perhaps be noted in this connection that a settlement in equity, that is to say, apart from considerations of strict legal rights (a possibility contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 38 of the Statute), can only be effected by the Court if the necessary powers have been expressly conferred upon it by the parties. On the other hand, there is nothing to prevent the Court from embodying in a judgment an agreement previously concluded between the parties : incidentally, the *ex æquo et bono* clause in Article 38 of the Statute was for some time construed in this sense.

Treaty obligations obviously form the most important of the sources from which the Court derives the rules which it applies; how it proceeds in order to determine these rules raises the question of treaty interpretation to which reference will be made later on in this paper. When the municipal law is the same in many countries in regard to a certain subject, it has sometimes been held to express a principle of law so general in scope that it has been regarded as also constituting international law. On the other hand, the Court has been remarkably wary of relying on precedent : it has cited but few arbitral awards or concordant judgments of mixed arbitral tribunals; but it has more frequently quoted its own earlier decisions; and on some rare occasions it has examined the case law of various countries in order to find out whether it was sufficiently unanimous to denote the existence of a generally accepted legal custom, usually with a negative result. As regards the ascertainment of a negative practice, it has gone out of its way to recommend special circumspection; it has emphasised that an omission to act can only be considered as evidence of the existence of a practice, if the omission can be proved to be due to the realisation, or consciousness, on the part of States, of a duty to abstain from taking action; similarly, it

has pointed out that omission may be due to tolerance, and that tolerance is the negation of right.

It is important to note that though, on the whole, its tendency has been rather positivist, the Court has not hesitated to recognise, at least implicitly, certain immanent and transcendental principles as forming part of accepted international law : it has held, for instance, that it is a principle of international law that a breach of an international engagement involves an obligation to make reparation in adequate form even in the absence of any express provision to that effect, and it has made similar statements regarding State succession and respect for vested rights.

As regards the principal source of international law, and apart from any question as to the method of treaty interpretation, the Court has made several pronouncements of some importance enriching the law concerning international agreements.

Thus it has laid down that, in case of doubt, reference to a convention must be held to contemplate a duly ratified agreement; the Court has been careful to avoid committing itself on the question of the effect of unratified treaties; but it has pointed out that ratification is a subjective condition which can be fulfilled at the will of the party concerned. To this extent, therefore, it is probably fair to extend to the sphere of treaty ratification the general rule which the Court has stated on many occasions and according to which, being an international tribunal, it need not pay the same attention to questions of form as a municipal court.

Generally speaking, it has taken a broad view as concerns matters of form connected with the conclusion of international agreements. It has, for instance, expressly laid down that special agreements providing for the submission to it of an international dispute are not bound by any conditions as to form, so long as the intention of the parties to submit the case to the Court is clear; this point, moreover, has been referred to above. Again, it has held that, irrespective of what the exigencies of the constitutional law of a given country may be, it must be possible for the representatives of another country to rely upon a statement made by the duly authorised representative of the government of the former country (*e.g.* its Foreign Minister) as binding and definitive. This, no doubt, amounts to a transference to the field of international law of the particular form of the *bona fides* principle on which, in certain systems of municipal law, the whole law of obligations is built up.

According to the doctrine adopted by the Court, treaties do

not, in case of doubt, create rights for third parties generally, or for private persons (persons at private law) in particular; but the Court recognises the possibility that the object of the international agreements may be precisely to create such rights, in which case nothing prevents them from having the intended effect; it has not said whether, in its opinion, the third party or private person must expressly accept the right thus conferred.

Conversely, an agreement between States can create no obligation for a third party, unless provisions stipulating for such obligations are expressly adhered to by the third State, which may also accept a part only of such obligations.

The Court has never been called upon to give an opinion on the general aspect of the question of termination of treaties, though it has, incidentally, affirmed or reaffirmed certain rules, as, for instance, the rule that war does not necessarily terminate all contractual obligations between belligerents. It has, on the other hand, deliberately avoided defining its attitude towards the problem of the effect of an essential change in circumstances on the binding effect of treaties—the *clausula rebus sic stantibus* —though opportunity to deal with this important matter has not been lacking.

The Court recognises State sovereignty as the basis of international relations. According to the definition which it has approved, international law governs relations between independent States and is an emanation of their own free will. Conversely, it has held that the principle of the independence of States is a fundamental principle of international law; and it has defined this independence as the continued existence of a State, within its present frontiers, as a separate State with sole right of decision in the sense that its sovereign will is not subordinated to the will of any outside Power or Powers. On the other hand, the Court has emphasised on more than one occasion that the acceptance by a State of treaty obligations does not infringe its sovereignty or independence but constitutes, on the contrary, an exercise of State sovereignty, or of control over the State's own independence—which amounts to the same thing. But the Court has admitted that, though not implying an abandonment of sovereignty, the acceptance by a State of treaty obligations imposes restrictions upon the exercise of sovereignty. In other words, and in principle, sovereign rights subsist in so far as their exercise is not limited by international obligations.

This would seem to mean that in the opinion of the Court,

although it has not said so in so many words, sovereignty possesses the same kind of elasticity as property rights in municipal law; it comes into its own as soon as any restrictions which may have been placed upon its exercise are removed. A consequence is, and this the Court has expressly laid down, that any limitation of sovereignty must, *in case of doubt*, be construed restrictively. It follows, for instance, in the Court's doctrine, that if, by treaty, part of a State has obtained an autonomous or simply special status, or that portion of a waterway which traverses a State has been placed under the control of an autonomous body or simply subjected to a more or less complete régime of internationalisation, such status, control or régime, in so far as it constitutes a limitation on the exercise of territorial sovereignty, must be kept strictly within the terms of the agreements by virtue of which it exists: restrictions upon sovereignty cannot be presumed. Applying this general principle the Court has held, *inter alia*, that the legal character of a protectorate depends entirely, and in each particular case, on the contents of the treaties by virtue of which the protectorate is established, and further that international obligations accepted or contracted by a mandatory State bind the mandated territory only in so far as this is expressly laid down in the mandate or in special agreements to which the mandated territory is a party; this would, however, seem to apply particularly, perhaps exclusively, to "A" mandates.

Applying the same principle in a different field, the Court has recognised that there is a sphere within which a State can in law regulate matters entirely according to its own free will, without regard to the outside world. This sphere, the extent of which is essentially relative, because it varies from one State to another and from one epoch to another, comprises matters which are not in principle regulated by international law and which are not by treaty brought under the application of international law. Such matters include what in certain continental systems is known as private international law, *i.e.* the rules governing nationality (citizenship) and conflict of laws. On the other hand, however, quite frequently questions appertaining to this branch of law form the subject of international conventions, in which case they cease to belong to the sphere which international law reserves to the domestic jurisdiction of each State.

In principle, statutes dealing with matters falling within this sphere enacted by one State cannot be challenged by another. This is true more particularly of the written constitutions, the application of which can, however, if it is tantamount to a denial

of justice incompatible with the treatment accorded by general international law to foreigners, form the subject of diplomatic representations and, if necessary, of international litigation.

On the other hand, a State cannot rely on its own municipal legislation in order to escape its treaty obligations. This applies also, for instance, to an enactment of the nature of a neutrality order. The Court has, in fact, formally reaffirmed the old rule according to which municipal law cannot prevail over treaty law. On the contrary, by accepting an international obligation, a State implicitly undertakes to enact the necessary measures for ensuring fulfilment. From the standpoint of international law, municipal statutes are mere facts, except in so far as their tenor, being identical in a number of countries, denotes the existence of a general principle of law.

The Court has found it necessary on several occasions to emphasise yet another aspect of State sovereignty, namely, that no State can be held to have assumed obligations which it has not formally accepted, either in so many words or by clear implication. If, for instance, one group of States concludes a convention with another, and if, before the conclusion of this convention, the members of the former group agree between themselves as to the meaning to be attributed to it, such agreement is not binding on the States belonging to the latter group. Similarly, if a group of States agrees that one of their number shall conclude with a third State a convention for a certain purpose and with certain contents, the agreement in question is *res inter alios acta* as regards the third State, which is only bound by the convention if and when concluded. Again, if certain States conclude an agreement on a point interesting a third State, and invite this State to adhere to the agreement, the latter becomes binding on the third State only if, and in as far as, it expressly accepts the agreement.

On the other hand, the Court has admitted that if a group of States conclude a treaty which, according to its terms, can be modified only by their common consent, and, if, notwithstanding, some of the States in question conclude a new agreement at variance with the original treaty, such agreement may be regarded by an international tribunal as binding the latter States *inter se*. This is, however, a point on which it may be open to doubt whether the decision reached in the particular case represents a general tendency.

The Court, of course, accepts the principle of the territoriality of State sovereignty. It has laid down that a State has juris-

diction over all persons and things, national or foreign, within its territory; but that outside its own territory it can exercise jurisdiction only by virtue of a permissive rule of general international law or by virtue of treaty stipulations, except as regards the high seas, where it has in principle exclusive jurisdiction over vessels flying its own flag (save, for instance, in cases of piracy).

A permissive rule, on the other hand, is not necessary in order to allow a State to exercise jurisdiction within its own territory over persons or property outside this territory or over acts committed on the other side of the frontier. In the Court's opinion, international law leaves the State a wide discretion as regards the extension of its laws and jurisdiction beyond the national territory, a discretion which is limited only by the prohibitive rules which exist in certain cases, and which it must not overstep. Accordingly, in the field of criminal law, the Court has adopted the point of view that territoriality is not an absolute principle of international law. It has, for instance, accepted the doctrine that if a given act produces its effect, be it a crime, misdemeanour or tort, in the territory of a given State, that State can take jurisdiction over the act even though, when committing it, the author was outside that territory. By assimilation, it has extended this doctrine to acts committed on board a ship flying the flag of State "A" but producing its effect on board a ship flying the flag of State "B," both ships navigating on the high seas; it has thus held that the tribunals of State "B" can try and sentence the author of the act if he comes within the territory of that State. In collision cases, the Court would seem to hold that the jurisdictions of States "A" and "B" are concurrent provided the collision takes place on the high seas. The Court's decision in this respect has, however, been much criticised, whether rightly or wrongly is a question which cannot be examined in this paper.

However that may be, it is certain, on the other hand, that the Court also recognises the existence of some limitations on the principle of territorial sovereignty. Leaving on one side the question of so-called State servitudes, a subject on which the Court has preferred to avoid giving any opinion, it has held, for instance, that the use by a belligerent of an internationalised waterway of a certain character traversing a neutral State and undoubtedly forming part of its national territory, does not, under international law, compromise the neutrality of that State. It has likewise recognised that a State can, by treaty, renounce the exercise of part of its administrative jurisdiction in a portion of its own territory without, thereby, relinquishing its sovereignty.

But this is precisely a case in which the necessity for a strict interpretation of any limitations on national sovereignty has been emphasised by the Court in a very typical manner: the treaty provided for the abandonment of the right to levy customs duties, and the Court held that it did not prevent the State from taxing imports and exports by imposing fiscal charges other than *customs* duties.

Finally, restrictions on the exercise of territorial sovereignty also result from the obligations which have been undertaken by certain States after the World War for the protection of minorities within their jurisdiction. Obviously, it has not fallen to the Court to define the scope and contents of these engagements, which are determined by the minorities treaties or declarations. But the Court has more than once been called upon to construe such treaties and declarations; and in so doing it has laid special emphasis on certain principles which, in its opinion, are expressed therein.

One of these principles is that the protection provided for extends not only to nationals possessing the citizenship of the State on whose territory the minority resides, but also to other inhabitants; the extent of the protection may, however, be different in the two cases; it may, in the case of minority *residents*, comprise the right to obtain citizenship. Another principle is that membership of a minority is an objective fact, and does not depend on the wishes of the person concerned. A third principle, and the most important of all, is that the rights of members of a minority under the minority provisions are not merely relative but are to a certain extent absolute: though, no doubt, the essential rule is a prohibition of discrimination in any form against the minority and, accordingly, a guarantee to them of treatment equal to that accorded to members of the majority, a measure that is, in fact, directed against the minority does not become lawful because, in form, it also applies to the majority; nor is an apparently equal treatment always sufficient to comply with the minority provisions, because different situations may call for different treatment in order to ensure real equality. For instance, the throwing open of majority schools to the children of the minority on a footing of equality does not necessarily imply the equal treatment provided for in the minority provisions even if the minority language is taught in these schools; for the minority children will not find in the majority schools the atmosphere necessary for the maintenance of their national culture, which is one of the rights of a minority. On the other hand, loyalty to the State to which they belong is essential on the part of the popula-

tion belonging to a minority and enjoying the treatment reserve to minorities.

The Court has also had to deal with certain aspects of th problem of the acquisition and loss of territorial sovereignty.

As regards acquisition and loss by conquest, the results o which are confirmed by a subsequent peace treaty, it has lai down the principle that if the cession is made *sub modo* or i subject to a condition, even if the condition is merely the ratifica tion of the peace treaty, the renunciation by the ceding State o its authority in the territory to be ceded is suspended pendin the fulfilment of the condition; in the meantime, that State ca do anything that is necessary or appropriate for the administratio of the territory, provided, of course, that it acts in good faith an does not expose itself to the reproach of abusing its rights; bu such abuse cannot be presumed.

This obviously applies only if the area to be ceded remains i the possession of the original sovereign; if, on the other hand, it i occupied by the military forces of the victorious State, it is stil true that acts performed by the ceding State retain their ful validity from the point of view of constitutional law, pendin definitive cession, but in international law the situation may o may not be different according to circumstances. The Cour makes no general statement as to what the rules of internationa law are in this respect; it does, however, affirm that the princip of State succession belongs to the domain of general internationa law, and is as such to be considered as implied in any treaty o cession which does not expressly purport to derogate from it One important corollary of this principle is, as the Court ha repeatedly pointed out, respect for vested rights; private right acquired under existing law do not cease on a change o sovereignty; this applies more particularly also to rights acquire by contract. Situations of fact such as the possession of good will, a clientèle or commercial advantages over would-be com petitors have not been considered as vested rights.

The Court, on the other hand, recognises that there are certai categories of legal enactments emanating from the ceding State the maintenance in force of which is incompatible with a transfe of sovereignty; this obviously applies especially to provisions o the nature of constitutional or, generally speaking, public law

As regards the question of acquisition of territorial sovereignt otherwise than by conquest or treaty, the Court accepts the ol doctrine according to which two things are required: *animus* or the intention, the will, to obtain sovereignty, and *corpus*, o the effective exercise, display, of sovereignty. But as regard

evidence of the existence in a given case of both these elements, the Court—relying on the consideration that international tribunals have not in general been very strict in this respect, provided that no State has presented a stronger claim than the Party concerned—has shown a certain leniency. It has, for instance, considered it to be sufficient that the existence of the elements in question at a certain date, held to be material in the particular suit, should be proved; and it has allowed certain presumptions in favour of the State claiming sovereignty, throwing the burden of disproving them on the other side.

International litigation, when its subject is not the interpretation of some international agreement in the abstract or with reference to a specific set of circumstances, more often than not originates in damage suffered, or alleged to have been suffered, by an individual or a juristic person belonging to one country and residing in the territory of another country, when the damage is attributed to acts of the authorities of that country or is at all events alleged to engage anyhow the international responsibility of those authorities.

The Court has, unavoidably, had much to do with litigation of this kind. In this connection it has reaffirmed the well-known principle that, in international law, a State is entitled to protect its subject when that subject is injured by some act of another State which is contrary to international law and for which it has been impossible to obtain redress through the ordinary channels; the Court has not always been equally strict in its insistence upon the production of evidence showing that this has been impossible; generally speaking, it has been lenient as regards proof of diplomatic negotiations. It has further had occasion to recall that such an act may be either administrative, legislative or judicial. In the latter case, it is obviously a question of denial of justice; as regards legislative acts, the Court has emphasised that an enactment which infringes the rights of foreigners does not become admissible in international law because it is also applicable, if such be the case, to nationals of the territorial State concerned; for the measures which are to be considered as prohibited are those which generally accepted international law does not sanction in respect of foreigners. It would seem to follow that the Court accepts the doctrine that international law guarantees to foreigners a certain minimum level of treatment, quite irrespective of any rights in some cases granted by conventions concerning conditions of residence and business, treaties of commerce and the like, and that this level may be higher than that afforded by the State to

its own nationals. The point is of importance, *inter alia*, because of the light it sheds on those provisions of the minorities treaties which, as interpreted by the Court, are sometimes said to grant an inadmissible privilege to members of minorities.

According to the Court, failure to treat a foreigner in accordance with the exigencies of international law automatically entails an obligation to make reparation; and if the Court has jurisdiction in respect of the breach of the law, it is automatically competent also to deal with the question of reparation; for differences concerning that question are looked upon as differences regarding the application of the law, at all events when the rule which has been infringed is set down in an international agreement.

Reparation, on the other hand, should, whenever possible, take the form of *restitutio in pristinum;* when such restitution cannot be made, it should be replaced by payment of a sum representing the same value; such payment may or may not be accompanied by damages and compensation for loss. It must be borne in mind in any case that reparation is due to the State, not to the individual, so that any damage or loss suffered by the latter can only be the measure of the redress to be given to his government; a claim for redress before the Court can only be based on international law.

It should perhaps be noted that the Court has expressly recognised, on the one hand, that the fact that the act productive of the injury was irregular from the point of view of municipal law does not relieve the State of its responsibility, and on the other hand, that the fact that an act is condemned as contrary to international law does not necessarily deprive it of its validity in municipal law, *i.e.* within the State itself.

Before turning from the points mainly of substantive law which have been dealt with so far in this paper to the methods of treaty interpretation evolved or followed by the Court, it may be useful to indicate the attitude adopted by it in regard to two questions of a general nature: evidence and decisions.

On the former point, important though it is, one can be extremely brief. The Court has, in fact, held that an international tribunal cannot allow itself to be bound by strict and somewhat formalistic rules of evidence. Its task is to ascertain the truth as best it can; for this reason, it reserves the right to accept evidence, even written evidence, which under certain municipal systems of procedure would be discarded as belated or otherwise inadmissible; and for the same reason, but partly also as a consequence of the principle just stated, it likewise reserves

the right to weigh all evidence according to its intrinsic value. In other words, the fact that the Court accepts evidence by no means binds it to attribute a certain importance thereto; such acceptance merely engages it to examine whether importance should be attached to the evidence, and if so, what importance.

In the same connection—and this brings us to the question of decisions—the Court has refused to set aside *a priori* entirely new arguments brought forward even at a late stage of the oral proceedings; for it has held that the decision of an international dispute by an international court should not mainly depend on a point of procedure of this kind, as might happen if the new arguments carried decisive weight but were discarded.

Somewhat similarly, the Court has refused to admit the thesis, which has sometimes been advanced, that in giving its decision it can be constrained to choose between two alternative solutions suggested by the parties: it has held that it cannot be restricted to such an alternative and that it must be free to give the decision which it deems to be just in each particular case. On the other hand, it has, of course, recognised that any decision is only binding so far as it falls within the terms of reference.

Inspired no doubt by its respect for the principle of State sovereignty, and acting, as always, on the assumption, which ensues, that governments are invariably actuated by good faith, unless the contrary is established, the Court has shown itself extremely reluctant to make use of its right to indicate measures of interim protection, and, still more, to award costs. Nevertheless, in the decisions rejecting demands for interim protection the Court has had an opportunity, which it has taken, of developing the law governing this delicate subject.

It goes almost without saying that, on the one hand, in elaborating its practice in regard to the interpretation of international agreements the Court has scarcely made any innovation, or added anything to the rules or principles which have been well known since the days of Vattel; and that, on the other hand, it has laid down no hard-and-fast method, no sort of *ordo gratiæ* to be applied in each particular case at the risk of going astray and working at random. What it has done is merely to take the rules of interpretation as it has found them—in most cases these rules are nothing but applied common sense—and to use them according to what it has deemed to be the exigencies of international law in general, and of the circumstances of each case in particular: in a way, it may be said that this is another and most important instance of the Court's reliance on immanent

and transcendental principles, on " natural law " if this expression is preferred, in addition to the rules of positive law.

At the very outset one of these principles is encountered : it is the duty of the Court to ascertain what was the intention of the parties to the agreement. This is what the Court means when it sometimes, perhaps a little loosely, uses expressions such as " the intention of the Convention, of the Statute," etc. The first and most obvious way of ascertaining this intention is to examine the wording of the relevant clause. This wording, however, does not, in the view of the Court, contrary to the rule adopted by certain municipal systems of law, assume a sort of absolute, detached, independent value : it has a value only in so far as it may reasonably be held to express the intention of the parties. Whether or not this is the case is a matter of judgment, and this judgment, which is necessarily of a discretionary nature, may depend on a great variety of circumstances. If the Court arrives at the conclusion that the clause expresses, on the face of it, the intention of the parties, it says that the clause is clear; if not, it holds it to be obscure, ambiguous, etc.

It is only in the latter case that factors other than the wording of the clause itself and, indirectly, rules of interpretation, come into play. If the clause is clear, it must be applied as it stands whether or not the Court may be of opinion that the parties would have acted wisely in substituting another and different provision for that which appears in the text, and even though it might sometimes be tempted to proceed to undertake this substitution itself in the guise of a simple construction of the text.

If the clause is, on the contrary, held to be obscure, the first thing to do is to examine the context; for it is possible that, if a treaty is read as a whole, the correct sense of a phrase which taken by itself, may have different meanings, becomes patent the context is the final test of the clarity of a provision as an expression of the intention of the parties.

In this way one may, however, arrive at a result which appears as unreasonable and absurd, or as inconsistent with the general aim and scope of the treaty, or as maintaining an uncertain and precarious situation. If so, it may be necessary to go one step further and to ascertain, for instance, whether the clause is couched in such definite terms as to make it likely that a deviation from the general system of the treaty was intended by the parties In this connection it may be well carefully to examine what is the normal sense of the words used, having regard to the context whether there are, in the treaty, provisions of a particular and important character which may shed light on the clause to be

construed—for while, as a rule, the generally accepted meaning of a word or expression is decisive, words of a special character, specially chosen, govern the meaning of general expressions; and which of several possible interpretations is best calculated to bring the clause into harmony with generally accepted principles of international law. All this is, of course, in reality only one aspect of the investigation of the intentions of the parties, it being assumed that these intentions are in conformity, as far as possible, with what is normal and customary.

In the same connection, and by virtue of the same principle, the Court may ascertain the scope of the clause by examining its practical effect if interpreted in one way or the other, and the question whether such effect would be in accordance with the known intention of the parties; in the latter respect it may also consider the action taken by the parties themselves under the clause.

The Court may, finally, endeavour to ascertain the intentions of the parties from the records of the preparation of the convention. In the practice of the Court, recourse to these records has been had for two different purposes: first, in order to ascertain the proper construction of an ambiguous clause, having regard to the parties' intention; and secondly, in order to make sure that a *prima facie* conclusion that a clause is clear—*i.e.* that its terms express without ambiguity the intention of the parties—is not contradicted by the historical facts.

In both cases the Court has proceeded with great caution, on the ground that records of the preparatory work can never be allowed to change the sense of a text duly agreed on. This it would do, for instance, if a clause were interpreted otherwise than according to its literal meaning on the ground that it can be proved that the development of events has, in fact, made it cover a wider field than was originally intended. The Court has refused to pay any attention to, or even to take cognisance of, preparatory work in which all the parties to the agreement to be construed have not participated. It has further declined to take into account proposals and declarations made in the course of negotiations which have not led to complete agreement. It has, finally, held that it cannot take any notice at all of preparatory work, the record of which, being secret or confidential, has not been submitted to it by the authority entitled to do so or with the consent of all the governments immediately concerned.

It is only in the very last resort—recourse to records of preliminary work being the last but one—that the Court has felt justified in applying the principles of so-called restrictive, or

liberal, interpretation, as the case may be. It has expressly saic that these principles apply only when ordinary methods fail that is to say, if, after taking all pertinent considerations intc account, the intention of the parties still remains doubtful. Ir cases of this kind the Court has held that the interpretatior involving the least restriction upon the freedom of action of a State must be adopted; for limitations on sovereignty must be construed restrictively in as far as this is possible without running counter to the meaning of the relevant clause as ascertained by other methods.

Other principles of the same order and of similar effect whicl the Court has either itself applied or mentioned with approval are first, the conception underlying the dictum that a text should be interpreted *contra proferentem*, and, secondly, the rule to the effect that provisions which are themselves in the nature o exceptions do not lend themselves to broad interpretation; ir any case, if a party alleges that a clause bears an unusual o exceptional meaning, the burden of proof rests on that party.

Special problems arise when a clause exists in different lan guages, when all versions possess the same degree of authority and when no provision is made for one of them to prevail in case of doubt. If in that event the various versions do not agree and they hardly ever do, the Court has held that, from thi point of view, and apart from all other considerations, the con struction is compatible with all versions, *i.e.* the narrowes should be adopted; if, however, it is officially known in whicl language the text was originally drawn and which texts are translations, regard may be had to this circumstance.

Problems also arise in connection with the effect of inter pretations given. In part, of course, these problems are identica with those which concern the effect of judgments and advisory opinions and which have, *pro tanto*, been solved, more particularly in the Statute, in the manner recalled above. Two additiona questions should, however, be referred to here.

One of these questions concerns the moment of time in th life of a treaty as from which an interpretation shall be considered as valid; on this point the Court has held that the treaty mus be considered as having always, from the very outset, borne th meaning given to it by the Court; this, however, does not, o course, upset arrangements and situations which may have been based on other constructions subsequently rejected by the Court

The remaining point relates to the question of so-called authoritative interpretation. In this respect the Court has give counsels of caution. It has first of all reaffirmed the maxim *eju*

est interpretare cujus condere, thus dissipating, for instance, any idea that the Court might be asked for an "authoritative" interpretation of the League Covenant. It has further laid down that the giving of an authoritative interpretation of a judicial decision is itself a judicial function, in the exercise of which judicial procedure must be followed. An interpretation given in another form has merely the value of a personal opinion without any kind of binding force. The same applies, as regards the Court itself, to interpretations given by it under the provisions of the Statute but going beyond the scope of the decision which it is asked to construe.

In the foregoing pages an attempt has been made to give a general idea of the various fields in which the Permanent Court has so far had an opportunity of contributing to the development, or of restating already recognised rules of international law, and also to indicate the general lines on which the Court has worked in this respect. Any impartial reader will, it is hoped, admit that the results achieved are not negligible, having regard to the fact that the Court has only exercised its judicial functions for a dozen years and in little more than sixty cases, contentious and advisory.

In the statement on the foreign policy of the British Government which Sir Samuel Hoare made in the House of Commons on July 12th, 1935, the Foreign Secretary said, speaking of the League of Nations, that he considered it not from the angle of the past but from the angle of the future, and that he thought much less of what it had done and what it had failed to do in the last fifteen years than of what it might do in the next fifteen years, if it were given a fair chance.

A similar attitude might with at least equal justification be adopted with respect to the so-called World Court, the creation of which represents the main achievement of the League in the field of international justice; this Court should not be judged by what it has done or failed to do within the short space of life, the brief period of activity which so far lies behind it, but by what it may have achieved or failed to achieve in, say, half a century, "if it is given a fair chance." The Supreme Court of the United States of America, which is the tribunal to which the Permanent Court of International Justice bears, after all, the closest resemblance, had to wait fifty years before the annual average of cases submitted to it rose from ten to seventy. Some forty years later still its docket comprised some fifteen hundred cases. It was given a fair chance.

TERRITORIAL REVISION AND ARTICLE 1 OF THE LEAGUE COVENANT[1]

I. By G. M. Gathorne-Hardy

I suppose most of us, at some time or another, have had tl experience known as sitting down on the chair that isn't ther It is a painful experience, and it brings home forcibly the desi ability of making sure of the existence of anything on which v propose to rely. In that spirit I wish to investigate the machiner for treaty revision which is alleged to be found in the Covenai of the League of Nations. When listening to discussions upon tl pacific settlement of European problems, I have been impresse by the frequency with which thoughtful and well-informed persoı are prone to repeat some such phrase as—" the time has come t apply Article 19." In *The Round Table* of March, 1935, fe instance, the first article speaks of a duty to " put into operatic Article 19," and at a recent meeting at Chatham House Loı Lothian repeatedly made use of a similar expression. Tl context in which such a phrase is always used is revision of tl territorial clauses of the Peace Treaties of 1919, and there seldom any indication of a doubt in the speaker's mind as to tl adequacy of the provisions of Article 19 for such a purpose. Tl machinery, he implies, is available, possibly with some sligl need of adjustment, whenever we choose to set it in motion.

To clear the issue further, it may be pointed out that tl territorial revision under discussion on such occasions is nece sarily of a highly controversial character. Little or no nee would arise for the insertion, in such a document as the Leagu Covenant, of provisions for the reconsideration of existin frontiers where the proposed change was likely to be agreed t by the parties immediately concerned. The question of a Austro-German *Anschluss* is perhaps an exception, and is there fore provided with special machinery for revision in the Peac Settlement, but, speaking generally, it is obvious that no dange to peace is occasioned, nor special machinery required, where proposed readjustment of frontier is agreed to by the States o each side of the line. What we mean, in practice, by territoria

[1] These papers were prepared for publication in July 1935, and arose out (a discussion at Chatham House earlier in the year.

revision is a transference of territory which one party is likely to resist, and the other to seek to compel, by an appeal to arms.

With this point clearly in our minds, let us look at Article 19. It runs as follows :—

The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable, and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.

Legal ingenuity might find scope for its exercise in quite a number of the words of which this article is composed.

Three points, in particular, stand out. In the first place, the function of the Assembly is purely advisory—a function which one would think might clearly be discharged without any specific authorisation,—and there is nowhere any provision making the adoption of such advice obligatory, nor any sanction imposed with the object of making the proposed reconsideration practically effective.

The second point, the precise meaning of "treaties which have become inapplicable," is of such crucial importance that consideration of it may be deferred for a moment. The third point is that the last part of the Article, beginning "and the consideration of international conditions," has no clear or explicit connection with the question of treaty revision. It speaks no longer of "reconsideration," or of "treaties," but seems intentionally to use the new words "consideration" and "conditions." If the second part of the Article was intended to refer to the same subject-matter as the first, what more simple than to say—"treaties which have become inapplicable, or whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world"? Why this change of terms? It is quite arguable, on the ordinary principles of legal interpretation, that the only reconsideration of treaties which the Article permits is of those which "have become inapplicable."

When does a treaty become inapplicable? I have heard the phrase interpreted as if it were the same as "a treaty which has ceased to be applied," or in other words is obsolete. But this cannot be the true meaning. In the first place, the words "periodic revision of treaties which have become obsolete" actually occur in an earlier draft (British amendment proposed on February 11th, 1919), and they have been deliberately changed. In the second place, while it may be a useful task to clear away from time to time dead wood of this kind, in the spirit which led us to abolish the twenty-mile limit for cars when it had long ceased to be either observed or enforced, an obsolete provision

can hardly present such an acute problem, involving danger to peace, as to make machinery for its deletion urgent or important. Obsolete conditions have a way of fading automatically out of the picture. While the cessation of reparation payments, for instance, was to some extent regularised at Lausanne, the fact had for some time been recognised that they would cease in any event, and the same considerations to apply to the fate of the disarmament imposed on Germany. An inapplicable provision of a treaty seems rather to mean one whose performance has become impossible: the situation envisaged is analogous to that of a contract void owing to impossibility of performance. This interpretation, as we shall see later, has received authoritative support.

In any case, however, there seems to be a difficulty in applying such an expression as "inapplicable" to the territorial clauses of the Peace Treaties. If there is a provision which it is impossible so to describe, it is one constituting the title-deed of an independent sovereign State, and expressly guaranteed by the whole membership of the League under Article 10. It is, in fact, not the inapplicability but the continued application of such clauses of the Peace Treaties which constitutes the danger to peace and stability which revisionists seek to avert. In short, if we confine ourselves to an interpretation, on legal principles, of the words themselves, territorial revision of a contested character appears to be definitely outside their scope.

The history of the Article may, however, induce us to modify this opinion. Let us therefore examine it. Somewhat disconcertingly, we discover that the germ of the Article relating to treaty revision is originally to be found as a pendant or proviso to the Article conferring a territorial guarantee, and nowhere else. The revision originally contemplated was, in fact, precisely that form which we have found legal grounds to exclude. Its earliest appearance is in President Wilson's draft of January 10th, 1919, of the Article which developed into Article 10. The whole Article, as then drafted, runs as follows:—

The Contracting Powers unite in guaranteeing to each other political independence and territorial integrity; but it is understood between them that such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the future become necessary by reason of changes in present racial conditions and aspirations or present social and political relationships, pursuant to the principle of self-determination, and also such territorial readjustments as may in the judgment of three-fourths of the Delegates be demanded by the welfare and manifest interest of the peoples con-

cerned, may be effected if agreeable to those peoples; and that territorial changes may in equity involve material compensation. The Contracting Powers accept without reserve the principle that the peace of the world is superior in importance to every question of political jurisdiction or boundary.

This reads at first sight like a far-reaching provision for territorial change, though it really boils down to a gentleman's agreement between the Members of the League to respect the principle of self-determination. A readjustment proposed by three-fourths of the Delegates is only to take effect if agreeable to "the peoples concerned," which puts it at once on a voluntary footing. It does not, therefore, confer any real power of revision in the cases most likely to lead to trouble. Yet, such as they were, the terms of the Article were at once vigorously criticised by Mr. David Hunter Miller, who urged in his comment :—

That the territorial adjustments made by the Peace Conference will not satisfy all claims, is the only thing now certain about them. Such general provisions as above mentioned will make that dissatisfaction permanent, will compel every Power to engage in propaganda, and will legalise irredentist agitation in at least all of Eastern Europe. It is submitted that the contrary principle should prevail.

President Wilson, however, preserved his phraseology unchanged in his next draft, of January 20th, 1919, and in the meanwhile Lord Robert Cecil produced a British draft (January 16th) in which provision for territorial change was even more stringently embodied, accompanied by a formidable sanction. This draft ran thus :—

If at any time it should appear that the boundaries of any State guaranteed by Article I (i), (ii) do not conform to the requirements of the situation, the League shall take the matter under consideration, and may recommend to the parties affected any modification which it may think necessary. If such recommendation is rejected by the parties affected, the States Members of the League shall, so far as the territory in question is concerned, cease to be under the obligation to protect the territory in question from forcible aggression by other States, imposed upon them by the above provisions.

Here we have indeed a drastic provision for the establishment of change in such circumstances as seem, in the opinion of the League Members, to call for it. "The requirements of the situation" is a phrase sufficiently wide to justify League intervention in almost any conceivable case. But what happened to this proposal? It was almost immediately deleted by Sir Cecil Hurst, with the complete concurrence of Mr. Hunter Miller, and

the Hurst–Miller draft, which formed the basis on which th(drafting Commission began work on February 3rd, not onl} omitted it, but contained no machinery whatever for treat} revision.

At the eighth meeting of the Commission, however, an amend· ment was proposed by the British Delegation, to insert ar independent article, then Article 23, reading as follows :—

the body of Delegates shall make provision for the periodic revisioı of treaties which have become obsolete and of international condition the continuance of which may endanger the world.

This was immediately modified into a form substantially identica with the present Article 19, and, in that form, adopted.

What, if anything, is to be deduced from this chapter o history? The divorce of the Article from Article 10 leaves th(guarantee in that Article legally absolute and unqualified. Th(absence of the sanction originally proposed by the British (laps(of the guarantee where a League proposal for territorial chang(was rejected by a party interested) strengthens this view, an(suggests that it was considered undesirable to invest the Leagu(with anything stronger than advisory power. And further, eveı such an advisory function (which one might think it was super fluous, in view of Article 11, to authorise specifically) is limite(to cases of treaties which have become inapplicable, a term which as already suggested, is quite inappropriate to a treaty provisioı the continued application of which is the effective reason fo objecting to it. In such an emasculated form, there is littl(wonder that the Article was accepted by revisionist and *status qu(* Powers alike, with but little discussion, but we are the mor(justified in asking the question whether it provides any effectiv(machinery whatever which is capable of being applied to th(critical territorial problems which threaten the peace of Europe.

The story is an illustration of both the major phases of th(conflict between different schools of thought, of whose views th(Covenant is a compromise. The comments of Mr. Hunter Mille on President Wilson's draft express, broadly speaking, the opinioı of those who regard the encouragement of revisionist ideas as : serious danger. But there is also a clash between the part} seeking to endow the League with executive authority and thos(who visualise its functions as purely advisory and consultative In this battle, the latter view was clearly triumphant on thi occasion, and it may be felt that the Article, as it stands, is littl more than a harmless concession to the feelings of the vanquishe(

party, which softens the bitterness of defeat by allowing them to voice their opinion as to the desirability of some provision for peaceful change. If the Article were omitted, it would still be open to the League, under Article 11, if not on general principles, to do at least as much as it authorises. The tendering of advice can hardly be forbidden in any circumstances, and, in a situation involving a risk to peace, may be claimed to be the minimum duty of Council or Assembly. Further than this the Article does not go.

Our doubts of its efficacy are only enhanced by the decision given by the League Committee of Jurists on the occasion when Bolivia sought redress under this Article in 1920. It was then held, not only that the function of the League was not adjudicative but merely advisory, but further, " that such advice *can only* be given in cases where treaties have become inapplicable " ; and a very interesting and presumably authoritative definition of this expression was then given, as being

> " when the state of affairs existing at the moment of their (the treaties') conclusion has subsequently undergone, either materially or morally, such radical changes that the application has ceased to be reasonably possible."

In the absence of such change, it was held that the Article could only be invoked if a danger to peace existed. This insistence on change of course rules out such a question as the Polish Corridor, where the situation complained of has been in existence from the first, unless we are to make such a concession to " power politics " as to say that, when the country desiring revision has attained such military strength that no one is willing to oppose her, the application of any treaty to which she objects has become, in spite of the guarantees of Article 10, practically impossible. This, however realistic a view, is perhaps too cynical to be accepted as a satisfactory reason for advocating a change.

This interpretation, in fact, makes any practical application of the Article doubly dangerous. By insisting on changed conditions as an essential preliminary, it encourages efforts, on the part of the State in possession, to obstruct all change, as by preventing the growth, and stifling the aspirations, of its minority communities. By requiring the existence of a danger to peace before the advice of the League can be invoked, it offers a direct inducement to the nation seeking redress to say, " Very well, in that case I must create the required situation." Such a requirement is apt to place the League in the position of the Unjust Judge of Scripture : " because this widow troubleth me, I will

avenge her." It creates a strong temptation to sacrifice the rights of a weak country to the supposed interests of general peace. Listening to discussions on revision has convinced me that this temptation is dangerously real. The argument often seems to run, " He won't be happy till he gets it : in the interests of peace, therefore, which override every other consideration, let us redistribute the toys in the family of nations." I suggest that an argument on these lines could be used to justify such an acknowledged international crime as the partition of Poland, or that " bartering of peoples and provinces like pawns in a game " which the Peace Settlement was designed to prevent. But such a concession to force lets in the worst evil of war by a side door : if military power, or the threat of it, is to weigh down considerations of right and law, peace becomes at once a very questionable ideal.

It may be urged, however, that the special circumstances of the Bolivian case make it an unsatisfactory precedent. At that date, the attitude of the United States towards any interference in American affairs rendered it advisable for the League to avoid intervention in America if possible, and it may be that it would take a more liberal view of its functions, in the event of an appeal to Article 19 by a European Power. Let us therefore take an imaginary case, and see how it is likely to work out in practice.

Under the terms of one of the Peace Treaties, the successor State of Kakotopia has been carved out of the former possessions of Ruritania. The latter asserts, not only that the existing frontier has always been inequitable, intolerable, and exasperating to Ruritanian susceptibilities, but that the Kakotopian province of Irredentia has changed its character owing to the greater fertility and lower death-rate of Ruritanians, and is now predominantly Ruritanian in population. It therefore applies for the advice of the League under Article 19. This, it will be agreed, is about as good a case for invoking the Article as may be anticipated. The League sets up a thoroughly disinterested Commission, which recommends a revision of frontier, transferring the greater part of Irredentia to its former sovereign. It may be expected that some compensation to Kakotopia will also be advised. Ruritania is satisfied, but not so Kakotopia, which feels that no compensation which Ruritania would agree to pay will make up for the loss of a region peculiarly valuable for economic or other reasons. Such a situation is probable, since, if Kakotopia were willing to sell or exchange the territory, it could easily have settled the dispute before the League was

invoked. The matter then comes before the Assembly. At once, every Successor State, seeing its own title-deeds threatened, ranges itself with Kakotopia. All revisionists, and some neutrals, espouse the cause of Ruritania. This is, from the nature of things, inevitable, and anything like unanimity is surely out of the question. Every prolific minority is under a cloud, and becomes unpopular if not actually persecuted. The marshalling of Europe in two rival camps becomes more pronounced than ever: feeling runs high. Meantime the League, if Kakotopia sits pat on its rights, can do nothing, but, on the contrary, remains bound to guarantee their maintenance. This is not all. If Ruritania now proceeds to resort to war, it should, technically, be faced with the opposition of all States Members of the League, and with the prospect of sanctions under Article 16. But the situation has become complicated by the fact that the League Commission, and perhaps a majority of the Assembly, have pronounced in favour of the Ruritanian claim. The League, in fact, is committed to opposing a change which it has itself recommended. At best, no general opposition to the Ruritanian action is to be anticipated, and the Collective System receives another set-back. At worst, the League is split, and dissolves in a general war. Is there anything improbable in this forecast?

In these circumstances we may be disposed to cast a wistful eye at Lord Cecil's rejected proposal, that, in such a case, the guarantee of integrity under Article 10 should be withdrawn. But further consideration reveals a number of objections to this course. In the first place, the whole object of the proposal is to enable the League to impose its own recommendations for territorial change upon one or more sovereign States. This is to give it such wide super-national powers as few of its Members are at all prepared to accept. Even an organised federation, like the United States, has no such power of modifying the frontiers between its component states. Secondly, the point of the withdrawal of the guarantee must be to enable the parties to fight out the issue, for, if the use of force is not authorised, the absence of the guarantee makes no practical difference. But the whole object of the League's intervention has been, *ex hypothesi*, to preclude an attempt to settle the question by force. This, from the standpoint of the League and of the world, is far more important than that the dispute should be settled at all. The proposed sanction, in fact, produces the very evil which the recommendation was intended to prevent. Incidentally, it is quite possible that the victory will rest with the party resisting

the League's recommendation. Lastly, it is not clear whether or to what extent the recommendation of the League is to be unanimous. President Wilson, it will be remembered, proposed a three-fourths majority. But, if there is to be anything short of unanimity, such an attempt may easily degenerate into a war in which the marshalled ranks of revisionist and *status quo* Powers meet in a general collision. If, on the other hand, the decision must be completely unanimous, the satisfaction of this requirement is, in Europe at any rate, a practical impossibility, and we are no farther on than we were before.

Consideration of the two methods of revision in which the League can participate thus reveals the existence of serious objections to both. To equip the League with any power to enforce its decision is to turn it into a super-State of a kind which hardly any nation is prepared to accept. Moreover, to leave the decision at the mercy of the stronger party, by a withdrawal of the League guarantee, is, on analysis, a return to power diplomacy. The dispute is left, by the League's abdication of its pacific functions, to be resolved by force, with all the danger to general peace which this implies. If, on the other hand, the function of the League is merely advisory, as at present, it ensures no better solution than the parties could, by private negotiations, work out for themselves, while it creates a risk, on the rejection of such advice, that the League may be forced into the position of being pledged to resist a change on which it has pronounced favourably. If, as under the present Article 19, even this advisory function can only be invoked in critical circumstances, or in consequence of a changed situation, oppression of minorities is fostered on the one hand, and an aggressive attitude on the other.

It will probably be urged, in mitigation, that to give the League an advisory status in such disputes has the advantage of focussing public attention upon them. But I submit that nothing could be less desirable. Each of the States concerned is, in such circumstances, forced to proclaim, with the utmost publicity, that the smallest reduction of its maximum claim involves a vital injury to its interests. To say less would fatally affect its bargaining power. Such a contention, made in a private exchange of views between the parties, would be merely the well-understood technique of bargaining, and could do no harm. But when the maximum claim of each has been broadcast to its nationals and the world as the irreducible minimum, it becomes extremely difficult to recede, in the smallest particular, from the

position taken up. The more privately, in fact, such negotiations are conducted, the better.

In view of these dangers and difficulties, there seems much to be said for the alternative policy of concentrating on the exclusion of any appeal to force, and leaving the parties to work out their own solution of the problem of revision. If it proves a Gordian knot which only the sword can loose, there is still the solution of letting it remain tied. Time can do much to render callous the body which is galled by such a bond. In any simpler case, the States directly concerned are more likely to discover a mutually acceptable solution if left to themselves and not encouraged to abuse each other in the hope of enlisting external support. Could the League, it may be asked, have achieved even the temporary improvement in German–Polish relations which has now been reached behind its back? A most prominent element in our present feeling of insecurity is a growing and unprecedented disregard for the sanctity of treaties. The association of the League with revision does nothing to diminish this tendency. So long, too, as the League can be induced to meddle with treaties, the possession of force has at least a nuisance value, and, while a solution by force remains open, nations will continue to try that broad and trodden way which leads to destruction. But, if the exit by force is firmly barred, other and better avenues of escape will be found. History, as Mr. Toynbee has shown us, is a tale of the triumphant response of humanity to the challenge of seemingly impossible situations.

II. By Professor David Mitrany

Mr. Gathorne-Hardy at the end of his paper bids us eschew the painful predicament of which he speaks at the outset, by sitting plump and tight on the floor. That has its advantages. No bother with a shaky and squeaky chair; and, at worst, one can fall no lower. Yet Mr. Gathorne-Hardy's wide experience will confirm that there is another side to this. One sits by preference on a chair not merely as a show of genteel breeding; one sits on a chair because that posture happens to be more helpful for the efficient performance of various social acts, towards which he who squats is apt to be indifferent by temperament or slothful by gravity.

I hope to show how this important consideration applies to the subject of Mr. Gathorne-Hardy's paper. But if I am to approach, as far as may be in my power, the clarity of his own argument,

I must divide my remarks into two parts. I must deal first with certain points with which I disagree in detail, before I show cause why I disagree with his paper as a whole.

A.

(1) The subject here discussed centres in Article 19 of the Covenant, and Article 19 is concerned with two explicit ends: (*a*) revision of treaties which have become inapplicable, and (*b*) revision of general conditions which are a danger to peace. In Mr. Gathorne-Hardy's view (*b*) has "no clear or explicit connection with the question of treaty revision" (p. 819); he therefore concludes that (*b*) is redundant, and that both parts relate really and solely to "treaties which have become inapplicable."

Does not this place an unduly restrictive interpretation upon what is, as generally agreed, I thought, the more novel and important part of that Article? As a principle it opens up possibilities of peaceful consideration and revision where no such avenues were open under the old international system. Let me suggest, by way of illustration, two outstanding types of cases:

(i) The criteria of the first part of Article 19 do not lie in the case of treaties which have been applied already. That excludes presumably all treaties which have involved a territorial change. It could not be said of such treaties that they are "inapplicable"; but it may be found that, having been applied, they have created or are creating conditions dangerous to peace. On this ground action would be possible under part (*b*) of Article 19, where it would not be possible under part (*a*). That may not be treaty revision in a narrow formalistic sense, but it certainly is that in a practical political sense: a revision not of the form of the original act, but of some of its results as subsequently revealed in practice. That is a far-reaching and progressive innovation of principle; especially if one keeps in mind that the bulk of international changes have been brought about forcibly, by so-called treaties of peace which in temper and effect were really treaties of war. Mr. Gathorne-Hardy himself points out (on p. 820) how illogical it is to apply the term "inapplicable" to treaties which cause trouble just because they are being applied. But the confusion springs from a change in connotation which reveals, I suspect, an emergent change in outlook; a point to which I shall want to refer again in conclusion.

(ii) This differentiation appears clearly in a second type of cases—those in which treaties are still in process of actual application, but with difficulty and duress. In the past, when in such

a case one party invoked the clause *rebus sic stantibus*, the other could deny that the treaty was altogether inapplicable. As that was the only contention legally admissible, there the matter rested. But though it may often be difficult to prove that a treaty is altogether inapplicable, and so demand its annulment as a whole, it may be possible to show that in some respects its application would be unfair or dangerous, and so demand revision of the parts. That is from a practical political standpoint the normal process of government; and that is presumably the valuable innovation which part (*b*) of Article 19 contemplates.

(iii) These are two types of cases which fall within the category of treaty revision, but to the consideration of which the principle enunciated in part (*b*) of the Article brings a necessary and valuable elasticity. In addition, and in particular, that principle introduces an altogether new and revolutionary norm in the working of the international system. It introduces the possibility of considering and revising conditions which do not arise out of a treaty. If the first type referred to conditions arising out of a treaty already applied, *e.g.* conditions in the Polish Corridor; and the second type to conditions arising out of a treaty in course of application, *e.g.* out of Reparations; the third may include action in such issues as the position of a minority which does not come under a Minorities Treaty, the proper use of a waterway or straits, access to a vital raw material, and so on. Under the old system, if direct negotiations were not open or failed, and force was avoided, no means were available for dealing with such issues *d'autorité*. The new principle invests the new international authority with the prerogative to deal with any and every issue which proves a danger to general peace, and in so doing goes far beyond the revision of actual treaties. It provides, in fact, the basic principle for some future instrument of international legislation.

(2) That this was the kind of action which the originators of the provision had in mind is proved by the text first drafted by President Wilson (quoted above on p. 820). That text gave the new international forum the right to consider even changes of territory, " if agreeable to the peoples " inhabiting the territory. From this reservation Mr. Gathorne-Hardy draws, however, the conclusion that it " does not, therefore, confer any real power of revision," but puts any readjustment " on a voluntary footing." Does not this reading rest on a confusion? The " if agreeable " refers, as I see it, to the population and not to the government

concerned (the idea of " self-determination " dominated the Paris conclave at the time); power of revision is thus lodged in the Assembly (" the Delegates ") and the particular community, both of them new-comers in international law, and that above the head of the State, who until then was the only legal person having a standing in international law. President Wilson's conception was thus a double breakaway from the old system, not a harking back to it; and Mr. David Hunter Miller's criticism of the draft, also mentioned above, was directed precisely against that bold and heretical innovation.

It is true that in the end that text was whittled down to the present tenor of Article 19. But if its history shows anything, it is that what now appears as the second part of Article 19 is not a meaningless and reduntant appendix, but a deliberate effort to introduce a new and vital conception into international law and practice.

(3) That textual metamorphosis is seen in a different, and sinister, light by Mr. Gathorne-Hardy. " The divorce of Article 19 from Article 10," he says, " leaves the guarantee in that Article [Art. 10] legally absolute and unqualified "—and revision therefore nowhere. That is going very far indeed. If correct, it would mean that the creators of the League Covenant have ended by achieving the very opposite of what they intended, and have merely invested the doctrine of national sovereignty with a sacred character, eternal and intangible and infallible, and offered their admirals and generals as vestals to that new deity. But what, by general assumption, Article 10 really offers is protection against forcible change, through one-sided and violent action; and that by implication cannot have sense except and precisely in conjunction with the provisions for collective peaceful change, which begin with Article 11 and end with Article 19. The machinery is incomplete, but the purpose is clear; and it can hardly be maintained, even in a strictly legal sense, that two provisions occurring in one and the same document have no bearing upon one another. They are both, like the rest, individual parts of a comprehensive and complex instrument, but in which for purposes of action all the parts have meaning and effect only in so far as they work as a whole.

While Mr. Gathorne-Hardy, therefore, reads the history of these provisions as having ended in divorce, I venture to suggest that it is merely a case of convenient separation; and that if the two principles could not be made to live from the outset, as was

first intended, in the same room, they have been brought to live under the same roof. To say that the vaguely admonitory power of Article 19 is but a poor relation to the firm assertion of Article 10, that relatively, therefore, the latter is absolute, is not enough. The document as a whole provides various other means for dealing with differences and disputes, and (no doubt because of the absence as yet of compulsory means for peaceful change) it contains even an eventual ultimate toleration of warlike action. If nothing else, this backhanded concession to latter-day habits, to the habit of violent revision, must go to show that the new collective guarantee in Article 10 was not "absolute and unqualified." The possibility of peaceful revision remained an essential concomitant of that guarantee against forcible change.

B.

On certain points of fact and of interpretation a different reading is, therefore, possible from that suggested in the preceding paper. More important, however, than the materials and devices used by Mr. Gathorne-Hardy is the general architecture of his thesis. Is the design, bold and attractive as it is, suited to the end in view? Does it serve even his own restricted intention, let alone the needs of the actual international purpose?

Mr. Gathorne-Hardy's argument is ostensibly limited to the possibility of applying Article 19 to territorial revision because, he suggests, that is the context in which reference to that Article is generally made. Admittedly that is a difficult type of revision, and the one best suited to provide Mr. Gathorne-Hardy with a case. He could not fail to make the most of it. But the restrictive interpretation he placed at the outset upon Article 19—and which, as I ventured to suggest, is hardly justified—has led him, in fact, into a material fallacy. Having started from the particular he has concluded in general; having of his own choice started from the vantage point of the use of Article 19 in relation to territorial revision, he ends by repudiating as both useless and dangerous any formal procedure for revision altogether.

It is true that in this respect the provisions of the Covenant are no more than embryonic. But if one accepts the idea of an international system at all, is not the next step to ask : "How can they be made adequate?" Again, if it be true that such procedure could be applied only with difficulty and, possibly, with danger to territorial revision, what is the next step but to ask (since Mr. Gathorne-Hardy began by pointing out that such demands are continuous) : "Can a procedure for peaceful change

be used so as to stem these demands for revision of territory—and so reduce the pressure upon international relations? " This is indeed the very heart of the problem, but it is ignored in the preceding paper, which denounces the provisions for peaceful change because they cannot do well what they really should avoid and prevent altogether.

Why do States covet and pursue territorial changes, even at the risk of war? How, if war is to be checked, can that habit be eradicated? Territorial changes are not demanded and pursued at so great a risk, simply in order that a State may collect more acres, as a collector accumulates stamps or strange eggs. They are wanted as a means of satisfying certain social needs, of securing certain resources needed by that particular community. But under the ruling system sovereign possession of a territory gives to the owner absolute control over its resources and activities (even over the stratospheric layers above it), and so the only way in which it is possible to secure a share of them is to secure a share in the sovereign title to that territory.

Unfortunately, since the useful habit of acquiring countries by marriage or inheritance or gift has fallen in desuetude, war alone was left as the means of increasing territory. But this forcible way is not only destructive as a method, it also is, in a way, self-destructive in effect. The need for change and the demand for it may spring from any one of a number of reasons. It may be a need for cultural freedom of the population concerned or simply a wish for union with their kindred; or it may be a craving for material resources or for markets or for an outlet, and so on. Any one of these claims or aspirations may be justified, and should then in fairness be met. But territorial change never acts so simply and fairly; a territorial change is by its very nature a wholesale and promiscuous change. It transfers with the soil a whole complex of things and conditions and relations; and while in so doing it may satisfy the particular need which urged the change, at the same time it changes many more other things which were not in question at all. It may solve a particular problem, but in so doing it creates a number of new problems. The attempt to meet in Central Europe the demand for cultural self-determination through a transfer of territory has produced economic conditions which bear hard on the very peoples so liberated. Any attempt to mend their economic plight by a new change of territory would inevitably give birth to fresh problems in other fields. The use of territorial change begets the need for territorial change.

As a means of satisfying the needs of one or more peoples, therefore, territorial change flies in the face of its very purpose, and flouts all we have learnt by long experience on the art of government. The art of government is to satisfy social claims, in so far as they are valid and not unjust to other groups, by means which will disturb communal life as slightly as possible in its material working and in its social relationships; which, in other words, will not do more damage to the whole than they can do good to the part. The art of government is to make itself the instrument and the guide of necessary adjustments by a fair balancing of needs and desires, and in thus easing the flow of evolution to forfend sporadic waves of revolution. That is every whit as true of the world of nations. The art of international government would be to find ways and means to satisfy in a direct and specific manner the justified needs and claims of the nations—material needs through an adjustment of material conditions, spiritual needs through an adjustment of spiritual arrangements—and not leave the grievance to fester till its victims are roused enough and numerous enough to seek relief through the indirect and revolutionary means of territorial changes. The international form of revolution is war.

Arguing from the standpoint which he has chosen, Mr. Gathorne-Hardy says that "even an organised federation, like the United States, has no such power of modifying the frontiers between its component States." But why is such a rigid arrangement possible? Because those frontiers are little more than formal divisions, many of them drawn with a ruler on the map; while as conditions alter, the necessary changes and adjustments in social life can be brought about across and above those frontiers. As the government of the federation can, at need, change the run of social life within and across them, it need not worry about divisions which divide no more than do the doors between rooms divide the life of an ordinary household. But how long would that formal territorial division last without serious friction, and survive, if one or more of the States were to take it into their minds to make of them lines of real separation, holding up at will the flow of people and trade and traffic across them?

Where Mr. Gathorne-Hardy sees the formal fact that the federal government *cannot* change the State frontiers, I see the living lesson why it *need not* change them. In the light of that difference can we not also discover some new relationship in the international sphere between territorial integrity and peaceful revision, between Article 10 and Article 19? I have earlier in this reply ventured

to suggest that I do not see the opposition between the two Articles which Mr. Gathorne-Hardy assumes. I would now go further and maintain, paradoxical though it may sound, that the guarantee contained in Article 10 will not become real and lasting until the procedure for peaceful revision envisaged in Article 19 has become real and effective. The need and demand for territorial changes will disappear in the measure in which international adjustments of a material and cultural kind will be possible without a title-deed to the territory. It has been well said of the House of Lords that its strength lies in its weakness; one may say in the same vein that the stability of frontiers will lie in their fragility.

That is an elementary conclusion, but it cannot be too strongly pressed at the present time. Revision means adjustment, and adjustment, speaking generally, is possible only in these two ways: by changing frontiers or by making frontiers imperceptible. The first is the method used by States hitherto, acting individually and, of necessity, violently; the second is clearly the method which an international system, aiming at law and order, must work out and apply. It is therefore serious and possibly fatal for our experiments in international security that at the same time individual States are increasingly blocking the channels of free adjustment—in trade and in finance, in migration and even in general intercourse. The immediate alternatives are, therefore, the danger of a relapse into the first method, for which symptons are not lacking, and the promise that lies in the development of the second method.

The method of peaceful adjustment and revision alone befits a collective international system. Without it the stronger will continue to impose his will upon the weaker, or problems will be shelved rather than solved. Even what may happen "at best" may, in effect, prove the worst. Mr. Gathorne-Hardy points to the recent German-Polish entente as a safer and simpler method of adjustment; and it goes without saying that a collective procedure for peaceful revision is not intended for those cases where there is ready and direct agreement. But the significant aspect of that so-called bi-lateral method is this—that every private arrangement of this kind is apt to be suspected of being really a bargain directed against a third. No such arrangement concluded in recent years has, rightly or wrongly, escaped that suspicion, and none has therefore failed to envenom relations in one quarter as much as it is supposed to have improved them in another. The benefit to common peace and the contribution to the progress of

a collective system could hardly have been less if such arrangements had not been made at all.

One other argument must be dealt with in conclusion and one which, I humbly confess, I fail to appreciate. It is suggested that a procedure for peaceful change would prove merely a promiscuous invitation to the ambitious and to the greedy to rush in with complaints and demands. It would open the flood-gates to incessant and unreasonable pressure, so the argument goes, and so let loose an undercurrent of disturbing clamour which will make all quiet discussion and co-operation impossible. I am not aware that the absence of a regular procedure has in any way, either before or since the War, kept in check the traffic in claims and the rage of propaganda. What I am aware of is that the absence of such procedure has denied us a means to sift and winnow those claims. Does not the fear to which Mr. Gathorne-Hardy gives expression overlook the more important aspect of the idea of a peaceful procedure for revision and adjustment? It would give a country, it is true, a right to put in a formal claim to a certain change; but that right would carry with it the obligation to substantiate the claim before an open and impartial forum. The other party would have an equal right and opportunity to state its view of the case, and public opinion would have before it something like a substantial brief rather than a vociferous pamphlet. Above all, after detached examination of the facts, the ultimate judgment would lie with an impartial common authority. Far from opening the door to unsubstantial and unreasonable claims, therefore, such a procedure would more than anything else serve to discourage them. That supposed danger thus contains within itself its own safeguard and corrective, because the procedure which would make possible the claim would also expose those claims which, lacking in substantial justice, are weighted with a specious ballast of "national honour."

"National honour" at the present time seems to require nothing so much as the breaking of pledges and the disregard of treaties; a state of things which Mr. Gathorne-Hardy rightly deplores and denounces. But shall we check this immoral and disruptive habit by sitting tight on the cause? Or shall we admit that to international treaties, etc., applies with equal force what the late Mr. Justice Holmes once said of a vital clause of the American Constitution—that "the 14th amendment was not meant to enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's 'Social Statics'"? If the new international system is to keep law and order, it cannot wait till an arrangement proves that it cannot work by exploding; it must have

means to ensure that arrangements *do* work by adjusting them to reality, by keeping a continuous harmony between the rules which regulate and the matters which are regulated. Under the old individualist dispensation a treaty, being a contract between two or more parties and with no common authority to watch over it, was inapplicable in the actual if not in the legal sense when the beneficiary was not in a position to enforce it. It was a matter of the *power* to apply it or not. Under the emergent collective dispensation a treaty and its effects are matters of concern to all (as witness the provision for open registration), and as such is inapplicable rather in a social sense when it does violence to those conditions of good-will and good life which are vital to the new system. It is a matter of the *justice* to apply it or not. A treaty or any other arrangement is inapplicable in this sense not because it cannot be applied in fact, but because it should not be applied in fairness. That is the change in outlook to which I referred early in this article; and like every progress in government, it needs appropriate rules and instruments for its reliable and continuous assertion.

Mr. Gathorne-Hardy dislikes to see the League burdened with such a difficult task, and would prefer to let it attend merely to that of preventing conflict. The idea that " law and order " can be reduced to the rôle of mere policing seems to me to evade all that a true international organisation needs, and all that we should aspire to endow it with. In a precarious way the function of police could at need be carried out without a League of Nations, through individual effort or through alliances. But the function of government, of peaceful change and evolution, demands the creation of a true international system and would in time justify its existence.

THE LEAGUE OF PEACE AND FREEDOM

AN EPISODE IN THE QUEST FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY

By E. H. CARR, C.B.E.

MUCH has been written about past schemes for the organisation of the community of nations to prevent war, and ingenious authors have gone back to Sully, or sometimes to Plato, for anticipations of the League of Nations. Far less is known of the first attempt to marshal what may be called international public opinion for the creation of a war-proof "collective system" of international life. The purpose of the present paper is to recall the curious and, even to-day, not uninstructive details of the naïve experiment in international pacifism which was launched at the Palais Electoral in Geneva in September 1867.[1]

It is odd to reflect how many events of European importance in the middle years of the nineteenth century had their source in the two little duchies, part German and part Danish, which lay on the confines of Denmark and Prussia. In 1866 the victor of Sadowa annexed the duchies to Prussia and settled the Schleswig–Holstein question for just half a century. A murmur of disapproval was heard throughout Europe; and in France disapproval rose to the pitch of indignation. In accordance with the well-known principle of international politics that two blacks make a white, Napoleon III announced his intention of annexing Luxembourg. Unlike Bismarck, however, he made the fundamental mistake of talking about the crime instead of committing it. The threat of European war roused public opinion, both at home and abroad, against him; and some far-sighted French republicans detected in these events a heaven-sent opportunity to discredit the Emperor, and to strike one and the same blow for peace and for democracy. They secured the powerful co-operation of James Fazy, for many years the uncrowned king of Geneva. Representatives of democratic opinion in other countries were sounded. An organising committee was set up under the presidency of Jules Barni, a Genevese professor; and in June 1867 a manifesto was issued convoking a congress to meet in Geneva at the beginning of September.

[1] The principal sources for this episode are: *Annales du Congrès de Genève*, 1868, Geneva; *L'Internationale : Documents et Souvenirs*, par James Guillaume, Vol. I, 1905, Paris.

In the manifesto, which was addressed to "all friends of free democracy," the purpose of the Geneva Congress was defined as "the maintenance of liberty, justice and peace." A programme issued by the committee in July was slightly more explicit :

> The object of the Geneva Congress is to determine the political and economic conditions of peace among the nations, and in particular to establish the *United States of Europe.* The Congress aspires to be the *Assize of European Democracy.*

The word "democracy" had, in 1867, a more distinctively radical sense than it afterwards came to bear. But for all that, the net was sufficiently wide to include a multiplicity of political opinions; and in the interval between the issue of the manifesto and the meeting of the Congress, nearly ten thousand people enrolled themselves as "adherents" and contributed the fee of 25 centimes each to the expenses. English politicians of both parties displayed a characteristic mistrust of international demonstrations; and the two most important Englishmen who announced their adhesion were John Bright and John Stuart Mill. They did not, however, attend the Congress; and the only English representatives were two trade unionists, Odger, a shoemaker, and Cremer, a mason, who appeared as delegates of the Reform League. Of distinguished French political exiles, Victor Hugo and Louis Blanc "adhered," and Edgar Quinet came in person. There was a good sprinkling of Germans, whose names posterity has not troubled to remember. The Italians were headed by Garibaldi, by far the largest fish whom the organisers of the Congress had succeeded in bringing into their net. Of the Russian *émigrés*, Herzen, who had sent in his name, failed to appear. But Michael Bakunin, the future anarchist, came, and was, next to Garibaldi, the most outstanding personality at the Congress.

There were indeed a few dissentients, even among those who professed and called themselves "friends of free democracy." The Poles played so conspicuous a part in most international movements of the nineteenth century that their absence on this occasion was all the more noteworthy. But it is difficult to drive pacifism and "revisionism" in the same team; and the Poles were perforce "revisionists." An old Polish general named Mieroslawski, whose militant career had begun in the insurrection of 1831, replied to the invitation that it would be time enough to talk of peace "when the Republic of Poland has been restored at the point of a million bayonets." Ladislas Mickiewicz, the

son of the poet, addressed a letter to the Congress declaring that "Poland has a right to expect that its name should be the first and last to be pronounced at the Congress, that her restoration should be the keystone of the deliberations . . . and that the Congress should affirm the necessity of prompt armed action" to liberate Poland from her oppressors. The objections of the Poles were shared, for different reasons, by Karl Marx, who missed any allusion in the programme to the necessity of class warfare, and harangued the General Council of the International Working-men's Association (the "First International") for half an hour on the importance of having nothing to do with this "Geneva wind-bag." But this did not prevent several members of the International from attending the Congress and exercising, as will be seen, some influence on the proceedings.

At 2 p.m. on Monday, September 9th, 1867, the Congress duly assembled in the Palais Electoral at Geneva (the predecessor of the present building of that name, where recent Assemblies of the League of Nations have held their plenary sessions). The attendance was estimated at 6000. But of these perhaps half came from Geneva and its environs; and some of them were less interested in the Congress than in Garibaldi, whose arrival was the signal for an ovation. Behind the platform appeared the word PAX embroidered in large letters on bunting and surrounded by the flags of all nations. This pleasing device provoked the first incident of the Congress. A French delegate named Fermé rose to protest against the display, among the other national emblems, of the Imperial French flag—the symbol of the evil genius of Europe. The protest was received with a good deal of sympathy by the Congress, which was almost unanimous in regarding Napoleon III as the principal menace to European peace. But the cautious Swiss were seriously concerned lest an act of discourtesy to a neighbouring Power might compromise their cherished neutrality. The protest was ruled out of order, the flag remained, and no reference to the incident appeared in the records of the Congress.

After the election of a Swiss politician named Jolissaint as president, and of a Bureau consisting of two members of each nation represented at the Congress, the general debate began. It was opened by Garibaldi, who occupied a seat on the president's right as delegate of honour. The General, speaking in French, propounded a programme of twelve points :—

1. All nations are sisters.
2. War between them is impossible.

3. All disputes arising between nations shall be judged by the Congress.

(Some exclamations of surprise caused Garibaldi to remark : " You will tell me perhaps that I am going rather fast.")

4. The members of the Congress shall be elected by the democratic associations of each country.
5. Each nation, whatever its numbers, shall have a vote at the Congress.
6. The Papacy, as the most pernicious of sects, is abolished.

(This unexpected declaration was greeted with prolonged and frenzied applause by all but a small minority of the Congress.)

7. The religion of God is adopted by the Congress, and its members undertake to preach it throughout the world.

(The delegates gasped with astonishment, and listened in chilly silence while Garibaldi explained that by " religion " he meant " the religion of truth and reason.")

8. The Congress dedicates to the priesthood chosen men of science and intellect ; it consigns to perdition the priests of ignorance.
9. Propagation of the religion of God by training, education and example.
10. A republic is the only form of government worthy of a free people.

(This brought the Congress back on to ground where it could applaud in comfort and with complete unanimity.)

11. Democracy alone can provide a guarantee against the evils of war.
12. The slave alone has the right to make war on tyrants.

(This was the most successful of all Garibaldi's " points " ; for the " right to make war on tyrants," like the more modern formula of " legitimate self-defence," was taken by every delegate to sanction any war in which his own country might be interested.)

It was noticed that the applause when Garibaldi sat down was considerably less in volume than that which had greeted him on rising. His speech brought to an end the first day's proceedings.

On the second day an element of discord was introduced into the proceedings by the speech of one of the delegates of the International. The International had just been holding its annual congress at Lausanne, where it had passed a resolution adhering to the programme of the Geneva Congress on condition of the acceptance by the latter of the principle of " the emancipation of the working class and its liberation from the power and influence of capital." The delegate at Geneva, a Frenchman named Dupont, argued that peace was " not a principle, but a result," and that, in order to attain it, it was necessary, not to create a new religion, as Garibaldi had proposed, but " to turn

all citizens into a single class of workers—in a word, to accept the social revolution with all its consequences." A German named Borkheim, a friend of Marx, then declared that, in order to assure peace in Europe, the first step was to declare war on Russia. Bakunin, the next orator, brought the Congress back to its professed programme. He echoed Borkheim's wish for a military defeat of the Russian Empire, which would lead to the victory of " socialism and federalism " in Russia. But was not the principle of "religious, bureaucratic and military centralisation " everywhere the same, and everywhere equally noxious?

> We are all friends of peace here [he continued], and it is to discuss peace that this Congress has met. But how many of us are naïve enough to believe that we have the power to conjure the terrible universal war which seems more imminent than ever? No, none of us believes it. We have met, not to undertake a thing which is beyond the means at our disposal, but to seek in common the conditions in which international peace will be possible.

The primary condition was the abandonment of " this false principle of nationality," which was bound up with the system of " centralised States." Until these disappear you cannot have your United States of Europe. For who can imagine a workable federation in which France would appear side by side and on equal terms with the Grand-Duchy of Baden, or Russia with Moldo-Valachia? " Universal peace will be impossible so long as the present centralised States exist."

After the second session, Garibaldi left Geneva, and the tone and temper of the third and fourth days' proceedings showed a marked deterioration. Criticism began to rear its head, and the remaining orators were subjected to frequent interruption. The religious question, so imprudently launched by Garibaldi, was a source of perpetual trouble. Italian delegates continued to maintain that the Papacy was the chief menace to the peace of the world; and a French speaker went one better, to the scandal of a considerable section of the audience, by arguing that Christianity itself was the root cause of war and supporting his argument with quotations from the Gospels. The social question was not less hotly contested. The conservatives of the Congress, including most of the large Swiss contingent, were not in the least favourable to the proposal to " turn all citizens into a single class of workers." A delegate from Neuchâtel even maintained the unpopular and paradoxical thesis that there was no connection between political liberty and love of peace, and instanced the savages " in the deserts of Africa and the pampas

of America," who, being free, eat one another, and the people of the United States, who, while possessing the most liberal institutions in the world, "had waged for four years the most horrible of all wars."

On the fourth and last day, when the Congress was in evident danger of breaking up in disorder, a resolution drafted by the Bureau was put before it. It was a resolution arrived at by the process of omitting everything to which anyone could possibly object. Any reference to the social question would have produced a riot. The Swiss radicals, who wanted the Catholic vote at the next local elections, were pledged to veto any censure of the Papacy. Of all the matters debated by the Congress, nothing concrete remained save a secondary proposal, which had excited no great interest and no opposition, for the substitution of national militias for standing armies. In addition to this, nobody objected to the institution of a League of Peace and Freedom (without a constitution and almost without a programme) or of a permanent committee to look after its affairs. Even this anodyne resolution was the signal for renewed disorder and shouts of disapproval from a substantial conservative and clerical faction, which was now determined to wreck the Congress at all costs. But on the second attempt at a show of hands, it was declared by the Chairman to be carried.

The text of the resolution was as follows:

Considering that the Governments of the great European States have shown themselves incapable of preserving peace and assuring the regular development of all the moral and material resources of modern society;

Considering that the existence and increase of standing armies constitute a state of latent war and are incompatible with the liberty and welfare of all classes of society, and particularly of the working class;

The International Congress, desirous of establishing peace on a basis of Democracy and Liberty,

Decides,

That a League of Peace and Freedom, a true cosmopolitan federation, shall be founded;

That it shall be the duty of every member of this League to labour to enlighten and form public opinion on the true character of government as the trustee of the general will, and on the methods of extinguishing the ignorance and the prejudices which keep alive various causes of war; to hasten by his constant efforts the substitution of the system of national militias for that of standing armies; to bring before public opinion in all countries the situation of the working and propertyless

classes in order that individual and general welfare may consolidate political liberty;

Decides, furthermore, to set up a permanent central committee, the organisation of which is entrusted to the Executive Committee of the Congress.

The formal closure of the Congress was followed by an excursion on the lake and a public banquet. But the acrimonious atmosphere of the Congress hall was allowed to permeate even these functions. The band of the local militia, a respectable *bourgeois* organisation, cast a gloom over the excursion by cancelling its engagement to provide music on board. The banquet was unfortunately accompanied by toasts. This gave delegates an opportunity to voice once more those advanced opinions which had been so conspicuously absent from the resolution of the Congress; and scandalised conservatives left the table in protest.

Such was the ignominious ending of the first notable attempt to organise international co-operation on a democratic basis for the preservation of peace. It is worth observing that the principal obstacles to agreement in 1867 were questions which would not present particular difficulty, at any rate on paper, to-day: religion and social equality. Nationalism, on the other hand, was not in 1867 the main problem, being disposed of by Garibaldi's naïve formula of the right of slaves to wage war on tyrants; and even Bakunin's bold thesis that peace was incompatible with the existence of large centralised States excited no special protest. What was perhaps the most revolutionary idea launched during the proceedings—Garibaldi's proposal that disputes between nations should be "judged" by a Congress of representatives of the "democratic associations" of each country—seems to have passed completely unnoticed.

The permanent committee duly met, and even published a few numbers of a journal entitled *The United States of Europe.* The second annual Congress of the League took place at Berne in September 1868. This was not a spectacular affair like its predecessor, and attracted only about 100 delegates. The social problem again gave trouble. Bakunin proposed a resolution advocating the emancipation of the worker and the "equalisation of classes" as a primary condition of peace; and when this was rejected by a large majority, he and fifteen others (mainly Russians, Poles and Italians) left the Congress and the League. The departure of the radical element deprived the League of most of its remaining vitality. A third congress, attended mainly

by Swiss and distinguished only by the presence of Victor Hugo, was held at Lausanne in 1869. Before the next September, the Franco-Prussian War had intervened to give the League its quietus as an international institution; and the two further Congresses which it held had only a local interest. The permanent committee survived in the form of a Bureau International de la Paix, which kept its office in Berne for more than half a century. A few years ago, the Bureau transferred its seat to Geneva, where it still flourishes—the last reminder of a valiant, though somewhat primitive, experiment in international pacifism.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Any book reviewed in this Journal may be obtained through the Publications Department of the Institute. Members of the Institute wishing to cable an order may use, instead of the title of the book, the number which it bears, e.g., "Areopagus, London: Send Book Twenty May Journal: Smith."

Books marked with an asterisk (*) are in the Library of the Institute.

ABYSSINIA

1*. THE CAMPAIGN OF ADOWA AND THE RISE OF MENELIK. By G. F.-H. Berkeley. 1935. (London: Constable. 8vo. xi + 403 pp. 15s.)

THIS book, first published in 1902, presents the full picture of the early Italian campaigns in Eritrea. Its re-issue is particularly appropriate at a moment when the Italian armies are spread over their old battle-grounds of Adowa, Senafe and Coatit and are marching south towards Makalle and Amba Alagi—fields hardly less famous.

To the second edition the author has added a valuable introductory chapter which deals briefly with the history of Italo-Ethiopian relations from the outset; and he divides it conveniently into three periods: (1) that before European intervention; (2) that when European intervention was beginning to threaten Ethiopian independence; (3) that of the struggle against Italy up to the death of King John.

The book has other virtues to add to its immediate interest. It is full of graphic descriptions of men, and of country and of battles, and it is sympathetic in tone towards Italian aims and misfortunes. It might be termed pro-Italian were it not for the fact that Britain herself was heartily pro-Italian at the time and remained so until recent events threw an unhappy blight on our mutual friendship.

It is of particular interest to note, as one reads history, how much Mussolini, combining in himself both Government and the practical direction of the War, has learnt from the failings of Baratieri and the Italian Government of 1895. Baratieri and Crispi under-estimated their opponents. They won victories with slender resources often by narrow margins when defeat must spell disaster. When they woke to the danger, the reinforcements for the most part arrived too late. Mussolini's worst enemy would hardly charge him either with under-estimation of the immediate problem or with delay in mobilisation. The Government of Crispi was terribly parsimonious. Mussolini has poured out gold like water. Baratieri with scarcely money to pay and feed his troops had perforce to neglect his communications; and, largely for that reason, was driven to the disastrous advance on Adowa. Mussolini, basing himself on that experience and upon the skilful engineering feats of Napier, has constructed a network of roads to the frontier and has 30,000 of the best roadmakers in the world driving further roads behind his army. They may contribute not only to present conquest but to future control.

H. ROWAN-ROBINSON.

2*. ABYSSINIAN JOURNEY. By Marcel Griaule. 1935. (London: John Miles. 8vo. 247 pp. 8s. 6d.)

3*. ENGLAND, ITALY, ABYSSINIA. By Major-General H. Rowan-Robinson. 1935. (London: William Clowes. 8vo. viii + 148 pp. 5s.)

FORTUNATELY for the public, Monsieur Griaule, as well as being a traveller, a linguistic and ethnographic expert and a naturalist, is a lively, humorous writer. His brilliant book gives the impression that one has discovered a chink in a curtain through which to study a shifting, highly coloured scene of life. Unfortunately it is spoilt for the English reader by a really bad translation. His flights of French have been done into their English equivalent so literally that they are irksome to read and in places do not even make sense. All who can do so should read the book in the original which won the Prix Gringoire: *Les Flambeurs d'Hommes.*

The journey described was carried out in 1931 under the auspices of the Ministry of Public Instruction. The author set out from Addis Ababa, crossed the Blue Nile from Shoa into Gojjam, visited the Governor and his capital at Debra Markos, and penetrated far enough north to inspect churches and join in hippopotamus hunts on the shores of Lake Tana. Thence back again to Addis Ababa as fast as an impoverished mule train would allow.

The author's knowledge of Amharic gives him an insight into the native mind. He records their conversations among themselves, their comment on customs foreign to their own district, on himself and on life in general. The impression he leaves is of a type idle, procrastinating, humorous, venerating religion, but in the magic superstitious form common to all mountain peoples, and above all boastful, vain-glorious and supremely self-confident: "By the Saviour, if you want to know how a man cries who is going to die, you have only to stand in my way."

Light is thrown on the vexed question of internal administration. In 1931 the rebellious Ras Hailu still reigned in Gojjam. His despatch of messengers of welcome to the river was thought by the author to mean that the Emperor Haile Selassie had warned subject *rases* of the impending arrival. But no: "I do not know the Master of the other bank, but the hotel-keeper Guiliz, of Addis, recommended you highly." Taxation is revealed as the chief bar to progress; governors and officials depend for their livelihood on what they can wring from the peasant; they collect so thoroughly that they remove all incentive to prosperity. Other facts which emerge are the loneliness, the discomfort and the expense of up-country travel. There is one unpleasantly long-drawn-out description of the most gruesome of Abyssinian tortures.

Among the spate of books now appearing on the current dispute, *England, Italy, Abyssinia* is in one respect unique. Its author's experience of soldiering on the North-West Frontier and in Kurdistan, and his well-known views on modern warfare, enable him authoritatively to survey the military situation. Three detailed chapters describe Napier's march to Magdala, the Adowa campaign and the tactical and strategic possibilities of present-day invasion; the comparisons drawn are interesting, and—not always the case with military history—all are readable and clear to the layman. It is a pity that the title does not indicate this special aspect of the book; it flavours rather of the eternal political triangle than of the three military duels chiefly dealt with.

Present political issues are also covered, but necessarily not so adequately, for the author was handicapped by writing at the height of the dispute. Finished in August, this section already dates badly. For instance, the author's hope that the Three Power Conference would be welcomed by Mussolini as a way of withdrawal less public and humiliating than eating his words at Geneva was dashed almost before the ink was dry.

The book seeks to be scrupulously fair to both sides, but no Italian would regard it as unbiased, for it speaks of nearly forty years of Italo-Abyssinian friendship after Adowa, whereas a chief point in the Italian case is the hostility which has prevailed over this very period. But this is the fault not of the author but of the Italians, who for some reason refrained from officially stating their case until September 1935.

The book lays suitable emphasis on the two large-scale issues brought to light by the dispute: the need for a redistribution of the resources over which colonial Powers now hold control, and the question of the value of the League in its present form, with its stress upon Article 10 instead of Article 19. ELIZABETH MONROE.

4. ABYSSINIA ON THE EVE. By Ladislas Farrago. 1935. (London: Putnam. 8vo. x + 286 pp. 10s. 6d.)

5*. THE ABYSSINIAN DISPUTE. By Freda White. [*League of Nations Union Pamphlet, No.* 387.] 1935. (London: League of Nations Union. 8vo. 76 pp. 6d.)

LADISLAS FARRAGO, who is a Hungarian journalist, spent three months early this year in Abyssinia. He interviewed the Emperor and many prominent persons and made a study of the prevailing conditions so far as that was possible in Addis Ababa.

Before leaving the country he made a journey through Ogaden, the effect of which was to sadden him that a nation should think of sending the flower of its youth to such a desert to perish of hunger and thirst, wild beasts and savages. "Three days in the yellow hell" was enough for him.

The general effect of his investigations is to leave upon the reader an unpleasant impression of the Abyssinian. The Emperor appears to obtain much of his income by selling concessions to foreigners and then obstructing the realisation of their designs to such an extent that they give up the struggle in despair. Many of the ministers and all the clergy oppose any kind of moral or material reform. Corruption is rampant. Slavery still prevails; and law is enforced by cruel tortures. But the most repellent picture presented is that of a feast given at Harrar in honour of the Emperor:—

"At one end of the tent countless newly-slaughtered oxen were hung up. Brisk servants cut off large slices of the warm flesh and as they threw them to the guests the meal began. Tetsh was supplied in big tubs . . . our fellow-guests swallowed their raw meat; sweating in their efforts to fill their bellies as tightly as possible in the short space of time allowed. They gulped down the tetsh so quickly that it gushed out from the sides of their mouths on to their white clothes, which were already splashed with the blood of the raw flesh. (A visit from the League of Nations Secretary for Table-Manners is indicated.)

"Outside, the shrieks of the animals that were being slaughtered mingled with the cries of the second relay of hungry diners . . . a sign, and overseers came to drive the guests out . . . but . . . they went on snatching pieces of the meat and drinking tetsh . . . until the lashes of hippopotamus whips hurried them out.

"The whole town was drunk. Men and women danced and sang wildly and licence was the rule."

Otherwise the book is full of interest and entertainment. It should,

however, not be taken very seriously, as it contains a number of statements on which some doubt may legitimately be cast: *e.g.* that Ras Imru, Governor of Gojjam, lives in Gondar, the most northerly town in the Empire (Gondar is the capital of Amhara. It lies 70 miles north of the province of Gojjam and 100 miles south of Axum); that Colonel Clifford, acting as a neutral, watched the Wal Wal battle in which the Italians lost about 1500 native soldiers (actually, according to the pamphlet reviewed below, only 30 native soldiers were killed); that "the country, especially in the north, is an unbroken mountain range 12,000 feet to 15,000 feet high so that every aeroplane would have to fly at a record height all the time."

The League of Nations Union and Miss White are to be congratulated on the production, at an absurdly low price, of an excellent pamphlet, well illustrated by maps, setting forth the basic facts of the Italo-Abyssinian controversy. There are only three criticisms to be directed against it: the first—a minor point—that the description of the Adowa campaign on p. 11 is hardly in accord with fact; the second, that, when the author leaves history for polemics, she gives the impression of bias in favour of Abyssinia; and the third, that there is an absence of any heart-searchings as to the behaviour of the League itself. The reviewer is in agreement with most of the views expressed, but would suggest that there are three parties arraigned at the moment before the judgment-seat: Italy, Abyssinia and the League of Nations; and that whether or not the dispute between the first and second be happily settled, there is an urgent call for the drastic reformation of the third.

H. ROWAN-ROBINSON.

6. ETIOPIA (1935). Panorama geopolitico. By "Africanus." 1935. (Rome: Ardita. Sm. 8vo. 125 pp. *Lire* 5.)
7. PANORAMA ETIOPICO. By Luigi Manzini. 1935. (Milan: La Stampa Commerciale. 188 pp. *Lire* 3.)
8. ASPETTI ECONOMICI DELL' ETIOPIA. By Verax. 1935. (Milan. 57 pp. *Lire* 6.)

THE Italian publishers pour forth cheap books about Ethiopia. Of these three small publications the first is a description of the "barbarous country, still plunged in medieval shadows, recklessly proud, inhabited not by a single race but by various races which hate one another." This is presumably reading-matter for the conscript or volunteer. The other two volumes are respectable summaries of the commonly accepted facts about Abyssinia. Indeed Signor Manzini is so little of a propagandist as to explain Italy's small participation in Ethiopian commerce more by commercial inexperience or insufficient finance on the Italian side than by recalcitrance on the Ethiopian side. In the third pamphlet one notes that in the census of economic potentialities of Ethiopia no great importance is given to oil, and a good deal to coffee.

C. J. S. SPRIGGE.

9*. ABYSSINIA AND ITALY. Information Department Papers, No. 16. 3rd ed., revised and enlarged. Sept. 1935. (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 8vo. 55 pp. 2 maps. 2*s*. To members of the Institute, 1*s*. New York: Oxford University Press. 75*c*.)

A third edition of the memorandum issued by the Information Department of Chatham House on *Abyssinia and Italy*, which was reviewed in the last issue of this Journal, appeared on September 21st, 1935. It contains eight new pages of text.

10*. The Grounds for the Serious Charges brought by Italy against Abyssinia. By Legionarius. 1935. (Rome: Ardita Publishers. Sm. 8vo. 38 pp.)

This pamphlet is either a translation of material written for Fascists or else a miscalculation of the type of propaganda suited to convincing English readers. Some points its raises are not exaggerated, others may not be, but in face of some blatant omissions the reader is left querying every statement made. An example is the failure to mention the first Adowa, or that Italy recognised Abyssinian independence by the treaty which followed it. E. M.

ITALY AND ITALIAN COLONIES

11. Italia e Francia per la nuova ascesa della civiltà latina. By Mario Bersellini. 1935. (Milan: Soc. ed. la Stampa Commerciale. 8vo. 152 pp. *Lire* 7.50.)

The author's thesis is the creation of a " Latin Empire of the Mediterranean," to which he gives the name of " Eurafrica," by a close collaboration of France and Italy. Long residence in Rome, where he saw the French Embassy more than once protected from attack, makes the reviewer sceptical as to the possibility of this intimate association of " the two Latin sisters." Did not Tacitus write of *nota inter fratres inimicitia*? The author ignores such difficulties as the Tunisian question and the Italian claims to Corsica, Nice and Savoy, not to mention temperamental differences, of which there was evidence in the War. But, after asserting that " the Latins are better colonists than the British," he argues that " in Eurafrica lies the future of Latin civilisation." Thus alone would a rampart be erected against the danger of German aggression, for he considers Anglo-Saxon policy as " egoistic," forgetting that *Sacro egoismo*, of which one heard so much when Italy was meditating her entry into the War. But he has, as his countrymen would say, " two weights and measures " for Great Britain and Italy, accusing the former of depriving her Maltese subjects, whose native tongue is not Italian, of their " liberty of language and thought," while ignoring the prohibition of Greek in the Dodecanese, of Croat in Istria and of German in the South Tyrol. As for the United States, their condition is compared with that of the Roman Empire in the fourth century. Thus the Latins can rely on neither the Anglo-Saxons nor the Russians. Nor is there much time to lose; for, according to his information from Soviet sources, the German armaments will be completed next year. Writing of Goering's visit to Belgrade, he thinks that Yugoslavia was offered the Slav district round Velden, which was awarded to Austria by a plebiscite. But he ignores the possibility of a German–Yugoslav agreement on the subject of Trieste. Such exaggerations as that " European civilisation is Latin civilisation " and that " Latinity is the source of all knowledge and all civilisation " detract from the historical accuracy of the book. Did not a Latin poet write that " Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit et artes Intulit agresti Latio "? There is little knowledge of the British mentality, so puzzling to most Southerners, upon which the Roman occupation left so small an impression. The book is illustrated by a map of Northern Africa, showing the projected " Eurafrica," and a plan of the German aviation camps. William Miller.

12. Mussolini Red and Black. By Armando Borghi. 1935. (London: Wishart. 8vo. 189 pp. 5s.)

The " showing-up " of Signor Mussolini has been the theme of many

books by Italian political refugees, mainly in France. In present conditions some of this activity is likely to be transferred to Great Britain; and this English translation of a book published three years ago in Paris is perhaps a symptom. It is a bitter, in parts almost scurrilous, attack. It has, however, some value as a study of the morally and politically seamy sides of the Duce's early career, and produces a considerable number both of independent documents and of writings of Signor Mussolini which he himself would doubtless prefer to see forgotten.

Politically, the point of most interest is the evidence here adduced (it amounts not to proof, but to strong presumption) that Signor Mussolini's famous evolution from the red republican, pacifist, anti-interventionist of the first weeks of the War into the patriot, pro-Ally interventionist of the spring of 1915 was brought about by French money. It is an open secret that the belligerent Powers, at various stages of the War, subsidised newspapers in neutral countries in order to influence opinion in their favour; and there is nothing surprising in the fact (if it is a fact) that Signor Mussolini, having just abandoned the extremist *Avanti*, received strong financial inducements from the French Government to run the newly-founded *Popolo d'Italia* on socialist-chauvinist pro-Ally lines. It is, however, a theme which provides the ironical historian with food for reflection.

An appendix, in which Signor Borghi seeks to show that Herr Hitler owes everything to his Italian prototype, quotes a number of striking encomiums on the National Socialist régime pronounced by the Duce and other leading Fascists. JOHN HEATH.

13. L'ORDINE ECONOMICO NAZIONALE. By Alberto de' Stefani. 1935. (Bologna: Zanichelli. 8vo. 317 pp. *Lire* 15.)

IN this further series of articles composed and published in 1934, the first of Mussolini's Finance Ministers discusses modern economic problems for an audience of Fascist newspaper readers. Somewhat like Mr. J. M. Keynes, Signor de' Stefani holds that the economic truths of yesterday are obsolete, because based upon a dogmatic assignment of immutable economic structures to the various countries participating in international trade. Thus Italy was assigned the rôle of an importer of wheat and also of manufactures. With the wheat campaign of 1925–1935 Italy is held now to have demonstrated that she could re-plan her production so as to be her own wheat provider; and now (more especially in the essays subsequent to those collected in the present volume) Signor de' Stefani urges the attainment of self-sufficiency in many lines of manufactures. Sgr. de' Stefani is the best of those who by "Fascism" mean chiefly what British Conservatives of the Elliott school mean by economic planning. There is indeed a laudatory article about Mr. Walter Elliott in this book. Sgr. de' Stefani, however, seldom gets beyond assertions that production and distribution can be planned, to any demonstration that planning in Italy has brought welfare or even maintenance of the pre-Fascist standard of living.

C. J. S. SPRIGGE.

14*. LA IVe ITALIE. By Maurice Lachin. 1935. (Paris: Gallimard. 8vo. 261 pp. 15 *frs.*)

M. LACHIN reveals in the preface of this readable description of present-day political Italy that he classed Italian Fascism at the outset as a reactionary movement, and judged it by its excesses. Quite

lately he returned to Italy, after several years' absence, and found much to induce a partial change of mind. He walked into the offices of newspapers, Government departments, employers' and employees' unions (which are also Government departments) and into University Professors' studies, and asked them to explain themselves, not sparing awkward questions. Most of his interlocutors were young, and of Left radical tendencies in internal politics, merely biding their time until Fascism sweeps away the relics of Capitalism. Among those of this tendency he mentions Bruno Biagi, the Under-Secretary for Corporations; Giuseppe Bottai, his predecessor; Luigi Fontanelli, a high official in the Industrial Workers' Confederation; Ugo Spirito, the social-economic theorist of the Left. They had some difficulty in persuading him that the Corporative system exists otherwise than on paper, but he found himself drawn to the conclusion that the workers, compulsorily grouped in their syndicates, are destined to exert through them the effort to achieve collectivist purposes.

M. Lachin did not give up the privileges of a detached observer. He remained somewhat sceptical about the financial probity of the immense Fascist bureaucracy, and he took the trouble, after being shown over a crowded and well-appointed workers' club in Rome, to visit another which was empty and cheerless. One chapter illustrates Rome as the city of sexual servitude, where marriages are semi-political, indiscreet amours a crime, and the streets a sort of prison-yard for frustrated amorists. Another chapter, seldom found in books on modern Italy, gives a dreadful picture of a colony of unemployed whose only duty in life is to keep well out of sight lest they spoil the noble spectacle of resurgent Rome. C. J. S. SPRIGGE.

15. DIE ITALIENISCHE AGRARPOLITIK SEIT 1925. By Dr. Paul Ucker. 1935. (Aarau: Sauerländer. 8vo. 181 pp.)

THE author, a Swiss merchant formerly engaged in the corn trade in Italy, decided to compose a treatise on the agrarian policy which he had watched from this point of vantage, and the University of Zürich has published his compact and painstaking, indeed for clearness all too elaborately documented, thesis. From Dr. Ucker's essay a general reader can disengage this argument: that the Fascist Government has proclaimed two great purposes of agrarian policy—first, land reclamation and, secondly, self-sufficiency in wheat. Dr. Ucker notes that Italy was, long before the War, well advanced in the technique of the reclamation of waste and marshy lands, in the interest both of health and of production. But the Fascist Government invented a special sub-Ministry to supervise the process of "bonifica integrale." Reclamation schemes are "major" or "minor": the major are those recognised to be of general hygienic and economic importance, and are undertaken directly or at one remove by the State; the minor schemes are less closely managed from political headquarters. The forcing of big land estates into cultivation where the owner has neglected the possibilities is accepted as a right and duty of the State: but Dr. Ucker seems to think that the Fascist Government has not done much more in this line than previous Governments, which indeed had similar powers. Indeed in the first years of Fascism squatters, who had established themselves on estates with the connivance of post-War Governments, were driven off without compensation.

The greater part of the thesis is a description of the "Battaglia del Grano" or Wheat Campaign initiated in 1925 to render Italy self-

sufficient in wheat. Since the book was published the first ten years' results of the Campaign have been announced and widely advertised, namely, an average harvest of 73 million quintals in the five years 1930–1935 against respective averages of 61 millions and 53 millions in 1925–1930 and 1920–1925, and a yield per hectare of 14·7 quintals against 12·4 and 11·5. Dr. Ucker's data are only up to the year 1933, when the crop was of 74 millions (1935 : 77 millions) and the yield of 15 quintals (1935 : 15·3) per hectare. He remarks that the increase in crops and in yield by no means commenced with the Corn Campaign : it was happening before the War and, after the interruption of the War and the 1919–1920 social struggles, was resumed. He will not, however, agree that the Wheat Campaign propaganda, conducted by politicians, clergy and schoolmasters, has been without effect in increasing the wheat output. But he adds that there are no data to prove that this concentration of energy and resources on wheat production was economically justified, and he thinks that the supposed gain in war-time security from approximate self-sufficiency in wheat is very questionable, seeing that Italy must import oils and fats, sugar and coffee, meat and fish, all mainly by sea transport. He ultimately, and no doubt rightly, concludes that the agrarian policy has to be judged more as a political proposal with an imaginative appeal, than as a calculated contribution towards Italy's wealth and security.

C. J. S. SPRIGGE.

16. POPOLARE LA LIBIA : PERCHÈ E COME. By Vittore Pisani. 1935. (Rome : Cremonese. 8vo. 170 pp. *Lire* 10.)

17. SOMALIA. By B. V. Vecchi. 1935. (Milan : Marcagoni. 8vo. 229 pp. *Lire* 5.)

18. SAHARA, NIGER E CIAD. By Achille Benedetti. 1935. (Milan : Zucchi. 8vo. 110 pp. *Lire* 12.)

COLONEL VITTORE PISANI wrote the first of these three books in or about 1930. He is an old colonial, with formed views on the use and purpose of colonies, which he sets forth in an amiably "soldierish" style. Briefly, he holds that the domination of native-inhabited areas is at best a transitory business, and not worth Italy's while to attempt. What Italy wants is an extension of Italian population across the Mediterranean. France has very imperfectly succeeded (he writes) in extending the life of France, by which he means of French people, living in French style, in Algeria : she has failed altogether in Tunis, where the only settlers in the true sense are the Italians. This he blames chiefly on Napoleon III, who had the mistaken ambition of wanting to rule over subjects of non-French race and encouraged economic exploitation by big business instead of settlements. This book, the author insists, is written not for the general reader, but solely in order to catch the Duce's eye. Although Colonel Pisani is enthusiastically polite (but not adulatory) towards the Duce, one gathers that the Fascist Government has not done much more than its predecessors to make of Libya the trans-Mediterranean Italy which the Colonel desires to see. The Colonel wants a million Italians in the north coast of Tripoli (against 30,000 now), and holds that the only justification for a nation occupying a country is readiness to pour in a superabundant population. He is most sympathetic and kindly towards the natives, and indignant at any tyrannical rule over them. The European's business is not to boss them and still less to assimilate them or educate them, but simply to outnumber them.

Signor Vecchi groups a number of articles on Italian Somaliland, beginning with a description of the cession of Jubaland and its ceremonial transfer from British to Italian rule. A visit to Zanzibar suggests a comparison between British and Italian colonial methods greatly to the disadvantage of the British method, which is "rigid, inflexible, based solely on force," where Italy's method is that of "Roman cordiality" and has won for her, from those whom she has ruled for thirty years, a love that nobody bears to the British.

Signor Achille Benedetti describes a long journey in North-Western Africa. Unlike Signor Vecchi (who, of course, is treating of the other extremity of the continent), he declares that the British unmistakably knew how to win over African natives to loyalty, by providing water, light, and not exacting military service. Hence the migrations from French possessions into Nigeria. But Signor Benedetti, who writes as an enthusiastic Italo-French ententist, regards the British ownership of the Nigerian railways as a disaster to his cause, and denounces the charges of the railway for produce carried from the (French) Chad regions to Lagos as monstrous. The proper route for the produce of Lake Chad is, he maintains, across Tripoli, and the book concludes with a strong plea to the French to abandon any projects for a Trans-Saharan all French railway in favour of an Italo-French route from Tripoli to Chad via Tummo. Signor Benedetti does not conceal his personal dislike for the British. C. J. S. SPRIGGE.

19. MUSSOLINI PREMIER MINISTRE. By Paul Bertin. 1935. (Paris: Nouvelles Éditions latines. 8vo. 150 pp. 10 *frs.*)

In this imaginative work of fiction two French Royalists offer to Mussolini the French Premiership: "the succession of Mazarin," as it is called. In an animated conversation, which owes much to Emil Ludwig, in the *Duce's* study, Mussolini refuses to imitate the great Italian Cardinal and become "Mussolin." His aim is defined as "the formation of a Latin against an Anglo-Saxon *bloc*," for his "place is at the head of the Latinity of Europe." He shows that aviation has altered the notions about frontiers. The Abyssinian question, which has arisen since the book was written, has qualified the statement that the French intellectuals could not pardon him for not having made wars, which they considered the natural result of Fascism. The book is discursive and has occasional slips in Italian, *e.g.* *Nostra* for *Mostra*. W. M.

20*. THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL POSITION OF ITALY. Information Department Papers, No. 15. 2nd, revised ed. Sept. 1935. (Oxford University Press. 8vo. 65 pp. 2*s.* To members of the Institute, 1*s.*)

A revised and enlarged edition of this memorandum, which was reviewed in the last issue of this Journal, was published by the Oxford University Press in September.

SANCTIONS

21. THE MINERAL SANCTION AS AN AID TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. By Sir Thomas H. Holland. 1935. (London: Oliver and Boyd. 8vo. 95 pp. 2*s.*)

THERE are few who would contest the proposition that the sanctions provided by Article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant would, if they were employed in the manner which those who devised them visualised, be fully effective before long in bringing to an end any war which the Council determined to stop. Yet Article 16 has not produced that confident feeling of security which seems to be a necessary fore-

runner of any general limitations of armaments; and it has neither actually been employed by the League for the purpose of stopping wars which have occurred, nor proposed for those which were threatened. One reason for this failure has undoubtedly been that the sanctions of Article 16 are so drastic, and so irksome to many of the Powers which, though not directly affected by the war in question, would be called upon to share the burden of applying them, that they are, in Sir Thomas Holland's words, " too drastic for imposition." Not all will agree with Sir Thomas that that is the only reason for the failure; but if not the sole reason, it is a cogent one. And it has led him, and others, including a Sub-Committee at Geneva, to seek for some other sanction which would be equally effective in preventing war, but which should be so much less irksome to apply that there would be little reluctance on the part of the Powers to make use of it. Sir Thomas proposes for this purpose an embargo by all other States upon the supply of minerals to the aggressor, or failing determination of the aggressor, presumably, to both warring parties.

He shows conclusively, from an exposition of the dependence of all countries upon foreign supplies of one or other mineral essential to the conduct of war, that no State could hope to carry on a prolonged war if such an embargo were imposed. He instances the striking example of the British steel industry in the late War. In 1914, Great Britain, from her own resources, was the third largest producer of steel in the world, and led the world in quality; the country could turn out 15 million tons of steel annually. Yet such was the demand for special steels for shells that the annual import of 4½ million tons of hematite iron ore from Spain was necessary throughout the War, and British troops would have been at a grave disadvantage early in the War if it had not been available. The same is true, for some minerals at least, for every State in the world, as Sir Thomas shows by his analysis, which though concise is sufficiently complete to be convincing. Anyone desirous of learning the extent of the dependence of the Great Powers upon foreign supplies of essential minerals will find all the facts summarised here.

But Sir Thomas's claim that the " Mineral Sanction " would be of universal efficacy is less convincing. It depends to a great extent, for instance, on his statement that " obviously no sane nation would go to war if it could not hope to continue it indefinitely," a proposition which many would contest. Germany certainly looked forward to winning the late War as quickly as that of 1870, and would hardly have been deterred from it by the warning that four and a half years of war would find her in difficulties. Moreover, he may well be thought to minimise the disturbance that the enforcement of a mineral embargo entails on the States enforcing it; of which he says,

" The country that is subjected to the Mineral Sanction would be compelled, when the war-clouds pass away, to repair its stocks again by purchase from the country that has surplus supplies for sale."

For they may afterwards purchase them elsewhere; and the damage to Great Britain, for instance, arising out of the loss of the Italian coal market would be heavy. The Mineral Sanction is, no doubt, less frightening to nervous governments than the full sanctions of Article 16; but its effects on those enforcing it are hardly so slight that the difficulties of achieving agreement to enforce it are negligible. Sir Thomas Holland's book is a valuable addition to the study of the problem of Collective Security; but it does not provide a complete solution.

H. G. T.

22*. SANCTIONS: THE CHARACTER OF INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AND THEIR APPLICATION. (Information Department Paper, No. 17.) 2nd revised and enlarged ed. 1935. (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 8vo. 72 pp. 2*s.* To Members of the Institute, 1*s.*)

THIS pamphlet provides a concise and, within its limits, comprehensive study of the question of sanctions. After explaining the legal meaning of the term, it sets out in Part I the legal basis for the application of sanctions under various Articles of the League Covenant. It examines in detail the scope of Article 16 and the various difficulties of interpretation to which its text has given rise.

Part II of the paper is devoted to a description of the different types of sanctions—moral, diplomatic, financial, economic and military. Under economic measures four kinds of embargo are dealt with: an embargo on imports, an embargo on exports of arms, munitions and implements of war, an embargo on raw materials essential for war purposes (details of these and of the deficiencies of the principal States are given), and an international boycott.

Part III describes special problems of application in the national and international spheres, such as public opinion and national sovereignty, the policy of States not members of the League, international organisation of sanctions, and the determination of the aggressor.

Appendices include the texts of the relevant Articles of the League Covenant and the Briand-Kellogg Pact; a table of thirty raw materials essential for war purposes with their production and sources of origin; the text of the British Note to France regarding British League Policy and Article 16; a summary of the provisions of the American Neutrality Act; the texts of Annex F of the Locarno Treaty, the League Council Resolution of 1920 regarding Swiss Neutrality, and of the League Assembly Resolutions of 1921 regarding Article 16, and, finally a note on procedure and measures adopted by the League for the application of sanctions against Italy. I. D.

LAW

23*. THE LEGAL PROCESS AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER. By Professor Hans Kelsen. (*New Commonwealth Institute Monograph Series A., No.* 1.) 1935. (London: Constable. 8vo. 30 pp. 2*s.*)

24*. THE POWER OF THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE TO GIVE A DECISION EX AEQUO ET BONO. By Dr. Max Habicht. (*N.C.I. Monograph Series B., No.* 2.) 1935. (London: Constable. 8vo. xii + 88 pp. 4*s.* 6*d.*)

25*. WILLIAM LADD: AN EXAMINATION OF AN AMERICAN PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL EQUITY TRIBUNAL. By Dr. Georg Schwarzenberger. (*N.C.I. Monograph Series B., No.* 3.) 1935. (London: Constable. 8vo. xvi + 78 pp. 4*s.* 6*d.*)

26*. THE CONTRIBUTION OF ENGLISH EQUITY TO THE IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL EQUITY TRIBUNAL. By Dr. Wolfgang Friedmann. (*N.C.I. Monograph Series B., No.* 5.) 1935. (London: Constable. 8vo. x + 84 pp. 4*s.* 6*d.*)

27*. THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL POLICING. By Professor Hans Wehberg. (*N.C.I. Monograph Series C., No.* 1.) 1935. (London: Constable. 8vo. 100 pp. 4*s.* 6*d.*)

28*. **Problems of Peace and War.** Transactions of the Grotius Society, Volume 20. Papers read before the Society in the Year 1934. 1935. (London: Sweet and Maxwell. 8vo. xxi + x + 216 pp. 10s.)

With the exception of the last-mentioned the books on the above list constitute the first set of monographs issued by the New Commonwealth Institute, an organisation designed and established to do research work for the New Commonwealth Society which, founded by Lord Davies, has for its aim the "promotion of International Law and Order through the Creation of an Equity Tribunal and an International Police Force." Both the Society and its off-shoot, the Institute, are organised on a wide international basis, and the many distinguished names on their various committees give assurance of a serious contribution to the study of a problem which is exercising the minds of people of vision and goodwill the world over.

Professor Kelsen opens the campaign with *The Legal Process and International Order* wherein he examines the nature of the international order and seeks the lines along which progress must be made. He sees a compelling analogy in the evolution of law within the individual State; to that we must look for guidance in building up the judicial organisation which will ensure the supremacy of law in the affairs of the nations. In the course of his monograph Professor Kelsen strongly insists that international law is positive law which must be held to be binding upon the individual States; not, in effect, a code of ethics which may be accepted or rejected at will. "There is no greater delusion," he tells us, "than to imagine that the value and significance of international organisation is enhanced by attributing to it a moral and not a legal character."

Dr. Max Habicht, the author of the second of these monographs, compiles the provisions of contemporary international law which empower the international judge to give a decision *ex aequo et bono*, analyses the judge's position in such circumstances, and shows that this setting aside of law in favour of equity requires the express authorisation of the parties interested. There is no appeal as of right to equity; recourse to it is only to be had by mutual consent. So that there is no remedy within the confines of the existing legal structure available to a State which wishes to change the terms of a treaty on the ground that they are inequitable and contrary to objective justice.

The third monograph is by Dr. Georg Schwarzenberger, who hangs on the not very convenient peg of a tribute to William Ladd (1778–1841) what is in effect a general survey of the problem of organising an international equity tribunal. It cannot be said that the author has succeeded in surmounting the difficulties inherent in the plan of his book. An interesting preface, however, is contributed to his monograph by Professor James Brown Scott of Georgetown University, Washington.

In the fourth monograph Dr. Wolfgang Friedmann discusses "what English Equity, both as a historical process and as a complex of rules and legal institutions, may have to contribute to an equitable jurisdiction in international affairs"; and puts forward the excellent suggestion that similar research into the legal institutions of other nations would be helpful towards "laying the legal fundaments of a

new and better international community." Dr. Friedmann's is an able monograph. It is reinforced by a succinct and illuminating preface, which is a model of what an introduction should be, by Sir William Holdsworth, Vinerian Professor of English Law in the University of Oxford. It is tempting to quote extensively from this preface but space permits but a brief excerpt:

> "Dr. Friedmann's thesis is in substance this: if States could be induced to consent to submit to the arbitration of a tribunal which administered Equity in cases where the rules of International Law were non-existent or inadequate or worked unjustly, a body of supplementary rules might be gradually developed which would be a useful supplement to the rules of that Law, and would give a new strength to the movement for the peaceable settlement of international disputes."

Therein we have, put tersely, the functions an international equity tribunal would perform. Sir William goes on:

> "There is, I think, much to be said for this thesis. At the same time I think Dr. Friedmann would agree that we must not push the historical parallel too far. There is a great deal of truth in Lord Mansfield's dictum that there is nothing in law so misleading as a metaphor or an analogy."

The warning explicit in this last sentence is apposite to the last monograph on the list, the *Theory and Practice of International Policing* by Professor Hans Wehberg. For, in regard to the general conception of what would be the main function of an international police force, there is, indeed, little resemblance between the cases he cites of a number of States combining to impose their will upon another, and the execution by an international force of the judgment of an international tribunal or of the will of the nations in conclave assembled. Professor Wehberg is of course aware of this; and his object must rather be held to be to compile such precedents as are available in promise of further progress, signposts along the road towards the realisation of the ultimate objective.

Professor Wehberg is on surer ground when dealing with the other and less ambitious functions of an international police force. Here, indeed, the exigencies of regional situations have time and again given scope for the employment of international police in the work of administration and in the maintenance or assurance of law and order. And no doubt increasing use will be made of an instrument which experience has thus proved to be both feasible and of the first value.

It will be seen that Dr. Wehberg's alone of these monographs deals with the second part of the New Commonwealth Society's double objective, the creation of an international police force. But it cannot be said that he carries his advocacy to extremes. He knows the difficulties of the problem too well, and it would appear that, with him, "the native hue of resolution is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought." He sounds throughout less the note of enthusiasm than that of caution, as for instance: "While, then, one should be sceptical about an *immediate* solution of the problem of a permanent international police for prevention and suppression of war and the threat of war, I would not consider progress towards an ultimate realisation of this idea to be impossible." And he concludes his monograph—

> "Let us therefore begin, with every means in our power, to create at least the nucleus of an international police! Should this experiment prove successful, humanity will then be able to see whether the continuation of this plan is desirable and practicable. In any case, it is a new and great experiment. But mankind must have the courage to risk this first attempt."

Taken together these five monographs give a good idea of th problems confronting the organisers of international peace. It is pity, however, that they should all suffer, though in varying degree from a certain looseness of construction and of exposition which, i obscuring in some measure their intrinsic worth, must tend to lesse their influence with the increasing public interested in these problems The specialist, unquestioned though his authority may be in his ow sphere, nevertheless neglects at his peril, as publicist, the lesson of th aphorism that hard writing makes easy reading.

Nearly the whole of the sixth and last of the books which are th subject of this review, Volume 20 of the Transactions of the Grotiu Society entitled *Problems of Peace and War*, being the papers rea before the society in the year 1934, deals with these same problems Professor Alfred Zimmern, Montague Burton Professor of Internationa Relations, University of Oxford, in a particularly lucid paper entitle "International Law and Social Consciousness" ascribes the failur which has hitherto attended the effort to set up an internationa system to a fundamental error of approach to the problem. Th architects of the new order are in fact endeavouring to fit the world ou with the mechanism of international law when the social conscious ness upon which in the ultimate the validity of all law depends has n widespread existence amongst the nations. They have, in brie put the cart before the horse; and the prerequisite to success lies i the bringing into being of such social consciousness, the will of th community behind the law, throughout the civilised world.

This point of view contrasts strongly with that of Professor Kelsen the author of the first of the above monographs, who roundly states

"If the League of Nations Covenant had said a little less about justice an had paid a little more attention to the technical side of the formation of law it would have better performed its task."

But the conflict is apparent rather than absolute, for law is in itsel one of the main factors in the formation of social consciousness; and further, even a law without compelling sanctions behind it, may ye contribute, by providing the opposition with ammunition, to th restraint of a law-breaking nation. That it is ammunition postulate of course the social consciousness upon which Professor Zimmer lays stress. Indeed, the formation of law and the building-up of th moral sense which is its sanction are properly complementary processe that should proceed *pari passu*, reacting the one upon the other. An the international jurist, far from feeling constrained to stand aside unti the preacher shall have done with us, is playing an essential rôle in th evolution we are witnessing of a new order in the affairs of the nations An interesting example of his work appears in this same volume of th Transactions, alike in the "Budapest Articles of Interpretation" of the Briand–Kellogg Pact adopted by the Conference of the Inter national Law Association held at Budapest in September 1934, and i Dr. Lauterpacht's interesting and well-reasoned paper commentin upon them.

"The Interpretation of Treaties" in general by an internationa tribunal, and more specifically by the Permanent Court of Internationa Justice, is the cognate subject of a paper by Professor Charles Fairma of Williams College, Williamstown, Massachusetts. The other paper in this interesting volume are respectively: "The Obstacles of Nationa and Primitive Customs to the spread of International Law" by M

W. S. Armour, which the reader will relate with Professor Zimmern's paper; "International Law and German Legislation on Political Crime" by Professor Preuss of the University of Michigan; "The Nationality of Married Women" by Beroë Bicknell, LL.B.; "Continuous Voyage as applied to Blockade and Contraband" by Dr. Thomas Baty; "The Choice of Law by the Parties to a Contract with Principal Reference to English and American Law" by Dr. Stephen de Szászy; and two papers on Grotius, the one an essay in biography, the other in history, respectively: "The Family Life of Grotius" by Professor R. W. Lee, and "Grotius's East India Mission to England" by Professor G. Norman Clark. While considerations of space preclude an analysis of these several contributions, it can be said that they all attain the high standard, in interest and authority, which the student of international affairs looks for in the papers read before this learned Society. L. M. KING.

GENERAL

29. THE STATE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE. By Harold J. Laski. 1935. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 332 pp. 7s. 6*d*.)

30*. BOLSHEVISM, FASCISM AND THE LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC STATE. By Maurice Parmelee. 1935. (London: Chapman and Hall. 8vo. 419 pp. 15*s*.)

31. THE BATTLE FOR DEMOCRACY. By Rexford Guy Tugwell. 1935. (New York: Columbia University Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. 321 pp. $3.00; 15*s*.)

ALL of these three volumes are marked by an approach to politics which is mainly economic. Professor Laski brings a warm interest in Communism to bear on his interpretation of the theory and the facts of the modern State. Mr. Parmelee, a versatile American writer who has published a number of volumes on different social and political themes in the last twenty years, is a critic of the inherent contradictions of capitalism, seeking from that point of view to analyse and appraise contemporary forms of government. Mr. Tugwell, a professor of economics in Columbia University who is now associated with Mr. Roosevelt's Agricultural Adjustment Administration, attacks the old American cult of free competition, and vindicates the right of the democratic State, as the "senior and controlling partner" in the processes of production, to regulate those processes in the interest of public welfare.

Professor Laski, in his new volume, is somewhat of a plagiarist —from himself. Those who have read his earlier volumes (particularly his *Democracy in Crisis*, of 1933) will be tempted to feel that this new work does not so much "develop the philosophical implications" of earlier works, as is suggested in the preface—it rather repeats their doctrine and reiterates their critique. There are four chapters in the book. The first contains a criticism of the philosophical conception of the State; the second a study of State and Government in the modern world; the third (which is much briefer) a review of the relations of the State and the international community; the fourth a riddling and Delphic, but generally pessimistic, account of the outlook for our generation. The purpose of the book, as it is stated by the author, is "not to justify, but to analyse"; but the analysis of facts presumes the justice of the particular philosophy by which it is coloured. Professor Laski still uses what may be called the argument of the bugbear:

property will fight, and property—on its own hypotheses—will b right: labour must therefore forearm itself for the inevitable struggle His contentions are stated in a style which is lofty rather than simple and there is a vacillation, sometimes a contradiction, in thei progress, which leaves one uncertain whether the author blesses o curses democracy (he seems to do both), and whether he believes i the rule of reason or the rule of force. Greater simplicity, more brevity and (above all) a sterner and more definite self-examination, whic would clarify for him his own real purpose and point of view, would ad greatly to the weight of Professor Laski's recent writings. He ha deserved so well of political theory by his numerous contribution to its development that it is a pity to find him drifting away fron scholarship and hard thinking into lofty but dubious jeremiads. " A clear fire, a clean hearth, and the rigour of the game "—that wa Mrs. Battle's opinion of whist; and it is an opinion which may b applied, not only to whist, but also to the writing of books on politica science, or indeed on any subject which demands scientific method an temper.

Mr. Parmelee's book is the book of a curious traveller and eage explorer, who wants to discover and record the truth. It is useful and it deserves attention and study, because it is full of facts, an generally up-to-date, on themes of the greatest importance: th working of Russian Communism; the politics and economics o Fascism; the racial and totalitarian ideas, and the economic programme of National Socialism; the problems of liberal democracy, mixed wit a capitalistic economy, in Western Europe and America. Mr Parmelee has too wide a range of interests, and he covers too wide a scope in the present volume, to be always profound; but it can safel be said in his favour that he is generally sound. His exposition run clearly; and his book is stimulating to read. It is based on travel an personal experience as well as on a large study of written material primary as well as secondary. The reader may not agree with th writer's point of view or his general conclusion (" everything point towards an eventual functional organisation of society under technological control competent to create a genuine social mechanism ") but he will at any rate find a large amount of descriptive material, an he will often find, in addition, some stimulating argument or suggestion

Mr. Tugwell's work on the Battle for Democracy is really a vigorou plea for President Roosevelt's New Deal, and especially for hi agricultural policy. Of the thirty chapters into which it is divide nearly one-half consists of reprints of addresses and articles. Some o the addresses are full of sustained and cogent argument; but th whole book seems to be something of a patchwork, sometimes the worl of a thinker, and sometimes the work of the journalist or the part orator. When Mr. Tugwell is writing as a thinker, he makes a reasone and powerful case for the new trend of American policies. He argue that competition is not the complement, but the enemy, of democracy It has been the shadow under which there has been developed a economic oligarchy; and the regimentation of industry by tha oligarchy must be destroyed before industry can be made compatibl with democracy. It is foolish to believe that the invisible hand o Adam Smith's dreams will reduce competition to a happy harmony it is wiser to trust in the visible hand of a President who can substitut

co-operation for competition, and thus introduce a real democracy in place of the old *de facto* oligarchy. The hand must be strong, and it must be warranted by the constitution in using its strength. Mr. Tugwell accordingly proceeds to contend that " a strong government, with an executive amply empowered by legislative delegation," is within the terms of the American constitution, and is the true expression of the American theory of democracy—under present conditions. The conditions are, in effect, the same as those of 1787: President Roosevelt and his advisers, like the founders of the constitution, are " fighting economic disorganisation backed by inadequate centralisation." If the battle is the same, the same weapons which were forged for its waging in 1787 may justly be used in 1935: " what we have done is to rediscover the constitution, to revitalise the powers it was intended to create." [1] These are the main points of the author's specifically political argument; but the readers of his book will find that it is more economic than political, and more concerned with agriculture than with any other branch of economics.

ERNEST BARKER.

32*. OUR OWN TIMES. Vol. II. By Stephen King-Hall. 1935. (London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson. 8vo. vi + 567 pp. 10s. 6*d*.)

IN Volume II, Stephen King-Hall brings his story of *Our Own Times* up to date, covering in it the period 1931 to 1934. The book is divided into two parts. After an introductory chapter, we are asked in Part I to examine national policies, particularly those of New Britain, the Empire political and economic, France, Italy, Spain, the Third Reich, Russia, the Middle East and the United States of America. In Part II, international relations are dealt with in four chapters covering the Far East, economic relations, political relations and the League of Nations. There is a final chapter devoted to conclusions and in which the reader is asked to think about the times to come. In addition there is a chronological table of events between 1913 and 1934 which occupies more than a hundred pages, an Appendix giving an account of the organisation of the League of Nations in 1934, and, rather surprisingly, a second Appendix giving an account of the British subsidy for shipping. Finally, as we have come to expect from Commander King-Hall, there is an excellent Bibliography and a really comprehensive Index to both volumes. The organisation and planning of the whole book is really excellent and Commander King-Hall and his staff deserve the highest praise for the thoroughness and efficiency of their work.

The individual chapters and sections of chapters reveal that same ability to select and synthesise which characterised Volume I. Thirty pages suffice for international economic relations in the years 1931 to 1934. The Lausanne, Stresa and London Conferences are competently dealt with and the effects of economic nationalism on the standards of life of individual countries is driven home in a graphic concluding paragraph. This section of the work is a typical sample. The same balance and illuminating dramatisation characterise the other chapters.

As we move forward to the conclusion, it is inevitable that views rather than events should come more and more to the forefront. The theme of the concluding chapter is that the fundamental problem of Our Own Times and still more of those to come, is the unwillingness of

[1] Since these words were written, the Supreme Court has said its say on this matter.

man to face the reality of plenty because his present social organisation finds its *raison d'être* in scarcity. Reluctance to change the social organisation is the fundamental reason for the problems and perplexities of Our Times, and Stephen King-Hall looks forward to a day when "Planning" and "Socialism" will no longer be bogey words to scare the fearful. Production for profit must disappear. It must be replaced by planned production giving to all that leisure and plenty which could be made available if modern society were willing to adopt the appropriate form of social organisation. Stephen King-Hall is passionately opposed to reactionary minds, whether they are to be found in the Conservative or Liberal parties or amongst the leaders of Trade Unions. He recognises that his proposals for more planning plus socialism will raise again the issue of personal and political freedom.

"At the end of *Our Own Times* the most important issue in the world was that of Freedom. The profound political and economic changes whose story we have traced in these pages had created problems which had caused Authority to take on new shapes. . . . The writer holds firmly to the faith that the Problem of Man and Himself is *not* to be solved by abolishing Man the Individual."

The reviewer as he read this last chapter, and indeed the whole of Volume II, could not get out of his mind the fate that befell the first Englishman who attempted to write a history of Our Own Times, Sir Thomas More. He abandoned his attempt before it was finished as the new shape which Authority, in the person of Henry VIII, was taking on made the continuance of his original project unduly hazardous. Instead, he published his *Utopia*, in which he described, not his ideal society, but the second best to which men could attain when they lacked the faith and spiritual strength necessary for the realisation of Christendom. More and his friends were very like the post-War reformers. In their letters to each other they freely discussed issues which we recognise as typically contemporary, including the desirability of spending less on armaments and more on schemes for social regeneration.

Meanwhile Authority was destroying the old order and using the growing knowledge and discoveries of the day to lay the foundations for a new despotism. There is much that is Tudor in Our Own Times. Green baize replaces cloth of gold as the cloak for cynical international diplomacy. The passionate zeal with which the structure of our international society is sacrificed to doctrines of empirical materialism is a sinister substitute for the spiritual conviction of the Reformers. The new knowledge of the Renaissance changed the form of the struggle for power, and the story seems to be repeating itself in Our Own Times. More and his fellow-reformers of the sixteenth century were the last of an old order, not the beginning of a new. *Utopia* owed more to the system of status in the fifteenth century than to the new régime of personal contract of the sixteenth. It looked backward, not forward. State control of economic life is to-day an anachronism which threatens to sprawl across a century which ought to have outlived the necessity for it. It survives because in times of difficulty surrender to Authority in new forms seems to be a way of escape. For all his protests in favour of Freedom, Stephen King-Hall seems to have jumped out of the frying-pan into the fire.

"It is clear [he says] that 'planning' necessitates a *government department* particularly charged with the duty of *researching* into the social sciences. . . . An immense machine of government is at work in Whitehall. It has no Central Thinking Department."

Wolsey and his servant and successor, Thomas Cromwell, thought

in just such terms as these, and for all their good intentions they opened wide the door for the introduction into England of a tyranny of the kind that is to be seen in two continental countries to-day. The problem of Man and Himself is still in our own times the problem of power: it has been acute in the post-War years because the concentration of power is essential in time of war and of great social and economic disturbance. Its redistribution needs generations, not decades, of peace and tranquillity.

Stephen King-Hall in his conclusions seems to have impaled himself on the horns of the dilemma which have threatened every social theorist since the days of Plato and Aristotle. If men were as good as they would need to be to live peaceably in Plato's Republic, they would be good enough to attain the Aristotelian *summum bonum* of the free polis. One Englishman, the first to write a history of Our Own Times and to-day canonised by the Vatican and revered in the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow, solved in his own life the Problem of Man and Himself: he was "the King's good servant, but God's first." Thomas More was executed on Tower Hill four centuries ago.

N. F. HALL.

33. HISTORY OF EUROPE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. By Benedetto Croce. Translated from the Italian by Henry Furst. 1934. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 375 pp. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

ANYTHING that Signor Croce writes is a literary event. In the present case his book demands, and amply repays, careful reading alike for its brilliant presentation of the intellectual background to nineteenth-century European history and for its pregnant thought. It is written in the spirit of a philosophic Liberal and opens appropriately with a chapter on "The Religion of Liberty." It closes with a moving exhortation to tolerance as forming an indispensable part of that religion. Throughout the emphasis is laid upon "movements" rather than upon the day-to-day progress of events. Indeed it is primarily a history for those who would seek to penetrate behind the outward appearance of events to the causative intellectual forces out of which they spring. And it is the history of Europe written from a European standpoint that is lifted high above the warring strife of the nations. That it will provoke disagreement in many is as undoubted as that it will give the impulse to other, perhaps equally valuable, studies. Signor Croce is indeed too convinced a philosopher to expect agreement over matters that lie at the very foundation of human society. His thought has unhappily not been made easier to understand by the translator's adherence to the long sentences and paragraphs of the original Italian. He excuses himself by saying that "it would often be impossible to break up" these long sentences and paragraphs "without materially altering his (Croce's) meaning." Nevertheless, the failure to do so will undoubtedly cause some readers to lay down the book before they have read it to its conclusion.

IAN F. D. MORROW.

34*. THE FATE OF MAN IN THE MODERN WORLD. By Nicholas Berdyaev. Translated from the Russian by Donald A. Lowrie. 1935. (London: Student Christian Movement Press. Cr. 8vo. 131 pp. 3*s.* 6*d.*)

MYSTICISM and gloom pursue each other across the pages of this short treatise. History is depicted as a merciless non-human force; and what we are witnessing to-day is a judgment upon its failures.

" History needed man as her material; but has not recognised him as her purpose." We are entering an inhuman world, in which man is subjected by bestialism to the deified State or race, the conceptions of the Fascist or the Nazi. Religious sanctions have vanished: freedom, "the eternal basis of human intercourse," is dead: democracy has turned traitor: indeed the only difference between democracy and dictatorship is the former's worship of gain and dishonesty and the latter's thirst for power and cruelty.

After all this ululation and much more, the writer settles down to enumerate the new forces which are dehumanising the world:—the striving for collective instead of individual life, the substitution of economic interests for the now useless luxury of culture, the slavery of the machine (technics), and the conversion of Christian society to polytheism. What is the remedy? The world, he moans, has grown too old for a cultural renaissance: it must go through the valley of bitter need and economic slavery before it can " expect a new and more powerful revelation of the Holy Spirit " in some form of Communism which will unite personality and the communal principle. The writer is desperately in earnest; but the miseries of his country have blinded him to the resilience of human nature. MESTON.

35. DIE GLEICHWERTIGKEIT DER EUROPÄISCHEN RASSEN UND DIE WEGE ZU IHRER VERVOLLKOMMNUNG. Edited by Karel Weigner. 1935. (Prague: Orbis. 8vo. 163 pp.)

IT is strange to think what might have been the fate of the racial ideas now fermenting in Germany if the romantic Count Gobineau, who began as a boundless admirer of Eastern civilisations, had on his return to France not been shifted by chance from a possible post in Constantinople to an embassy at Stockholm. There he gave birth to the "Nordic" myth, which he and his still more romantic follower, H. St. Chamberlain, applied not to the truly Nordic countries but to the racial amalgam which forms the German people. German writers have now succumbed to it to the point that one of them has discovered that Boccaccio's name was really Buchatz, Leonardo da Vinci's name was Winke, Tizian Vecelli's, Wetzel—and so on; while another has produced a new classification of the whole animal kingdom into " Nordic man," on the one hand, and " animals," the latter species including all non-Nordic men.

This little volume, from a small neighbouring country, has to serve as a corrective to the once so sternly scientific and proud German scholarship. Six professors, writing under the auspices of the Czech Academy of Sciences, offer in a few brief essays a useful and sober summary of our present knowledge in racial matters. None of the criteria of differentiation tried so far has proved conclusive, and the attempt to attribute a physical superiority to one supposed race over another is, as Dr. Malý shows, refuted by concrete inquiries. The blood group index, it is true, has opened up new and interesting possibilities, but its results cut across the racial divisions worked out on the basis of physical criteria.

There is even less substance in the theories which from such assumed physical and biological differences derive conclusions as to the psychological and cultural superiority of one group or the other. The cultural affinities which determine a nation often are opposed to those supposed racial characteristics, and they generally cut across each other's field. The two are not connected, for the first can be changed, while the

second, if genuine, cannot; therefore a policy which might greatly affect the first deceives itself when at the same time it tries to affect the second. Moreover, as Professor Matiegka points out, higher civilisations have at various periods in history flourished in many and different parts of the world. These racial theories have therefore little scientific value, but they have political significance, because, like the old Pan-Slavism, they are taken to justify not merely abstract academic conclusions, but certain positive political claims. Significantly again, especially in their Nordic form, they have found acceptance so far only in Germany; but it may not be long before they will appear, with more cogency, one must admit, in the political armoury of the Eastern and African peoples, who may find in this bastard product of Western science the ideal weapon with which to fight Western influence.

D. MITRANY.

36*. LE DESTIN DES RACES BLANCHES. By Henry Decugis. 1935. (Paris: Librairie de France. 8vo. vii + 402 pp.)

M. DECUGIS offers a gloomy prospect for the white races, and in particular for the peoples of Western Europe. Our economic supremacy is vanishing before the competition of non-European producers. The subject races are emancipating themselves politically; and even culturally Europe is no longer the mistress of the world. War, crises and socialism have exhausted our financial strength. Our population is only growing because of the increase among proletarians and idiots. Economic and political progress are being checked by dictatorships and State socialism; while centrifugal forces prevent the formation of a federation of peoples. These conclusions are supported by a great array of statistical tables and diagrams, which amply justify them. M. André Siegfried, in his most interesting preface, agrees with them, and discusses some of their political and economic implications. At the end he allows himself to sound a note of uncertain optimism. A new international prosperity that raises all peoples must in the end react to the benefit of Europe also, and, in the division of labour in that richer world, may not Europeans become the specialists in the higher forms of production, and in the performance of the more complicated and difficult services for which there will be an increasing demand?

H. A. WYNDHAM.

37*. VATICAN DIPLOMACY IN THE WORLD WAR. By Humphrey Johnson. 1935. (Oxford: Blackwell. 8vo. 46 pp. 1*s*. 6*d*.)

THIS monograph deals with the diplomatic activities of Pope Benedict XV, who, so soon after his election in September 1914, was faced with many serious problems arising out of the Great War and during a period of the utmost difficulty and delicacy to Vatican policy. The entry of Italy into the War in 1915 further complicated these issues in view of the doubt surrounding the Law of Guarantees of 1871, which did not explicitly contemplate a state of war. The question of paramount importance in the pursuit of the Pope's policy was, however, his peace note of August 1917, and Count De Salis, the then British Envoy to the Holy See, who was intimately connected with the negotiations, contributes a well-informed and admirable foreword " on the devoted efforts of a Great Pope " to bring about the termination of war.

The author's examination of these efforts is complete and illuminating. That the Papal Note should have proved abortive is not surprising, since it involved readjustments of frontiers which neither

group of belligerents was willing to accept at the time. Of more permanent importance were the two proposals contained in Benedict XV's Note "for a just agreement between all for the simultaneous and reciprocal diminution of armaments" and the "establishment of arbitration in the place of armies," both of which conceptions were later to be reflected in the Covenant of the League of Nations.

C. JOHN COLOMBOS.

38*. THE LEGAL POSITION OF THE HOLY SEE BEFORE AND AFTER THE LATERAN AGREEMENTS. By Mario Falco. 1935. (London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. 46 pp. 2s. 6*d*.)

THE two lectures delivered at Oxford by Professor Mario Falco in 1934 are now reprinted in a more permanent form. The distinguished author disagrees with the view of those jurists who consider the Lateran agreement as being merely a concordat and adopts the opinion that it constitutes a real international treaty. The question is not free from doubt in view of the fact that the preponderant doctrine in international law inclines to the principle that a treaty can only be concluded between States. Professor Falco meets this difficulty by stating that Italy entered into the Lateran Treaty with the Holy See by solemnly recognising that the Pope possessed a legal personality and sovereignty in the international sphere and the right to a territory as a means for the exercise of his spiritual power throughout the world. Whatever may have been the doubts regarding the legal status of the Holy See before the signing of the Lateran Treaty, however, there seems to exist no doubt at present that as a result of that Treaty, the Vatican City constitutes now "a State" within the meaning of international law.

C. JOHN COLOMBOS.

39. THE VATICAN: YESTERDAY—TO-DAY—TO-MORROW. By George Seldes. With historical chapters by Geo. London and Ch. Pichon. 1934. (London: Kegan Paul. 8vo. vii + 439 pp. 15s.)

THIS volume makes the large claim to be an account of the "inside workings of the Catholic Church from Saint Peter to the reigning Pontiff." If the author does not quite succeed in fulfilling that aim, he does at least contrive to give the general reader an interesting, sometimes amusing, description of the organisation of the Catholic Church both in its spiritual and temporal aspects. The work is divided into four sections: The Ancient Vatican, The Pope, Courts and Administration, The Modern World, and it is well-written in a popular style. A surprising amount of information is packed into its 400 pages and the chapters on the government of the Church are of especial interest. The standpoint from which this study of the oldest Christian institution in the world has been written can best be illustrated by a single quotation:

"While the believers, in their love of the Church, place their faith in the promise of immortality given by Jesus to the Apostle Peter, the plain observers may, in their turn, see in the institution devoted to things of the spirit the exercise of a realism which is probably without rival in this world."

IAN F. D. MORROW.

40*. CATHOLIC ORGANISATION FOR PEACE IN EUROPE. By Mary C. Schaefer. 1935. (Washington: Catholic Association for International Peace. Cr. 8vo. 37 pp. 10 *c*.)

This pamphlet gives a handy description of the Catholic bodies which are at work on the promotion of peace. Nine European countries and the United States are concerned.

M.

41*. Pacifism is not Enough: Problems of Peace: Ninth Series. 1935. (London: Allen and Unwin, for Geneva Institute of International Relations. 8vo. xv + 269 pp. 8s. 6d.)

The title of this, the ninth volume in the *Problems of Peace* series, is somewhat misleading, since it suggests a unity of opinion and purpose among the contributors which does not, in fact, exist. Certain of the lectures deal with economic questions; others, again, are primarily historical in character. It would be wrong, however, to make too much of this point; the standard of treatment in this volume is fully as high as in its predecessors, and every lecture would be well worth discussion did space permit. As it is, the reviewer can single out for notice only those contributions which have specially interested him.

The lecture from which the book presumably derives its title (since it, too, is called "Pacifism is not Enough") is by Sir Norman Angell and is written with his characteristic persuasiveness and lucidity. In it he examines the question: Why is so much sincere and devoted labour in the cause of peace ineffective? Why does it bear so little fruit in actual policy? His answer is that men desire peace but they also desire defence, and this they seek by "the old each for himself method" as opposed to "the collective method . . . of common resistance to the war-maker." His argument is a powerful plea for the latter as the only effective alternative to international anarchy actually open to us. Professor Zimmern's lecture, "The Great Powers in the League of Nations" (another rather misleading title), attacks the same problem from another angle, though it arrives at a similar conclusion. This, too, is forcibly written, though Professor Zimmern exaggerates, perhaps, his differences with some of those he criticises. Professor Rappard's lecture, "Small States in the League of Nations," has a different purpose from his colleague's; it is a valuable historical survey of the way in which the distinction between "small States" and "Great Powers" arose and how this distinction has affected the structure and activities of the League.

Another outstanding contribution is that of Senor Alvarez del Vayo on "The Chaco War." The author is chairman of the League's Commission of Enquiry into the dispute, so that he speaks with peculiar authority. His survey of the origins of the conflict, of the factors that have influenced its course, and of the attempts to reach a peaceful solution, is admirably done.

The last lecture which can be mentioned here is that by Professor MacIver on "National Planning and International Organisation." From the present reviewer's standpoint it is the gem of the whole work. Its argument is too closely knit to be summarised without grievous loss; one can only say that it is worthy of the author of *Community* and *The Modern State*, and urge the reader, whatever else in this volume he may pass over, not to omit the study and re-study of this.

Sydney Herbert.

42*. La Presse et les Relations Politiques Internationales. By Oscar Butter. 1934. (Paris: Recueil Sirey. 8vo. 165 pp.)

There exist very few books dealing with the subject of the function of the press in international relations. M. Butter's book offers a welcome contribution in this field, not only by its comprehensive historical survey of the problem, but also by its analysis of the present situation. The book consists of a series of lectures delivered before the Academy of

International Law at The Hague, and is engagingly written and well documented.

We cannot doubt the power of the press in the modern State. Nor can we doubt its democratising influence, even when spreading the most reactionary ideas, or its influence upon the formation of public opinion (sometimes called the "educational value" of the press). Such facts we must accept, even if we are told that the evil of present civilisation lies just in the fact that people can be misled to an incredible degree by the written word. The author argues admirably the case for the freedom of the press and supports it by pronouncements of professional journalists. But the problem of the freedom of the press is more fundamental. It is more closely connected with the political and ethical ideas of the age and society than the author would lead us to assume. There is room for speculation whether there is not one universal, but several specific, conceptions of "freedom." In States which, for political reasons, insist on the public control of privately owned concerns, the press is simply "gleichgeschaltet." In States which deny private ownership of the means of production altogether, there seems to be hardly any justification for the type of free press with which we are familiar in the Western Democracies. The attitude of these States is based on the fact that the newspaper has become, for good or evil, a commercial enterprise. Such an enterprise is often unprofitable, but that does not alter its character. M. Butter maintains that this freedom of the press adds to its sense of responsibility. But this would not dispose of the problem of tendencious news. According to the resolutions of the International Press Conference at Copenhagen in 1932, there are only two methods of dealing with this particular problem: first, a reduction in the cost of transmission of news, and secondly, abundant and correct information by authorities. It depends largely upon the action of the individual governments, how far these two methods may be used towards the establishment of a "moral disarmament" through the press. The first would release the press from their dependence upon interested bodies and the second would diminish the wholesale suppression of news at present practised in some countries.

J. F. VRANEK.

43*. IF I WERE DICTATOR. By Vernon Bartlett. 1935. (London: Methuen. Cr. 8vo. ix + 94 pp. 2s. 6d.)

MR. VERNON BARTLETT has known so many dictators in the flesh that he has no difficulty in becoming one for the nonce. Needless to say, he would be a benevolent dictator. He would tackle our cities first, reducing them to one-third of their area by moving the people into great apartment blocks with large balconies, private bathrooms and allotments in the public gardens attached to them. Ribbon development, of course, would go; lakes and moors would surround the towns and provide playgrounds and health. He would establish a minimum wage, make divorce more sensible, wipe out superfluous middlemen, abolish military aviation and institute a test of intelligence for voters. He would have a League of Nations militia posted at all international danger-points, and he would allow defective frontiers to be rectified by a Court of Equity sitting at Vienna and manned by winners of the Nobel Peace Prize to be chosen by the Council of the League. Mr. Bartlett sometimes writes as if he were dictator not of one country, but of Europe: yet there is much that is interesting and suggestive in his little *jeu d'esprit*.

MESTON.

44*. WHAT IS PATRIOTISM? Edited by N. P. Macdonald. 1935. (London: Thornton Butterworth. La.cr.8vo. 312 pp. 7s. 6d.)

MR. MACDONALD is a pessimist about this generation and its materialisms; and he has called in a score of eminent men and women, from "the Army, the Navy, the Church and the Stage" and elsewhere, to solace his fears. On the whole they have responded satisfactorily. There are signs, say most of them, that a new idealism is emerging, a patriotism which is neither a narrow nationalism nor a bastard cosmopolitanism, but which answers to Bishop Welldon's definition as being "good citizenship" not only of one's own country but of the world. The theory of concentric loyalities is developed in much detail; and although one or two of the writers urge us to put our own house in order before we attempt to be internationally-minded, the general view is that we are well on the way to a new stage in man's slow evolution. As is inevitable in such a collection of essays, there is a good deal of repetition; and Rupert Brooke, Sir Walter Scott, Dr. Johnson and Nurse Cavell are a little overworked in quotation: but the book is welcome as evidence of a sound and generous public opinion. MESTON.

45*. FASCISM: MAKE OR BREAK. By R. Braun. Translated by Michael Davidson. 1935. (London: Martin Lawrence. Cr. 8vo. 133 pp. 2s. 6d.)

Disguised in a black dust-cover this little book is a proletarian protest against the Nazi régime in Germany. Hitler's policy, according to the author, is purely an adventure of Big Business or, as he calls it, "finance-capital," working in subordination to British "finance-capital" in a joint anti-Soviet campaign. The detailed arguments are a strange welter of industry and nonsense. M.

46*. A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION TO NATIONALISM. By Koppel S. Pinson. 1935. (New York: Columbia University Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. 71 pp. 3s. 6d.)

A very usefully annotated bibliography of the more modern works, in the English, French and German languages, touching on the theme of Nationalism. Although 431 books and pamphlets are enumerated, there are obvious omissions: but Dr. Pinson promises to revise and republish in five years M.

47. AN ATLAS OF EUROPEAN HISTORY. By J. F. Horrabin. 1935. (London: Gollancz. Cr. 8vo. 159 pp. 3s. 6d.)

Here we have the teaching of history without tears, by 70 thumb-nail maps, each with a short paragraph of letterpress, and an excellent index to complete the whole. Without being a text-book, it aims at fixing in the mind the movement and tendencies underlying the facts which the ordinary text-books teach. The ingenuity of the maps suggest the efforts of a cine-photographer to deal with a kaleidoscope; and the little book is well worth its price. M.

48*. EAST AND WEST. By Gilbert Murray and Rabindranath Tagore. [*An International Series of Open Letters, No. 4.*] 1935. (Paris: International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation; London: Allen and Unwin. Foolscap-quarto. 67 pp. 2s. 6d.)

Professor Murray and the poet Tagore have been in correspondence on the possibilities of closer co-operation in human brotherhood between the East and the West. Here are their letters, beautifully printed at a Dijon press, fragrant of the fine flower of the cultures which the writers represent. Professor Murray's is an appeal not to Indians only but to his own countrymen as well, an appeal for "a recognition that our own national habits are not the unfailing canon by which those of other peoples must be judged." Tagore's response is generous and characteristic. MESTON.

49*. WORLD WIDE WITNESS, 1935-36. By various Bishops and others. 1935. (London: Church Assembly Press. Demy 8vo. ix + 127 pp. 1s.)

This is the third unified statement of the missionary work, needs and finance of the Church of England and its sister churches in the British Isles. A stirring foreword by the Bishop of Guildford introduces reports from every quarter of the globe. There are interesting passages on the attacks upon Christianity in the totalitarian States. M.

50*. CHRIST AND THE WAY TO PEACE. By the Most Rev. William Temple. 1935. (London: Student Christian Movement Press. 8vo. 31 pp. 6*d.*)

The fruit of some meditations by the Archbishop of York on the Christian's duty in face of the calamity which threatens the world. Every nation, he concludes, must abandon its claim to be judge in its own cause. Arbitration must be accepted in international disputes, and competition in armaments must cease. The League of Nations must be strengthened, and the Treaties of Versailles and Trianon revised. M.

51. THE END OF OUR TIME. By Nicholas Berdyaev. 1935. (London: Sheed and Ward. 8vo. 258 pp. 3*s.* 6*d.*)

The original work of which this is a cheaper reprint was favourably reviewed in the issue of *International Affairs* for Jan.-Feb. 1934. J. H.

ECONOMICS AND FINANCE

52*. LABOR IN THE LEAGUE SYSTEM. A Study of the International Labor Organisation in Relation to International Administration. By Francis Graham Wilson. 1935. (California: Stanford University Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. xii + 384 pp. 18*s.*)

THIS is not a beginner's book. It is a book for those who already know a great deal about the League of Nations and wish to know more. Its appearance is opportune in view of the entry of the United States into the International Labour Organisation, and it will constitute an authoritative guide for American readers on the history and work of the Organisation. As such it should also be useful outside the United States, the great care with which it has been compiled giving it a claim to serious consideration.

The author has not been content to study only the published documents of the Organisation, voluminous as these are and minute as has been his reading of them all, even the more obscure; he spent many months at Geneva delving into the history of the Organisation and acknowledges many informative talks with officials and members of the staff of the International Labour Office. He has had access to the Minutes of the Governing Body, and part of the value of his book consists in his references to this all-important source, not, as a rule, accessible to the public.

The book is pre-eminently a survey of machinery and administration, but this subject is taken in a large sense and an historical review leading back to the opening of the Peace Conference at Paris as well as an account of the actual work accomplished or in hand is included. The number of facts and details which the author mentions in less than 400 pages is astounding. This detailed completeness tends to be demanded nowadays of any author catering for United States university circles, and in the present instance it has been generously, indeed lavishly, supplied. In spite of this, or perhaps because of it,

the book is lacking in certain directions. There is a tendency to dullness, which is inevitable, but above all the author has left himself no room and no leisure to comment fundamentally on the facts which he has collected. There are a certain number of running observations, usually thoughtful and interesting, and these make one all the more regret that Mr. Wilson has not more fully used powers of critical penetration which he evidently possesses. The book is most successful where he has allowed himself a wider scope and has entered on a critical exposition, *e.g.* in the chapter on "The Theory of Part XIII."

In spite of this general defect the book must be welcomed. It is a very serious study, it is up to date, and takes the reader over the whole ground; the Labour movement leading up to the foundations and influencing the present working of the Organisation, the constitution of the Organisation, its internal administration, the work so far effected, the difficulties encountered, the opening up of research, are all very competently handled. A good index, a well-selected bibliography, and a chart of ratifications add to its value; the text of Part XIII of the Treaty is included.

L. E. HOWARD.

53. AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATION IN FASCIST ITALY. By Freppel Cotta, with a preface by C. R. Fay. 1935. (London: P. S. King. 8vo. 148 pp. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

54. CO-OPERATION IN THE U.S.S.R. By Leslie A. Paul. 1934. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 160 pp. 3*s.* 6*d.*)

THE question raised by these two books—whether a co-operative society ceases to be truly co-operative, if membership is compulsory and federation imposed from above—has some international significance. The International Co-operative Alliance brings together many different kinds of co-operative organisation on the common basis of the Rochdale principles, which are regarded by the members as guiding lines for democratic organisations in democratic States. Now that co-operatives in several European States must exist under dictatorships, the common policy may be difficult to maintain: it is inevitable that co-operative societies in the surviving democracies should find themselves out of sympathy with members of their organisation which have been forced to fit into the mechanism of State control, and if this lack of sympathy hardens into opposition, the international character of the movement may be seriously endangered.

Mr. Cotta evades the question. He rightly emphasises the evils of party divisions which weakened the Italian movement, and praises the Fascist régime because it has removed this source of weakness by "purging, reconstructing, and co-ordinating." But his evidence of improved efficiency consists mainly of lists of federations and committees and their duties. It is claimed that Fascism has not affected the co-operative character of the movement, because the Rochdale principles require political neutrality—and under Fascism this exists, because only one party is tolerated. In this, of course, he misses the point: technically the principles may be fulfilled, but their main object is to force members to run their society themselves, not to create an efficient non-political mechanism for buying and selling. How far active association of the members can be maintained under centralised control cannot be determined merely by a study of the official documents, on which Mr. Cotta relies.

In Russia the co-operatives have lost all vestige of independence,

but Mr. Paul thinks that in the future the worker will come to express his needs through his local store more powerfully as time goes on. The great possibilities of socialised distribution—the reduction of costs through drastic standardisation and eliminating unnecessary links—are not yet being fulfilled, because under the pressure of increasing output it has been necessary to improvise new machinery for distributing it, and this has severely strained technical and managerial ability. Far from exaggerating the economic success of the co-operatives, Mr. Paul emphasises the frequency of food delays and spoilages—" except for the fact that the co-operatives have almost entirely eliminated the private trader the movement has no great achievement to its credit." It is clear that the consumers' co-operatives do not and cannot influence the direction of production at all as yet: their relation to planning in general and their social character have so far no permanent basis.

DOREEN WARRINER.

55*. MODERN PRODUCTION AMONG BACKWARD PEOPLES. By I. C. Greaves. 1935. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 229 pp. 10s. 6d.)

MISS GREAVES' book deals with the economic changes which have taken place in the tropics as a result of the extension of imperial rule over communities originally self-supporting. It is a critical survey of modern tropical agricultural production and of the results which have followed the invasion of commerce into those regions since the time of the slave trade.

After dealing with the principal factors which underlie production—the characteristics of primitive peoples, the governance of tropical possessions, methods of cultivation, labour supply, wages and standards of living—the author reaches the heart of the subject, namely, the contrast between the plantation system and peasant production. The efficiency of both these methods has, during the last five years, been subjected to a severe test by the fall in prices. The effect on the plantation system is well known—a substantial fall in the annual dividends, followed by efforts to stabilise prices by the regulation of output. Although information on the effect of the depression on native production is not complete, nevertheless some interesting facts emerge. In such crops as rubber and ground-nuts, the fall in prices was often followed by decreased production of the money crop, accompanied by a corresponding increase in the area under food crops. In cacao and cotton, the two spectacular successes of native production in Africa, the 1929 level of export has been maintained and even increased. These and other facts bring out the conclusion that the elasticity of peasant agriculture, combined with the absence of overhead charges, must, in many of the simpler products at any rate, tend to place the native producer in a much stronger economic position than the European planter, who must always strive after large annual profits to meet heavy capital and overhead charges. Even in crops like sugar-cane, where manufacture intervenes between the crop and the market, the steady growth of co-operation between the native cane-grower and the sugar factory is a significant sign of the times. Which of the three systems of production—(1) complete identification with foreign enterprise as wage-earners; (2) complete separation as independent producers; or (3) free co-operation as producers for foreign-owned factories—will eventually survive in the backward regions is, naturally, a question for the future which the author very wisely does not attempt to answer.

No doubt in the years to come the London School of Economics, at which this admirable book was written, will produce a second volume dealing with the future progress of this question. A. H.

56. UNITY, NATIONAL AND IMPERIAL. By H. Martin Leake. 1935. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 320 pp. 10s. 6d.)

In *Unity, National and Imperial*, Dr. Martin Leake deals with two problems of the day: the financial basis of the British agriculture of the future and the nation's duty towards her African possessions. A somewhat unusual method of approaching these questions has been employed, namely, the publication, in book form, of a number of essays which have appeared during the last five or six years in various journals. The result is that the book suffers from the almost complete absence of any underlying theme and the inevitable introduction of a large amount of matter which has little or no bearing either on national or on imperial questions.

The author considers that, if British agriculture is to make any progress, the question of costs must be tackled, as well as of prices. This can be achieved by the creation of strong corporations in place of the rapidly disappearing landlord. How these corporations are to be created is a matter to which a larger amount of space might usefully have been devoted.

A large portion of the book refers to our trusteeship in Africa, where it is considered that economics underlie the political problem. Dr. Leake contends that native agriculture will not be able to export its produce in competition with the more highly developed organisations in other parts of the world. In view of the immense expansion of native cacao in West Africa and of native rubber in the East, this view would appear to be directly contradicted by the facts. K. M.

57. THE WAY TO WEALTH. By Hartley Withers. 1935. (London: Thornton Butterworth. 8vo. 288 pp. 6s.)

MR. HARTLEY WITHERS' books have always been greeted as fine examples of lucidity and sobriety. His latest publication, *The Way to Wealth*, deserves this praise at least as well as its predecessors. It is somewhat more ambitious than they were. It is, on the one side, a spirited defence of what might be called the capitalist system against attacks holding it responsible for the great depression. It is, on the other hand, a kind of critical economic survey of our times, including a description of the history of the crisis, of the part played by the United States, of monetary problems and of problems of international trade. It is written from the point of view of a moderate liberal who not only has faith but, what is much rarer, a knowledge of facts.

It is rather significant that many of the modern critics of capitalism are "litterateurs," who have no inward understanding of "the dismal science" of economics; but, unlike the author of that famous phrase, who despised economics, they exaggerate their importance enormously. This is no doubt partly due to a misleading simplification of Marxian historical materialism. The present vogue of Marx in Anglo-Saxon countries, where his works were almost completely ignored in the days when the Continent rang with the arguments of the great controversies in the Marxian camp, is rather amusing and at the same time a little depressing. The naïve ignorance of earlier days was, so to speak, a

sign of Anglo-Saxon self-assurance; the present rather emotio capitulation to its supposed charms (which does not complet cover up what might be called a "learned ignorance" in thi Marxian) may be a sign of moral, intellectual and perhaps even politi weakening.

It is rather a pity that Mr. Hartley Withers does not go deeply int discussion of the more theoretical aspects of Marxian philosophy a economy. His mind is clear enough and his style lucid enough to me successfully the Marxian popularisers on their own ground. H exposition of the Douglas system is a proof of this ability, though this the only instance in the book where Mr. Hartley Withers' temper dealing with an opponent is not quite sweet.

Mr. Hartley Withers' central thesis is this: The War smashed t foundations on which the existing world is reared. The War and t silly Peace concluding it are responsible for the great depression. I doubt if business men and statesmen had possessed superhuman i telligence and statesmanship they might have prevented the afterma of the War producing the great depression. But if they had been that level there probably would have been no war. Mr. Hartl Withers strongly denounces the socialist thesis that the War was d to the capitalist system. No doubt economic forces contributed to i outbreak, but the War, as such, was very different from those ma colonial wars, originating from private money-making motives. It w after all the legitimate successor of a series of wars which made mode Europe. Neither the Crimean War nor the Russo-Turkish War, whi prepared the ground in the Balkans for the last war, were capitali wars. Nor were the wars of 1864, '66, '70 which forced the Franc German problem to the front, capitalist wars. And the Italian Liber tion wars of '48, '59 and '66 which created the Italo-Austrian situati had nothing to do with the capitalist system as such. Mr. Hartl Withers is quite right in attacking the glib syllogism: depression due war, war due to capitalism, depression due to capitalism. He right points out that capitalists are rather timid people who lose more a fear to lose more by war than the feudal classes who formerly ruled t world. He might have pointed out that these classes do not disappe completely with the advent of capitalism, but sometimes get the bett of it by combining with it and influencing it, in the same way in whi the traditions of Russian absolutism and serfdom colour to-day t economics of Soviet Russia.

Mr. Hartley Withers is perhaps a little hard on the United Stat The monetary policy of President Roosevelt is certainly open to cri cism, but it was the British, according to American opinion, who ga him the opportunity for staging the play. If they had been willing stabilise before America went off gold, in return for a reasonable sett ment of the War debts and greater freedom of commerce, the history the world might have been very different.

Mr. Hartley Withers calls himself old-fashioned; and some his views may appear so to less balanced minds. But he has astounding gift of understanding and dealing fairly with tendencies may neither share nor like. He can state a commonplace when nece sary without boring the reader. He can bring facts to the discussion theories and he can unravel abstruse, twisted, woolly-headed reasoni and make it so clear, that the fathers of some such thoughts might lea for the first time from him what was really at the back of their minc

M. J. BONN.

58. Le Pétrole et son Économie. [*Cahiers Économiques et Sociaux*, 1935. (Paris: Librairie Technique et Économique. 8vo. 224 pp.; maps, plans. 30 *frs.*)

This book consists of a series of articles on various technical and economic aspects of the petroleum industry, viewed both nationally and internationally. The contributors are specialists of experience and authority, whose views command respect.

In a short foreword, the director of the French Petroleum Department, Colonel Pineau, commends this work to French readers for its clear and honest exposition of facts, "*de préférence à l'entrefilet Venimeux, au Reportage Fantaisiste, ou au Roman Alimentaire.*"

The commendation is well merited, for *Le Pétrole et son Économie* sets forth, in a sober and unromantic vein, a great mass of valuable and informative material. It is less, however, for the general reader than for those to whom the subject-matter is one of special concern. For this reason it is hardly likely to prove an effective antidote to the more imaginary literature on the subject to which Colonel Pineau refers. However, it provides a valuable and reliable *point de repère* for those who wish to study the subject in all seriousness, and the publishers are to be congratulated on giving it a place in their series. A. C. H.

59. World Dislocation and World Recovery. By Dr. Jr. W. H. C. Knapp. 1935. (London: P. S. King. 8vo. viii + 203 pp. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

This book has evidently been published in the sincere belief that it will be a lasting contribution towards solving the economic distress which convulses the world to-day. Unfortunately, a much more fundamental treatment of the difficult questions raised in it would be called for before it could be accepted as a useful addition to the literature on world recovery. A rather ambitious historical sketch of physiocratic, liberal, Marxist and other doctrine leads to a long chapter on "Recovery and Agriculture," the main theme being that wages and profits have been, in the course of time, artificially raised in industry at the expense of agriculture and that even in agriculture itself a similar policy, namely, to put consumption at a level not warranted by present productive capacity, is noticeable; the only remedy would be to abandon all attempts at restrictions or interference (but it is not clear how far the author goes in this direction) and to allow wages and profits to drop to a natural level.

This difficult thesis is not supported by solid arguments, nor is the reader's comfort enhanced by a translation into English which, while not unskilful, can sometimes be curiously faulty and which, in any case, imitates far too closely what must have been an elaborate original in a language not stated, but which we assume from the author's nationality to have been Dutch. L. E. Howard.

60*. The Theory of Money and Credit. By Ludwig von Mises. Translated from the German by H. E. Batson. 1934. (London: Cape. 8vo. 445 pp. 18*s.*)

61. The Problem of Credit Policy. By E. F. M. Durbin. 1935. (London: Chapman and Hall. 8vo. 262 pp. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

Both these volumes must inevitably find a place on the shelves of the serious student of monetary questions, but they rightly demand hard work and hard thinking and are unlikely to be of service to the general reader unless he be equipped with considerable leisure and

unlimited powers of concentration. The subject is difficult, the problems intricate, and the reasoning close and exact, so that although the writers are both at considerable pains to write clearly and to avoid jargon, the paths they have chosen are not always easy to follow.

The Theory of Money and Credit is a translation of the 1924 edition of Professor Mises' comprehensive treatise, the *Theorie des Geldes und der Umlaufsmittel.* It should certainly serve to consolidate Professor Mises' reputation among English-speaking economists; ten or twenty years ago (for the first edition of the book was published in 1912) he was saying many of those things which we have been discovering in the last few years. Anyone who doubts this might turn to pages 357-364, and read the section headed "The Influence of the Interest Policy of the Credit-issuing Banks on Production," and he will find as clear an exposition of the relationship of interest theory to the theory of capital as he could wish for. It is to be regretted, however, that Professor Mises has not taken the opportunity to bring the book up to date, and has thus ignored the more recent work of Keynes and others. There is, it is true, a recently-written eight-page "preface to the English edition," but neither in matter nor manner does this in any way fill the gap.

The result is that Mr. Durbin's less monumental work is much the more interesting of the two. Mr. Durbin has set himself a hard task, that of arriving at conclusions on monetary policy by following a road through the more inhospitable regions of monetary theory. He would seem to favour the stabilisation of final expenditure per head of the population (measured through carefully classified indices of bank-clearings), using, if necessary, budget deficits or added taxation to secure this stability, and envisages fluctuating exchanges, though he gives reasons for believing that fluctuations need not be large. Finally, he makes a plea for a unified financial authority. All who believe that business fluctuations are aggravated and not corrected when several vital parts of the financial machine are run by people whose primary considerations must be year-to-year profits and losses, will endorse this last suggestion.

But the real significance of Mr. Durbin's work lies not in the conclusions at which he arrives as in the process by which he arrives at them. His approach is that of the theorist starting with certain hypotheses and bringing out the implications of various assumed changes. He builds up his case step by step, with exactness and careful qualifications. How strong the case is, is another matter, and can only be answered after prolonged and realistic study of circumstances and institutions. But even those who would question the practical value of Mr. Durbin's suggestions could hardly fail to be impressed by the scholarly way in which he has carried through the difficult task he has set himself, and has thrown new light on a particularly intricate set of problems.

A. T. K. GRANT.

62. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PRICES. By Sir W. T. Layton and Geoffrey Crowther. 1935. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. xiv + 280 pp. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

THIS is said to be a new edition of Sir Walter Layton's book of 1912; but is, in fact, almost a new book, planned by Mr. Crowther on the pattern of the earlier work. In the concluding and summarising chapter Mr. Crowther inquires whether price stability through monetary management is (i) desirable or (ii) possible. That it is desirable he

thinks doubtful (the pre-War book definitely summed up for falling prices): that it is possible Mr. Crowther evidently thinks unproved, despite the 1930–1935 experience in Great Britain. C. J. S. S.

PRE-WAR HISTORY

63*. Britain and the Balkan Crisis, 1875–1878. By Walter G. Wirthwein. 1935. (London: P. S. King. 8vo. 433 pp. 22*s*. 6*d*.)

This is mainly a compilation of newspaper articles on the Eastern Question from its resuscitation at Nevesinje to its temporary settlement at Berlin. The value of such a painstaking work may be doubted, for "leaders" do not always lead and their life is like that of "the flowers of the field." It is, however, curious to note the foresight of some journalists and the ignorance of others. As examples of both may be cited Walter's accurate anticipation of the present situation in the Near East and *The Daily Telegraph's* article about the "ample harbours" of Cyprus.

As has happened in the recent case of the Abyssinian concession, a newspaper often had news before a diplomatist or a Cabinet Minister. Thus Northcote first learnt of the dispatch of Indian troops to Malta from *The Times*. Of the many proposals for the solution of the Eastern Question perhaps the most curious was that of Duff—to make the Duke and Duchess of Edinburgh rulers of European Turkey, with which we may compare the idea of making the Duke of Kent King of the Greeks with Cyprus as a coronation-gift. An amusing and—to the British military *attaché*—embarrassing incident was the reading of the Russophobe articles of the British press to the Tsar before Plevna. The author omits to tell the reader unacquainted with the details of the period who such persons as Miss Irby and Denton were. Despite his long researches in the British Museum and the Public Libraries of New York, he never mentions such a first-hand source as Sir Arthur Evans' *Illyrian Letters*, or Professor Temperley's articles on the Cyprus Convention. The late M. Skouloudes informed the reviewer that no less a statesman than Trikoupes acted as *The Times'* correspondent in Greece after the murder of Ogle on Pelion. But the book shows greater acquaintance with newspaper files than with the psychology and countries of the various nationalities, comparing in this respect unfavourably with the recent work of Professor Seton-Watson on the same crisis. The origins of the Turkish enclaves of Klek and Sutorina are left unexplained: they arose from the requirements of the Ragusan Republic.

William Miller.

64*. Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878. By Dwight E. Lee. 1934. (London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. x + 230 pp. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

The defects of this painstaking compilation from the *Layard* and *Simmons Papers*, the British contemporary press and a number of books and pamphlets tabulated in the bibliography are the complete omission to consider the wishes and welfare of the Cypriote population, silence (save for two slight references) to the question of the tribute, so ridiculously estimated that it hampered the development of the island until it was abolished, and the lack of any account of what was the result of the Convention in Cyprus itself. We are told in detail how the objects of that arrangement in Asia Minor, and especially

in regard to the Euphrates Valley railway, were never realised, owing to the British Government's refusal to guarantee a loan and to the Sultan's distrust and dilatoriness. We have a full account of the origin of the Convention. Colonel Home, whose letters to Simmons, with other valuable documents, are printed in the Appendix, suggested in 1876 that Great Britain should take "Crete, Egypt or Rhodes," for which he subsequently substituted "the Dardanelles and Cyprus"; in 1818 Kinneir had advocated the acquisition of that island, which "would give England a preponderating influence in the Mediterranean." The conclusion is that "the decision to take Cyprus was made some time between April 18 and May 10 (1876), largely upon the responsibility of Colonel Home." The forecast of the latter, that the prosperity of Cyprus would increase British prestige, has not been verified, any more than the newspaper prophecies that it would be "An admirable naval situation." The author admits that it has not become "an emporium of trade," but thinks that "the recent development in airways may yet render it a valuable link both in the commerce and the defence of the Empire." About the Near East it is rash to prophesy; one has only to remember Layard's anticipation of what would be the result of substituting independent Balkan States for Turkey. The discontent in England, on both sides, with the Convention is fairly stated: Granville is quoted as having asserted "that he did not know a single naval officer who had not pronounced against Cyprus as a naval station." Simmons wanted the occupation of Stampalia, but Admiral Hornby thought that a "harbour could be made at Famagousta." France was hostile, Italy dissatisfied that she "had obtained nothing," especially as Salisbury told her "that England would not countenance any attempt to secure the Trentino." Cyprus has not been "'transformed into a Gibraltar,'" as Laveleye proposed, and, on his own evidence, it is difficult to accept the author's judgment that the "choice of Cyprus was the best solution." A map shows the proposed railways in Asiatic Turkey in 1878. It is interesting to note that Bismarck's proposal at Berlin "to give Thessaly, Epirus and Crete to Greece" failed owing to British opposition. The "need of improvement in the diplomatic service" in the Near East, recognised in 1878, is still obvious to residents there; for there are Legations, where one person alone, and he not a professional diplomatist, can speak the language of the country.

WILLIAM MILLER.

65*. STUDIES IN ANGLO-FRENCH HISTORY DURING THE EIGHTEENTH, NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES. Edited by Alfred Coville and Harold Temperley. 1935. (Cambridge University Press. 8vo. xv + 180 pp. 8s. *6d.*)

THIS collection of studies, the product of conferences by historians of both countries held in London and Paris during 1933 and 1934, is a proof that, though historians may have been late in the field in giving concrete meaning to the words "intellectual co-operation," they are well aware of the profit to international relations to be derived from such meetings; and it is a tribute to the common sense of the groups that such delicate subjects as the annexation of Saxony and the Fashoda question should have been discussed with frankness and cordiality. The five English and six French contributors provide a wide range of subjects, covering the fields of institutions, public opinion, diplomacy and finance :—the Anglo-French alliance after the

Treaty of Utrecht; Secretaries of State in two countries during the eighteenth century, in which Professor Basil Williams shows the superiority in methods of foreign policy of the French over the English, who at this early date were already demonstrating the national talent for muddling; Palmerston's administrative reforms at the Foreign Office, a most interesting paper by Professor C. K. Webster which brings out the importance of smoothness in the bureaucratic machine; two years of Eastern Policy under Salisbury; Gambetta's approach to England, in which Professor Bury shows the founder of the Third Republic, in spite of his liberal sympathies, on much better terms with Conservatives than with Liberals; the inter-borrowing of political terms in the eighteenth century: Anglo-French finance in the time of Law; English public opinion and the nineteenth-century revolutions; the annexation of Savoy; M. Cambon's embassy in London; and the influence of the General Staff before the War.

In one of the most interesting essays, M. Elie Halévy traces with admirable clarity the reaction in England to the big political movements in France during the nineteenth century. He describes with some originality the influence of the 1830 outbreak on English politics, and shows the Reform Bill as being the direct outcome of the first of the nineteenth-century revolutions. The sympathy shown in 1830 hardened in 1848 to conscious opposition to French methods of government. Moderate Liberalism gave England a stability which, contrasted with alternate revolution and reaction on the continent, engendered a feeling of proud superiority. A generation later the fall of Napoleon III and the attempt to build a constitution on the English model aroused but little interest, and though there was personal sympathy for the fallen monarch, few persons cared much about the political changes, and nobody seems to have realised that the "Constitution of 1875" was to be the most durable and successful of the French attempts to regulate internal politics.

This increasing insularity did not help Gambetta in his quite difficult enough task of reconciling a policy of expansion with a desire for an entente with the one country inevitably to be alienated by colonial enterprise undertaken by anyone else, and Professor Bury, though refraining from speculation on developments had Gambetta remained in power, clearly emphasises the strength of his belief in the urgency of an understanding with England.

Both countries were fortunate in the successor to Baron de Courcel at the Embassy in London, and M. Mantoux, drawing on unpublished "documents diplomatiques français" in his study of the début of Paul Cambon in England, brings out all the courage, patience and vision of the French Ambassador at a most critical period in Anglo-French relations. Between the settlement of the Fashoda question at the beginning of 1899 and the understanding of 1904 there were several minor affairs as well as the Boer War which renewed mutual irritation, and the highest qualities of diplomacy and statesmanship were needed to bring about the general agreement of the Entente.

The last study, by M. Renouvin, deals with the part played by the General Staffs of the two countries between 1905 and the outbreak of the War. The technical conversations were carried on intermittently until 1913, their frequency depending on the degree of general international tension, and permanent co-operation was not assured until the beginning of 1914. Although he makes the reservation of not having had all the possible material at his disposal, M. Renouvin

does dispel the legend of the sinister influence of Admirals and General in initiating technical negotiations tending to dictate policy; in fact the initiative of the General Staffs was subordinated to and authorise by the respective governments. Moreover, the technical arrangement arrived at by no means implied a promise of intervention, althougl M. Renouvin persuasively argues that the provisions of those agree ments had the value of a moral obligation. The reservation of complet liberty of action, though possibly less real than the British Governmen declared it to be, gave to Anglo-French relations in those years a element of uncertainty which seems to have suited the essentiall pragmatic policy of the Foreign Office.

The continuance of such conferences as these can only hel the development of Anglo-French co-operation, however arduousl achieved or uneasily maintained, and it is to be hoped that this volum is the first of many. The translation into English of the Frencl studies has been admirably handled by M. Renouvin; there is on minor slip on p. 39. E. D. GANNON.

66. DEUTSCHLAND UND DIE VEREINIGTEN STAATEN. By Otto Gra zu Stolberg-Wernigerode. 1935. (Berlin und Leipzig: Walte de Gruyter. 8vo. xix + 368 pp. *Rm.* 9.)

IN spite of isolationist policy, the United States has had importan relations, practically always peaceful, with the European States Relations have, naturally, been most continuous and most important politically and socially, with Great Britain, but have existed also witl France, Russia, Germany, Spain, and, indeed, practically every State.

The survey begins in the late eighteenth century with Frederick th Great. One of Frederick's officers, Steuben, went out to the War o American Independence, and did very notable service in introducin regular discipline and battle practice into Washington's militiamen Steuben, however, was, as the author generously points out, not s much a gift to the United States from Germany as from France. H was selected and sent over by a French ambassador. It is a curiou fact that down to the early nineteenth century, the German tongue except in certain parts of Pennsylvania, seems to have been practicall unknown in the United States. George Ticknor, later a famou Harvard professor, was inspired to learn German after he had rea Madame de Staël's *De l'Allemagne* in English. This work appeared i translation in New York in 1814. Ticknor was unable to procure teacher of German. There was some trade between the Hanse citie and the United States; and the American constitution had some in fluence on the constitutional policies of the Frankfort National Assembl in 1848. But all this does not amount to much.

It was after 1848 that Germany and the United States became fairl closely connected. There was a remarkable emigration of Germa Liberals who had participated in the early successes and the ultimat failures of the revolutions of that year. Many of these emigrant found their way to the Middle West, and had in time a great share i making the prosperity of, for instance, Wisconsin, one of the mos advanced states, socially, of the Union. Among these Germa incomers was Carl Schurz, whose published memoirs and letters ar valuable sources for the history of the United States in the twenty year after 1850. Count Stolberg-Wernigerode freely uses this source fo his book.

Valuable information is given in the book about German immigra

tion into the United States after the founding of the German Empire in 1871. The German Government seems to have disliked this exodus of the surplus population, though there seems no room for reasonable doubt that it benefited Germany, just as it also benefited the United States.

There is also much information about the German colonial question so far as it affected America: about Samoa, the Caroline Islands, even West Africa.

The survey of the author stops at the year 1898, when Bismarck died and the United States became a World Power. Down to that year the relations of the two peoples had been almost uniformly good, except in 1889, when there was trouble about Samoa. In 1898, however, during the Spanish-American War there occurred an incident at Manilla when the conduct of the Commander of a German squadron convinced Admiral Dewey and the American Navy Department that Germany was a dangerous and unfriendly neutral. Count Stolberg-Wernigerode takes the view, which seems to be justified, that the incident was due to sheer misunderstanding and mismanagement on the part of the Germans, and was not due to hostile intentions. Nevertheless, the year 1898 seems to close a period of fairly happy German–American, and fairly smooth Anglo-German, relations. And so the author ends his interesting and informing book there.

R. B. MOWAT.

EUROPE

67*. THE DEATH OF DOLLFUSS: an official History of the Nazi Revolt of July 1934 in Austria. 1935. (London: Denis Archer. 8vo. 250 pp. 10s. 6d.)

THIS is the official Austrian account of the German campaign against Austria which began in the summer of 1933 and ended a year later with the murder of the Chancellor. It was a thoroughly discreditable episode, which did more than anything else (except perhaps the Jewish persecution) to bring the German Nazi régime into disrepute abroad. The degree of official German complicity cannot be established with any certainty, but the following appears to be a fair summary of the evidence:—(1) the campaign of intimidation by sabotage, by bomb-throwing and by wireless propaganda cannot have been carried on without the active assistance of the German Government and the approval of Herr Hitler; (2) the specific *putsch* of July 25th, 1934, shows signs of preparation across the frontier but, though German Nazi complicity is certain, the case against Herr Hitler and the German Government must be treated as not proven; (3) the murder of Dollfuss was not part of the original plan, the fatal shots having been fired by Planetta under the impression that the Chancellor was attempting to escape from the building.

The present account is too slipshod and too obviously partial to add much to the already known indictment of German methods. It produces a number of documents, the authenticity of some of which is not beyond doubt, and statements of which the sources are not always quoted. It gives the Austrian official view, even where that view is contradicted by the evidence. This is particularly noticeable in the matter of the safe-conduct which was promised to the insurgents on July 25th, and subsequently broken. The new Chancellor stated late the same evening, over the radio, that the

safe-conduct had been conditional on none of the imprisoned ministers or officials being killed, and that it had therefore lapsed owing to the death of Dollfuss. At the trial the insurgents vigorously denied that any such condition had been attached; and since Dollfuss had already been dead for an hour when the negotiation for the safe-conduct began, it is hardly likely that they would have been so transparently foolish as to accept such a condition. Major Fey, who took part in the negotiation and gave his "word of honour" that the safe-conduct would be observed, admitted in cross-examination that he had not then known of the condition. Moreover, the Cabinet were aware when they promised the safe-conduct, if not that Dollfuss was dead, at any rate that he was gravely wounded; and if they gave the promise deliberately intending to revoke it in the event of Dollfuss's death, they were guilty of a somewhat disagreeable piece of casuistry.

These points are necessarily slurred over in the present volume. On the other hand, the German Minister, who was disowned by the German Government and recalled, seems to be in large measure exonerated by the new evidence. Everything that he did appears to have been done on the request of members of the Austrian Government, which may have been rash, but was not incorrect.

The translator has added in an appendix some selections from the comments of the press of various countries on the Dollfuss murder.

JOHN HEATH.

68. GOD AMONG THE GERMANS. By Paul F. Douglass. 1935. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. xiii + 325 pp. 13*s*. 6*d*.)

THIS book needed a sub-title to explain its character. The gap, however, is filled by a lucid table of contents. The first four chapters deal with the predisposing influences, namely, the functions of the Falkic State, the Theological Currents and Political Revolution, the Racial Mysticism of Alfred Rosenberg, and Folkic Religions. The next three chapters discuss the application of these influences to the thought, political and religious, of the post-War German peoples, namely, the German Christians, the Christian Jews in the Third Reich, and Youth in the Third Reich. In the last chapters the writer fully sets forth the struggle between Church and State under headings such as Struggle for the Organisation of a National Church, the German Evangelical Church, and the Significance of the Religious Struggle in the Third Reich. So much for the contents of the book. Mr. Douglass in the Preface reveals its authoritative character.

"Professor Hans Michael Müller, of the University of Jena, placed at my disposal his manuscript notes which have been drawn upon in Chapter II (Theological Currents and Political Revolution). Alfred Rosenberg read Chapter III in translation and gave it his approval as an adequate summary of his philosophy and cultural outlook (The Racial Mysticism of Alfred Rosenberg). Count Ernst Reventlow contributed generously to Chapter IV on Folkic Religions. For many suggestions and a great deal of factual material I am indebted to my friends in Berlin, Dr. Heinrich Stuebel, Herr Gerhard Deissmann, Dr. Karl Borner, Dr Walter Kunneth, Dr. Friedrich Wieneke, Oberst H. W. von Herwarth, the late Dr. Bernard Liebisch, and last but not least to Fräulein Ilse Monninghoff, who has worked with me during the preparation of the study."

Those who were familiar with the world-wide influence of the theological works of the German Protestant Church in pre-War days will probably think that Professor Müller of Jena under-estimates that Church's influence, and will attribute its weakness in the recent crisis

to the fact that in Germany almost every baptised Protestant citizen possesses the legal right to exercise the franchise in the Protestant Church. Thus the world again and again outnumbered the recognised members and defeated them in Church decisions. It was in this way that Bishop Muller and Dr. Goebbels were able to coerce the religious churchmen and construct, for the moment, a Church subservient to the State and divorced from the "sole headship" of Christ.

The Folkic State based on Nordic blood cannot but accept Dr. Goebbels' law, namely, that "there can be only one party, one conviction, one folk. All other strengths must be subordinated to this State or recklessly be cleared aside." Against such international bodies as the Jews and Freemasons it must wage war. Hebrew Scriptures and the life and teaching of Christ must be given new orientations consonant with the Folkic State. In the Development of Thought and Government in Greece, Sophocles thought it necessary to remind his day that there were eternal laws higher and more imperative than the transitory statutes then being decreed by man. The reader of this authoritative and detailed account of Hitler's attempt to establish a National Church, to discredit the Jewish sources of Christianity, to bring spiritual matters under the rulings of National Socialism, will often wonder what must be the end of this stupendous effort to make man's transitory statutes superior to all eternal laws. Already only physical force prevents its defeat by the Protestant Church, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Supreme Court of its own country. On June 14th, 1935, the Supreme Court in Berlin decided in Karl Barth's favour that he should not have been deposed from the chair in Bonn. On June 22nd, Dr. Rust, exercising his veto and finally dismissing him from the chair despite the Supreme Court judgment, said,

"The National Socialist Government cannot use further any official who is not prepared to tender the oath without reserve. No considerations of a religious, philosophical, or any other character can be allowed to modify the absolute requirement this oath demands."

How will the Law Courts take this rebuff, how will Christian pastors act, now that Hitler demands an oath that may require disobedience to God? Such are the questions raised in the Swiss press.

God among the Germans is a valuable book, "the first serious attempt," claims the publisher, "to describe this cultural impasse in the Third Reich." JOHN LOVE MORROW.

69. THE CASSUBIAN CIVILISATION. By Fr. Lorenz, Adam Fischer and Tadeusz Lehr-Splawinski. 1935. (London: Faber. 8vo. xxvi + 400 pp.; maps, illus. 21s.)

THE Cassubs are a people of Slavonic race and speech, more or less akin to the Poles, about 150,000 in number, inhabiting the northern part of what is commonly known as the "Polish Corridor." At the Peace Conference it was claimed by the Polish Delegation that the Cassubs were, for all practical purposes, Poles; by the German Delegation that they were an independent Slav stock loyal to Germany and having no ties with Poland. This controversy is the background of the present volume. It is a sign of the times that the names of a German and two Polish professors can appear on the same title-page. But it is not strictly accurate to speak, as the publishers do, of "collaboration." The three monographs of which the book is made up are independent. The two Polish authors make use of Dr. Lorentz's

study; but there is no indication that Dr. Lorentz has seen, or agrees with, their contributions.

Dr. Lorentz is a German professor who has made a study of the Cassubs for the past forty years, and is undoubtedly the greatest living authority on the subject. In an essay which is both learned, objective and readable, he examines their language, their folk-lore, their customs and their buildings, discussing the similarities and dissimilarities between Cassub and Polish culture, the extent of borrowings from Germany, etc. At the end he records the cautious verdict that

"the Cassubians, though externally appropriating the results of German progress, have inwardly remained what they had been from the outset: a true Slavonic race."

It is perhaps natural that the two Polish authors, who cover between them much the same ground as Dr. Lorentz but obviously without his peculiar qualifications, should be more dogmatic in their conclusions. Every chapter and almost every paragraph is made to point the moral of the substantial identity of Cassub with Pole. The result unfortunately is that, while Dr. Lorentz's contribution is a work of real scholarship (Dr. Malinowski, in the preface, pays a tribute to "the absolute disinterestedness and objective spirit of German science as we knew it of old"), the other sections of the book are a little reminiscent of those works of pseudo-scientific propaganda with which we have been familiar in so many countries during the past twenty years. Anyone who reads this book will, however, acquire a pretty comprehensive view of the Cassubs; and for any serious student Dr. Lorentz's monograph is indispensable.

The whole volume rightly confines itself to ethnography and philology. No attempt is made to estimate what would have been the political wishes of the Cassubs if it had been decided in 1919 to consult them by plebiscite. JOHN HEATH.

70. PILSUDSKI: MARSHAL OF POLAND. By E. J. Patterson. 1935. (London: Arrowsmith. 8vo. 144 pp. 5s.)

This biography seems to have been written in a hurry to take advantage of the interest created by Pilsudski's death last May. It is superficial and uncritical, and adds nothing of value to the Marshal's own account of his life translated into English by Mr. Gillie in 1931. J. H.

71. WHAT I SAW IN SPAIN. By Leah Manning, J.P. 1935. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 221 pp. 5s.)

MRS. MANNING went to Spain at Christmas 1934 at the invitation of "an international Committee anxious to receive, through trusted representatives, proofs of the atrocities which it was alleged had been committed against the working people of Spain by the armed forces of the republic." In her book *What I saw in Spain* she brings together material collected largely from conversations with various members of Left Wing parties. The most convincing evidence of the atrocities committed in the suppression of the revolt in Asturias in October 1934 is to be found in the three appendices—reprints of documents prepared by the socialist leader, Don Fernando de los Rios, by Sr. Gordón Ordás, and Sr. del Vayo. There is plenty of matter in this book to arouse one's indignation against the forces of reaction and to make one weep at the waste caused by the incompetence of the well-meaning. Apart from this the book has little positive value. Mrs. Manning

would be more convincing if she showed a deeper knowledge and understanding of politics and conditions in Spain, and did not weaken her case by over-statement. She has, for example, a misleading habit of using the word "Fascist" as a term of abuse to describe all shades of opinions except those of the Left. HELEN F. GRANT.

72*. DEUTSCHE FLÜSTERWITZE: DAS DRITTE REICH UNTERM BRENNGLASS. Gesammelt und eingeleitet von Jörg Willenbacher. 1935. (Karlsbad: Verlagsanstalt "Graphia." 8vo. 82 pp. 2s. 10d.)

This collection of jokes, most of which have understandably not appeared in print before, affords an interesting illustration of what happens under any dictatorship when open comment on public men and affairs is forbidden. Many of these jokes are chestnuts by now, which are known and repeated by nine out of every ten Germans. Some are really caustic and witty, while others are barely funny, but the collection as a whole gives expression not only to anger and bitterness which have no other outlet, but also to a sense of the ridiculous which is conspicuously lacking in official utterances. E. S.

73. DIE DEUTSCHEN IN SÜDSLAWIEN.
EUPEN, MALMEDY UND DIE VENNBAHN. (Taschenbücher des Grenz- und Auslanddeutschtums.)

These pamphlets contain sketches of the history, institutions and political position of the German minorities in Yugoslavia and Belgium respectively. They have a good deal to say about the grievances of these minorities, but disclaim any irredentist tendency. J. H.

74. YUGOSLAVIA: a new Country and its People. By Grace Ellison. 1935. (London: John Lane. 8vo. xiv + 304 pp. 5s.)

A pleasant and chatty account of a tour by the authoress.

75. LA TCHÉCOSLOVAQUIE: ÉTUDE ÉCONOMIQUE. By André Tibal. 1935. (Paris: Armand Colin. 16mo. 224 pp. 10.50 *frs.*)

MONSIEUR TIBAL is eminently qualified to discuss Czechoslovak economics, as he has the objective view of a Frenchman studying another nation, while possessing the inner knowledge obtained by having spent many years at the Prague University as Professor.

His conclusions show that post-War difficulties have gradually been surmounted by the Czechoslovak nation, and progress in the industrial field has been steady. Statistics are quoted to prove that even when still an Austrian province, Bohemia was the most flourishing manufacturing centre of the Empire, and it is merely a continuation of that evolution which has raised Czechoslovakia to her present position in Central Europe.

A new national spirit arose in the second half of the nineteenth century and the establishment of Czech schools in German districts, educating the youth to be bilingual, and other measures, gave a tremendous impetus to the Slavonic population. The Czech birth-rate increased rapidly, especially in the towns. In 1846 Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia were 64·4 per cent. Czech and 37·3 per cent. German, and in 1910 the figures were respectively 62·5 per cent. and 34·9 per cent.

Dr. Beneš, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, continually stresses how essential it is to establish confidence in a community; that stability is a primary condition for economic success. M. Tibal demonstrates how the Czech Government has struggled to achieve this. A rapid decline took place between 1929 and 1931, and the ever-present

rivalry between industry and agriculture became more than usually acute, vitally affecting party politics. The Government intervened vigorously and conditions gradually improved. M. Tibal considers that the Czechs will retain industrial supremacy, whilst the Slovaks will concentrate on agriculture.

This is a closely reasoned and informative little book.

BLANCHE B. TUFNELL.

76*. BENEŠ. By Pierre Crabitès. 1935. (London: Routledge. 8vo. 293 pp. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

A very readable, popular account of Beneš's work in the creation of Czechoslovakia and the guidance of her foreign relations, based chiefly on Beneš's published memoirs. The author, who does not pretend to contribute any new material, wishes to make Beneš better known to England and America, since he regards the Czech statesman as the possible saviour of Europe from the violence of her dictators. R. G. D. L.

77*. BLACK HAND OVER EUROPE; CONSISTING OF WAR IS COMING AGAIN. By Henri Pozzi. Translated by Francis J. Mott. 1935. (London: Mott. 8vo. xxii + 273 pp. 8*s*. 6*d*.)

THE author would have been more convincing if he had shown any sign of impartiality. He informs us that he "profoundly loves Serbia," but his book is a violent diatribe against Serbs, Czechs and Roumanians, and a panegyric of Bulgarians and Hungarians. He denounces the tortures inflicted by the Serbs on the Bulgarians in Macedonia, but has no word of condemnation for the repeated attempts by Bulgarian *comitadjis* to blow up trains bearing innocent travellers from Western Europe, of which the reviewer has had personal experience. He boasts in his preface that "since 1912" he has "taken part in all the events" of the Balkans, and Central Europe, "known intimately all the statesmen," "received the confidences of Ministers and revolutionaries," and that "all doors have been open to" him. Yet he places Drama "on the Ægean Sea," writes that "for centuries Hungary has been forming a unity which had become the most homogeneous in Europe," says nothing of the Magyar oppression of the Roumanians in Transylvania, whom he considers as "immigrants" there, talks of the British "embassy" and "ambassador" at Belgrade, and asserts that Czechoslovakia "reposes entirely on violence and deceit." The most interesting chapter is that on the barbed wire on the Macedonian frontier. Visitors to modern Belgrade will find that his description does scant justice to its improvement; with his account of Skoplje may be contrasted that recently published by Lord Buxton. But he tells us that "the Supreme Court of Belgrade sentenced" him "by default to twenty years of hard labour and the White Hand sentenced" him "to death" after the publication of the French original. He notices the bad effect of Jingo school-books and the increasing prevalence of German over French at Belgrade—the same phenomenon exists at Athens. A curious Appendix contains the manuscript of Petrovitch, former *attaché* at the Serbian Legation in London, who committed suicide in 1934, containing the story of the alleged responsibility of the Black Hand, whose director was "Apis," for the Great War. Another Appendix reprints the secret protocols of the Balkan Pact of 1934. The translation omits the article before "Banat" and "Zappeion"; several names are misspelt; "Western" should be "Eastern" Roumelia (p. 107).

WILLIAM MILLER.

78*. TERROR IN THE BALKANS. By Albert Londres. Translated by L. Zarine. 1935. (London: Constable. 8vo. vi + 244 pp. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

A SLIGHT and journalistic account of the struggles between the two factions of the IMRO, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation. Not only have the lives of all Mihailovists and Protogerovists been constantly precarious; but all public men in Sofia have been accustomed to walk the streets only if accompanied by armed gunmen. One of the author's many anecdotes is of a child pointing to a statue of Prince Alexander and asking, '"Who is he, mama?" "A great prince, my dear, but he is dead now." "Who killed him, mother?" It never occurred to the angelic child that there was any other form of death.'

IMRO began in the Turkish days, but what caused it to develop a ruthless policy of assassination against Serbian enemies and Bulgarian "false friends" was the savage denationalisation practised by the Serbs in Macedonia. M. Londres, who stopped short in 1931, could see no hope of peace in Macedonia except a federation of all the Southern Slavs, an event which he considered most improbable. His translator, however, adds an appendix describing the suppression of IMRO by the Georghieff Government in 1934, the final flight of Mihailoff to Turkey, and the entente between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The Macedonian cause appears to be dead, and the murder of King Alexander to have been its dying gesture. Nevertheless, Balkan nationalisms have a way of rising from the dead.

I do not know why the translator calls IMRO "an almost mediæval tyranny." Such use of "mediæval" as a term of pure abuse is grossly insulting to the Middle Ages. R. G. D. LAFFAN.

U.S.S.R.

79*. THE SOVIET UNION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. By T. A. Taracouzio. 1935. (New York and London: Macmillan. 8vo. xvi + 530 pp. 31*s.* 6*d.*)

SOVIET RUSSIA has now lived in pretty close contact with a world of non-communist States for nearly eighteen eventful years; and in the course of that period, in treaties, notes, trade agreements, protests, "interventions" (in truth, wars), and other forms of international contact, she has inevitably built up a great volume of diplomatic and juridical relationships, in almost all of which she has had to compromise between pure Communist theory and practical problems and advantages.

It was high time that the great volume of interesting legal and political material thus brought into existence should be worked over thoroughly by someone who could bring some measure of detachment to the task; and Mr. Taracouzio has done his work with care and thoroughness, and on the whole with such fairness and balance that neither the friends nor the enemies of the U.S.S.R. could claim him as "on their side." He has, moreover, taken a generous view of his task. Not only has he devoted much labour to giving the reader ignorant of Russia a real and even a vivid picture of the framework of the Soviet State and of the outlook (or ideology) of the Bolshevik; what is at least as important, he has not limited himself to the activities of the U.S.S.R. in public international law in the narrower sense, but has

treated also the municipal law of the Soviets in all those departments in which it comes into contact with foreign countries. (It is hardly an exaggeration to say that, as one result of this treatment, the English lawyer by studying the book can give himself not merely some knowledge of the constitutional law of the U.S.S.R., but also a pretty good conception of the underlying philosophy of the Soviet State.)

In general, in spite of a few errors, it is difficult to do anything but give the book warm praise, although one may well feel that, in the important chapter on "War," where the writer is driven to theorise as to how the U.S.S.R. would behave in still hypothetical circumstances instead of recording what she has already done, the touch is less sure. It is a misfortune, but not a fault, that the book was written before the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the League of Nations, for it would have been interesting to have Mr. Taracouzio's views on this additional and striking instance of compromise between Marxist theory and practical advantage in the transition period.

One of the most interesting points to which the book draws attention is the extent to which, in such fields as those of national minorities or capitulations, the Soviet State has willingly sacrificed what capitalist countries would regard as valuable material advantages to its loyalty to Communist doctrine; as the writer says, "the Soviets apply their abstract theories contrary to their own practical interests."

D. N. PRITT.

80*. SOVIET RUSSIA FIGHTS CRIME. By Lenka von Körber. 1935. (London: Routledge. 8vo. xiv + 240 pp. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

THIS is probably the most thorough study of the Soviet penal system made by a foreign observer. Dr. von Körber claims to have been allowed complete freedom in her investigations, and visited prisons and prison settlements in and near Moscow, in the Ukraine, in the Caucasus and in the Urals. The system of self-discipline and self-administration, in which a few tentative experiments have been made by prison authorities in some parts of Western Europe, has been extensively applied in the Soviet Union, and Dr. von Körber was evidently impressed with the results. Imprisonment in Russia has always been a social affair. Even in Tsarist days, confinement in cells, except for political prisoners or for special reasons, was almost unknown; and this still constitutes the most remarkable difference between Russian and Western conceptions of prison administration. Material conditions are, on the other hand, primitive. Dr. von Körber's favourable impressions would doubtless have been modified if she had been allowed to visit the Labour camps for *Kulaks* and other political offenders in the north. But these were excluded from her programme.

JOHN HEATH.

81*. PRESS AND PUBLISHING IN THE SOVIET UNION. School of Slavonic Studies Monograph, No. 6. May 1935. (London: School of Slavonic Studies. 8vo. 24 pp. 1*s.* 6*d.*)

THIS is a broad sketch of the organisation of the Soviet press and of book publishing at the present day, accurate enough in its main features but wanting in detailed information other than that provided by official statistics. The State monopoly of printed matter follows the general lines of Soviet organisation and is shared between the Party, the Government and the individual Commissariats, the trade unions and the consumers' co-operatives, each of which has its own

central organ and subsidiary press. The Party press and the Government organs are often fused in the lower administrative divisions. Outside the formal sphere of official periodical publications are the wall and factory newspapers, the so-called "lower press," the responsibility for which falls chiefly upon the Party cells, which also provide the most active personnel in the system of worker and peasant correspondents to the central and main regional press. The system has obvious defects, but its psychological and practical advantages are underrated in this brief survey. The general growth in recent years of the press in outlying areas of the constituent Republics of the Union is illustrated by the increase in the number of national languages with periodical publications of their own, from 48 in 1928 to 88 in 1933.

R. D. CHARQUES.

82. RUSSIAN JUSTICE. By Mary Stevenson Callcott. 1935. (New York and London: Macmillan. 8vo. xi + 265 pp. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

Dr. Callcott would probably have little use for a work on American justice by someone who knew no English. The present book brings together a great deal of half-digested information; but the author lacks two of the most essential qualifications for a serious study of so technical a subject as Soviet justice (which would be very welcome), *i.e.* a knowledge of Russian and a critical faculty. JOHN HEATH.

83*. LA FRANCE ET L'UNION SOVIÉTIQUE. By H. Slovès. 1935. (Paris: Éditions Rieder. 8vo. 409 pp. 18 *frs*.)

A FULL account of French policy *vis-à-vis* Soviet Russia from the Bolshevik revolution to M. Laval's visit to Moscow. The narrative is accurate, but rather dull, since the author refrains from criticism and slavishly follows the official attitude. His point of view appears to be that France is well rid of "the spirit of Rapallo and the spirit of Locarno," and has been fortunate to establish her policy on the firm basis of a Franco-Russian alliance. J. H.

FAR EAST AND PACIFIC

84*. TRADE AND TRADE BARRIERS IN THE PACIFIC. By Philip G. Wright. Introduction by W. L. Holland. 1935. (London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. 430 pp. 15*s*.)

85*. COMMODITY CONTROL IN THE PACIFIC AREA: a Symposium on Recent Experience. Edited by W. L. Holland. 1935. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 452 pp. 25*s*.)

IN its investigation of problems of international relations and of causes of international conflict in the Pacific, the Institute of Pacific Relations has recently produced a triad of weighty monographs upon factors connected with trade. The trilogy consists of the *Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area*,[1] *Commodity Control in the Pacific Area* and, the last of the three, *Trade and Trade Barriers in the Pacific*.

The motives of publication are somewhat broader than those which inspire most economic studies of the sort. The I.P.R.'s interests are, if not primarily, at least "fifty per cent." political, and in writing of trade and of commodity production the writers are mainly concerned with the political bearing of their subjects, their effect, that is, on foreign relations and on the prospects of peace or war in and around the Pacific. "In the Pacific region," writes Mr. Holland in his introduction to *Trade and Trade Barriers*, "it is probable that

[1] Reviewed in *International Affairs* for January 1935.

commercial considerations have since quite early times been the determining factor in the formulation of foreign policies . . . and probably more so here than in Western Europe the quest for profit through the exchange of goods and services has come to be, and to be accepted as, the very stuff of which international relations are woven."

This political aspect is given prominence throughout and a great many readers will find in the sections which deal with it the most interesting parts of the book. They fill, however, only a small fraction of it. The bulk of the work is statistical data designed to show in detail the position of the various countries in respect to foreign trade and their individual trade relationships one with another. The countries covered by the book comprise virtually all those bordering on the Pacific, with the Central and South American States excepted. Soviet Russia, however, is dealt with only incidentally, as is also Great Britain, whose inclusion in the study is explained on the grounds of its many connections with the Pacific and its representation in the I.P.R. As a preface to each chapter there is a brief description of the leading economic characteristics of the country concerned and an indication of its degree of dependence upon foreign trade.

Information concerning tariffs is an important feature of the book. Trade barriers, more even than trade, have occupied the attention and the pen of the editor. Of an avowed free-trade tendency, he gives a great deal of space to the evil effects of tariffs on international relations. Tariffs, he remarks, by disturbing foreign trade, throw industrial life out of gear, threaten the standards of living of workers, arouse national animosities and finally lead to the point where "the aggrieved nation may resort to diplomatic protest, to retaliatory tariffs, to an economic boycott, or even to war." His insistence on the detrimental aspects of protectionist policies will probably strike some people as excessive, but in general he will carry his readers with him in his thesis concerning the dangers of restrictive measures in trade. It is more questionable how far he will command assent when he mounts to the realms of pure economic theory and discourses on capitalism and private profit. The harm wrought by private enterprise in business and the contribution which it has made to the present economic confusion is forcibly emphasised. The argument is occasionally supported by statements at which it is possible to demur, as, for instance, when the writer asserts that the British Crown Colonies in imposing quotas on Japanese imports "accepted the suggestion of the interests concerned in Great Britain." Whatever its ultimate origin, the direct suggestion, one is bound to point out, came from the British Government itself.

The mass of tables in the book is at first sight rather appalling. Happily, however, they are largely pre-digested in the accompanying pages of text and are well summed up at the end of the volume. Even with this assistance it is hard for the reader to deduce a clear, comprehensive picture from the voluminous data. This is partly due to the limitations of a study which, treating of movements of an essentially world-wide nature, does so from the restricted angle of the Pacific Area. In the case of Japan, in particular, the absence of figures of trade with countries outside the Pacific results naturally in a very imperfect picture of Japanese trade as a whole. This defect, of course, is inherent in the work of an Institute the scope of whose studies is geographically defined instead of extending, like that of the League of Nations, over all the continents of the world. These are,

however, but points of criticism in a work which, taken as a whole, is much more inviting of eulogy. It is well-constructed, clear and concise, of good literary style and, for a technical book, essentially "readable." If there are some cases like that of Japan, where it is, as suggested, a little inadequate, there are others, of which Manchuria is an outstanding example, where the information gathered together in the book throws a very illuminating light on a situation which is apt to be very obscure.

The book must rank primarily as a text-book, or a "source-book" as the author himself describes it. As such it is part of the solid foundation which the I.P.R. is at present engaged in laying for the scientific study, and balanced interpretation, of the politics of the Pacific. For the world at large to attain to an informed and impartial judgment on the critical problems developing in the Pacific Area we must have research of the sort which has gone to the making of *Trade and Trade Barriers* and its companion volumes. Only the fruits of such work can, like that of the Tree of Knowledge, enable us to discern the good and the evil, the true and the false in the complex of international relations, the intricacy of which is geographically suggested by the dense network of communications illustrated on the fly-page of the book.

It is sad to have to record that the death last year of Mr. Wright, the originator of the study, has robbed this field of research of one of its foremost workers.

Commodity Control in the Pacific Area is a collection of papers by thirteen economists from Great Britain, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Honolulu and Japan. The papers, supplemented and brought more up to date in the present volume, originated in the Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations held in 1933 at Banff, where "Economic Conflict and Control" was the chief subject of study and discussion. Maladjustment between national economic needs and "opportunities" is, as was emphasised in the Conference proceedings, a main source of conflict between nations in the Pacific Area; attempts to cure this maladjustment therefore deserve the careful attention of all who are concerned with the maintenance of peace in that quarter of the globe. Avoiding the debate of Utopian schemes for super-national control, the Conference took the practical view that hope for the future lies in the development of already existing systems along broader and less sectarian lines. Consequently, a selection of these systems of control—most of them national, a few international—were taken for critical analysis, and it is a collection of essays dealing thus with the various systems which forms the major part of the book under review. Editorial comment is slight and the task of drawing deductions from the descriptions of various experiments contained in the book is expressly left to the reader. The line of view taken by the editor can be seen, however, by his comparison of the existing tangle of control schemes to a Mad Hatter's tea-party with "price-profit" as the Mad Hatter himself installed at the head of the table.

The individual essays deal *inter alia* with the American experiments in agricultural control, the Canadian wheat pool, Japanese rice and silk, Australian sugar, New Zealand meat and dairy produce, Malayan tin and rubber, petroleum in the United States, and the Northern Pacific fisheries. The systems of control which are investigated are of various

types and include export restrictions, Government bounties and subsidies, price and output regulation, price stabilisation, selling pools, etc. We see State intervention introducing itself sometimes as a natural outgrowth and extension of co-operative schemes initiated among private interests, sometimes, as in the case of the American " A.A.A.," as an attempt to put into effect the more or less abstract theories of professional economists; more often than not the schemes are found to represent no real policy but a " crude compromise between vested group-interests "; we are shown, at the same time, how " expedients develop into permanent policies," often unsuited to permanent conditions and so destined to ultimate failure, and we are made to realise the difficulties of controlling the production and disposal of certain commodities (petroleum oil in the United States being a special instance), of reconciling the rights and interests of State and Federal authority, or of " home " and colonial governments and the still greater difficulties of crossing the border between national and international control. The possibilities of the latter are, however, foreshadowed in the concluding essay of the book, which deals with the international conservation of fisheries and shows how, in a given limited field—to wit the halibut fisheries—legislative and administrative control can be effectively exercised by an international commission.

In one respect the book is somewhat disappointing. In most of the chapters the author is content to analyse the history, working and results of the particular scheme or schemes with which he is dealing, and only a few of the writers, among whom Professor G. L. Wood, the author of " Control of Primary Commodities in Australia " is the most notable example, set out to correlate the schemes with the general political problems of the individual country concerned, or with its international relationships. Nor is there any very definite attempt to show the connection between the schemes dealt with in the book and the specific problems of the Pacific Area; one feels indeed that the reference to this area in the title of the book is perhaps a trifle misleading. The book must be accepted primarily as a source of detailed information on a sample series of experiments in economic " control." As such it takes an undoubtedly useful place in the growing literature, emanating so largely from Geneva, which by treating economic conditions in the world from an international standpoint, educates public opinion to see the problems involved in clearer and truer perspective.

G. E. HUBBARD.

86. THE GREAT WALL CRUMBLES. By Grover Clark. 1935. (New York: Macmillan. 8vo. xvii + 406 pp. 15s.)

THE title of this book is allegorical; the Great Wall stands for " the barriers which have separated the two great streams of Eastern and Western civilisation," and its crumbling is the historical process which has destroyed China's partly natural and partly artificial seclusion of past times.

Mr. Clark is a keen and thoughtful observer of contemporary Asia who holds that " the West cannot hope to maintain the pre-eminence in the East as well as in the rest of the world which it achieved in the nineteenth century," and is anxious for a good understanding between the Western Powers and China. He pleads for " an adequate perspective " in the historical consciousness of the West, and himself provides a very competent summary of Chinese history by way of introduction to the modern scene. Chapter VI, entitled " Mutual Arrogance,"

shows us the Chinese and Westerners in contact at the beginning of the nineteenth century, each despising the other. Then came the period of conflicts; "China was open, for good or ill, in 1860," but instead of following the example of Japan in turning Western penetration to account, China put up a futile resistance to modernity until 1911. The obstruction of reform by the Manchu dynasty brought about a republican revolution and "the experiment of a government copied from the West, with whose concepts, forms and methods the people of China were utterly unfamiliar." The form of government set up by the Kuomintang in 1928 was, on the other hand, "a blending of standard Western, not Russian, and old Chinese features," and the author thinks it well suited to China. It is to be noted that he does not estimate China's progress simply in terms of conversion to democracy on the American model, as an American observer would probably have done ten years ago; with rugged individualism under a cloud in the United States and more than half Europe under the rule of dictators, Mr. Clark has to admit that "the West seems to be moving more rapidly towards the Chinese conception of how society should be organised than China is moving towards the Western conception."

The author brings out very clearly how Japan has come to supplant the Western Powers as the menace to China's independence. The Western Powers which preyed on China in the recent past now appear as her defenders (albeit, very ineffective ones) instead of her assailants. But Mr. Clark complains that the attempts made so far by the Western Powers to substitute conciliation and equality for privilege in relations with China have been too reluctant and half-hearted to gain Chinese friendship, and under the headings of "Tariff blundering" and "Extraterritorial ineptness" he criticises the policy of postponing concessions until they can no longer be made with even the appearance of generosity. G. F. HUDSON.

87*. JAPAN ALS WELT-INDUSTRIE-MACHT. By Professor Ernst Schultze. 2 volumes. 1935. (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer. 8vo. 553, 530 pp. *Rm.* 16.)

THIS encyclopædic work of over 1000 pages is, its author informs us, the product of thirty years' study. One can well believe it. Its range is prodigious and, although it represents little of the nature of original research, it is a vast repository of information for the most part carefully analysed. It is perhaps not too much to suggest that it may well attain to the rank of a standard book on Japan. Two drawbacks will, however, strike the reader at once—its formidable and rather unnecessary length, which the general "make-up" of the volumes does little to mitigate, and the confused arrangement of sections and chapters which involves the reader in frequent returns to ground already covered. The absence of an index is another, and a very exasperating, defect in so comprehensive a work and the lack of a bibliography and of adequate references to sources will be deplored by all critical readers. It is surprising that these deficiencies should occur in a study involving such careful and long preparation.

The author leads off with the assumption that the all-round "expansionism" of Japan has become a world problem of the first order of importance, and the task which he sets himself is to investigate *à fond* the "why" and the "how" of this expansionism. Politics and economics are, he says, too inextricably interwoven in the modern history of Japan to allow of their separate treatment, and he himself

interweaves them freely, although, broadly speaking, politics find their place in the first volume and economics in the second. Japan's invasion of world markets and her military imperialism Dr. Schultze regards as complementary manifestations of one and the same " urge." From the arrival of the first American warship in Yedo Bay in 1845 till nearly the end of the century Japan was, he maintains, directing her whole energy to averting from herself the fate of falling, like so many other parts of Asia, under the dominating power of the West. This could only be done by equipping the country in the shortest possible space—in Japanese eyes it became a race against time—with the weapons and machinery of the West. This in turn implied the intensive development of modern industries to furnish whatever Japan was capable of making for herself and the building up of a maximum export trade to pay for what she had to import. In accomplishing this task Japan, in Dr. Schultze's estimation, has presented the world with " the perfect picture of a National State "—one in which by common consent everything is subordinated to national *Machtinteressen*. Thus, when analysing the " why " of Japan's *Exportoffensive*, Dr. Schultze puts first the " White Peril," as he calls it, and relegates to a secondary place the more familiar and more obvious motive of pressure of population.

Tempting though it is to enlarge further upon Dr. Schultze's interesting and sometimes challenging theories, space requires that one should pass on to outline the actual scheme of the work. Volume I, " The White and the Yellow Peril," sketches Japan's rise to the status of a Great Power, reviews her natural endowments in the matter of climate, race and geographical situation, traces her economic and trade development—discussing *en route* the vital problem of the peasantry, the peculiar position of the " *Finanzbaronen*," emigration, etc.—and ends with a section on finance and military expansion under the heading of " Gold and War." Volume II, which deals with " Japan as an export-industry State," gives a history of her industrial development, examines the factors of weakness and of strength in the industrial structure (including related sociological problems) and treats of Japan's trade in its international aspects. This volume forms a close parallel to the Chatham House publication *Eastern Industrialisation and its Effects on the West* which has just been published. It may be observed, in passing, that, although on the whole the conclusions reached in the two books are very similar, the German writer is rather the more inclined to foresee an early arrest of Japan's industrial advance. He takes a very serious view of the economic and social difficulties now facing Japan and ventures on the tentative conclusion that her progress in export trade is reaching " a certain standstill." While *Eastern Industrialisation* pays equal attention to the rocks lying ahead, its deductions are a little more favourable to Japan, although the imminent necessity of radical readjustments in her industrial policy and in the nature of her export trade is fully recognised.

Dr. Schultze prognosticates also the political future of Japan. Here he begins by emphasising the strategic strength of the Japanese Empire as it exists to-day. A relatively small Empire when reckoned in square miles, it ranks, with its 125 million inhabitants, second only to the British Empire and to Russia in the matter of population. How does this great entity stand, he asks, towards the other Great Powers in the world? Japan and Great Britain are, he declares, the

two most energetic (*aktivste*) Powers and he argues the possibility, if not the probability, of a combination of the two for the "division of the world." This he qualifies by adding that a reconciliation of their interests in the economic sphere is something which cannot happen. Russia he regards as no longer a serious threat to Japan since she abdicated (*sic*) her position on the Pacific by selling the Chinese Eastern Railway. America's move to grant Philippine independence is given a similar interpretation. China he conceives as offering to Japan an incalculable reserve of potential military man-power. The author's balance and sobriety of judgment appear somewhat in abeyance in this final section of the book—constituting, however, a minor feature of the whole—and, notably when dealing with Great Britain, he is by no means free of errors of statement and of exaggeration. An example of the former is his statement that, out of fear of Japan, Great Britain has foregone the completion of the Singapore naval base, and a sample of the latter is his attribution to the British nation of a spirit of *Schadenfreude* towards Japan, in regard to which he alleges that the English press carefully registers and notes with satisfaction all cases of bandit activity in Manchuria.

The deficiency of documentation already referred to (the comparatively few references too often apply to secondary sources) detracts from the book, and the reliability of the data given is not always above question. In considering, for instance, the competitive value of cheap industrial labour in Japan, it is notoriously difficult, if not impossible, to do more than guess at the proportion which wages bear to the total production costs of the manufacturer, an essential factor in the problem. Yet the author of this book gives an exact figure, without quoting authority, both for individual industries and for Japanese industry as a whole—a fact which creates the suspicion of an uncritical acceptance of figures of doubtful validity. Such cases are, however, exceptional and should not be allowed to weigh too heavily in the scales against the mass of accurate information and perspicacious analysis with which the book is replete.

G. E. HUBBARD.

88. THE PROBLEM OF THE FAR EAST. By Sobei Mogi and H. Vere Redman. 1935. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 352 pp. 5*s*.)

This is a pretentious and unsatisfactory work. It makes a great show of classifying and arranging information, but it contains little of any value. The author knows something about his own country (it is difficult to discover Mr. Redman except on the title-page) and in the section on Japan has occasionally something of interest to say, as, for example, his account of the party system in Japanese politics. The section on China, however, betrays ignorance and is full of blunders. JOHN BRENT.

UNITED STATES

89*. THE STRATEGY OF RAW MATERIALS: a study of America in Peace and War. By Brooks Emeny. 1935. (London and New York: Macmillan. 8vo. xiv + 202 pp. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

IN his address to the Assembly of the League of Nations on the 11th September, 1935, Sir Samuel Hoare drew attention to the unequal availability of raw materials as a present cause of unrest among the industrialised nations. Studies of the kind made by Dr. Brooks Emeny in this book are of inestimable value in formulating any plans

for adjusting these inequalities. To a great extent inquiries of the sort have been anticipated already by the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament, which, among other matters, discussed the extent to which each possible belligerent country is self-supporting as regards fuel, food-stuffs and the raw materials of industries; the extent to which, as a result of its means of transport and the freedom of its communications, especially its communications by sea, it can obtain the commodities of every kind in which it is itself deficient.

Dr. Emeny has made an exhaustive examination of the natural resources of the United States, of the foreign sources from which supplementary commodities might be obtained under various contingencies of war, and of the measures that could be adopted for assuring the self-sufficiency of the States during any war emergency. He has had the benefit of access to the files at Washington of the Commodity Division of the Planning Branch under the Assistant Secretary of War, and has examined a wide range of literature published by the League of Nations as well as by various voluntary institutions and journals.

His results must have given him and his fellow-citizens immense gratification; for a critical examination of the American resources in essential raw materials shows that of the twenty-six commodities which the War Department regard as "strategic" in importance, that is, difficult to supply in sufficient quantities under possible conditions of isolation by war, only five or six are of really vital concern; and measures can be devised to ensure reasonable supplies of these during a war emergency of at least two years. No other Great Power is in the same safe and satisfactory position. The continental size of American territory, with a wide range of climate, makes this geographical unit self-contained for food supplies and for most vegetable products which are required for essential civil activities during isolation; access to the two great oceans facilitates the drawing of supplies from the tropical parts of Latin America; distance from any other great naval Powers makes a sustained blockade of the coasts impossible. And with the British Empire, either neutral or in alliance, relative security would be placed beyond possible question; for, as Dr. Emeny points out, the natural resources of the United States are complementary to those of British territories, especially for minerals and tropical products. Naturally, in a survey of materials essential to support both civil and military operations, minerals occupy a prominent place, as resources in these are fixed, and natural deficiencies are permanent. Of these in America, only antimony, chrome, high-grade manganese-ore, nickel, platinum, tin and tungsten present problems of "strategic" importance. The British Empire can produce abundant supplies of all these except antimony. To meet possible war demands for antimony, it is proposed to curtail civilian consumption by the use of substitutes, to draw some supplementary supplies from Mexico and Bolivia, and to ensure additional security by building up stocks. With the British Empire as an enemy, however, it would be difficult for America to obtain supplies of the others, and the inevitable shortage of manganese especially would be a most serious form of embarrassment because of the difficulty of accumulating sufficiently large stocks.

Dr. Emeny's thesis is illustrated by thirty charts based on tables of statistics, which mainly refer to the most prosperous quinquennium of 1925–1929, and an exhaustive bibliography. It is a most valuable contribution to the questions arising from the unequal distribution of raw materials.

THOMAS H. HOLLAND.

90. **Maritime Trade of Western United States.** By Eliot G. Mears. 1935. (Stanford University Press, California; London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. xvii + 538 pp. 18s.)

"The maritime trade of Western United States is significant and of rapidly growing importance. The merchandise imports increased from \$60,000,000 in 1900 to \$129,000,000 in 1913, to \$523,000,000 in 1929, and then declined to \$121,000,000 in 1933; correspondingly, merchandise exports gained from \$72,000,000 in 1900 to \$147,000,000 in 1913, to \$595,000,000 in 1929, and declined to \$198,000,000 in 1933. The recent abnormal slump in foreign trade, which has affected the whole world as well as the Pacific Coast, is to be viewed as a temporary phenomenon."

In these words is summed up the situation in a part of the world whose destinies are inevitably tied up with the sea, and particularly that vast sheet of water which provides the trade routes for half of the world's population. Changed beyond recognition by the opening of the Panama Canal in August 1914, it now awaits with hope, but without a clear view of how to foster them, further developments in the style and standard of living of those many millions who are expected to enjoy with them what is confidently called "the era of the Pacific."

Dr. Mears' cautious optimism is well founded on facts which speak more eloquently than the over-copious supply of statistics with which he embellishes the book, albeit devoting an entire chapter to a lament over their discrepancies; but there are one or two factors on which he dwells somewhat lightly, though they must be taken into serious consideration in any study of the future. It is true that the population of the region in question, especially California, which was practically uninhabited a century ago, has grown more rapidly than any other part of the United States, and that its attractions are such that it will continue to grow; it is true that it is rich and fortunate in its power resources, its natural advantages, its agricultural products, that its climate is easy for the worker, its harbours few but good; it is true that the purchasing power of its virile and progressive people is well above the average; but it is only by the best use of that purchasing power that the best use of those resources and advantages may be assured. In other words, in spite of a pious resolution unanimously passed by the Pacific Foreign Trade Council in 1928, and the preaching of an enlightened shipowner, Mr. Roger D. Lapham, who unceasingly urges two-way traffic, the Westerner has so far shown himself incapable of putting into practice the maxim that he who sells must buy.

The principal exports of the Western States are petroleum and lumber, both of which are wastefully exploited and exhaustible, wheat and flour, barley, dried fruits, citrus fruits, apples and canned goods, most of which can be, and are being, produced elsewhere, though possibly not yet of so good or so standardised a quality. Why should the United Kingdom, for example, continue to buy 2,249,000 long tons of Pacific Coast products, heavy and light, against a sale of only 84,000 long tons of British goods, or Australasia to buy 1,295,000 long tons against a sale of 64,000 long tons, if and when they come to get most of those goods in some other land where barter is less one-sided?

Thus a future, which can be glorious for those concerned, will depend to a considerable degree on trade reciprocity, to which must be added, as further important factors, a lowering of economic barriers, the removal of regulations handicapping unreasonably or unfairly the importation of foreign goods, and a realisation that shipping is primarily international in character so that excessive legislation, by which means it is commonly sought to bolster up an industry in which

the nation as a whole takes little interest, proves harmful to national shipowners and operators and is provocative of a desire to retaliate on the part of foreign nations.

This book is full of sense and information for all who want to know the present and future of those who have obeyed the call to "Go West." LEGER.

91. THE NEW AMERICA: THE NEW WORLD. By H. G. Wells. 1935. (London: The Cresset Press. 8vo. 96 pp. 2s. 6d.)

92. AMERICA'S DESTINY. By C. Reinold Noyes. 1935. (London: McGraw Hill Co. 8vo. viii + 205 pp. 7s. 6d.)

MR. WELLS' little book, which consists of four short essays, was bound to cause a stir. If it starts a little wildly and Mr. Wells is at times obsessed by the material side of life, he soon escapes from this narrow track. On the whole, the book is well-balanced, well-informed, and both brilliant and fair.

If, as Mr. Wells says, "we Americans and British see the bare shapes of things best each in the country of the other," we should all welcome an American Wells to give us an equally lucid series of essays on the state of Great Britain.

It is, of course, true that in America the struggle to reconstruct goes on in an atmosphere of "brawling public discussion"—some of it very crude—and that there is a "widespread discontent and discomfort" still, and that, to use Mr. Wells' phrase about the Brain Trust, "the crystal had not crystallised." But the improvement all round since March 1933 in the United States is striking and progressive. And we think Mr. Wells under-estimates both this and the magnitude and severity of the crisis in 1933.

In particular the degree to which the mortgagors of farms and homes have been helped back towards solvency and independence is a solid achievement. If Mr. Wells is too pessimistic on this and one or two other minor points, he has a most timely warning for what he calls the "superior voices." As he says,

"the American people is thinking, and in the face of the new needs the inexplicitness of the directors and leaders of American economic life becomes a weakness and a danger. If they will not take their proper share in the reconstruction of American life upon broad and generous lines, then it is from the level of those who think loudly and audibly, even if they think wrong, that the reconstruction of America must proceed."

There are good sections with which everybody will agree on money, private property and the raising of prices, and a good discussion on what he calls "devitalisation" or limitation of production which all will find interesting and with which some will disagree.

Mr. Wells does not touch on the machinery of government, though many, including the President, hold that this is badly in need of reconstruction.

The crisis of 1933 undermined the financial stability and independence of the state governments. They retain their constitutional powers. Possibly some readjustment might release the reserve of common-sense and leadership which now lies stifled and unheard in the political din, but not quite inarticulate, as many interesting recent publications show.

The interest of *America's Destiny* is in the main to enable one to realise a type of opposition which formerly faced Mr. Hoover and which

President Roosevelt now has to overcome. Mr. Noyes considers that to-day America has arrived at the goal of balanced economy and "all we need is to preserve our present degree of self-sufficiency." He considers that "big business—the system of corporations—is tending towards the gradual obliteration of the old lines of division between the capitalist, the entrepreneur and the labourer."

If this is true, it is only beginning to be true since President Roosevelt came into power, as the investigations of the Brookings Institution, given at length in recent publications such as *The Formation of Capital*, clearly show. The "blight of too much government" is the disease which Mr. Noyes diagnoses and which he regards as an infection coming from those unfortunate lands in Europe which have too large a population for their area and natural resources. It is interesting to find that a type of diehard, almost if not quite extinct in Great Britain, still survives in America. The book is not an entirely safe guide for those who seek accurate information either as to America or other parts of the world. C. WALEY COHEN.

93. ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES. By Fred Albert Shannon. 1934. (New York and London: Macmillan. 8vo. xi + 942 pp. 16s.)

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT claims that he has induced his fellow-citizens to think economically, so Professor Shannon comes to the rescue with something upon which to base their economic thinking. Once the New World has been discovered by the old he sticks mainly to his own country, but its economic history with its manifold ramifications is a big subject and, although he is as precise as it is possible to be, he covers nearly nine hundred closely written pages. However that may be, the reader does not get tired, for the style is easy and there is, of course, much to interest him in the text and tables. It is the history of an age of rugged individualism which he considers now to be a closed chapter, "whatever the direction government regulation should take in the future, whether towards the socialised State or a State capitalism dominated by a few great monopolies." The author is probably right, but the reader who has followed him through his story of the past closes the book with a slight feeling of wonder mixed with sadness.

LEGER.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor, "International Affairs."

Review of "Security" by Major-General H. Rowan-Robinson.

SIR,

In dealing with General Rowan-Robinson's book *Security* in the September issue, your reviewer claims to show that a Ministry of Defence is impossible because

"the conditions of the sea, land and air services are in their nature so dissimilar that no single person or body can command them collectively in war, or administer them jointly in peace, save the supreme responsible government. . . ."

His thesis is, however, self-contradictory, for, if any supreme power can direct them, then it means that their dissimilarity can be controlled.

It seems desirable to its advocates, of whom General Rowan-

Robinson is one, that there should be some *professional* co-ordina before the supreme politicians attempt to apply this control, and hisi backs their theory with copious examples of failure due to the lack o

The reviewer also claims that the advocates of a Ministry of Defe were decisively refuted in both Houses of Parliament. A m thorough study of those debates would have shown him that the si ject was very inadequately dealt with, and in one at least the gove ment spokesman gave a rendering of the findings of committees wh. showed a lack of familiarity with them.

Might I point out too that a Ministry of Defence does in real exist in the Committee of Imperial Defence, which claims to fu the necessities of co-ordination. This Committee, however, has oı an advisory function and therefore no direct responsibility, which i: very unsatisfactory state of affairs.

Yours faithfully,

J. R. KENNEDY.

Editor, The Army, Navy and Air Force Gazette.

Cannon House,
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